Opinion
HHDCV166067517S
12-12-2016
Bonnie Mangan v. Newfield Construction, Inc. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#121)
Kevin G. Dubay, J.
FACTS
The present action was commenced on March 21, 2016, by the appointed Chapter 7 Trustee in the bankruptcy action concerning Mota Brothers Asbestos, LLC (Mota Brothers), pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Connecticut, Hartford Division. The Trustee brings suit with the approval of the Bankruptcy Court for the purpose of collecting money due and owing to Mota Brothers for the benefit of Mota Brothers' creditors.
On July 8, 2016, defendant, Kronenberger & Sons (Kronenberger) filed their answer and special defenses with the court. The defendants, the State of Connecticut Department of Labor and its Commissioner (the state), moved to strike Kronenberger's special defenses on July 18, 2016. In its memorandum of law, the state argues, inter alia, that Kronenberger's special defenses either fail to state a cause of action, or are conclusory, or are not recognized special defenses, or simply do not correspond to facts alleged in the complaint. Thereafter, on July 21, 2016, Kronenberger filed a request to amend, along with an amended answer and amended special defenses. On August 31, 2016, Kronenberger filed their objection to the motion to strike, arguing that the state, as co-defendant, lacks standing to strike its special defenses, and, further, the motion to strike is now moot as the special defenses have since been amended. On September 2, 2016, the state replied, countering that it has standing to file the motion to strike given that it has an interest in defending itself against the action, and an interest in enforcing the prevailing wage and hour laws. Oral argument was heard during the short calendar on September 12, 2016.
DISCUSSION
I
Standing
" Standing concerns the legal right of an individual to set the machinery of the courts in operation . . . [W]e have long recognized that a person is not entitled to set the machinery of the courts in operation except to obtain redress for an injury he has suffered or to prevent an injury he may suffer, either in an individual or a representative capacity. . . . An individual also has standing to litigate a claim where that right is conferred by statute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 545-46, 427 A.2d 822 (1980). " When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Association of Boards of Education, Inc. v. Shedd, 197 Conn. 554, 558, 499 A.2d 797 (1985). " A complaining party ordinarily can show that it is a proper party when it makes a colorable claim of [a] direct injury [it] has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 553-54, 698 A.2d 245 (1997).
In the present case, the plaintiff has named the state as a defendant to this action in count eleven pursuant to the interpleader statute, General Statutes § 52-484, and in count twelve as a party to the declaratory judgment which the plaintiff seeks. Because the nature of counts eleven and twelve seek to determine the rights of the state interest with respect to the unpaid wages owed to Mota Brothers, the state has sufficiently demonstrated that it has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, and thus, the necessary standing to file its motion to strike Kronenberger's special defenses.
General Statutes § 52-484 provides in relevant part: " Whenever any person has, or is alleged to have, any money . . . in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, to any court which by law has equitable jurisdiction of the parties and amount in controversy, making all persons parties who claim to be entitled to or interested in such money or other property. Such court shall hear and determine all questions which may arise in the case, may tax costs at its discretion and, under the rules applicable to an action of interpleader, may allow to one or more of the parties a reasonable sum or sums for counsel fees and disbursements, payable out of such fund or property; but no such allowance shall be made unless it has been claimed by the party in his complaint or answer."
II
Motion to Strike Special Defenses
" A motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest . . . (5) the legal sufficiency of any answer . . . or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein." (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 10-39(a)(5). See also GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 179-80, 73 A.3d 742 (2013).
" Generally speaking, facts must be pleaded as a special defense when they are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action . . . The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway . . . Whether facts must be specially pleaded depends on the nature of those facts in relation to the contested issues." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Almada v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 449, 456, 876 A.2d 535 (2005). " In ruling on a motion to strike, the trial court must accept as true the facts alleged in the special defenses and construe them in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 398, 119 A.3d 462 (2015). " On the other hand, the total absence of any factual allegations specific to the dispute renders [the special defense] legally insufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Jackson, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-14-6024411-S (August 21, 2015, Roraback, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 864, 865, ) .
In the present case, Kronenberger's answer includes ten enumerated special defenses; each set forth as a conclusory statement, absent any facts supporting the legal conclusion it purports to assert. For example, the First Special Defense reads: " The complaint fails to state a claim, in whole or in part, upon which relief may be granted." The remaining enumerated special defenses are plead in a substantially similar fashion. It is well recognized in the State of Connecticut that legal conclusions may not be asserted as special defenses, and special defenses which fail to allege supporting facts is a ground upon which said special defenses may be stricken. See People's United Bank v. Wetherill Associates, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-6005763-S (January 4, 2011, Robaina, J.) (51 Conn.L.Rptr. 377, ); Cluney v. Regional School District No. 13, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-99-0089468-S (June 19, 2000, Gordon, J.) (27 Conn.L.Rptr. 415, ); Sun Company, Inc. v. Greg & Todd, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-98-0577958-S, (October 7, 1998, Hale, J.) (23 Conn.L.Rptr. 304, ); Cowart v. Grimaldi, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-96-61674-S (February 7, 1997, Rittenband, J.) (46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833) [18 Conn.L.Rptr. 682, ]. Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted.