Opinion
2d Civ. Nos. B298691
04-26-2021
In re Marriage of DENNIS and VICTORIA ANN MACKLIN. VICTORIA MARTIN, Respondent, v. GERALDINE LOPEZ MACKLIN, Appellant.
Barnick | Hodges Law Corporation, Whitney Northington Barnick, John F. Hodges; Conley W. Anderson for Appellant. Hosford & Hosford, Inc., Valerie Ryall Hosford for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. DR24504)
(San Luis Obispo County)
Geraldine Lopez Macklin appeals a post-dissolution domestic relations order concerning payment of a pro-rata share of California Public Employees' Retirement System (CALPERS) preretirement death benefits to Victoria Martin (formerly Victoria Macklin). We affirm.
This appeal concerns the claim of a former spouse to a portion of the CALPERS death benefits received by a surviving spouse. The CALPERS member died prior to retirement and his surviving spouse began receiving a death benefit. Approximately five years following the member's death, his former spouse sought to enforce the terms of a marital settlement agreement incorporated into a judgment of dissolution. The judgment ordered that the former spouse receive a portion of the member's retirement benefits according to the "time-rule" formula. Following lengthy litigation between the former spouse and the surviving spouse, the family law court entered a domestic relations order awarding the former spouse approximately 17 percent of the member's monthly death benefit, consistent with the marital settlement agreement and the dissolution judgment. The surviving spouse appeals and raises procedural issues and issues of statutory interpretation, among others.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Dennis Macklin and Victoria Martin married on June 7, 1985, and separated on July 1, 1994, for a marriage of nine years one month. The parties had two children and owned modest marital property. Dennis was employed by the City of San Luis Obispo and was a member of CALPERS. On October 8, 1996, the family law court dissolved Dennis's and Victoria's marriage. Although the parties were represented by counsel, they did not join CALPERS to the dissolution action.
We will refer to the parties by their first names, not from disrespect but to ease the reader's task.
The judgment of dissolution provided that Victoria receive the entire interest in Dennis's deferred compensation plan maintained by the ICMA Retirement Corporation, and a fractional interest, calculated by the time-rule formula, in Dennis's CALPERS retirement plan. Paragraph 4 (C) provided: "[Dennis's] interest in the retirement plan with [CALPERS] shall be divided pursuant to the Time Rule. [Victoria] is awarded an interest in [Dennis's CALPERS] plan based on [Dennis's] employment for 9.066 years as the numerator and the number of total years of employment will be the denominator. [Victoria] is awarded one-half of that fraction times the monthly benefit. The Court reserves jurisdiction over the division of this Plan." The face page of the judgment also provides that "[j]urisdiction is reserved to make other orders necessary to carry out this judgment." The court did not issue a domestic relations order and CALPERS was not notified of Victoria's interest either by a letter or copy of the dissolution judgment.
The family law court awarded the family residence to Dennis, subject to his $15,000 payment to Victoria.
Dennis married Geraldine on July 7, 2007. He died four years later, on July 27, 2011, while still employed by the City of San Luis Obispo. At the time of his death, he had accumulated 26.363 years of service credit with the City. The parties agree that Dennis did not designate a beneficiary to his retirement benefits. At the time of his death, Dennis was survived by Geraldine but no minor children.
Geraldine timely notified CALPERS of Dennis's death. CALPERS gave her the option of a pre-retirement allowance of $3,796.04 monthly, plus medical and dental benefits, or the "[l]ump [s]um [d]eath [b]enefit" of $214,150.61, in large part a return of Dennis's retirement contributions. CALPERS also notified Geraldine of her entitlement to a 1959 survivor benefit for her lifetime.
The survivor benefit provides a monthly allowance to eligible survivors of members who did not participate in Social Security and who died before retirement. (Gov. Code, § 21583.) Neither the 1959 survivor's benefit nor the deferred compensation plan administered by ICMA is in issue in this appeal.
Geraldine decided to receive the monthly pre-retirement allowance plus medical and dental benefits. On January 2, 2012, she received payment for benefits retroactive to Dennis's death, and thereafter received $3,796.04 monthly (plus any future cost of living increases) as well as a 1959 survivor benefit.
Approximately five years following Dennis's death, Victoria notified CALPERS that she had an interest in his retirement benefits pursuant to the 1996 judgment of dissolution. Victoria included a copy of the judgment in her notice to CALPERS. As a result of that notice, CALPERS began withholding one-half of Geraldine's monthly allowance pending receipt of a court order resolving Victoria's community property claim.
On November 18, 2016, Victoria sought an order to join Geraldine to the dissolution proceeding. Approximately one year later, the family law court ordered Geraldine joined to the proceedings over her objections. Geraldine did not appear at the hearing and later disputed the sufficiency of the pleading and the notice of hearing.
On October 2, 2018, following earlier argument and written briefing, the family law court ruled that Victoria was entitled to a portion of Geraldine's monthly allowance according to the time-rule formula. The court ordered that payment was prospective only, from September 1, 2016, and that laches precluded Victoria from receiving earlier benefits. The court also ordered Victoria to prepare a domestic relations order, which the court signed on July 17, 2020. In addition, the court ordered Geraldine to pay a portion of Victoria's attorney fees.
Geraldine appeals and challenges the order awarding Victoria an interest in Dennis's preretirement death benefits.
DISCUSSION
I.
