Opinion
DA 23-0407
11-06-2024
PATRICK A. MALLOY, III, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BETTINA J. WEILER MALLOY HUNT, PROVIDENCE ST. PATRICK HOSPITAL, PROVIDENCE HEALTH SERVICES, and JOHN DOES 1-5, Defendants and Appellees.
For Appellant: Jami L. Rebsom, Jami Rebsom Law Firm, PLLC, Livingston, Montana For Appellees: Elizabeth L. Hausbeck, Jennifer L. Swajkoski, Gabrielle N. Gee, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 14, 2024
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-21-1466 Honorable Shane A. Vannatta, Presiding Judge
For Appellant: Jami L. Rebsom, Jami Rebsom Law Firm, PLLC, Livingston, Montana
For Appellees: Elizabeth L. Hausbeck, Jennifer L. Swajkoski, Gabrielle N. Gee, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Missoula, Montana
OPINION
Beth Baker, Justice
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Patrick Malloy appeals the Fourth Judicial District Court's summary judgment order in favor of Defendants Providence St. Patrick Hospital, Providence Health Services, and Bettina Hunt after it concluded that Malloy could not establish his claim that Hunt's alleged unauthorized access to his medical records caused him harm. We affirm.
¶3 Malloy received a PTSD diagnosis after serving in the military from 1988-1991. Malloy married Bettina Hunt in 1990. The couple separated in July 2017 and divorced on November 2, 2018. During and after their marriage, Hunt worked as a registered nurse at Providence St. Patrick Hospital in Missoula. On November 28, 2017, Malloy e-mailed Providence to request an audit of his medical records, seeking to ascertain whether Hunt had accessed them. The privacy officer who responded to Malloy wrote that Providence's investigation showed no evidence that Hunt had used her employment access to view Malloy's medical records. On January 14, 2021, Malloy's counsel e-mailed Providence, alleging that Hunt accessed Malloy's medical records repeatedly from August 2017 until January 13, 2021.
¶4 On November 24, 2021, Malloy filed a complaint against St. Patrick Hospital, Providence Health Services (collectively, Providence Defendants), Hunt, and five John Does. Malloy filed his First Amended Complaint on July 29, 2022. Malloy alleged that Hunt repeatedly accessed his medical records without authorization. Malloy further alleged that Providence Defendants failed to investigate or establish safeguards against such unauthorized access. Malloy brought seven counts: negligence and respondeat superior against Hunt and Providence Defendants (Count I); negligent retention against Providence Defendants (Count II); two counts of negligent establishment of safeguards against Providence Defendants (Counts III and IV); intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against all Defendants (Count V); negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) against all Defendants (Count VI); and actual malice against Hunt (Count VII). Malloy asserted that Defendants' acts severely exacerbated his PTSD, anxiety, and depression and caused him significant nausea, vomiting, and weight loss.
¶5 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Malloy opposed the motion and sought additional discovery under Rule 56(f). The District Court granted Defendants' summary judgment motion and denied Malloy's Rule 56(f) motion. This appeal followed.
¶6 We review a district court's summary judgment ruling de novo to determine "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). See also Beck v. Dimar, 2024 MT 176, ¶ 11, 17 Mont. 444, 554 P.3d 130 (citation omitted). We review a district court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for abuse of discretion. Miller v. Goetz, 2014 MT 150, ¶ 9, 375 Mont. 281, 327 P.3d 483.
Malloy's Claims of Negligence, Respondeat Superior, Negligent Retention, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED) (Counts I, II, V, VI)
¶7 Malloy alleged that Hunt had a duty to keep his medical information confidential, which she breached while acting in the course and scope of her employment. Malloy also asserted that Providence Defendants negligently retained Hunt because they did not discipline her or terminate her employment after she accessed his medical information. Malloy contended that Defendants intentionally and negligently acted to cause him severe emotional distress. Providence Defendants claimed that Hunt did not use her employment credentials but retained access to Malloy's records after their separation because they were part of a family medical plan for which she was the guarantor. The Defendants asserted further that Malloy's injuries did not result from any of their alleged actions.
