Summary
In Mandle it was said: "The sensibilities of mankind demand that anyone, whether he be a citizen or a stranger, is entitled to receive hospital and medical care when he is injured in this State, and the State must furnish such services either through the means of its public institutions or by private citizens, who are the State. Humanity also demands that indigent and helpless persons be furnished the necessities of life, and this, too, must be furnished by the State through public or private means.
Summary of this case from The Harrison Co. v. NortonOpinion
No. 40273.
November 19, 1956.
1. Workmen's Compensation — conflict of laws — injury in this State of employee hired elsewhere — where Act of sister State silent as to extra-territorial recognition of laws of this State.
Where Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act was silent as to extra-territorial provisions of workmen's compensation or similar laws of other States and did not provide for exempting from its application employees and employers in situation where employees are hired and regularly employed outside Georgia but injured while temporarily within Georgia doing work for their employers, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act would apply to injuries sustained by Georgia employee while temporarily within Mississippi and doing work for his Georgia employer. Secs. 6998-01, et seq., 6998-55(c), Code 1942; Sec. 114-101 et seq., Code Ga.
2. Workmen's Compensation — Act adopted in public interest.
Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act was adopted in exercise of State's police power to provide for welfare of its citizens and others performing labor within its borders, and subject matter of such legislation is one concerning which the State is competent to legislate. Sec. 6998-01, et seq., Code 1942.
3. States — constitutional law — injury in this State of employee hired elsewhere — full faith and credit clause of Federal Constitution would not require withholding of application of Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Laws.
Where employee and employer were residents of Georgia and had entered into the employment contract in Georgia, but employee was injured while temporarily doing work for employer in Mississippi and received in Mississippi extensive medical treatment for which payment had not been made, Mississippi had a substantial and legitimate interest in the matter, and full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution would not require Mississippi to withhold application of its Workmen's Compensation laws merely because they conflicted with Georgia laws. Sec. 6998-01, et seq., Code 1942; Sec. 114-101 et seq., Code Ga.; Sec. 1, Art. IV, U.S.C.A. Const.
4. Workmen's Compensation — injury in this State of employee hired elsewhere — State has legitimate interest in imposing rule of Workmen's Compensation liability — application of Act may not be altered by contract.
State has such a legitimate interest in imposing a rule of workmen's compensation liability where an injury occurs within State that application of Workmen's Compensation Statute of such State may not be altered by contract.
5. Workmen's Compensation — State within its sovereign powers to adopt reasonable measures in its Workmen's Compensation Act for safety and welfare of its citizens and others within its borders.
In absence of Congressional regulations on the subject or infringement on Federal jurisdiction or authority in respect to interstate commerce, Mississippi was well within its sovereign powers to adopt reasonable measures in its Workmen's Compensation Act for safety and welfare of its citizens and others within its borders. 6998-01, et seq., Code 1942; Ch. 3, Sec. 8, Art. II. U.S.C.A. Const.
6. States — injury in this State of employee hired elsewhere — State had such interest in matter that its Workmen's Compensation Act would be applicable notwithstanding full faith and credit or interstate commerce clauses of Federal Constitution.
In matter of Georgia employee, who was employed by Georgia employer, but who was injured while temporarily in Mississippi doing work for Georgia employer, and whose medical bills were owed to Mississippi citizens and had not been paid, Mississippi had such substantial interest in matter that its Workmen's Compensation Act would be applicable notwithstanding contract of parties or full faith and credit or interstate commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution. Sec. 6998-01, et seq., Code 1942; Ch. 3, Sec. 8, Art. I and Sec. 1, Art. IV, U.S.C.A. Const.
7. Workmen's Compensation — compensation carrier's liability fixed and limited by contract and State law under which contract was made.
Compensation carrier's liability was fixed and limited by terms of contract and the Georgia law under which the contract was made. Sec. 114-101, et seq., Code Ga.
8. Workmen's Compensation — liability of compensation carrier under its contract could not be extended by application of Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act.
Where compensation carrier's contract with employer expressly provided that carrier was not obligated to pay any person any benefit under any compensation law except that of Georgia, liability of carrier could not be extended by application of Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act, even though employer and employee came within Mississippi Act, in view of the fact that carrier had not subjected itself to the policy and public interest of Mississippi. Sec. 6998-01, et seq., Code 1942; Sec. 114-101, et seq., Code Ga.; Amend. XIV, U.S.C.A. Const.
