Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-1709.
June 11, 2003.
MEMORANDUM
Rachel Marran, a three-year old child ("Rachel"), and Claudia Librett, her mother and legal guardian ("Librett") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), brought this action against Michael Marran ("Marran") and Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth Services and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania ("Montgomery County Defendants") (collectively, "Defendants") seeking damages and other relief alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as related state law claims. Plaintiff Rachel seeks recovery in Count I against Marran for assault and battery. Both Plaintiffs seek recovery against Marran in Count II for breach of fiduciary duty and Count IV for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff Librett seeks recovery against Marran in Count III for breach of implied contract and Count V for loss of earnings. Finally, Plaintiffs seeks recovery in Count VI against the Montgomery County Defendants for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Presently before the Court are Marran's Motion to Dismiss and the Montgomery County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
I. Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs claim that the Court has jurisdiction over the claims: (1) against Defendant Michael Marran pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and (2) against the Montgomery County Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiffs also claim that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and that venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
The following facts are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
Rachel is the daughter of Librett and Marran, who were never married, but share legal custody of Rachel. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10.) A New York state court granted Librett sole legal custody of Rachel, and Marran was permitted supervised visits. (Custody Order at 13; Compl. ¶ 11.) After Librett was granted permission to move to Pennsylvania, which Marran agreed to, she and Rachel moved to Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. (Custody Order at 13; Compl. ¶ 12.)
Marran sought to modify his visitation with Rachel in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (the "State Trial Court"), and hearings occurred intermittently from October 17, 2000 through May 24, 2002. (Compl. ¶ 13.) The State Trial Court eventually expanded Marran's visitation to include gradually increasing unsupervised visit time and overnight visits, the first of which occurred on December 11-12, 2001. (Custody Order at 24.) After the first overnight visit, Librett reported that Rachel was biting herself, kicking Librett, talking about animals being killed, refusing to allow Librett to touch her, refusing to go to sleep, and generally being uncontrollable.Id. at 25. The State Trial Court found that much of this behavior was brought on by Librett's reaction to the visit as opposed to Rachel's reaction. Id.
After the December 11-12, 2001 overnight visit, Librett stopped providing Rachel for visits with Marran and failed to make Rachel available for phone calls. Id. The visits with Marran were not resumed until after the first day of the Contempt Hearing in the State Trial Court, February 20, 2002.Id.
During the litigation, Librett raised issues regarding her concern that Marran lacked regard for Rachel's safety. (Compl. ¶ 15.) The State Trial Court made preliminary findings of fact on May 8, 2001, which accepted as true many of the incidents upon which Librett's concerns were based. Id. ¶ 16.
Plaintiffs claim that the litigation was abruptly halted at the end of May 2002 and ultimately cancelled sua sponte by the State Trial Court. Id. ¶ 17. After May 2002, but before the State Trial Court stopped the trial, Plaintiffs allege that Librett first learned of the allegation that Marran was sexually abusing Rachel during visits. Id.
On July 24, 2002, Librett filed an Emergency Petition to Suspend/Modify Custody. (Custody Order at 6.) Plaintiffs claim that the Emergency Petition was supported by reports of several psychologists who concluded that Rachel had been abused by Marran, that Rachel suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, and that Rachel is at risk of serious and irreparable injury. (Compl. ¶ 17.) At a phone conference held on Librett's Emergency Petition on July 30, 2002, the State Trial Court suspended all contact between Marran and Rachel pending an investigation by Defendant Montgomery County Children and Youth Services ("MCOCYS") on the allegations of sexual abuse. (Custody Order at 6.) The State Trial Court noted that Librett's report of abuse was the fifth or sixth report of abuse made to either the New York Children and Youth Agency or MCOCYS.
Based upon reports that Rachel had been subjected to abuse, MCOCYS conducted an investigation. (Compl. ¶ 20.) On September 20, 2002, MCOCYS sent Librett a letter indicating that it was closing the case because the reports of abuse were considered "Unfounded under the Child Protective Services Law Act #127."Id. Plaintiffs contend that although they have been unable to access MCOCYS' investigative file, not one of the doctors who wrote the reports concerning Marran's abuse of Rachel were contacted during the investigation. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that the State Trial Court never reviewed the Emergency Petitions and never resumed the proceedings. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs further contend that the State Trial Court did not allow Librett to present witnesses, and relied instead on a determination by Defendant MCOCYS regarding abuse, which was rendered without hearings and without any true taking of evidence. Id.