¶8 The District Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on these claims because Malloy did not demonstrate that Defendants' acts caused or exacerbated his medical conditions. The District Court reasoned that, despite Malloy's purported reliance on his medical records to establish these claims, he did not cite to or provide relevant portions of those medical records. The District Court also observed that Malloy did not provide expert testimony supporting his assertions that Defendants' acts more likely than not exacerbated his PTSD and caused him stress, anxiety, nausea, vomiting, and weight loss. Citing Kostelecky v. Peas in a Pod LLC, the District Court reasoned that qualified medical expert testimony is generally required to prove "the occurrence, nature, cause, and/or prognosis of an alleged bodily or mental injury." Kostelecky v. Peas in a Pod LLC, 2022 MT 195, ¶23, 410 Mont. 239, 518 P.3d 840 (citation omitted).
¶9 Defendants provided the District Court with a sealed record of Malloy's visit to the emergency department on February 8, 2019. The District Court found that the impetus for Malloy's admission to the ER was not the Defendants' acts but "that Malloy had an argument with his significant other and threatened self-harm." The District Court found further that "all current medications listed in [the sealed] record include[d] start dates which precede the date of the parties' marital separation," indicating that Hunt's alleged acts did not cause Malloy's medical issues. In sum, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Defendants because Malloy failed to provide the District Court with relevant portions of or citations to his medical records; Malloy did not provide expert medical testimony indicating that Defendants' acts caused his claimed medical issues; and what evidence the District Court had before it did not adequately establish the causation element of Malloy's tort claims.
¶10 A negligence claim "requires a legal duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages." Gourneau v. Hamill, 2013 MT 300, ¶ 10, 372 Mont. 182, 311 P.3d 760 (citation omitted). A defendant's "alleged negligent conduct was a cause-in-fact if the alleged harm and resulting damages would not have occurred but for that conduct." Kostelecky, ¶ 22 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Except in rare cases where the cause of the alleged injury is plain and obvious to lay persons without need for specialized knowledge or expertise, . . . proof of the occurrence, nature, cause, and/or prognosis of an alleged bodily or mental injury, disease process, or other medical condition generally requires qualified medical expert testimony.Kostelecky, ¶ 23 (internal citation omitted). Malloy asserted that he had provided disclosure of his medical providers and records and that, as hybrid expert witnesses, they could testify regarding his treatment "and how additional traumatic events exacerbate his symptoms to an intolerable state." The District Court found, however, that Malloy had not provided the court with any such disclosures in his summary judgment submissions. As it properly observed, "summary judgment is appropriate for disposing of an emotional distress claim that lacks sufficient evidentiary support." White v. State, 2013 MT 187, ¶ 43, 371 Mont. 1, 305 P.3d 795 (citation omitted).
¶11 Defendants met their initial burden of showing the absence of genuine issues of material fact and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kostelecky, ¶ 17 (citation omitted). "To meet the responsive Rule 56 burden of demonstrating that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, the non-moving party must in proper form, and by more than mere denial, speculation, or pleading allegation, 'set out specific facts' showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Kostelecky, ¶ 18 (quoting M. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)) (citations omitted). Malloy did not provide the needed evidentiary support to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the Defendants' actions caused the alleged harm and resulting damages. Absent that sufficient evidentiary showing on the Rule 56 record, the District Court correctly determined that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It therefore properly granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Malloy's negligence, respondeat superior, negligent retention, IIED, and NIED claims.
Malloy's Claims for Negligent Establishment of Safeguards (Counts III and IV)
¶12 Malloy argued before the District Court that Montana's Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA) imposed a duty on Providence Defendants that formed the basis for his negligent establishment of safeguards claims. The District Court disagreed with Malloy, ruling that the UHCIA does not apply to Providence Defendants. The District Court cited § 50-16-505, MCA, which provides that the UHCIA applies "only to a health care provider that is not subject to the privacy provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d, et seq., and administrative rules adopted in connection with HIPAA." Malloy did not dispute Providence Defendants' statement that each is subject to HIPAA's privacy provisions.