9. Constitutional law — due process — contracts — State may not extend effect of its laws beyond its borders to impair right of citizens of other States to make contract not operative within State's jurisdiction and lawful where made.
State may not extend effect of its laws beyond its borders to impair right of citizens of other States to make a contract not operative within State's jurisdiction and lawful where made, and to do so would violate the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. Amend. XIV, U.S.C.A. Const.
Headnotes as approved by Gillespie, J.
ON MOTION TO APPROVE CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEESJanuary 21, 1957 92 So.2d 246
10. Workmen's compensation — attorney's fee.
Where claimant and his attorney requested the Supreme Court to approve a contract under which attorney was to receive 50 per centum of amount of compensation recovered by claimant, Supreme Court would allow attorney a counsel fee of only 33-1/3 per centum of the total amount which might be recovered by claimant, though claimant's attorney performed an unusual amount of legal work in compensation proceeding.
Headnote as approved by Roberds, P.J.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Harrison County; LESLIE B. GRANT, Judge.
Jason Floyd, Gulfport, for appellant.
I. Would Mississippi's taking jurisdiction of this claim violate the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution? The above question must be answered in the negative. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. of California, 306 U.S. 493, 83 L.Ed. 940, 59 S.Ct. 629; Art. IV Sec. 1, U.S. Constitution; Vol. II, Larson's Workmen's Comp. Law, Secs. 86.32, 86.50 pp. 370, 375.
II. Would Mississippi's taking jurisdiction of this claim impair the obligation of a contract, so as to violate United States Constitution? This question must be answered in the negative. In re Alaska Packers Case, 294 U.S. 532, 79 L.Ed. 1044, 55 S.Ct. 518; Art. I Sec. 10, U.S. Constitution.
III. For Mississippi to apply its Act would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) of Federal Constitution. In re Liberty Mut. Case, 306 U.S. 493, 59 S.Ct. 629; Art. I Sec. 1, Amend. XIV, U.S. Constitution; Vol. II, Lawson's Workmen's Comp. Law, Sec. 86.34 p. 372.
IV. Would Mississippi's taking jurisdiction of this claim violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution? This question has been answered in the negative. Holly v. Industrial Comm. (Ohio), 50 N.E.2d 152; Valley Steamship Co. v. Wattawa, 244 U.S. 202, 61 L.Ed. 1084, 37 S.Ct. 523; Lake Shore Mich. So. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285, 43 L.Ed. 702, 19 S.Ct. 455; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 408, 57 L.Ed. 1511, 33 S.Ct. 729; Spohn v. Industrial Comm., 138 Ohio St. 42, 32 N.E.2d 554, 133 A.L.R. 931; Ahern v. United Van Lines, 265 App. Div. 898, 37 N.Y.S.2d 990; M. A. Motor Freight Lines v. Villere, 190 Miss. 848, 1 So.2d 788; Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 76 L.Ed. 1026, 52 S.Ct. 571; In re Alaska Packers Case, supra; Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 91 L.Ed. 1028, 67 S.Ct. 801; In re Chattanooga Boiler Case, 289 U.S. 439, 77 L.Ed. 1307, 53 S.Ct. 663; In re McCartin Case, 330 U.S. 622, 91 L.Ed. 1140, 67 S.Ct. 886; Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 3, U.S. Constitution; 58 Am. Jur., Sec. 76 p. 629; Larson's Workmen's Comp. Law, Secs. 86, 86.10, 86.20, 86.30-86.34, 86.40, 86.50.
V. Does the fact that the employer did not have eight employees employed in Mississippi at time of injury preclude the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Commission from taking jurisdiction of this claim? The Mississippi Compensation Act does not provide that the employer is required to have eight workmen in the State of Mississippi. McFall v. Barton-Mansfield Co., 333 Mo. 110, 61 S.W.2d 911; Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 330 Mo. 596, 50 S.W.2d 32; Mobile Elevator Co. v. White (Fla.), 39 So.2d 799; Sec. 3(A), Miss. Workmen's Comp. Act; Vol. I, Larson's Workmen's Comp. Law, Sec. 52.34 p. 774.
VI. The one-year statute of limitations provided in the Georgia Compensation Act is not applicable to this claim. Mississippi has a right and the duty of taking jurisdiction of this claim and applying the Mississippi Compensation Act, which has a two-year statute of limitations. This claim was filed within two years after the date of the accident.
VII. The effect of policy limiting payment of compensation to the benefits under the Georgia Compensation Act. Mississippi is a "full coverage" State. Sec. 33(b), Miss. Workmen's Comp. Act; Vol. II, Larson's Workmen's Comp. Law, Sec. 92.20 p. 445.
VIII. The Mississippi Compensation Act provides coverage for the claimant in this case. LaDew v. LaBorde, 216 Miss. 598, 63 So.2d 56; Sec. 49(c), Miss. Workmen's Comp. Act.
IX. The Legislature certainly intended for the Act to cover all employees engaged in interstate commerce, except interstate railroad employees. Sec. 3(1), Miss. Workmen's Comp. Act.
X. Claimant is an employee within the meaning of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act. Sec. 1(4), Miss. Workmen's Comp. Act.
XI. Luther Mandle was temporarily within the State of Mississippi doing work for his employer when he sustained his injuries on July 27, 1953. The Workmen's Compensation Law of Georgia does not recognize the extra-territorial provisions of the Mississippi Compensation Act and exempt from its application employers and employees covered by the Mississippi Compensation Act. Unless the provisions in Section 49(c) are to be completely ignored, the Mississippi Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of this claim. Schmidt v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 55 N.W.2d 227; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 119 Maine 552, 112 A. 516; Doughwright v. Champlin, 91 Conn. 524, 100 A. 97; Ocean Acc. Guaranty Co. v. Ind. Comm., 257 P. 644; Interstate Power Co. v. Ind. Comm. (Wis.), 234 N.W. 889; In re Chattanooga Boiler Case, supra; A.L.I., Restatement of the Law (Conflict of Law), Sec. 399.
XII. The claimant-appellant, Luther Mandle, was an employee within the meaning of the Mississippi Compensation Act and he should be awarded the compensation and medical benefits provided thereby. This is in conformity with the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. A fair interpretation of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act shows that temporary employees injured in Mississippi are intended to be covered. The overwhelming weight of authority throughout the United States, including most if not all of the recent decisions, sustain claimant's position. The reasons behind the rule as explained by Larson shows that this is the sound and practical procedure. Otherwise, a claimant may be barred from recovering in any state because of the conflicting requirements of the Compensation laws of the states involved. It is a practical rule because employers almost universally have compensation coverage by insurance carrier. These policies of necessity afford coverage for the employer in all states where coverage is needed. If the injured employee can obtain more benefits under the Compensation law of the place of injury than under the law of the state where he is regularly employed, should he not be permitted to do so? The decisions and authorities say he has this right, and the Mississippi courts which have given the Act a liberal construction to date will certainly not go against the great weight of authority on the question here involved. Wallace Greaves, Gulfport, for appellee.
I. It is clear, we think, that the employer and employee relation, upon which the claims being asserted in this proceeding are predicated, was created by the law of Georgia and, so long as that relation existed and/or remained operative, its incidents were properly subject to regulation there, because the employer and employee (claimant) had, and still have, their respective domiciles and residences in Georgia; the employer's place of business was, and still is, located in Georgia; the contract of employment was made in Georgia, and pursuant to its Workmen's Compensation Law; both parties (employer and employee) accepted the provisions of Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law and, thereupon, that law became a constituent of the contract of employment; and the duties of the employment only required the employee to go into Mississippi occasionally, in the performance of the work inherent in, and/or incident to, his operation of the employer's motor truck, in interstate commerce. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 76 L.Ed. 1026, 82 A.L.R. 696; Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 91 L.Ed. 1028.
II. The prime purpose of Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law, like the Workmen's Compensation Laws of most other states, is to provide residents of Georgia with a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and to place on Georgia employers a limited and determinate liability. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, supra; Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra; Secs. 6998-05, 6998-55, Code 1942; Georgia Workmen's Comp. Law, Secs. 114-03 (Sec. 12), 114-201 (Sec. 4), 114-411 (Sec. 37).
III. Since, in the circumstances presented by the record here, Mississippi has no more than a scant interest (if that) in the contract of employment, which was made in Georgia, and has no legitimate interest in the subject matter which can operate legally in contravention of Georgia's interest therein, under its Workmen's Compensation Law; Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law is not obnoxious to Mississippi's legislative or public policy; the employer's rights under Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law are set up by him (a resident citizen of Georgia) as a defense to an asserted liability presented in this proceeding by the employee-claimant (a resident citizen of Georgia); and the giving of effect to the substantive defense thus interposed by the employer will not work any injury to any citizen or resident of Mississippi, it follows that Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law must be given full faith and credit, in accordance with the requirements of Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, in this proceeding. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, supra; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. of California, 305 U.S. 493, 83 L.Ed. 940.
