Opinion
No. FST CV 98-0163762 S
August 1, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This case comes before the court following a partial reversal and remand from the Appellate Court. The plaintiff's cause of action was an insurance claim based on the loss of hatchery fish in Maine in 1991 as the result of hurricane Bob. The underlying facts and the prior procedural history are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court in Mariculture Products, Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 84 Conn.App. 688, 854 A.2d 1100 (2004).
In its second count, the plaintiff claimed that, in addition to damages, it was entitled to interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month and attorneys fees pursuant to the provisions of Maine Revised Statutes, Title 24-A § 2436. On September 20, 2001, immediately prior to trial, the parties stipulated that "the law of the State of Maine governs issues pertaining to the interpretation of the insurance contract that is at issue in this case, including but not limited to notice of claim, proof of loss, terms and conditions of the contract including exclusions and limitations contained therein, but the parties expressly do not stipulate or agree as to the applicable state law governing consequential damages."
Concerning unfair claims settlement procedures.
The case was tried to a jury in the fall of 2001. During a lengthy charge conference, the parties entered into a stipulation reserving the issue of the amount of any interest and attorneys fees to the court, but submitting to the jury the question of whether the defendants had violated the Maine statute. On November 6, 2001, the jury answered interrogatories finding that: 1) the defendants had breached the insurance contract by failing to pay the plaintiff for the loss of the fish; 2) the defendants breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing in their investigation, adjustment and/or settling of the plaintiff's claim; and the defendant's written statement disputing the plaintiff's claim which, while timely, did not include sufficient detail to permit the plaintiff to understand and respond to the plaintiff's position. The jury awarded the plaintiff $445,000 in damages.
After hearing the parties, the trial court, Tierney, J., awarded interest in the amount of $768,515 (representing simple interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month from April 2, 1992 to November 6, 2001) and attorneys fees in the amount of $487,194. Thereafter judgment entered on June 4, 2002.
The Appellate Court upheld the jury verdict, but found that the provisions of the Maine unfair claims settlement procedures statute were inapplicable because the insurance policy had not been delivered or issued for delivery in the state of Maine. The court remanded the case with direction to render judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's second count and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
The issue now before the court is whether and to what extent the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a(a) on the damages found by jury on the first count of the complaint. Normally the issue of statutory interest is an issue for the finder of fact. Iseli Co. v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 211 Conn. 133, 143, 558 A.2d 966 (1989). In this case, however, the plaintiff claims that by oral stipulation, the parties reserved that issue, among others, to the trial court. On their part the defendants claim that the issues reserved to the court were limited to those relating to interest and attorneys fees under Maine law and that the plaintiff, by failing to submit the issue of Connecticut statutory interest to the jury waived its right to such interest.
(a) Except as provided in sections 37-3b, 37-3c and 52-192a, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration proceedings under chapter 909, including actions to recover money loaned at a greater rate, as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable.
The court heard counsel for the parties on April 25, 2006 and requested them to provide the court with a copy of the transcript of the oral stipulation so that the intent of the parties with respect to that issue could be ascertained and to file supplemental briefs addressing the issue. On June 9, 2006 the plaintiff filed its brief with extracts from transcripts reflecting court proceedings held on October 4, 2001 and October 25, 2001 before the court (Tierney, J.).
Those transcripts show that the issue of interest was addressed by counsel and the court on several occasions during the trial. On October 4, 2001, in the absence of the jury counsel for the plaintiff stated his position that the issues of attorneys fees and interest are not for the jury, but are more appropriately addressed by the court. Counsel for the defendants stated: "[W]e are in complete agreement with the plaintiffs that that is an issue that should be for the court, that the jury should not be dealing with attorneys fees or interest calculation." The court noted that under Connecticut law the issue of interest was for the jury unless the parties stipulated otherwise.
On October 25, 2001, in the absence of the jury the court addressed parties' counsel: "[You have agreed and so stated in open court that the defendant's position is that] if this matter is tried to the jury, then the issue as to amount or calculation of interest and the amount and calculation of the attorneys fees is also reserved for the court, not for the jury." Defendants' counsel responded: "That is absolutely correct, your honor." Plaintiff's counsel also responded "Yes, that is correct."
Despite these colloquies, the defendant now claims that only the issue of interest under Maine law was reserved to the court and that, by not submitting the issue of Connecticut statutory interest to the jury, the plaintiff waived any claim to such interest. The court disagrees.
A stipulation is essentially a contract between the parties. Owsiejko v. American Hardware Corp., 137 Conn. 185, 187-88, 75 A.2d 404 (1950), State v. .2 Acres Known as 319 Jackson Street, 39 Conn.App. 40, 663 A.2d 1115 (1995). As such, the construction of that contract is controlled by the parties' intent. Connecticut National Bank v. N.E. Owen II, Inc., 22 Conn.App. 468, 473-74, 578 A.2d 655 (1990), Connecticut Bank Trust Co., N.A., v. Recket, 33 Conn.App. 702, 638 A.2d 44 (1994). "A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction . . . [T]he intent of the parties [to a contract] is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the . . . words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 498, 746 A.2d 1277 (2000).
Nothing in the language of the stipulation entered into by the parties in open court suggests an intent to limit the issues reserved to the court to those arising under Maine statutory law. In fact the court, in discussing the attorneys fees aspect of the stipulation clearly stated its understanding that "If either the case law either in Maine or Connecticut says that is a jury issue as to the amount of attorneys fees but you stip that it goes to a court, it goes to the court." There is nothing in the transcripts submitted by counsel to suggest that either party could have reasonably believed that the issue of interest reserved to the court was limited to interest under Maine law. Accordingly, the court finds that the parties have reserved the issue for the court to resolve and that the plaintiff has not waived or otherwise abandoned its claim for interest.
"A trial court must make two determinations when awarding compensatory interest under § 37-a: (1) whether the party against whom interest is sought has wrongfully detained money due the other party; and (2) the date upon which the wrongful detention began in order to determine the time from which interest should be calculated." Metcalfe v. Talarski, 213 Conn. 145, 160, 567 A.2d 1148 (1989); West Haven Sound Development Corp. v. West Haven, supra, 207 Conn. 321. In this case the answers to the special jury interrogatories dated November 2, 2001 make it clear that the defendants wrongfully withheld payment for the losses incurred by plaintiff from April 2, 1992 until the date of judgment, June 4, 2002. The court finds that interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum authorized by General Statutes § 37-a is both reasonable and appropriate. Interest at that rate from April 2, 1992 to June 4, 2002 amounts to $452,924.66. A supplemental judgment may enter in accordance with this memorandum of decision. Postjudgment interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum will run from the date of judgment until payment.
Thirty days following the submission of plaintiff's claim on March 2, 1991.