Opinion
No. FBT 06-5006053 S
April 19, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This case involves a dispute arising out of the sale of a single-family residence known as 59 Warren Avenue, Fairfield (the "property"). On May 12, 2005, the plaintiffs David Mantell and Jodi Mantell entered into a contract to purchase the property from defendants Hristo and Nancy Varsos. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants are obligated to reimburse them for the costs they incurred in remediating environmental contamination on the property caused by an underground oil storage tank which the defendants had removed from the property prior to the closing. In their first count the plaintiffs claim that the defendants breached the provisions of the contract by refusing the plaintiffs' demand for reimbursement for their costs. In the second count the plaintiffs claim that the defendants recklessly made false statements regarding the removal of underground tank and the absence of contamination. In the third count the plaintiffs claim that the defendants are responsible for the costs of remediation under the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes § 22a-452.
Prior to the trial of this case the plaintiffs reached settlements with two parties who were formerly named as defendants. The plaintiffs recovered $25,000 from McGoldrick Fuel, Inc. and $2,700 from Complete Environmental Testing, Inc. In this memorandum of decision Hristo and Nancy Varsos will be referred to as the "defendants."
The defendants filed an answer denying the essential allegations of the complaint, asserting three special defenses and asserting a counterclaim for attorneys fees incurred in defending the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 37 of the contract. The first special defense was that any representations of the defendants were made only to the extent of their best knowledge and belief. The second special defense was that no representations survived the delivery of the deed. The third special defense was that the plaintiffs were paid for the costs and expenses of removing and remediating the contamination at the property. The case was tried to the court from March 16, 2010 to March 18, 2010.
THE FACTS
The evidence shows that the defendants purchased the property from John F. Holzbauer, the executor of the estate of Anna M. Holzbauer, on July 6, 1998. (Ex. 26.) At that time the residence on the property was heated by a fuel oil/hot water system. The fuel oil tank was located in the basement. An underground fuel oil tank formerly used in connection with the heating system was located in the backyard. The tank in the back yard was abandoned and disconnected from the boiler prior to the defendants' purchase of the property. Defendant Hristo Varsos was a long-term employee of the Southern Connecticut Gas Company. For reasons of company loyalty and available inducements being offered by the gas company, the defendants decided to convert their home's fuel supply to gas. Within a few months of purchase the defendants removed the oil-fired furnace (properly abating the asbestos insulation attached to the furnace) and replaced it with a gas furnace. At the same time an oil-fueled hot water heater was replaced with a gas-fueled hot water heater. When the defendants purchased the property, the oil tank in the basement contained 206 gallons of fuel. (Ex. 64.) The defendants never purchased additional oil, but used the supply in the tank for heating and hot water purposes until the conversion to gas.
When the defendants decided to sell their property they completed a Residential Property Condition Disclosure Report. (Ex. 1.) Item 6.b. on the Disclosure Report revealed the existence of the underground tank in the backyard and stated "to be removed prior to closing." Item 17 revealed that the basement suffered from dampness in times of excessive rain. The Disclosure Report was eventually signed by the plaintiffs and included as part of the contract. Prior to signing the contract the plaintiffs engaged the services of Pillar to Post, a residential inspection service. The report from that firm (Ex. 60) recommended that both the underground fuel tank in the backyard and the fuel tank in the basement be removed.
The contract was on a standard form of residential real estate sales agreement approved and adopted by the Greater Bridgeport Bar Association. Paragraph 28 of the standard form is titled "Underground Storage Tanks" and sets forth several representations of the defendants as "Seller" with respect to that subject. The provisions of that paragraph are discussed in detail below.
The contract also included a "Rider." Paragraph 12 of the Rider is titled "Underground Oil Tank." That paragraph set forth certain undertakings by the defendants as "Seller" with respect to both the underground oil storage tank located in the back yard and the oil storage tank located in the basement. These provisions are addressed in connection with the court's consideration of the plaintiffs' contract claims under the Rider.