¶13 Malloy does not address the District Court's statutory analysis of his negligent establishment of safeguards claims on appeal, instead reiterating his argument that the UHCIA applies to these claims. In support of this proposition, Malloy relies on House v. Kalispell Regional Medical Center, a 2002 case from the Eleventh Judicial District. House v. Kalispell Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. DV-01-426(B), 2002 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3387 (Mont. Eleventh Judicial Dist. Oct. 21, 2002). In House, the court denied a hospital's motion for summary judgment on a negligent establishment of safeguards claim, finding that the UHCIA imposed a duty on the hospital. House, 2002 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3387 at *9.
¶14 Defendants point out that the Montana Legislature added § 50-16-505, MCA- exempting health care providers subject to HIPAA-after the Eleventh Judicial District Court decided House. 2003 Mont. Laws ch. 396, § 8. See also § 50-16-502(6), MCA ("the enactment . . . and the adoption of rules pursuant to the [HIPAA] . . . require health care providers subject to that legislation to provide significant privacy protection for health care information and the provisions of this part are no longer necessary for those health care providers[.]"). Because Providence Defendants are subject to HIPAA, Defendants argue, they are not subject to the UHCIA, and the UHCIA does not confer a duty on them.
¶15 Although the UHCIA requires "[a] health care provider [to] effect reasonable safeguards for the security of all health care information it maintains," § 50-16-511, MCA, this provision does not apply to a health care provider subject to HIPAA. Section 50-16-505, MCA. House has no persuasive value because the court decided the case in 2002, before the Legislature exempted health care providers subject to HIPAA from the UHCIA's provisions in 2003. 2003 Mont. Laws ch. 396, § 8. Malloy does not dispute that Providence Defendants are subject to HIPAA. Providence Defendants thus did not owe him a duty under § 50-16-511, MCA. The District Court properly granted summary judgment to Providence Defendants on Malloy's negligent establishment of safeguards claims.
Malloy's Claim for Punitive Damages (Count VII)
¶16 Finally, Malloy asserts that Hunt is guilty of actual malice under § 27-1-221(2), MCA, and therefore he is entitled to punitive damages under § 27-1-220, MCA. A court may award punitive damages, however, only "in addition to compensatory damages." Section 27-1-220(1), MCA. Having ruled against Malloy on his claims for compensatory damages, the court did not err in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Malloy's actual malice claim.
Malloy's Rule 56(f) Motion
¶17 Malloy argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion seeking additional discovery under M. R. Civ. P. 56(f). The District Court denied the motion on all claims because he had not shown that additional discovery would uncover facts essential to opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Malloy argues on appeal that the District Court "erred when it refused to allow Plaintiff additional time to collect . . . information pursuant to Rule 56(f) based on Defendants' wil[l]ful acts of refusing to provide discoverable information and then asking the Court to enter judgment without further opportunity to obtain the same." Defendants respond in part that Malloy "failed to demonstrate that any of the information sought through his Rule 56(f) request would alter the determination on summary judgment."
¶18 Rule 56(f) allows a court to deny a summary judgment motion, order a continuance, or "issue any other just order" when the party opposing the motion "shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition." M. R. Civ. P. 56(f). "A district court does not abuse its discretion in denying a M. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion where the party opposing a motion for summary judgment does not establish how the proposed discovery could preclude summary judgment." Miller, ¶ 15 (quoting Rosenthal v. Co. of Madison, 2007 MT 277, ¶ 38, 399 Mont. 419, 170 P.3d 493).
¶19 In support of his Rule 56(f) motion, Malloy asserted that he needed audit trails of access to his medical records, records of Defendants' investigations into his complaints, Hunt's work schedule, and copies of training manuals. Malloy does not explain, however, how this additional discovery would have enabled him to establish that the Defendants' actions caused his injury and alleged damages or that they owed him a duty under the UHCIA. Because Malloy did "not establish how the proposed discovery could preclude summary judgment," the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his Rule 56(f) motion. Miller, ¶ 15 (citation omitted).
¶20 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. Applying the appropriate standards, the District Court properly applied the law to the undisputed material facts. Its summary judgment order is affirmed.
We Concur: MIKE McGRATH, LAURIE McKINNON, INGRID GUSTAFSON, JIM RICE