Opinion
Case No. 03-3363-JTM.
July 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 13). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below, the court grants defendant's motion.
I. Statement of facts
Plaintiff is a convicted felon who at all relevant times herein was and is an inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility operated by the State of Kansas. Defendant CSE is a private corporation duly authorized and existing under the laws of the State of Kansas. Defendant entered into a Lease Agreement with the State of Kansas for the purposes of operating a manufacturing-related business from a building at the Lansing Correctional Facility. The State believes that the employment of inmates by entities such as defendant is consistent with the proper training and rehabilitation of inmates and entered into the Agreement for that purpose.
Under the terms of its Agreement with the State, the operations of defendant are not to unreasonably disrupt the normal routine and management of the Lansing Correctional Facility. The State is to determine the number of inmates available to defendant as employees, is responsible for screening applicants and determining which ones are eligible for employment and retains the authority to terminate an inmate's employment at any time. The State provides correction officers to supervise the inmates employed by defendant. Defendant is required to comply with the published and written policies, procedures and laws of the State. Defendant is required to immediately notify the State whenever an inmate employee fails to report to work or leaves the work earlier than scheduled. Defendant is required to assist the State by reporting violations of inmate rules to the State, writing disciplinary reports regarding such violations as appropriate and testifying in any judicial or administrative hearings as requested by the State.
The State of Kansas maintains rules and regulations which apply to all inmates including plaintiff. K.A.R. 44-12 through 44-16. The State of Kansas has the sole discretion and authority to discipline all inmates, including plaintiff, for violations of its rules and regulations.
During his incarceration at the Lansing Correctional Facility, plaintiff was offered and accepted employment with defendant. After accepting such employment, plaintiff requested he be "laid in" or "off-work." On July 18, 2003, one of defendant's shop managers accepted plaintiff's request.
Defendant was required under its contract with the State to report inmates who no longer desired to work ("laid in"). Consistent with this policy and at the request of the State, defendant reported that "On the above date and approx[imate] time report writer was in the office of Central States Emblems in the Industrial Yard at Lansing Correctional Facility when inmate Martin, F#43628, reported to work and came into the office. Martin said `Hey man I am going to have to be laid in. I can't work these hours anymore.' I told Martin that the hours were needed to meet production and if he couldn't work them he would have to be replaced. Martin said he understood. Officer Endriss escorted inmate Martin back inside the walls. End of report." The State concluded that plaintiff's actions violated K.A.R. 44-12-401 and initiated institutional disciplinary proceedings against plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) herein on September 2, 2003. On February 3, 2004, plaintiff signed and filed a charge of discrimination with the E.E.O.C. The Charge was received by the E.E.O.C. on February 9, 2004. Plaintiff states in his charge of discrimination:
I was subjected to disciplinary measures by the above-named employer on or about July 18, 2003 for the same or similar alleged infraction that a similarly situated Caucasian employee also committed, but the Caucasian employee was not similarly disciplined for his infraction. I believe I was subjected to this treatment due to my race, Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Plaintiff's charge of discrimination filed with the E.E.O.C. does not allege that plaintiff was fired or terminated by defendant.
Plaintiff clarifies his allegations in a January 23, 2004, letter to the E.E.O.C. wherein he states "I was given an `institutional disciplinary violation report' for work performance [K.A.R. 44-12-201 Class I], because I objected to working additional forced overtime. I was laid in and wrote up on July 18, 2003." Plaintiff admits that he asked to be "laid in" because he did not want to work the additional overtime. Plaintiff asserts that a Caucasian inmate who was employed by defendant "contacted his unit team manager after [plaintiff] was wrote up and complained about the long hours, health problems and requested a job transfer." Plaintiff is not aware of any other inmates who complained other than himself and the one Caucasian inmate. Plaintiff admits that unlike the Caucasian inmate he "didn't want another job or request one."
The E.E.O.C. sent a letter to plaintiff dated February 11, 2004, wherein it advised plaintiff that it had concluded its investigation of his allegations of discrimination — that he had been disciplined because of his race — and advised that it was unable to corroborate his allegations, in part because the Caucasian employee whom is alleged to have similarly quit his employment without being subject to discipline cited health related reasons and requested a job transfer making the two situations dissimilar. The E.E.O.C. issued a right to sue letter to plaintiff on February 17, 2004, which was received by plaintiff on or before February 24, 2004.
II. Analysis
Plaintiff brings claims for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and/or unlawful employment practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Defendant argues plaintiff's claims should be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1977e, and plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing litigation on his Title VII claims. Defendant also argues it is not a proper party to this litigation; it further contends plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In Schmidt v. Cline, 127 F. Supp.2d 1169, 1175 (D. Kan. 2000), the court sets out the standard for reviewing subject matter jurisdiction:
When reviewing a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations. A court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1). In such instances, a court's references to evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion.
Before turning to defendant's arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the court evaluates plaintiff's standing. The court "has an independent duty to inquire into its jurisdiction over a dispute, and the issue of standing is part of that inquiry." Schmidt, 127 F. Supp.2d at 1172. (citation omitted). Upon review, the court finds plaintiff's Title VII claims must be dismissed because plaintiff lacks standing to sue for unlawful employment practices under Title VII. Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) ("plaintiff is not an `employee' under either Title VII or the ADEA because his relationship with Bureau of Prisons, and therefore, with the defendants, arises out of his status as an inmate, not an employee."). See also Rhodes v. Schaefer, 2002 WL 826471 (D. Kan. 2002) (prisoner lacks standing to proceed on Title VII and KAAD claims against "private employer operating a business on the grounds of the Lansing Correctional Facility"). Defendant is a prison-based private industry production plant; plaintiff's employment with defendant arose out of his status as an inmate. Accordingly, the court dismisses plaintiff's Title VII claims.
Next, the court considers plaintiff's remaining claims under § 1981. Defendant argues plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because it is not a proper party to this litigation. Plaintiff alleges he was discriminated against when disciplined; he complains of "institutional sanctions," a privilege level reduction, confiscation of personal property, the inability to remain gainfully employed, and an increased stress level. These disciplinary actions are within the exclusive discretion of the State of Kansas; they are actions taken against plaintiff as an inmate rather than as an employee. The court has reviewed the record and finds no evidence implicating defendant in plaintiff's loss of privileges and other complaints. Accordingly, the court finds defendant is not a proper party to this litigation; the court dismisses plaintiff's § 1981 claims.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT, ORDERED this 29th day of July, 2004 that defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 13) is granted. Accordingly, all claims are dismissed.