IV. Georgia's courts of last resort have construed and applied its Workmen's Compensation Law in numerous decisions and it is the well-settled rule that the construction given that law by the courts of that State will be adoped by the courts of Mississippi. McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305, 120 A.L.R. 846.
V. Under Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law, as construed by the courts of last resort in that State, workmen's compensation liability arises out of contract created by that law (Travelers Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 51 Ga. App. 579, 181 S.E. 111), and that construction is in consonance with the decisions in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, supra, and Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. of California, 294 U.S. 532, 79 L.Ed. 1044, relating to the subject. And, where, as here, Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law is operative, it is the exclusive remedy between the employer and the employee. Grice v. U.S.F. G. Co., 187 Ga. 259, 200 S.E. 700; Blue Bell Globe Mfg. Co. v. Baird, 60 Ga. App. 298, 6 S.E.2d 83, 64 Ga. App. 347, 13 S.E.2d 105.
VI. Even where, as here, the injury occurs outside the State of Georgia. Hockmuth v. Perkins, 58 Ga. App. 649, 191 S.E. 156; Blue Bell Globe Mfg. Co. v. Baird, supra.
VII. It is settled by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that the power of Georgia to effect legal consequences by its Workmen's Compensation Law is not limited strictly to occurrences within its boundaries, but it has the power through its own appropriate tribunals to grant compensation to employees employed in Georgia for injuries received outside its borders. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, supra; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. of California, supra; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. of California, supra; Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra.
VIII. Accidents occuring outside of Georgia are compensated under Section 114-411 (Section 37) of the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Law. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S.E. 121; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Menees, 46 Ga. App. 289, 167 S.E. 335; Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra.
IX. A construction of Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law so as to make it applicable to the subject matter of this proceeding and so as to empower the Workmen's Compensation Commission to assume, and to exercise, jurisdiction over such subject matter will violate the contract clause (Art. I, Sec. 10) and the due process clause (Amend. XIV, Sec. 1) of the Constitution of the United States. Hartford Acc. Indemnity Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 78 L.Ed. 1178, 92 A.L.R. 928; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16, 73 L.Ed. 147.
X. It is clear, we think, that, at the time of his injury, the employee-claimant was employed in interstate commerce only, under a contract of employment made in Georgia with a Georgia employer; that he was not an employee within the meaning of Mississippi's Workmen's Compensation Law (Section 6998-02 (4), Code of 1942); and that a construction of Mississippi's Workmen's Compensation Law so as to make it applicable to the subject matter of this proceeding and so as to empower the Workmen's Compensation Commission to assume, and to exercise, jurisdiction over the subject matter will place an undue burden upon interstate commerce and will violate the commerce clause (Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause 3) of the Constitution of the United States. Spohn v. Industrial Comm., 138 Ohio St. 42, 32 N.E.2d 554, 133 A.L.R. 951; Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So.2d 784; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, supra; Industrial Comm. v. Watson Brothers Transp. Co., Inc., 75 Ariz. 357, 256 P.2d 730.
XI. Contracts of workmen's compensation insurance made under, and conformably to, Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law have been construed by the courts of last resort in that State, where is is held that the insurance carrier's contract of insurance in the policy fixes the obligation; that there cannot be an enlargement of the obligation except by contract between the parties and that the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Law does not impair contractual relations fixed in a workmen's compensation insurance policy. Fortner v. Industrial Comm., 312 Ill. 327, 143 N.E. 845, 33 A.L.R. 583; Thomas v. Industrial Comm., 243 Wis. 231, 10 N.W.2d 206, 147 A.L.R. 103; U.S.F. G. Co. v. Stubbs, 70 Ga. App. 284, 28 S.E.2d 168; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 49 Ga. App. 600, 176 S.E. 104; 58 Am. Jur., Sec. 563 p. 925.
XII. As regards the construction of contracts of insurance, Mississippi's decisional law is that, where, as here, an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous, it should be construed as written, like any other contract. Mississippi Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram Laud, 34 Miss. 215; Continental Cas. Co. v. Hall, 118 Miss. 871, 80 So. 335; Griffin v. Maryland Cas. Co., 213 Miss. 624, 57 So.2d 486; Camden Fire Ins. Assn. v. New Buena Vista Hotel Co., 199 Miss. 585, 24 So.2d 848.