In its January 9, 2003 Custody Order ("Custody Order"), the State Trial Court explained that because it had already concluded hearing 15 days of hearing on the underlying custody and contempt case, but had not entered a final decision, it was totally deferring to the investigation by Defendant MCOCYS in an effort to insure that the procedure in investigating the most recent allegation of abuse within MCOCYS was impartial and unbiased. (Custody Order at 6.) The State Trial Court further explained that it did not provide any information to MCOCYS or respond to requests for information concerning the underlying matter made by MCOCYS because it did not want to influence the investigation and decision of the MCOCYS into the allegations of abuse of Rachel by Marran. Id.
Because the report of abuse was deemed to "unfounded" at the conclusion of Defendant MCOCYS' investigation, the State Trial Court lifted its stay and ordered that visits between Marran and Rachel resume immediately. Id.
On September 23, 2002, Librett filed an Emergency Petition to Suspend Visitaion and Order a Plenary Hearing into Abuse pursuant to 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303 and PA. R. Civ. P. 1915.15, which Plaintiffs claim was supported by psychological reports that concluded that Rachel had been sexually abused and was severely traumatized. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege that the State Trial Court never held a hearing or considered the merits of the September 23, 2002 Emergency Petition. Id.
The State Trial Court stated that it refused to acknowledge or act on any petitions filed by Librett pertaining to the emergency situation caused by Marran's alleged abuse and/or MCOCYS' decision pertaining to these allegations. (Custody Order at 7.) The State Trial Court explained that it deferred completely to MCOCYS, an arm of the Juvenile Court division of the State Trial Court, and failed to involve itself in any way or for either side, in Librett's new accusations. Id. In its Custody Order, the State Trial Court also stated that because it failed to act, Librett appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
In its Custody Order, the State Trial Court stated that it placed little weight on the testimony of Librett's experts because of their adamant refusal to consider the facts of the case to be as posited by the State Trial Court in that their conclusions were based on basic assumptions that Marran was a perpetrator of domestic violence against a "battered woman", which the State Trial Court did not find as fact. (Custody Order at 44.)
The Custody Order granted Librett and Marran joint legal custody, giving Librett primary physical custody of Rachel subject to Marran's partial physical custody. Id. at 46; Compl. ¶ 21. The Order further provided that Marran will eventually have custody of Rachel at his home in New York from Monday afternoons through Wednesday mornings, every other weekend, and certain holidays. (Custody Order at 46-50; Compl. ¶ 21.)
On January 13, 2003, Librett filed a notice of appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court from the State Trial Court's Custody Order. (State Trial Court's 3/5/03 Order at 6.) On March 5, 2003, the State Trial Court issued an opinion addressing the merits of Librett's appeal. The State Trial Court urged the Superior Court to quash the appeal as meritless because the State Trial Court made the fullest possible inquiry in the custody matter and, based on that inquiry, entered a Custody Order that is in the best interest of Rachel. Id. at 7-8.
In response to Librett's contention that the State Trial Court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, and denied substantive and procedural due process and equal protection to Librett and Rachel, the State Trial Court found that Librett was not denied substantive and procedural due process and equal protection because the State Trial Court held fifteen days of hearing regarding the issue of custody, and Librett had ample opportunity to present evidence and testimony regarding any alleged instances of abuse by Marran. Id. at 8.
Librett also argued that the State Trial Court abused its discretion by relying on its prior determination regarding the credibility of mother when deciding that a subsequent, new issue of abuse of Rachel was not an emergency and/or was not worthy of review and hearings and findings of fact. Id. In response, the State Trial Court found that it treated each allegation of child abuse as an emergency and responded swiftly to the allegations by immediately suspending all contact between Marran and Rachel.Id. at 9. The State Trial Court also stated that it decided to rely on the determination of MCOCYS, which was already conducting an independent investigation into the report of abuse, in lieu of a hearing. Id.
In response to Librett's contention that the State Trial Court erred in refusing to acknowledge emergency petitions regarding abuse, which were supported by experts, and in refusing to review the expert reports, the State Trial Court found that it was in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, and that it was not obligated to delegate to experts that responsibility of making custody decisions. Id. at 9-10. Although the State Trial Court determined that Librett's experts may have been credible, the Court acted within in discretion in discounting the weight of their testimony because they failed to respond to the facts as the Court stated them. Id. at 10.