Geraldine argues that the family law court erred by ruling that Victoria has an interest in the "monthly allowance" set forth in Government Code section 21546 because the obvious intent of the section is to benefit a surviving, not former, spouse. (Id., subd. (h) [defining "surviving spouse"]; In re Marriage of Cramer (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 73, 78-79 [surviving spouse does not include a former spouse].) Thus, Geraldine asserts that section 21546 provides a death benefit, not a retirement benefit. She points out that Dennis did not name Victoria as a beneficiary to his retirement benefits and the 1996 dissolution judgment did not address retirement death benefits. Moreover, Geraldine points out that Victoria failed to request the family law court in 1996 to divide the community interest in Dennis's retirement account into two separate accounts pursuant to section 21290, subdivision (b).
All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise stated. --------
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law to be decided independently unless disputed factual questions exist. (In re Marriage of Lee & Lin (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 698, 702; In re Marriage of Schofield (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 131, 137.) We also independently interpret a marital settlement agreement incorporated into a judgment of dissolution unless there is conflicting parol evidence of the agreement's meaning. (In re Marriage of Dalgleish & Selvaggio (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1178.)
The 1996 judgment, incorporating the marital settlement agreement, specifically awarded Victoria "an interest in [Dennis's] PERS plan" according to the time-rule formula applied against "the monthly benefit." A reasonable interpretation of the judgment is that it contains general language that does not eliminate or preclude Victoria's interest in a monthly death benefit. Here the judgment specifically describes Dennis's retirement plan, the intent of the parties that the retirement asset be divided, and the formula to be used to calculate Victoria's interest in the "monthly benefit." Unlike the circumstances in In re Marriage of Becker (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 65, 68, the judgment of dissolution here disposed of the CALPERS retirement benefits. (Id. at p. 77 [former wife's community share of retirement contributions reimbursed from a resulting trust placed on surviving wife's monthly allowance].)
The family law court also expressly retained jurisdiction concerning division of the retirement plan. (Fam. Code, § 290 ["A judgment or order made or entered pursuant to this code may be enforced by the court . . . by any other order as the court in its discretion determines from time to time to be necessary"]; In re Marriage of Lisi (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1575-1576.) "Following death of a party [in a dissolution action], the court is deprived of jurisdiction to make further orders concerning property rights, spousal support, costs or attorney fees. [Citations.] The court retains jurisdiction, however, to take action to enforce rights adjudicated prior to the death of a party." (Lisi, at pp. 1575-1576.)
Persuasively, in the case of a named beneficiary (Dennis had none), sections 21490, subdivision (b)(1) and 21546, subdivision (b) reflect legislative intent that a nonmember spouse shall nevertheless receive his or her community share of the pension. Geraldine's present monthly allowance rests in part upon Victoria's community property contributions based upon her nine-year marriage to Dennis. The family law court's ruling and the subsequent domestic relations order implements and enforces the existing intent of Dennis and Victoria that Victoria receives her community interest in Dennis's CALPERS pension, whenever and in whatever form it is later paid.
II.
Geraldine contends that the one-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2, subdivision (a) required Victoria to commence her proceeding within one year of Dennis's death. (Embree v. Embree (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 487, 494 [former spouse subject to one-year limitations period to satisfy her claim to decedent's property pursuant to dissolution judgment].) She also argues that laches precludes Victoria's claim to Dennis's death benefits post-2016. (In re Marriage of Powers (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 626, 642-643 [application of laches principles in family law].) As for prejudice, Geraldine asserts that her selection of death benefits in 2011 did not consider that Victoria would make a claim made five years later.
Geraldine also argues that Dennis's death benefits vested in her at the time of his death and that the 1996 judgment could not be modified to include retirement death benefits. (In re Marriage of Padgett (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 830, 847 [ordinarily, surviving spouse's rights vest upon member's retirement].) She asserts that generally a domestic relations order cannot be obtained after a member's death.
The limitations period of Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2 does not preclude Victoria's action because it was an action against Geraldine and CALPERS, and not Dennis. Victoria's rights to her community property share of Dennis's pension were determined in the 1996 judgment; in 2016, she sought entry of an order to enforce her rights. (Fam. Code, § 291, subd. (a) ["A money judgment . . . that is made or entered under this code . . . is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied"].) Moreover, the domestic relations order did not modify the 1996 judgment. The order rendered the existing interest set forth in the marital settlement agreement and incorporated into the subsequent judgment enforceable against CALPERS.
The family law court properly determined that laches barred Victoria's claim to Dennis's pre-2016 death benefits, but not the benefits payable thereafter. Laches involves the failure to assert a right for an appreciable period as to amount to unreasonable delay, resulting in prejudice to the adverse party. (In re Marriage of Powers, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 626, 642.) "Laches is an equitable defense, the existence of which is a matter commended to the discretion of the trial court." (Id. at p. 643.) Although Geraldine had structured her financial affairs based upon 100 percent of Dennis's death benefit, a significant portion of that death benefit rested upon Victoria's community property contribution. We cannot say that the trial court's decision was inequitable.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Parties are to bear their own costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J. We concur:
PERREN, J.
TANGEMAN, J.
Gayle L. Peron, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
Barnick | Hodges Law Corporation, Whitney Northington Barnick, John F. Hodges; Conley W. Anderson for Appellant.
Hosford & Hosford, Inc., Valerie Ryall Hosford for Respondent.