Opinion
Argued September 21, 1999
October 25, 1999
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bellard, J.).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff firefighter was injured when he was exposed to a toxic substance while investigating a smoke condition caused by a smoke grenade. He and his wife subsequently commenced this action against, inter alia, the City of New York (hereinafter the City). The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the City's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the plaintiffs' first cause of action as alleges that the City was negligent in failing to warn the injured plaintiff of a dangerous condition. The plaintiff firefighter was injured while acting in furtherance of a firefighting function which exposed him to a heightened risk of sustaining his particular injuries. Therefore, the court properly dismissed that portion of the first cause of action as barred by the "firefighter rule" (see, Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 85 N.Y.2d 423, 439-440 ; Cooper v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 584, 590 ; June v. Laris, 205 A.D.2d 166, 169 ).
The court also properly denied that branch of the plaintiffs' cross motion which sought leave to amend their complaint to add a cause of action pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-a. Those portions of a New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Procedure which allegedly were violated are not part of a well-developed body of law and do not impose clear legal duties mandating the performance of certain acts (see, Gonzalez v. Iocovello, 93 N.Y.2d 539 ; Desmond v. City of New York, 88 N.Y.2d 455, 464 ; Lawrence v. City of New York, 240 A.D.2d 711 ; Luongo v. City of New York, 240 A.D.2d 712 ). Rather than containing particularized mandates, they simply offer guidance for the exercise of professional judgment (see, Desmond v. City of New York, supra, at 464). Consequently, they cannot serve as a basis for a cause of action under General Municipal Law § 205-a.
O'BRIEN, J.P., SULLIVAN, ALTMAN, and KRAUSMAN, JJ., concur.