The State Trial Court found meritless Librett's contention that the State Trial Court committed an error of law and an abuse of discretion in refusing the hear, acknowledge, and/or receive evidence of abuse in the custody/visitation proceeding.Id. The State Trial Court found that although Librett had ample opportunity to present evidence of abuse during the fifteen days of hearings, the evidence and testimony were not sufficient to prove that Marran abused Rachel. Id. In addition, MCOCYS concluded that the allegations of abuse were unfounded. Id. Librett also argued that the State Trial Court abused its discretion, acted unconstitutionally, and committed an error of law in relying on MCOCYS' determination. Id. The State Trial Court rejected this argument and found that it acted within the bounds of law in relying on the determination of MCOCYS, which is the state-designated agency whose sole purpose it to protect children who are dependent, neglected, and abused, and concluded that it need not intervene. Id. at 11.
The State Trial Court disagreed with Librett's contention that it denied equal protection to Rachel because MCOCYS made an unfounded determination preventing the child from having access to State Trial Court, and because the State Trial Court refused to hear issues of abuse. Id. The State Trial Court noted that a court's overriding concern in any custody dispute is to determine what will serve the best interests of the child. Id. The State Trial Court explained that the record reflects that it fulfilled its duty to focus on the best interest of Rachel by suspending visitation as soon as it learned of the allegations of abuse, conducting numerous hearings in the underlying custody dispute, making extensive findings of fact, issuing a Custody Order that was in Rachel's best interests, and explaining its decision in detail. Id. at 11-12.
Librett also argues that the State Trial Court abused its discretion in keeping Rachel from accessing the State Trial Court for protection by refusing to hear and/or rule on information unavailable during the pendency of a visitation hearing. Id. at 12. In response, the State Trial Court again stated that it properly relied on MCOCYS to investigate the allegations of abuse. Id.
The State Trial Court rejected Librett's contention that it denied due process and abused its discretion in failing to hear and/or rule on facts of abuse and/or failing to consider emergency petitions on abuse during or after a visitation hearing supported by expert evidence. Id. The State Trial Court believes that it heard much testimony regarding the issues of abuse and carefully considered all of the related testimony on both sides before concluding that these allegations were not credible. Id. The State Trial Court noted that if it were expected to stop visitation and conduct a hearing every time Librett filed a petition against Marran alleging that he abused Rachel, Librett could disrupt contact between Marran and Rachel for extended period of time, which would not be in the best interests of Rachel. Id. at 12-13.
Librett also argues that the State Trial Court's finding of joint custody was an abuse of discretion in light of the weight of the testimony and the uncontroverted testimony with regard to Marran and Rachel. Id. at 15. The State Trial Court found that it did not abuse its discretion because issues concerning weight of the evidence and credibility are within its sound discretion, and there was credible evidence and testimony proved that Marran is a fit parent, that Marran can provide a good home for Rachel, and that he loves and cares for Rachel. Id.
The State Trial Court found inaccurate Librett's contentions that: (1) it committed errors of law and abused its discretion in not permitting Librett to develop and amplify the record concerning allegations of sexual abuse after providing ample notification as to the nature of the evidence that would be presented; and (2) it committed similar errors in refusing to consider such evidence in the course of the custody/visitation hearings. Id. at 17. The State Trial Court pointed out that the issue of sexual abuse was raised during Librett's testimony at the May 2002 hearings, and that Librett told the State Trial Court that Marran was not the target of her allegations. Id. The State Trial Court, therefore, found these contentions to be without merit. Id.
Librett also contends that the State Trial Court misconstrued MCOCYS' determination that the allegations of abuse were "unfounded" as demonstrating that there was no evidence of evidence because MCOCYS cannot reach that conclusion as a matter of law. Id. at 18. The State Trial Court explained that MCOCYS clearly implied that there was no evidence of abuse because the statutory definition of the term "unfounded report" clearly implies that there was no evidence of abuse. Id.
Finally, the State Trial Court found meritless Librett's contention that it erred in concluding that numerous reports of abuse to MCOCYS meant that abuse was less likely because it stated that it did not conclude that abuse was less likely.Id. at 19. In addition, the State Trial Court noted that there is no correlation between the number of reports filed and the likelihood of abuse, and that each report should be considered on a case-by-case basis. Id.
Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Defendants on March 21, 2003, and filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction on March 27, 2003. Defendant Marran filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 21, 2003, and the Montgomery County Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on April 23, 2003.
On April 1, 2003, the Court held a telephonic conference with the parties on the record notifying them that there would be a delay in any ruling on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction by the Court because it was involved in a lengthy trial. The Court, therefore, gave the parties the option of transferring the instant action to the emergency judge, but the parties declined and agreed to wait for this Court to be available.
On May 6, 2003, the Court was informed that the State Trial Court issued a Contempt Order against Librett on April 29, 2003. As a result, on May 7, 2003, the Court ordered the parties to file briefs addressing whether the Court should proceed with the present case in light of the State Trial Court's Contempt Order.
See discussion infra Part III. E.
For the reasons set forth below, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.
III. Discussion
A. The Relief Plaintiffs Seek in this Court is Essentially Identical to the Relief Plaintiff Librett Sought in State Court
Although Plaintiffs' legal theories in the instant action are different from Plaintiff Librett's theories set forth in the state court proceedings, the relief Plaintiffs are seeking — preventing Marran from having custody of or visitation with Rachel — is the same as the relief Plaintiff Librett sought in the state court proceedings. Plaintiffs' requested relief, therefore, will undeniably and impermissibly interfere with pending state proceedings because a Order from this Court preventing Marran from having custody of or visitation with Rachel would alter the State Trial Court's Custody Order.
B. Pennsylvania Law Regarding Custody
Pennsylvania law gives Pennsylvania state courts that are competent to decide child custody matters jurisdiction to decide child custody matters if:
(1) [Pennsylvania]:
(i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding; or
(ii) had been the home state of the child within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from [Pennsylvania] because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in [Pennsylvania];
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of [Pennsylvania] assume jurisdiction because:
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with [Pennsylvania]; and
(ii) there is available in [Pennsylvania] substantial evidence concerning the present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships of the child;
(3) the child is physically present in [Pennsylvania], and:
(i) the child has been abandoned; or
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent;
(4)(i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraph (1), (2) or (3), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that [Pennsylvania] is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child; and
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that the court assume jurisdiction; or
(5) the child welfare agencies of the counties wherein the contestants for the child live, have made an investigation of the home of the person to whom custody is awarded and have found it to be satisfactory for the welfare of the child.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5344 (2002).
In making an order for custody, partial custody or visitation, Pennsylvania state courts that are competent to decide child custody matters jurisdiction consider, among other factors: (1) the preference of the child as well as any other factor which legitimately impacts the child's physical, intellectual and emotional well-being; (2) which parent is more likely to encourage, permit and allow frequent and continuing contact and physical access between the noncustodial parent and the child; (3) each parent and adult household member's present and past violent or abusive conduct; and (4) each parent's past criminal conduct. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5303.
A competent Pennsylvania state court's custody order binds all parties who have been served in Pennsylvania or notified in accordance with 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5346 (relating to notice to persons outside of Pennsylvania; submission to jurisdiction) or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5353. In addition, the competent Pennsylvania state court facilitates the implementation of the custody order and has the power to modify the custody order. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5306, 5310.
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendants move to dismiss the instant action in reliance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and "the well-settled understanding that the Supreme Court of the United States, and not the lower federal courts has jurisdiction to review a state court decision." Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003);see also Bass v. Butler, 224 F. Supp.2d 950, 954 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)). The doctrine precludes lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated in state court or are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court adjudication. Id. (citing Parkview Associates Partnership v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000)). For Rooker-Feldman purposes, a federal claim and a state claim are inextricably intertwined, where, if the federal claim succeeds, the state court judgment would be effectively voided. Id. at 954-55 (citing Gulla v. North Strabane Township, 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998)). Additionally, "[a] federal district court has jurisdiction over general constitutional challenges if these claims are not inextricably intertwined with the claims asserted in state court." FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996).
28 U.S.C. § 1257 states in relevant part:
"[F]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States."
This Court recently reviewed the leading Third Circuit cases addressing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Bass v. Butler, 224 F. Supp.2d at 955-56.
