Opinion
Civil Action 20-6277
04-19-2022
VIRGILIO MANGUAL-ALICEA v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security[1]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ELIZABETH T. HEY, U.S.M.J.
Virgilio Mangual-Alicea (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”), denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and recommend that the Commissioner's decision denying benefits be affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In his October 4, 2018 DIB application, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of September 21, 2018. Tr. at 62, 147. The claim was denied initially, id. at 63-66, and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, id. at 72-73, which took place on November 14, 2019. Id. at 34-48. The ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim for benefits on December 12, 2019, id. at 18-26, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on October 16, 2020. Id. at 1-3.
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 14, 2020, and filed a Brief and Statement of Issues on June 28, 2021. Docs. 1 & 13. Defendant filed a response on July 28, 2021, to which Plaintiff filed a reply on August 9, 2021. Docs. 15 & 16. The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, referred the case to me to prepare a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). Doc. 16.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
To prove disability, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for . . . not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). The Commissioner employs a five-step process, evaluating:
1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;
2. If not, whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;
3. If so, whether based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in the listing of impairments (“Listings”), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, which results in a presumption of disability;
4. If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria for a listed impairment, whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past work; and
5. If the claimant cannot perform his past work, then the final step is to determine whether there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform.See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to establish that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs in the local and national economies, in light of his age, education, work experience, and RFC. See Poulos v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007).
The court's role on judicial review is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, the issue in this case is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and must be “more than a mere scintilla.” Zirnsak, 777 F.2d at 610 (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)).
III. FACT RECORD AND THE ALJ'S DECISION
Plaintiff was born on January 18, 1974, making him 44 years old at the time of his alleged disability onset date (September 21, 2018), and 45 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision (December 12, 2019). Tr. at 35, 147. When Plaintiff completed his Disability Report, he was 5 feet, 6 inches tall, and weighed 180 pounds. Id. at 173. Plaintiff testified that he completed the fifth grade in Puerto Rico and was unable to read, write or speak English, and he required an interpreter at the administrative hearing. Id. at 35-36. He also testified that he cannot read or write in Spanish. Id. at 41, 44. Plaintiff has past relevant work as an auto detailer and laborer. Id. at 46, 174.
During a consultative examination, Plaintiff reported that he “went to the sixth grade” and was in special education for reading, writing, and arithmetic. Tr. at 276; see also id. at 339 (reported finishing sixth grade in Puerto Rico). During the Adult Psychosocial Assessment on December 10, 2018, Eduardo Maldonado, M.A., reported that the assessment was conducted in English and Plaintiff spoke English at home and work and could read and write English. Id. at 341. When the ALJ asked about Plaintiff completing that interview in English, Plaintiff testified that his friend “filled it out.” Id. at 36.
Plaintiff alleged disability beginning on September 21, 2018, as a result of mild mental retardation, anxiety, bipolar disorder, depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and intermittent explosive disorder (“IED”). Tr. at 173.
To be entitled to DIB, Plaintiff must establish that he became disabled on or before his date last insured, 20 C.F.R. § 404.101(a), which was determined to be September 30, 2019, at the initial review level. Tr. at 49. The ALJ indicated in his opinion that Plaintiff met the insured status requirement through September 30, 2020. Id. at 18, 20. I find no explanation for the discrepancy. Plaintiff filed four earlier petitions for benefits (February 2010, March 2012, October 2012, and February 2014), all of which were denied at the initial determination phase and Plaintiff did not seek an administrative hearing. Tr. at 50, 53.
A. Mental Health Treatment Records
The record includes notes for the diagnoses and treatment for various physical ailments, see, e.g., tr. at 298-301 (4/1/16 - joint pain suspected to be related to inflammatory bowel disease), 293-96 (5/13/16 - follow up colonoscopy noting diagnosis of ulcerative colitis in 2009), 286-90 (7/22/16 - shoulder and other joint pain and stiffness related to ulcerative colitis). Because Plaintiff's claims are limited to the ALJ's consideration of Plaintiff's mental impairments, I will focus on the mental health treatment evidence.