On May 18, 2005, after the contract was signed, the defendants entered into an agreement with McGoldrick Fuel, Inc. (Ex. 2.) On May 27, 2005, pursuant to the terms of that agreement McGoldrick Fuel removed all remaining liquid from the underground fuel tank in the backyard, obtained a permit from the local fire marshal allowing removal of the tank, removed and disposed of the tank, took a soil sample from the "tank grave," forwarded the sample to Complete Environmental Testing, Inc., and backfilled the "tank grave" with clean soil. Test results from Complete Environmental Testing, Inc. revealed that the soil sample taken by McGoldrick Fuel from the tank grave had Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons ("TPH") of less than 50 parts per million ("p.p.m."). The report from Complete Environmental Testing states that under the State of Connecticut Remediation Standard Regulations, the residential criterion for TPH contamination is 500 p.p.m. (Ex. 6.) Defendant, Hristo Varsos, took photographs of the removal of the tank and shared them with the plaintiffs. (Ex. 28.)
On June 20, 2005, the defendants delivered a deed to the premises to the plaintiffs and received the balance of the purchase price. In the fall of 2005, the plaintiffs decided to address the problem of moisture in their basement and hired a contractor to install a sump pump. During the process of installation the contractor reported to the plaintiffs that an oil sheen was found in water accumulating in the sump and that an odor of petroleum was noticeable in the basement. The plaintiff and the contractor contacted the local fire department which in turn notified the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") of a possible release of petroleum products.
The DEP assigned David L. Poynton, an environmental compliance specialist, to investigate the plaintiff's property. October 27, 2005, Poynton arrived at the property and after reviewing the situation, installed seven shallow micro-wells in and around the former location of the underground fuel storage tank. Groundwater samples were taken from each of the wells and from the sump and a soil sample from the vicinity of the "tank grave" was also taken. After the samples were tested, Poynton prepared a report detailing his findings. (Ex. 10.) Poynton's report revealed the presence of high levels of petroleum hydrocarbons in ground water as well as elevated levels of petroleum hydrocarbons in the soil sample.
The plaintiffs obtained bids from contractors to remediate the fuel oil contamination found in their back yard. In June 2006 the plaintiffs engaged counsel who sent demand letters to the defendants, and to McGoldrick Fuel and Complete Environmental Testing, Inc. (Exs. 32-35.) In December 2006, the plaintiffs filed this action against the defendants, McGoldrick Fuel and Complete Environmental Testing, Inc. Prior to the trial of this case the plaintiffs reached settlements with McGoldrick Fuel, receiving $25,000, and Complete Environmental Testing, Inc., receiving $2,700. (Exs. 40 41.)
In July 1, 2008, the plaintiffs entered into a contract with Enviroshield, Inc. for the remediation of the fuel contamination from their backyard. (Ex. 42.) The plaintiffs paid Enviroshield a total of $27,397.50 to remove the contaminated soil and water from their backyard and to replace the contaminated soil with clean backfill. (Exs. 43-44.) Prior to the Enviroshield's work, the plaintiffs removed the dilapidated garage situated on the rear of the property and a portion of the slab foundation for the garage. Initially, the plaintiffs claimed the costs associated with the removal of the garage and, possibly, the costs of a new garage as part of their damages. Wisely, the plaintiffs abandoned this claim during the trial.
The plaintiffs' evidence showed that they had incurred legal fees and disbursements in the total amount of $27,188.54 through the end of the trial. (Exs. 48-59 and 73.) The plaintiffs claim to be entitled to legal fees under their third count alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and under the first count claiming breach of contract. The contractual claim is based on paragraph 37 of the contract which provides:
37. Costs of Enforcement. Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, in the event of any litigation brought to enforce any material provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys fees and court costs from the other party.
In their counterclaim, the defendants also claim that they are entitled to recover their attorneys fees and costs under this provision and produced evidence of attorneys fees totaling $10,410.75 incurred in defense of the plaintiffs' action. (Ex. 67.)
DISCUSSION BREACH OF CONTRACT I. Claims under paragraph 28 of the contract.
The plaintiffs' first contract claim is that the defendants made express representations in paragraph 28 of the contract which they relied on to their detriment. The plaintiffs claim that the first sentence of that paragraph contains an unqualified representation that no underground storage tanks on the property leak, have leaked or in disrepair. They further claim that the second sentence sets forth an unqualified representation that the property is "not contaminated by any oil, petroleum product or hazardous waste which, if know to the state and federal authorities, could result in remedial clean-up work and expense to the [plaintiffs] subsequent to the passing of title."
The defendants point out that paragraph 35 of the contract provides: "Unless otherwise specified in writing to the contrary, none of the representations made in this Agreement or any addenda attached hereto shall survive the delivery of the deed and all representations by SELLER are made to the best of SELLER's knowledge and belief."
The court will first consider the plaintiffs' contractual claims based on a breach of the representations set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 28. In an effort to prove that the defendants had actual knowledge of the contamination on their property to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs produced evidence showing that, at the time of their purchase of the property in 1998 the defendants were aware of the presence of the underground oil tank and purchased the fuel oil in the tank at closing. (Ex. 64.) However, defendant, Hristo Varsos, testified that the fuel oil he purchased was not in the underground storage tank, but rather in the oil tank located in the basement. He further testified that the underground tank in the backyard was no longer connected to the fuel system and that the piping leading to the tank was clearly visible in the basement and that it had been bent to render it inoperable.
The plaintiffs also elicited testimony that approximately two years prior to the closing, the defendants had removed a concrete patio from their back yard. In some places the concrete was up to eighteen inches deep and required significant excavation to remove. As part of the same project the defendants had excavated to a depth of several feet in the vicinity of a "Bilco" door giving access to a stairway leading from the backyard to the basement. The purpose of that excavation was to install waterproofing to the outside of the stair enclosure in an effort to mitigate the moisture problem in the basement. Both the patio and Bilco door were located in close proximity to the underground fuel storage tank. The defendants denied reaching ground water during these excavations and denied finding any evidence (visual or olfactory) of the presence of petroleum products in the soil. The court finds those denials to be credible.
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that defendant, Hristo Varsos, must have been aware of the presence of contamination in the tank grave based upon one of the photographs which he took on May 27, 2005, the date the tank was removed from the backyard. The plaintiffs claim that photograph #8 in Exhibit 28 shows black line in the soil at the end of tank grave and another area of black soil on the side of tank grave. The plaintiffs argue that this black soil can only be oil contamination and that the photograph proves that the defendants were aware of the contamination prior to the closing but fraudulently remained silent when they had a duty to inform the plaintiffs of the contamination. The plaintiffs argue that the same evidence is also relevant to their claims of misrepresentation alleged in the second count of their complaint.
The evidence does not establish that either defendant had any knowledge of the presence of oil in the backyard or that the underground tank had leaked. Under these circumstances the court finds that the defendants did not breach the provisions of the first sentence paragraph 28 of the contract.
The court will next consider the evidentiary basis for the claim that the defendants breached the contract with respect to the second sentence of paragraph 28. The plaintiffs called David Poynton, the DEP environmental compliance specialist who conducted the investigation into the contamination in the plaintiffs' backyard and issued a report of his findings. (Ex. 10.) Poynton testified that the regulations issued by the DEP do not require owners of residential property to remove or remediate petroleum spills or discharges on their property. He included in his report a copy of a DEP document entitled "Guidance for Residential Underground Fuel Tank Releases." That document states the DEP recommendation that oil spills be cleaned up particularly if the oil is in close proximity to private or public drinking water wells or is being discharged to a surface body of water. However the document also confirms that: "The property owner would be required to clean up such pollution only if DEP issues an administrative order or otherwise takes action to compel the owner to undertake remediation."
In the absence of evidence of any order from the DEP or any other governmental authority or evidence showing the possibility of the plaintiffs being required to engage in remedial or clean-up, the court finds that a breach of contract claim cannot be based on the second sentence of paragraph 28. In light of the court's findings, there is no need to consider the defendants' claim that, by virtue of the provisions of paragraph 35, the representations of paragraph 28 did not survive the passing of title.
II. Claims under the Rider to the contract.
The plaintiffs also claim that the. defendants breached the provisions of the Rider attached to the contract. The relevant provisions of the Rider include an initial statement in bold type face: " All representations made in this Rider by either party hereunder shall be deemed made only to the best knowledge of that party." Also relevant is paragraph 1. of the Rider which states: "This rider shall be incorporated into and shall be deemed to be an integral part of the agreement. In the event of a conflict between the provisions of the Agreement and the provisions of this Rider, those of the Rider shall prevail."