The doctrine has been extended to decisions of lower state courts and does not apply exclusively to state courts of last resort. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Auth., 973 F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1992).
In Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit quoted Justice Marshall's concurrence in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) for guidance in determining when a constitutional claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the particular decision of a state court:
While the question of whether a federal constitutional challenge is inextricably intertwined with the merits of a state court judgment may sometimes be difficult to answer, it is apparent, as a first step, that the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issue before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state court judgment.Behr v. Snider, 900 F. Supp. 719, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citations omitted) (holding that the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's federal civil rights claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the plaintiff ultimately sought to invalidate the custody decisions rendered by the state courts).
Courts have not infrequently applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in finding that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction in civil rights cases where the primary focus is child custody. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not permit a disappointed state plaintiff to seek review of a state court decision in the federal court by mascarading his/her complaint in the form of a federal civil rights action. Logan v. Lillie, 965 F. Supp. 695, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's constitutional claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the relief requested by the plaintiff would require the Court to determine that the state court "wrongly decided" the custody and visitation issue). If it were otherwise, "any person dissatisfied with a state custody award could seek review in the district court under the guise of a [federal civil rights] violation." Id. (quoting Fuller v. Harding, 699 F. Supp. 64, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd 875 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Rose v. County of Lehigh, No. CIV.A.01-13, 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14403, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2001) (holding that the plaintiff s civil rights claims arising from a custody dispute were barred by both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Younger abstention doctrine). Therefore, theRooker-Feldman doctrine counsels that the path for correcting a lower state court's decision, even one which assertedly results in a violation of the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights, lies with the state appellate courts and, ultimately, with the United States Supreme Court. Logan, 965 F. Supp. at 698 (citing Fuller, 699 F. Supp. at 67) (explaining that if a plaintiff s federal constitutional rights to due process were violated during a state court custody proceedings, the appropriate recourse, in light of the jurisdictional bar ofRooker-Feldman, is to take an appeal to the state appellate courts and, ultimately, to the United States Supreme Court).
In determining whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable, the Court will compare Plaintiffs' claims and allegations against Marran and the Montgomery County Defendants in this case, and then examine whether the relief Plaintiffs seek in this Court is based on contentions that "the state court wrongly decided the issue before it." Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring).
1. The Allegations against Marran
In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that "Marran's repeated acts of sexual abuse against his daughter Rachel constitute an assault and battery upon her." (Compl. ¶ 42.) In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that Marran undertook a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff to safeguard the well-being of Rachel, and that Marran breached this fiduciary duty by his repeated acts of sexual abuse against Rachel. Id. ¶¶ 44-47. In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that Marran undertook an implied contractual obligation to Librett to safeguard the well-being of Rachel, and that Marran breached this implied contract by his repeated acts of sexual abuse against Rachel. Id. ¶¶ 49-51. In Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that Marran's repeated acts of sexual abuse against Rachel caused Plaintiffs to suffer sever emotional distress. Id. ¶ 55. Finally, in Count V, Plaintiffs allege that Marran's repeated acts of sexual abuse against Rachel has caused Librett to be deprived of the normal companionship of Rachel, and to incur substantial medical, psychological, therapeutic and legal expenses to try to remedy the damage Marran has caused to Rachel. Id. ¶ 60.
All of the claims against Marran are based on Plaintiffs' allegations of Marran's repeated acts of sexual abuse against Rachel. The merits of these allegations have already been adjudicated by the State Trial Court. In rendering the Custody Order, the State Trial Court held that it was deferring to MCOCYS' conclusion that the report of sexual abuse was "unfounded." (Custody Order at 6-7.) In addition, the State Trial Court found that it acted within the bounds of law in relying on the determination of MCOCYS. (State Trial Court's 3/5/03 Order at 10.) Accordingly, the Court concludes under theRooker-Feldman doctrine that it is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims against Marran. See Stypulkowski v. Stypulkowski, No. CIV.A.00-3151, 2000 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14175, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2000) (holding that the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's federal civil rights claim under theRooker-Feldman doctrine because the plaintiff ultimately sought to revise or invalidate the state court decisions by implicitly and explicitly asking the Court to review the proceedings and orders of the state family court relating to the care and custody of the plaintiff s children)
2. The Allegations against the Montgomery County Defendants
In Count VI, Plaintiffs allege that the Montgomery County Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by violating their rights to substantive due process in the manner in which they carried out their investigation of the claims of sexual abuse against Marran. (Compl. ¶ 2.) The relief Plaintiffs seek against the Montgomery County Defendants are declarations that: (1) the investigation and findings of MCOCYS violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) MCOCYS' findings are null and void and may not be relied upon for any purpose. Id. at 19. As MCOCYS was not a party in the state court proceedings, the analysis of Plaintiffs' claims against MCOCYS is different.