At a consultative mental status evaluation on December 14, 2018, Plaintiff told Kathleen Ledermann, Psy.D., that he had been hospitalized for psychiatric symptoms three times, in 2009, 2012, and 2016, and during one of those hospitalizations, he attempted suicide. Tr. at 277. The corresponding treatment notes are not contained in the record. However, on June 26, 2014, during a consultative examination related to an earlier application for benefits, Michael Caiazzo, Psy.D., noted that Plaintiff was hospitalized earlier that year due to a suicide attempt. Id. at 265. At that point, Plaintiff reported attending weekly outpatient psychotherapy and medication management at Lancaster Behavioral Health, and his medications included Risperdal. Id. There are no related treatment notes in the record. On February 6, 2013, Thomas Schwartz, Ph.D., another consultative examiner, also noted that Plaintiff was then taking Risperdal for depression prescribed by his primary care physician. Id. at 239.
In a history he provided on December 10, 2018, Plaintiff reported that “he took a bunch of pills” and was taken to the emergency room. Tr. at 338.
Risperdal is an antipsychotic used to treat schizophrenia. See https://www.drugs.com/risperdal.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
During her December 14, 2018 evaluation, Dr. Ledermann noted prior diagnoses of mild mental retardation, ADHD, depression, anxiety, paranoia, anger, and hearing voices. Tr. at 277. At that time, Plaintiff reported that he was seeing a therapist once a week and was going to begin seeing a psychiatrist the following month. Id. On mental status exam (“MSE”), Plaintiff was disheveled with poor grooming; his thoughts had no evidence of hallucinations or delusions; his affect was labile, irritated, and somewhat hostile; he reported that he felt “not good” and mad; he was oriented to person but did not know the day of the week or where he was; and his insight and judgment were both poor. Id. at 278. Dr. Ledermann noted that Plaintiff became irritable and agitated during the MSE and jumped out of his chair at one point during the evaluation. Id. Dr. Ledermann discontinued the concentration and memory skills evaluation due to Plaintiff's agitation, but noted that Plaintiff had difficulty with attention, concentration, and memory. Id. at 278-79. Plaintiff reported visual and auditory hallucinations and seeing shadows and hearing voices, and that he has angry outbursts at least twice a week. Id. at 277. Dr. Ledermann diagnosed Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder (depressed type with paranoid features), unspecified anxiety disorder, IED, specific learning disorder (reading, writing, and arithmetic), and a rule out diagnosis of intellectual disability. Id. at 279.
“The diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder is based on the assessment of an uninterrupted period of illness during which the individual continues to display active or residual symptoms of psychotic illness.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed. (2013) (“DSM 5”) at 106. The diagnostic criteria include an uninterrupted period of illness during which there is a major mood episode concurrent with delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech or thought and/or negative symptoms associated with schizophrenia. Id. at 105.
Unspecified anxiety disorder “applies to presentations in which symptoms characteristic of an anxiety disorder that cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning predominate but do not meet the full criteria for any of the disorders in the anxiety disorders diagnostic class.” DSM-5 at 233.
“[T]he criteria for [IED] focus largely on such poorly controlled emotion, outbursts of anger that are disproportionate to the interpersonal or other provocation or to other psychosocial stressors.” DSM 5 at 461.
Dr. Ledermann completed a Medical Source Statement, finding that Plaintiff had mild limitations in his abilities to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions, moderate limitation in the abilities to understand, remember and carry out complex instructions, and marked limitation in the ability to make judgments on complex work-related decisions. Tr. at 281. The doctor found Plaintiff had marked to extreme limitations in his ability to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, and coworkers, and a moderate limitation in his ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting. Id. at 282.
On December 10, 2018, Eduardo Maldonado, M.A., at Cuidado Sincero, conducted a psychosocial assessment. Tr. at 336-47. On MSE, Mr. Maldonado noted that Plaintiff's appearance was appropriate with fair hygiene, he was passive with fair eye contact and was restless. Id. at 345. His mood and affect were depressed, with a notation of a constricted affect, and his thought content was ruminative-worrying. Id. at 345-46. Mr. Maldonado did not note current auditory or visual hallucinations, but indicated that Plaintiff complained of auditory and visual hallucinations. Id. His attention/concentration and insight were poor/limited and his memory and judgment were impaired. Id. at 346. Mr. Maldonado diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar I disorder (current or most recent episode depressed) and assessed Plaintiff with a Global Assessment of Functioning score of 50. Id. at 347. Plaintiff repeated that he sought treatment to “work on his depression and anxiety” and manage anger and aggressive feelings and behaviors. Id. at 344.
Diagnosis of bipolar I disorder requires a manic episode preceded by or followed by a hypomanic or major depressive episode. DSM5 at 123.
The GAF score is a measurement of a person's overall psychological, social, and occupational functioning, and is used to assess mental health. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. Text Revision (2000), at 34. A GAF score of 41-50 indicates “[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) [or] any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” Id.
Plaintiff saw Bassam M.A. El-Borno, M.D., at Cuidado Sincero on January 17, 2019. Tr. at 361-62. At that time, the only unusual notations on MSE were a depressed and euthymic mood and fair judgment and insight. Id. Notably, Dr. El-Borno noted that Plaintiff's recent and remote memory were intact. Id. at 362. The MSEs were identical on February 7, March 7, and April 4, 2019. Id. at 363-64, 365-66, 367-68. The Prescription Record indicates that Plaintiff began on Risperdal and Cogentin on January 12, 2019. Id. at 360. Xanax and Zoloft were added to Plaintiff's treatment regimen on February 7, 2019, and Remeron was added on April 4, 2019. Id. at 360. On April 4, 2019, Dr El-Borno completed a Department of Human Services form indicating that Plaintiff was permanently disabled as a result of bipolar I disorder (current or most recent episode depressed with psychotic features) and mental retardation diagnosed when he was in school. Id. at 369.
Cogentin is used to treat symptoms of Parkinson's disease and to treat Parkinson-like symptoms caused by certain medications. See https://www.drugs.com/mtm/cogentin.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
Xanax is a benzodiazepine used to treat anxiety disorders, anxiety caused by depression, and panic disorder. See https://www.drugs.com/xanax.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2022). Zoloft is an antidepressant. See https://www.drugs.com/zoloft.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
Remeron is an antidepressant. See https://www.drugs.com/search.php?searchterm=Remeron&sources%5B%5D= (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
At the initial review stage, on December 27, 2018, Valorie Rings, Psy.D., found from a review of the records that Plaintiff suffered from schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, depressive, bipolar and related disorders, anxiety and obsessivecompulsive disorders, personality and impulse control disorders and neurodevelopmental disorders. Tr. at 56. Dr. Rings found Plaintiff had no limitations in his ability to understand, remember, or apply information, mild limitations in his abilities to interact with others and adapt or manage oneself, and moderate limitations in his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. Id. at 55. With respect to Dr. Ledermann's assessment, Dr. Rings noted that “other evidence in [the] file do[es] not consistently show this type of presentation. In other evidence, this gentleman is able to make his needs known in a social[ly] appropriate manner.” Id.
B. Hearing Testimony and Related Evidence
As previously noted, Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing with the assistance of an interpreter. Tr. at 35. Plaintiff testified that he gets nervous around people and does not socialize because if someone says something he does not like, he will get violent and want to fight with them. Id. at 38-39. When people make fun of him because he does not speak properly and cannot write, he gets mad and fears that he will become violent and end up in prison. Id. at 41. When Plaintiff gets angry, it takes him an hour or two to calm down. Id. at 42.
Plaintiff testified that when he is not taking his medication he hears voices that tell him to hurt people. Tr. at 41. He testified that, at the time of the hearing, he was not taking medication because his doctor closed down the building. Id. at 40. When he has thoughts of doing bad things, he gets anxious and afraid. Id. at 42. When he gets depressed, he does not want to go out because he is afraid he will hurt people. Id. at 43. He also has trouble with his memory and has to be told something three times before he will remember. Id. Plaintiff testified that a friend pays his household expenses, cooks, does the grocery shopping and the laundry although he goes with her to do the shopping and laundry. Tr. at 37. She also provides transportation for him. Id. at 38.