Paragraph 12 of the Rider included as part of the contract also addressed the issue of underground oil storage tanks:
Seller acknowledges that an underground oil storage tank exists upon the premises. Seller agrees, at Seller's sole cost and expense, to remove the underground oil storage tank and to remediate any contamination in accordance with applicable DEP, state and municipal standards and regulations, particular note is made that if contamination exists to the level and proximity with the footings and/or foundation the Seller will only be required to remediate to the extent that the applicable DEP, state and municipal standard and regulations so provide. The Seller shall select the company to perform the removal and remediation for which costs the Seller shall be solely responsible. Only licensed and registered contractors with the State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection may be selected to accomplish the removal and clean up and elimination of any contamination. The premises shall thereafter be restored to their original condition as nearly as possible upon such removal of the underground tank. In addition, prior to closing Seller, at its sole cost and expense, agrees to remove the oil tank located in the basement in accordance with applicable DEP, state and municipal standards and regulations. Prior to closing Seller shall provide Buyer with all documentation evidencing payment in full and completion of said work in compliance with all applicable DEP, state and municipal standards and regulations, including, but not limited to, soil tests. Seller agrees to pay all the costs and expenses for such work. Seller agrees to perform said work in a prompt and diligent manner.
The plaintiffs claim that the obligation stated in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Paragraph 12 "to remediate any contamination in accordance with applicable DEP, state and municipal standards and regulations . . ." imposes on the defendants an obligation, which survived the passing of title, to remediate the contamination to the point where any violations of state approved standards are cured. As noted in connection with the plaintiffs' claims of breach of paragraph 28, the evidence does not support a finding that any obligation under federal, state or local law required the defendants to remove the tainted soil from their property. In the absence of such a requirement the court can not find that, under the provisions of existing environmental laws and regulations, an obligation was imposed upon the defendants to remediate any contamination found on the property either prior to or after the closing. In light of the court's finding, the court need not determine whether the provisions of the Paragraph 12 of the Rider survived the delivery of the deed.
The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants breached the provisions of the second paragraph of Paragraph 12 of the Rider. In particular they claim that the second sentence of that paragraph imposes an obligation to remediate any contamination "in compliance with all applicable DEP, state and municipal standards." The plaintiffs assert that this provision requires remediation to the standards set forth in DEP regulations even if the same regulations do not, themselves, require the remediation to take place.
The court disagrees. The subject of the second paragraph of Paragraph 12 is the oil tank located in the basement, not the underground tank in the back yard. The first sentence of the paragraph clearly establishes that fact. Even assuming that the provisions of the remainder of the paragraph apply to the removal of both tanks, the second sentence does not impose an obligation on the defendants to remediate contamination either prior to or after closing. The defendants' obligation was to deliver to the plaintiff, prior to closing "documentation evidencing payment in full and completion of said work [removal of the tank] in compliance with all applicable DEP, state and municipal standards and regulations, including, but not limited to, soil tests." The defendants, in fact, delivered such documentation to the plaintiffs prior to closing. Presumably, these documents were the basis for the plaintiffs' successful claims against McGoldrick Fuel and Complete Environmental Testing. The court finds no basis for the plaintiffs' claim of the breach of the provisions of the second paragraph of Paragraph 12 of the Rider.
III. Claims under the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Report CT Page 9671
The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants breached the contract by virtue of their responses to item #6.b. on the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Report which was attached to the contract incorporated by reference in Paragraph 18. Item #6.b. asks "Is there an underground fuel tank? If yes, location and age." In their response the defendants stated: "Yes/unknown. Backyard — to be removed prior to closing." The plaintiffs claim that defendants should have known the approximate age of the underground tank since it was apparently installed when the residence was constructed on the property in the early 1950s. Paragraph III on the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Report expressly provides: "Any representations made by the seller on this report shall not constitute a warranty to the buyer." Paragraph IV provides: "This residential disclosure report is not a substitute for inspections, tests, or other methods of determining the physical condition of the property."