If the Court grants the requested relief against the Montgomery County Defendants, the State Trial Court would be unable to defer to MCOCYS' finding that the allegations of sexual abuse are unfounded, thereby invalidating the State Trial Court's Custody Order. See Carpenter v. Pennell Sch. Dist. Elem. Unit, No. CIV.A.01-6270, 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 15152, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2002) (holding that the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's federal civil rights claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the plaintiff ultimately sought to reverse the custody decree rendered by the state court); Stypulkowski, 2000 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14175, at *5-6; Logan, 965 F. Supp. at 699; Behr, 900 F. Supp. at 724-25. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiffs' civil rights claim against the Montgomery County Defendants is inextricably intertwined with the State Trial Court's decision regarding custody. Accordingly, the Court concludes under theRooker-Feldman doctrine that it is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims against the Montgomery County Defendants.
The Montgomery County Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the Montgomery County Defendants on the ground that it fails to state an adequate claim under Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), because Plaintiffs did not allege that the Montgomery County Defendants possess any policy or practice that authorizes or condones the violation of constitutional rights by its employees in the investigation of complaints of abuse. (Montgomery Co. Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 4.)
In order to prevail against a municipality under § 1983,Monell requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that there was a "direct causal link" between a violation of his rights and a policy or a custom of the municipality. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996). As explained by the Third Circuit:
"Policy is made when a `decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action' issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict." Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 89 L.Ed.2d 452, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986) (plurality opinion)) (alteration in original, other internal quotation marks omitted). Customs are "`practices of state officials . . . so permanent and well settled' as to virtually constitute law." Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691) (other internal quotation marks omitted).Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000). After identifying the policy or custom that caused the injury, the plaintiff must "demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged." Id. at 276 (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). If the policy or custom identified does not facially violate federal law, causation must be established by "demonstrating that the municipal action was taken with `deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice." Berg, 219 F.3d at 276 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407).
Plaintiffs' Complaint lacks any allegations identifying: (1) a policy or custom that caused the injury; or (2) a "direct causal link" between a violation of their rights and a policy or a custom of the munipality. Nor have Plaintiffs "demonstrate[d] that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged." Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for their § 1983 against the Montgomery County Defendants. If theRooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply and the Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs' claims, the Court would grant the Montgomery County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
3. Identity of Parties
The parties in the state court proceedings and the instant federal action are not identical. In Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 1992), plaintiffs in the state action differed from the plaintiffs in the federal action. The Court held that Rooker-Feldman "does not bar individual constitutional claims by persons not parties to earlier state court litigation seeking a place on the ballot[.]" Id. at 298.
The parties in this federal action differ somewhat from those in the state action due to the addition of Rachel as a plaintiff and the Montgomery County Defendants as defendants in this federal action. Plaintiff Librett, having lost her action in state court, may have been motivated to prevent Rooker-Feldman from applying in federal court simply by naming different defendants. Although this Court is not asserting that Librett has been so motivated, even if privity among the parties is necessary, there is some basis to conclude that Defendants in this federal action are in privity with Marran because they all share the same legal interest in preserving the outcome in the State Trial Court's Custody Order. See Bass, 224 F. Supp.2d at 962.
Plaintiffs argue that the Montgomery County Defendants' brief regarding abstention was improperly submitted and untimely. (Plaintiff s June 3, 2003 Br. at 1.) It is not necessary for the Court to address these arguments, however, because the Court has the power to abstain sua sponte. Grimm v. O'Donnell, 249 F. Supp.2d 571, 2003 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 5714, at *131 n. 38 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
Even assuming arguendo that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply so that the Court would have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs' claims, the Court would decline to exercise jurisdiction in the instant action based on abstention principles.
Numerous commentators have noted the close relation between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and abstention principles. Some of these are summarized in this Court's opinion in Bass, 224 F. Supp.2d at 960 n. 11.