Although not identified, it may be that the friend to whom Plaintiff was referring at the administrative hearing was Holly Casanova, a friend who completed a Third Party Function Report. Tr. at 184-91.
Plaintiff's friend Ms. Casanova explained in her Function Report that Plaintiff is afraid to leave his boarding house because he wants to fight everyone and does not trust anyone. Tr. at 184. She explained that she visits him once a week and he refuses to leave his room. Id. at 186. She noted that he needs instructions explained to him verbally in Spanish because he cannot read or write in English or Spanish, and that he needs things repeated and does better visually seeing what he has to do. Id. at 187. She described him as paranoid and said that he shuts down when there are changes in his routine. Id. at 188.
A vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing and described Plaintiff's past work as an auto detailer and as a laborer as medium level work and the laborer job as unskilled. Tr. at 46. The ALJ asked the VE to consider a hypothetical person of Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience who could perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks with few, if any, workplace changes, with no interaction with the public, occasional interaction with co-workers, but no tandem tasks, and occasional supervision. Id. The VE said that such a person could not perform the auto detailer job, but could perform the laborer job. Id. The VE also identified other jobs that such a person could perform, including laundry laborer, machine feeder, and cleaner/housekeeper. Id. at 4647. The ALJ then asked about the same person but with the additional limitation of not being able to engage in sustained work activity on a regular and continuing basis for eight hours a day, five days a week, and the VE responded that such a person could not perform these jobs or any other type of jobs. Id. at 47. Similarly, when asked if the person could not have any interaction with co-workers or supervisors, the VE said that such a person could not be employed. Id.
C. ALJ'S Opinion
In the decision dated December 12, 2019, the ALJ found as follows:
1. At step one, Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 21, 2018, the alleged onset date. Tr. at 20.
2. At step two, Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: Specific Learning Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, Anxiety, and IED. Id.
3. At step three, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id.
4. Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: he is limited to work involving only simple, routine, repetitive tasks with few, if any, workplace changes, no interaction with the public, occasional interaction with coworkers but no tandem tasks, and occasional supervision. Id. at 22.
5. At step four, Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a laborer. Id. at 25.
Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 25-26.
In his request for review, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ erred in failing to (1) explain the RFC determination that Plaintiff could have occasional interaction with supervisors and co- workers in light of Dr. Ledermann's assessment that Plaintiff had marked to extreme limitation in interaction with the public, co-workers, and supervisors, and (2) consider how Plaintiff's inability to tolerate work stress would impact his ability to work on a regular and continuing basis. Doc. 13 at 3-6. Defendant responds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and that he reasonably considered Plaintiff's ability to interact with others and his ability to handle stress and that the RFC assessment accounted for Plaintiff's established functional limitations. Doc. 14 at 6-11. Plaintiff also filed a reply and the arguments presented in the reply will be addressed in the discussion. Doc. 15.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Interaction with Others
Plaintiff first complains that the ALJ erred in failing to explain the finding that Plaintiff could tolerate occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. Doc. 13 at 4-5. Defendant responds that the ALJ adequately explained his finding. Doc. 14 at 6-9.
In determining that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in interacting with others at the third step of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff's history of anger issues, but noted that when he was receiving psychiatric treatment, his MSEs were normal.