XIII. The uncontroverted evidence in the record demonstrates clearly that the policy is a contract of workmen's compensation insurance made in Georgia with a resident citizen of Georgia, whose business is located in Georgia, pursuant to Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law; that the contract of insurance is a Georgia contract and is lawful in that State; that both the employer (the insured in the policy) and the employee-claimant in this proceeding are bona fide resident citizens of Georgia; that no claim for workmen's compensation liability has been made under Georgia's Workmen's Compensation Law for, or on account of, anything involved in the subject matter of this proceeding and the right of the employee-claimant to workmen's compensation benefits claimed by him in this proceeding is barred by Section 114-305 (Sec. 25) of that Law, which provides, "The right to compensation under this Title shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed with the industrial board within one year after the accident, * * *"; and that Mississippi does not have, and cannot acquire, any legitimate interest in the contract of workmen's compensation insurance which can operate legally in contravention of Georgia's interest therein, under its law, or which can operate legally in contravention of the rights, privileges and immunities conferred by the contract of workmen's compensation insurance. Therefore, a construction of Mississippi's Workmen's Compensation Law so as to make it operative upon the contract of workmen's compensation insurance involved in this proceeding and thereby enlarge the obligations of the said contract so as to extend its coverage to the claims for benefits under Mississippi's Workmen's Compensation Law asserted by the employee-claimant in this proceeding will violate the contract clause (Art. I. Sec. 10) and the due process clause (Amend. XIV, Sec. 1) of the Constitution of the United States. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 58 L.Ed. 1259; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 69 L.Ed. 342; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 408, 74 L.Ed. 933, 74 A.L.R. 701; Hartford Acc. Indemnity Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co., supra.
Appellant filed claim for compensation under the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act. The facts are not in dispute.
R.O. Kelly, one of the appellees, operated a cannery at Midville, Georgia, and regularly employed more than eight employees. No business was conducted by the employer outside of Georgia, but he operated two tractor-trailer truck units in delivering the products of his cannery to various points outside the State of Georgia. Appellant and one other employee were employed to operate these trucks. The employer consigned a truck load of the product of his cannery to a point in Louisiana, and shipped it in one of his trucks which was operated by appellant. In order to reach the Louisiana destination, appellant was required to traverse the State of Mississippi along U.S. Highway No. 90, and when appellant reached Kreole, Mississippi, his vehicle was weighed at the official weighing scales and it was determined that too much of the weight load rested on the front axle of the trailer. In order to correct this situation, appellant moved 25 or 30 cases of goods to the rear of the trailer, and while so doing, experienced pain under his short ribs, followed by what he thought was indigestion. His discomfort continued and he sought and obtained medical treatment in Harrison County, Mississippi, where it was determined that he had suffered a spontaneous pneumathorax, and this condition later precipitated a heart attack.
The attorney-referee found that appellant's disability was causally related to his work for employer and that appellant was permanently and totally disabled. Appellant incurred hospital and medical bills amounting to $1001.00 in connection with his injuries. These bills are due citizens of this State, and have not been paid. This proceeding was originally instituted by the hospital and physician for the collection of their bills. Appellant later filed his claim.
After treatment in the hospital in Harrison County, Mississippi, appellant returned to his home in Georgia, where he has since resided. Appellant did not file for compensation benefits under the Georgia Act and when he instituted these proceedings, the one-year statute of limitations had run on his claim under the Georgia Act.
The attorney-referee dismissed appellant's claim on the ground that the Workmen's Compensation Commission was without jurisdiction of the subject matter of the claim, and on successive appeals, this action was affirmed by the Commission and the Circuit Court.
Insofar as the liability of the employer is concerned, there are two questions for our determination: (1) Whether the employee and employer are exempted under Sec. 49 (c) of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act (Code of 1942, Vol. 5A, Recompiled, Sec. 6998-55 (c)), and (2) whether Mississippi has the constitutional power to apply its act under the circumstances of this case.
The provisions of the Mississippi Act provide coverage in this case unless the employee and employer are exempted by the provisions of Sec. 49 (c), which is as follows:
"(C) Any employee who has been hired or is regularly employed outside of this state and his employer shall be exempted from the provisions of this act while such employee is temporarily within this state doing work for his employer if such employer has furnished workmen's compensation insurance coverage under the workmen's compensation or similar laws for a state other than this state, so as to cover such employee's employment while in this state, provided the extra-territorial provisions of this act are recognized in such other state and provided employers and employees who are covered in this state are likewise exempted from the application of the workmen's compensation or similar laws of such other state. The benefits under the workmen's compensation act or similar laws of such other state shall be the exclusive remedy against such employer for any injury, whether resulting in death or not, received by such employee while working for such employer in this state."