As a general rule, federal courts are bound to adjudicate all cases and controversies that are properly before them and they cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 41 U.S. 350, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989). Abstention is a judicially-created doctrine under which a federal court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction so that a state court or state agency will have an opportunity to decide the matters at issue. Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1982). As abstention is the exception and not the rule, abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is appropriate only in certain limited circumstances. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).
The Supreme Court has articulated four primary types of abstention. Under Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed.2d 971 (1941), abstention may be appropriate where a federal court is presented with both a federal constitutional issue and an unsettled issue of state law whose resolution might narrow or eliminate the federal constitutional question under principles of comity in order to avoid needless friction with state policies.
Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1943), abstention is appropriate where a difficult question of state law, which involves important state policies or administrative concerns, is presented. A federal court may abstain to avoid disrupting the efforts of a state "to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
Colorado River abstention establishes permission for district court, in exceptional circumstances, to dismiss a federal action because of parallel state-court litigation.Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d765 (1983). In order forColorado River abstention to be appropriate, there must be parallel state and federal litigations that are "truly duplicative." Rycoline Products, Inc. v. C W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 890 (3d Cir. 1997). Actions are considered duplicative if the same parties are litigating the same issues. Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
Finally, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), abstention is appropriate when federal jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings, state nuisance proceedings antecedent to criminal proceedings, or collection of state taxes. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 816. In Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979), the Supreme Court extended the doctrine to bar federal interference in a child custody case.
The Third Circuit in Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003) recited the following predicates that must be met in order for a federal court to abstain under the Younger doctrine:
(1) there [must be] ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings [must] implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings [must] afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Even if the necessary three predicates exist, however, Younger abstention is not appropriate if the federal plaintiff can establish (1) the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances exist . . . such that deference to the state proceeding will present a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests asserted.Anthony, 316 F.3d at 418 (citations omitted).
1. There Are Ongoing State Proceedings
Although Plaintiffs argue that there are no prior state court proceedings that would bar this action, Plaintiffs concede in their Complaint that "Ms. Librett and Mr. Marran have been involved in litigation over the custody of Rachel in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, and that litigation is now on appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania." (Compl. ¶ 8.) The Court, therefore, finds that there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature.
2. The State Proceedings Implicate Important State Interests
The ongoing state proceedings involve custody, visitation, and sexual abuse allegations. Courts have held that domestic relations matters are traditionally an area of state concern.Rose, 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14403, at *8 (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 435). In particular, Judge DuBois of this Court has held that a federal district court "has no jurisdiction over a custody matter, which is purely a state law issue." Carpenter, 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 15152, at *9.
Because custody disputes are purely state law issues, the Court finds that the state custody proceedings that the parties are involved in implicate important state interests. Thus, the second predicate of Younger abstention has been satisfied.
See discussion supra Part III. B on Pennsylvania law regarding custody.
3. The State Proceedings Afford Plaintiffs an Adequate Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims
"[T]he burden on this point rests on the federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of [its] claims." Anthony, 316 F.3d at 422 (quoting Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14). The Supreme Court has also held that "when a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary." Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15. Plaintiffs have offered no reason why their federal constitutional and civil rights claims could not be fully heard by Pennsylvania courts, and the Court does not believe there are any procedural barriers to bringing a federal civil rights claim in a Pennsylvania state court. See Murtagh v. County of Berks, 634 A.2d 179, 182-83 (Pa. 1993). The Court, therefore, finds that the third predicate of the Younger test has been satisfied. See Anthony, 316 F.3d at 422.
Plaintiffs have also failed to allege that the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, or that some other extraordinary circumstances exist such that deference to the state proceeding will present a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests asserted.
Because the requirements for Younger abstention have been met and because Plaintiffs have failed to allege that any exceptions to Younger abstention are applicable, the Court finds that Younger abstention is appropriate.
To the extent that Plaintiffs now address the custody proceedings and how the State Trial Court and MCOCYS handled the allegations of sexual abuse of Rachel by Marran, review is barred by Younger. In addition, Plaintiffs must exhaust their state appellate remedies before seeking relief in federal district court unless one of the Younger abstention exceptions applies. Anthony, 316 F.3d at 419-20 (citing Huffman v. Pursue. Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975)). Further, not only did Plaintiffs have the opportunity to raise the claims in the instant action in the state court proceedings, Plaintiffs have taken advantage of their opportunity to appeal the State Trial Court's decision through the state appellate system and Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to eventually appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2003). By commencing this action seeking relief in federal court without the completion of state appellate review, Plaintiffs are impermissibly attempting to bypass the state system. See Anthony, 316 F.3d at 420.
D. State Contempt Order
As noted above, the State Trial Court issued a Contempt Order against Librett on April 29, 2003 in response to Marran's Motions for Contempt of Court, which were filed on December 2, 2002, December 11, 2002, December 15, 2002, and January 15, 2003. (Contempt Order at 1.) The State Trial Court scheduled a hearing on Marran's Motions to be held on four consecutive days beginning April 28, 2003. Id. Although seven attorneys, who are representing Librett in one capacity or another, appeared in Court on April 28, 2003, all seven specifically indicated that they were not authorized by Librett to represent her at the Contempt Hearing. Id. In addition, Librett herself did not appear at the Contempt Hearing. Id. at 2.
The State Trial Court proceeded with the Contempt Hearing, at which no evidence was presented by Librett to refute or justify the allegations of contempt, and found Librett in contempt of the State Trial Court's Custody Order for the following reasons: (1) Librett failed to provide Marran any medical, educational, and/or other information concerning Rachel that would give effect to his right to joint legal custody; (2) Librett failed to provide partial physical custody of Rachel since the entry date of the Custody Order; and (3) Librett failed to pay Marran $14,775.00 for counsel fees and expenses as ordered in the Custody Order. Id. The State Trial Court also found Librett in contempt of previous state court orders by failing to provide Rachel for therapeutic supervised visits prior to January 9, 2003. Id.
The State Trial Court, therefore, ordered and decreed as follows: (1) Marran would be awarded "make-up" time for visits missed with Rachel since November 6, 2002, calculated by the State Trial Court to be approximately a total of 30 days; (2) effective immediately, and at his election, Marran was allowed to take custody of Rachel for as long as the 30 days "make-up" time; (3) any police department requested to do so was to assist Marran in securing custody of Rachel for purposes of giving effect to the Court's Contempt Order; (4) Librett was to notify Marran of the names and addresses of Rachel's doctors, dentists, and any other medical practitioners who render services on an ongoing basis to Rachel; (5) Librett was to immediately notify Marran of the names and addresses of Rachel's school and any other caregivers providing ongoing care to Rachel; (6) Librett was to pay Marran $14,775.00 as ordered in the Custody Order (if not already paid), and an additionally $3,440.00 for attorney's fees generated by virtue of the contempt proceeding; and (7) in the event Librett failed to surrender custody of Rachel to Marran, a fine of $500 per diem for each day would be imposed for each day Rachel was not so presented. Id. at 3-4.
In their supplemental brief, the Montgomery County Defendants stated that Librett has continued to fail to obey the State Trial Court's Contempt Order and that the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office has issued an arrest warrant for Librett. (Montgomery County Defendants' Supplemental Br. at 2.)
The Court finds it deeply troubling that Librett is seeking equitable relief in federal court at the same she has openly refused to obey Orders of the State Trial Court, and has essentially conceded that she is in Contempt of the State Trial Court. She attempts to deflect the significance of that Contempt by pointing out that her daughter was not a party in the state court proceedings, but is a party in this Court. Although technically correct, Librett is guardian of Rachel and Librett's actions are the ones with legal consequence. However, the Court need not reach any conclusion on the findings of Contempt in view of the conclusions about the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and abstention. If the this case had gone to a hearing, however, Librett would surely have a difficult time proving a right to equitable relief in this Court when she is guilty of Contempt in the State Trial Court.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction in the instant action based on abstention principles
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 2003, upon consideration of Defendant Michael Marran's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 9), Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth Services and Montgomery County, PA (Docket No. 11), Plaintiffs' Response to the Motions to Dismiss (Docket No. 13), Defendant Michael Marran's Supplemental Brief (Docket No. 15), Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief (Docket No. 16), Supplemental Brief Defendants Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth Services and Montgomery County, PA (Docket No. 17), and Plaintiffs' Response to the Montgomery County Defendants' Supplemental Brief (Docket No. 18), it is hereby ORDERED that the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED on the ground that the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction.