Opinion
2013-10-9
In the Matter of MARQUIS B. (Anonymous), appellant, v. ALEXIS H. (Anonymous), et al., respondents.
Kent V. Moston, Hempstead, N.Y. (Jeremy L. Goldberg and Argun M. Ulgen of counsel), for appellant. Mitra K. Zervos, Great Neck, N.Y., for respondent Alexis H.
Kent V. Moston, Hempstead, N.Y. (Jeremy L. Goldberg and Argun M. Ulgen of counsel), for appellant. Mitra K. Zervos, Great Neck, N.Y., for respondent Alexis H.
William A. Sheeckutz, East Meadow, N.Y., for respondent Rason B.
John M. Zenir, Mineola, N.Y., attorney for the child.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, JJ.
In a child custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Eisman, J.), dated April 3, 2012, which, after a hearing, granted the motion of the attorney for the child to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that the petitioner lacked standing to commence the proceeding.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
This Court previously affirmed a determination that the appellant is equitably estopped from asserting that he is the biological father of the child ( see Matter of Rason S.B. v. Alexis H., 101 A.D.3d 710, 711, 955 N.Y.S.2d 628;Matter of Juanita A. v. Kenneth Mark N., 15 N.Y.3d 1, 904 N.Y.S.2d 293, 930 N.E.2d 214;Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320, 326, 820 N.Y.S.2d 199, 853 N.E.2d 610). Contrary to the appellant's contention, the determination that he was equitably estopped from claiming paternity has res judicata effect in the instant case and precludes him from claiming that he is a parent of the child ( see Matter of Weaver v. Durfey, 93 A.D.3d 1185, 941 N.Y.S.2d 822;Matter of Michael H. v. Carole S.D., 198 A.D.2d 414, 604 N.Y.S.2d 573).
A nonparent may have standing to seek custody in the event “extraordinary circumstances” warrant it (Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 545, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277). Such extraordinary circumstances include “ ‘surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, [or] unfitness' ” by the parents (Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris, 53 N.Y.2d 204, 208, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 423 N.E.2d 361, quoting Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d at 544, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277;see Matter of Herrera v. Vallejo, 107 A.D.3d 714, 966 N.Y.S.2d 206;Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N.Y. [ Sarah P.], 216 A.D.2d 387, 629 N.Y.S.2d 47). Here, there are no allegations that the legal parents of the child surrendered, abandoned, or neglected the child, or were unfit, and there are no allegations of any other extraordinary circumstances.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the proceeding for lack of standing was properly granted.