(Hn 1) The exemption provided in this section is not applicable if the employer has failed to provide compensation insurance coverage under a workmen's compensation or similar law for a state other than this state, or if the extra-territorial provisions of the Mississippi act are not recognized in such other state, or if the workmen's compensation or similar law of such other state does not likewise exempt from its application employees and employers who are covered in this state. The Georgia act is silent as to the extra-territorial provisions of the workmen's compensation or similar laws of other states, and there is no provision for exempting from its application employees and employers when the employee has been hired and is regularly employed outside of Georgia. and such employee is injured while temporarily within Georgia doing work for his employer. The exemption does not apply to the present case, and the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act applies to the injury sustained by appellant while temporarily within this State doing work for his employer. LaDew v. LaBorde, 216 Miss. 598, 63 So.2d 56.
We now consider the constitutional questions raised by the employer, leaving for later consideration the constitutional questions raised by the appellee, Federated Mutual Employment and Hardware Insurance Company.
(Hn 2) The employer set up as a defense the Georgia Compensation Act, and contends that under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States, this Court can not constitutionally impose a system of compensation liability on the employer. The Georgia Act provides that the rights and remedies therein granted to an employee are exclusive of all other remedies at common law, or otherwise. Appellant and employer are residents of the State of Georgia, and the contract of hire was a Georgia contract; appellant was injured while temporarily doing work for his employer in the State of Mississippi; appellant received extensive medical treatment in this State for which payment has not been made. This State has a substantial and legitimate interest in these matters and its policy has been declared in its own compensation act. The Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act was adopted in the exercise of its police power to provide for the welfare of its citizens and others performing labor within its borders, and the subject matter of this legislation is one concerning which this State is competent to legislate. (Hn 3) It has been held that the full faith and credit clause does not go so far as to require this State to withhold the application of its own laws because they conflict with the laws of another State under such circumstances as this case present. Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493, 59 S.Ct. 629, 83 L.Ed. 940; Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec. 8600, et seq.; Carroll v. Lanza, 75 S.Ct. 804.
(Hn 4) The employer also contends that the application of the Mississippi Act in this case would constitute an interference with, or impairment of, the right to contract. Employer bases this contention on the grounds that the contract for hire was made in Georgia between residents of Georgia, and the provisions of the Georgia Act, which provides that it is the exclusive remedy, that the Act is a constituent part of the contract of hire. It is argued that the application of the Mississippi Act alters the contract between the employer and employee. We think the overriding consideration in applying compensation statutes is the public interest rather than private contract. There is ample authority for the proposition that a State has such a legitimate interest in imposing a rule of compensation liability where the injury occurs within the State, that the application of such statutes may not be altered by contract. Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532, 55 S.Ct. 518; 79 L.Ed. 1044; Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec. 87.70, et seq.
(Hn 5) The employer also contends that appellant was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his injury and that the application of the Mississippi Act to the injury in question would place an undue burden upon interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. There are no congressional regulations on the subject and there is no infringement on federal jurisdiction or authority in respect to the interstate commerce aspects of the case. The State is well within its sovereign powers to adopt reasonable measures for the safety and welfare of its citizens and others within its borders. 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 76; Valley Steamship Co. v. Wattawa, 61 L.Ed. 1085, 244 U.S. 202, 37 S.Ct. 523; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 57 L.Ed. 1511, 33 S.Ct. 729.
(Hn 6) The several constitutional questions raised in this case are resolved largely by the substantial interest of this State in the injury and its consequences. If it has such substantial interest it may legislate concerning it within reasonable limitations, notwithstanding the contract of the parties, the full faith and credit clause, and the interstate commerce clause. We think the State has such an interest. The sensibilities of mankind demand that anyone, whether he be a citizen or a stranger, is entitled to receive hospital and medical care when he is injured in this State, and the State must furnish such services either through the means of its public institutions or by private citizens, who are the State. Humanity also demands that indigent and helpless persons be furnished the necessities of life, and this, too, must be furished by the State through public or private means. These duties of the State rest more on moral rather than legal grounds, but the power of the State to legislate in regard thereto rests on firm legal ground. This State has done so by assuring the payment of compensation so that an injured employee who is covered by the act may not become a public charge; and by making provisions that whoever may succor the injured employee by providing hospital and medical care shall be paid therefor. These considerations are public ones; they are substantial; and they are the legitimate concern of the State where the injury occurs. We need not bow to the law of Georgia in reasonably dealing with these matters; nor enforce a Georgia contract in contravention of the policies of this State; and absent action by the Congress in this field creating a conflict of authority, no undue burden is placed on interstate commerce.
We now consider the question of liability of Federated Mutual Employment and Harware Insurance Company, one of the appellees, herein called carrier, who made a separate motion to dismiss on the ground that the application of the Mississippi Act to it would violate the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contract.
The Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act provides that every employer who accepts the compensation provisions of the act shall insure the payment of compensation to his employees, and that every policy for the insurance of the compensation shall be deemed made subject to the provisions of the act, and the contract of insurance shall be approved as to form by the industrial board. The policy issued by the carrier to the employer obligated the carrier to pay to any person entitled thereto Workmen's Compensation under such of certain statutes, as may be applicable thereto, "cited and described in an endorsement to this policy." The policy also provided that: "Nothing herein contained shall operate to so extend this policy as to include within its terms any workmen's compensation law, scheme or plan not cited in an endorsement hereto attached." In the endorsement attached to the policy designating the compensation law applicable to the policy it is provided: "1. The obligations of paragraph One (a) of the policy apply to the Workmen's Compensation Law herein cited: Title 114, Code of Georgia, 1933, entitled `Workmen's Compensation' and all laws amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto which are or may become effective during the policy period, hereinafter referred to as `this act'."
(Hn 7) The carrier's liability is fixed and limited by the terms of the contract and the law of Georgia under which it was made. (Hn 8) By the express terms of the contract, the carrier is not obligated to pay to any person any benefit under any compensation law except the Georgia Act. All other compensation acts are excluded. The liability of the carrier may not be extended by application of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act contrary to the express terms of the policy. The carrier has in no way subjected itself to the policy and public interests of the State of Mississippi. Its contract with the employer was made in Georgia under Georgia law, and the policy expressly limited liability to the application of the Georgia law. This State has no constitutional right to interfere with or enlarge upon the obligation of a Georgia contract. (Hn 9) This State may not extend the effect of its laws beyond its borders so as to impair the right of citizens of other states to make a contract not operative within its jurisdiction, and lawful where made. To do so would violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 78 L.ED. 1178, 54 S.Ct. 634, 92 A.L.R. 928. The action of the lower tribunals in dismissing the claim as to the carrier should be affirmed.
The case is affirmed as to the carrier, and reversed and judgment rendered here as to the liability of the employer, and the case is remanded to the Commission for proper application of the Act.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Roberds, P.J., and Lee, Arrington and Ethridge, JJ. concur.
ON MOTION TO APPROVE CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
This case was handed down on its merits November 19, 1956. 229 Miss. 327, 90 So.2d 645.
(Hn 10) Mandle and his attorney have filed a motion asking the Court to approve a contract between them under which the attorney is to receive fifty percent of the amount of compensation recovered by Mandle. In Prince, et al. v. Nicholson, No. 40,307, decided January 7, 1957, not yet reported, this Court said:
"It further appears from the record that the circuit court allowed to the claimant's attorney as an attorney's fee for his services forty percent of the benefits recovered, in accordance with a contract entered into between the claimant and said attorney. We have heretofore definitely held, however, that the fee for all servicse of a claimant's attorney in workmen's compensation cases should not exceed 33-1/3% of the sum recovered. Sunnyland Contracting Co., Inc. v. Davis, 221 Miss. 744,
75 So.2d 638; Mississippi Federated Cooperatives v. Jefferson, 79 So.2d 723; Pigford Bros. Construction Co. v. Evans, 83 So.2d 622."
The motion herein discloses that counsel has performed an unusual amount of legal work. However, we think it inadvisable to undertake to estimate and evaluate the services which attorneys perform so as to increase their fees in excess of the maximum we have heretofore set.
Therefore, the contract in this case will be approved so as to allow counsel a fee of 33-1/3% of the total amount which may be recovered herein by Mandle.
Motion for attorney's fees approved in part.
Hall, Lee, Kyle and Holmes, JJ., concur.