It is difficult to see how the age of an abandoned underground tank would have been a relevant factor for the plaintiffs. In any event, the evidence did not show that either defendant had any knowledge of age of the tank or were in possession of information which would have led them to provide a more accurate answer to item #6.b. The court finds that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the defendants breached the contract by virtue of their responses on the Property Condition Disclosure Report.
The court finds the issues on the first count of the complaint for the defendants.
MISREPRESENTATION
The plaintiffs' second count claims that the defendants represented to the plaintiffs that the property "was not contaminated by any oil, petroleum product or hazardous waste . . ." The plaintiffs further allege that these representations were false and made as statements of fact and that at all times the defendants were aware that the representations were untrue. Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants "acted in reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of their statements."
From these allegations it appears that the plaintiffs are asserting a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, a tort which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Barbara Weisman, Trustee v. Kaspar, 233 Conn. 531, 540 (1995); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 219 Conn. 314, 327-28 (1991); J. Frederick Scholes Agency v. Mitchell, 191 Conn. 353, 358 (1983).
In order to prove that the defendants misrepresented the condition of their property to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs produced evidence showing that, at the time of their purchase of the property in 1998 the defendants were aware of the presence of the underground oil tank and purchased the fuel in the tank at closing. (Ex. 64.) However, as noted above in connection with the court's consideration of the plaintiffs' contract claims, the evidence shows that the fuel oil purchased by the defendants when they purchased the property was in the basement oil tank and that the underground oil tank in the backyard had been disconnected from the fuel system.
The plaintiffs also elicited testimony that approximately, two years prior to the closing the defendants had removed a concrete patio from their back yard. In some places the concrete was up to eighteen inches deep and required significant excavation to remove. As part of the same project the defendants had excavated to a depth of several feet in the vicinity of a "Bilco" door giving access to a stairway leading from the backyard to the basement. The purpose of that excavation was to install waterproofing to the outside of the stair enclosure in an effort to mitigate the moisture problem in the basement. Both the patio and Bilco door were located in close proximity to the underground fuel storage tank. The defendants denied reaching ground water during these excavations and denied finding any evidence (visual or olfactory) of the presence of petroleum products in the soil. The court finds those denials to be credible.
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that defendant, Hristo Varsos, must have been aware of the presence of contamination in the tank grave based upon one of the photographs which he took on May 27, 2005, the date the tank was removed from the backyard. The plaintiffs claim that photograph #8 in Exhibit 28 shows a black line in the soil at the end of tank grave and another area of black soil on the side of tank grave. The plaintiffs argue that this black soil can only be oil contamination and that the photograph proves that the defendants were aware of the contamination prior to the closing but fraudulently remained silent when they had a duty to inform the plaintiffs of the contamination. The plaintiffs further argue that the same evidence is also relevant to their breach of contract claim.
The court finds the plaintiffs' claims unpersuasive. The plaintiffs produced no evidence (expert or otherwise) supporting their claim that the black soil was either oil contamination or evidence of it. Moreover, the evidence of both parties establish that defendant, Hristo Varsos, gave copies of the photographs showing the removal of the oil tank to the plaintiffs prior to closing. Such an open disclosure is inconsistent with any guilty knowledge of a condition which the defendants were trying to hide from the plaintiffs. The court concludes that the evidence falls far short of establishing either fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation on the part of either defendant.
STATUTORY LIABILITY — GENERAL STATUTES § 22a-452.
In their third count the plaintiffs claim that the defendants are liable to them under the provisions of General Statutes § 22a-452. In relevant part, that statute provides:
(a) Any person . . . which contains or removes or otherwise mitigates the effects of oil or petroleum or chemical liquids or solid . . . resulting from any discharge, spillage, uncontrolled loss, seepage or filtration of such substance or material or waste shall be entitled to reimbursement from any person . . . for the reasonable costs expended for such containment, removal, or mitigation, if such oil or petroleum or . . . contamination or emergency resulted from the negligence or other actions of such person . . .
The evidence in this case demonstrates, without question, that the plaintiffs incurred reasonable expenses for the removal and mitigation of the fuel oil found in the soil and groundwater in the backyard of 59 Warren Street. However, the evidence fails to establish that either of the defendants were negligent or that either of them engaged in "other actions" which caused the presence of fuel oil in the soil and groundwater.
The evidence shows that when the defendants purchased the property, the underground storage tank was no longer in use. The only fuel oil which the defendants purchased prior to converting their heating system to gas, was the fuel oil in the basement tank on the date of closing. There is no evidence to suggest that the fuel oil in the backyard came from any place other than the underground storage tank. However, there was no evidence that either defendant knew of any leak in the tank prior to or after its removal.
Defendant Hristo Varsos testified that on May 27, 2005 he assisted two McGoldrick employees in removing the underground fuel tank. His assistance consisted of two relatively inconsequential acts. First, he used a spade to remove soil from around the tank after it had been uncovered by a backhoe. Second, he steadied the tank as it was being transported away from the backyard while suspended by a chain from the backhoe. There was no evidence that either defendant directed the McGoldrick employees as to how to accomplish the removal of the tank or as to the manner in which soil samples were to be taken.
In Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Refuse Gardens, Inc., 229 Conn. 455 (1994), the Supreme Court considered a claim that General Statutes § 22a-452 "imposes strict liability upon a prior landowner for a subsequent landowner's costs of cleaning up a contaminated landfill." Id., 455. In that case, the plaintiff brought an action under to recover clean-up costs of a landfill from the prior corporate owner and its officers, directors and shareholders seeking reimbursements of costs of clean-up. The Supreme Court affirmed that trial court's denial of the plaintiff's application for prejudgment remedy agreeing with the trial court's conclusion "that the legislature intended § 22a-452(a) to require a showing of culpability and not merely causation. Because the plaintiff had not alleged such culpability on the part of the defendants, the court denied the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy." Id., 458. In so holding, the court noted that "[w]ithout clear statutory guidance, we cannot presume that the legislature intended to impose strict liability on former landowners. Even the imposition of liability for negligence on former landowners is a substantial deviation from the rule of caveat emptor." Id., 459 n. 5.
Based on the tests conducted by David Poynton on behalf of the DEP, it can be inferred that McGoldrick either failed to remove the underground tank properly, or, more likely, failed to take appropriate soil samples from the tank grave. However, the evidence demonstrated that McGoldrick was acting as an independent contractor. It is axiomatic that one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the independent contractor. Gazo v. Stamford, 256 Conn. 245, 256-57 (2001); Douglass v. Peck Lines Co., 89 Conn. 622, 627 (1918). Accordingly, neither defendant can be held responsible for either the negligent acts of McGoldrick or those of its subcontractor, Complete Environmental Testing, Inc.
In the absence of evidence of either the defendants' negligence or any "other actions" causally connected to the oil contamination in the backyard of 49 Warren Avenue, the defendants cannot be held responsible under the provisions of General Statutes § 22a-452. The court finds the issues on the third count for the defendants.
Because of its findings with respect to the plaintiffs' claims, the court does not reach the issues raised by the defendants' special defenses.
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM — ATTORNEYS FEES
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants claimed to be entitled to the award of attorneys fees pursuant to paragraph 37 of the contract. The court finds that the plaintiffs' first count claiming breach of contract sought to enforce provisions of the contract. The court has found for the defendants on the first count. Accordingly, as the "prevailing party" they are entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred in the defense of the contract action. The defendants produced evidence of the expenditure of $10,410.75 in attorneys fees incurred in defense of the action brought by the plaintiffs. Some of these fees were incurred in defense of the plaintiffs' claims of misrepresentation under the second count and liability under General Statutes § 22a-452 under the third count. The defendants have not made a claim for reimbursement of attorneys fees incurred in connection with the second and third counts nor have the defendants provided evidence from which the court could determine the portion of their attorneys fees attributable to the defense of each count.
Our Supreme Court has held that under similar circumstances a trial courts can "rely on their general knowledge of what had occurred at the proceedings before them to supply evidence in support of an award of attorneys fees." Andrews v. Gorby, 237 Conn. 12, 24, (1997). Based on the evidence produced at trial and the relative complexity of each of the plaintiffs' claims, the court finds that pursuant to their counterclaim, the defendants are entitled to an award of damages for their attorneys fees in the amount of $7,000 plus taxable costs for their successful defense of the plaintiffs' claims under the contract. Judgment may enter in accordance with this memorandum of decision.