In interacting with others, [Plaintiff] has a moderate limitation. [Plaintiff] has a history of anger issues and assaultive behavior secondary to hearing voices telling him to harm others ([tr. at 274-83, 335-55]). The record indicates that [Plaintiff] became ang[ry] and irritable with the interpreter at the consultative evaluation when his speech was not understood ([id. at 274-83]). [Plaintiff] testified that he
has “bad thoughts” without his medication (Hearing Testimony). The record indicates that he presented with overall stable and normal [MSE] findings while receiving monthly psychiatric outpatient treatment ([id. at 356-68]).Tr. at 21. In discussing the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ found Dr. Ledermann's assessment persuasive
as it indicates that [Plaintiff] has no more than a mild limitation in his ability to remember, understand, and carry out simple instructions. Dr. Ledermann noted [Plaintiff's] history of auditory hallucinations and anger/assaultive behavior. As noted above, [Plaintiff] became angry during the evaluation when the interpreter did not understand him. However, [Plaintiff] was not taking any prescribed medications. At the hearing, he testified that without his medications he experiences thought-related symptoms (bad thoughts) ([tr. at 274-83] and Hearing Testimony).Id. at 24. Thus, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's difficulties in interacting with others and explained that when Plaintiff is under psychiatric care, he is not as limited. The ALJ also acknowledged Dr. Ledermann's assessment of Plaintiff's functional abilities, including her finding that he had a marked to extreme limitation in his ability to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, and coworkers. Id. However, as noted in the above quote, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff was not taking any prescribed medications at the time of Dr. Ledermann's consultative examination and Plaintiff testified that without his medications he experiences “thought-related symptoms (bad thoughts).” Id. at 24 (citing Id. at 274-83 and Hearing Testimony). As the ALJ explained his reasons for rejecting this portion of Dr. Ledermann's assessment supported by evidence from the record, I find no error in the ALJ's determination in this regard. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005) (ALJ may not “reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason”).
In his reply brief, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's mental symptoms improved with medication. “[A]ny improvement that a claimant experience[s] is relevant only to the extent that the improvement restores a claimant's capacity to engage in substantial gainful activity.” Doc. 15 at 1. However, the ALJ explained that “[t]he record indicates that while in treatment and prescribed medication, [Plaintiff] presented with overall normal and stable [MSE] findings (Hearing Testimony and [tr. at 274-83, 356-68]).” Tr. at 25. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. When Plaintiff was seeing Dr. El-Borno regularly between January and April 2019, and prescribed medication for the treatment of his mental health impairments, his MSEs were normal apart from euthymic and depressed mood and fair judgment/insight. Id. at 361-62, 363-64, 365-66, 367-68.
Plaintiff also complains in the reply brief that the ALJ did not explain why Plaintiff's auditory and visual hallucinations and paranoid thinking “did not warrant limitations that [Plaintiff] could not have properly interacted with supervisors or received criticism from supervisors.” Doc. 15 at 1-2. Again, once Plaintiff began treatment and taking medication for his mental health impairments, the MSEs were normal with no indication of any hallucinations and “intact” perception/reality testing. Tr. At 361-62, 363-64, 365-66, 367-68.
To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that “occasional” interaction with coworkers and supervisors was insufficient to address moderate limitations in interacting with others, I reject the argument. Courts in this circuit have determined that “occasional” or “superficial” contact with supervisors, co-workers, or the public is adequate to reflect moderate limitations in social functioning. See Peggy C. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. 19-17472, 2021 WL 3206812, at *6-7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2021) (remanding where ALJ failed to include limitation in interacting with supervisors, but finding occasional interaction with coworkers and the public sufficient to address moderate limitation in interaction for those two groups); Meszaros v. Saul, Civ. No. 19-1809, 2021 WL 1398228, at *7 (M.D. Pa. March 12, 2021) (R&R adopted Apr. 13, 2021) (citing Hyer v. Colvin, Civ. No. 15-297, 2016 WL 5719683, at *13 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) (collecting cases)); Brassfield v. Colvin, Civ. No. 11-847, 2013 WL 1345644, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2013) (finding that occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors was sufficient to accommodate moderate social limitations and that marked limitation in interacting with the public was accommodated by no interaction with the public).
In his reply brief, Plaintiff also argues that “[b]ecause the ALJ disagreed with all opinion evidence in [the] file regarding [Plaintiff's] limitations in social interaction, an evidentiary deficit was created.” Doc. 15 at 2. This argument finds its genesis in Doak v. Heckler, in which the Third Circuit held that the ALJ's decision that the plaintiff was able to perform light work was not supported by substantial evidence because “[n]o physician suggested that the activity Doak could perform was consistent with the definition of light work.” 790 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1986). However, the judges of this district have not read Doak to require the ALJ to adopt a medical opinion for each component of the RFC assessment.
As previously noted, Dr. Ledermann found Plaintiff to have marked to extreme limitations in his ability to interact appropriate with the public, supervisors, and coworkers. Tr. at 282. Dr. Rings, who reviewed the records at the initial review stage, found that Plaintiff had mild limitations in his ability to interact with others. Id. at 55.
Doak does not stand for the proposition that an ALJ cannot make an RFC determination in the absence of a medical opinion reaching the same conclusion. Such a rule would be inconsistent [with] the Third Circuit's express holding that “[t]he ALJ - not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants - must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Rather, the Court in Doak held that the ALJ's opinion was unsupported because nothing in the record, which consisted of testimony and three medical reports, justified the ALJ's conclusion. Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the more recent, nonprecedential Third Circuit and district court opinions . . . clarify, rather than contradict, Doak's holding, and make clear that an ALJ is not restricted to adopting the conclusions of a medical opinion in making an RFC determination.Cleinow v. Berryhill, 311 F.Supp.3d 683, 685 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (footnotes omitted); see also Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed.Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC. Surveying the medical evidence to craft an RFC is part of the ALJ's duties.”).
As discussed, the ALJ adequately explained his consideration of the opinion evidence, noting that Dr. Ledermann evaluated Plaintiff when he was not under psychiatric care and not taking medications, and that he “presented with overall normal and stable [MSE] findings” when he was in treatment. Tr. at 24, 25. Likewise, the ALJ found that Dr. Rings' assessment understated his limitations based on the record as a whole. Id. at 24.
B. Stress
Plaintiff next complains that the ALJ failed to analyze how Plaintiff's inability to tolerate work stress would impact his ability to work on a regular and continuing basis. Doc. 13 at 5-6. Defendant responds that Plaintiff's argument is based on a statement by Plaintiff's friend that the ALJ properly found unpersuasive. Doc. 14 at 9-11.
In considering medical opinion evidence, the governing regulation lists the factors to be utilized in considering medical opinions: supportability, consistency, relationship including the length and purpose of the treatment relationship and frequency of examinations, specialization, and other factors including familiarity with other evidence in the record or an understanding of the disability program. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). The most important of these factors are supportability and consistency. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The regulation includes nonmedical source evidence, but does not require the ALJ to articulate how he considered such evidence. Id. § 404.1520c(d).
In presenting the argument regarding the ALJ's failure to consider stress, Plaintiff relies on the third-party function report completed by Ms. Casanova in which she stated that “when subjected to stress, [Plaintiff] got suicidal, pulled his hair, punched himself, and hurt others.” Doc. 13 at 5 (citing tr. at 188). The ALJ addressed Ms. Casanova's report in his decision.
This report is not persuasive. While Ms. Casanova is a longtime friend of [Plaintiff], she is not a medical or mental health treatment provider. She indicated that her interaction with
[Plaintiff] is limited to once a week. The record also indicates that she completed the report prior to [Plaintiff]
beginning outpatient psychiatric treatment and being prescribed medication ([tr. at 335-55, 356-68]).Id. at 24-25.
Having considered Ms. Casanova's report and concluded that she had limited time with Plaintiff and that her observations were inconsistent with the mental health treatment evidence that Plaintiff “presented with overall normal and stable MSE findings” while in mental health treatment, I find no error in the ALJ's consideration of Ms. Casanova's report.
V. CONCLUSION
The ALJ's determination that Plaintiff could have occasional interaction with coworkers and occasional supervision is supported by substantial evidence. To the extent Plaintiff complains that “occasional” interaction is insufficient to address a moderate limitation in interacting with others, the courts of our circuit have found such a limitation to be sufficient. Similarly, the ALJ properly considered the evidence in formulating the RFC and the mental health treatment evidence did not warrant any additional limitation based on stress.
Therefore, I make the following:
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this 19th day of April, 2022, it is RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's final decision denying disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income should be AFFIRMED. The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. See Local Civ. Rule 72.1. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of, 2022, upon careful and independent consideration, the record reveals that the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED AND ADOPTED;
2. JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY and the relief sought by Plaintiff is DENIED; and
3. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to mark this case closed.
C. DARNELL JONES, II, J.