Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2369.
September 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Angel Maldonado, Petitioner, who is serving 15 to 30 years at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, after his conviction on a charge of third degree murder, asks this court to grant him habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After a careful and independent review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, we find none of the four issues Petitioner raises presents a ground for relief; therefore, we approve the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Peter F. Scuderi and overrule the objections of Petitioner.
Petitioner was convicted of third degree murder in the shooting death of Luis Ramos in Philadelphia after a bench trial. The relevant evidence is that during Petitioner's preliminary hearing, Jamal Ball testified he and another man were in Ramos's car when Ramos accused Petitioner of stealing drugs from one of Ramos's dealers. Ball testified that Petitioner turned away and, when he turned back, fired a handgun in Ramos's direction. Ramos died of gunshot wounds. Ball said he left the scene running and encountered a Philadelphia police officer. The police officer testified Ball said there had been a shooting and Ball identified the shooter's car. Ball later told police he "handed off" his own gun to someone else before talking to the officer.
During Petitioner's preliminary hearing, Petitioner's counsel was told of Ball's impending arrest on an unrelated capital charge, his prior crimen falsi convictions, and his statement that he had a gun but handed it off. Counsel did not cross-examine Ball at the preliminary hearing about any of the three items. At trial, Ball invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence which made him unavailable to testify. Ball's preliminary hearing testimony and his prior records involving crimen falsi were read into the record. Petitioner was convicted after the bench trial and appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied petitioner's Petition for Permission to Appeal. Petitioner brought a timely habeas action in which he claims:
1. he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his preliminary hearing;
2. the trial court erred in suppressing the statement Ball made about possessing a gun;
3. the trial court denied him an opportunity to confront Ball regarding Ramos's prior actions; and,
4. the trial court erred by improperly admitting hearsay which suggested that someone named "Angel" had stolen Ramos's crack cocaine and that Ramos called out to "Angel."
The District Attorney replies that 1) Ball did not know about his impending arrest and, therefore, had no reason to "curry favor" with the Commonwealth; 2) Ball's statement regarding his own gun was irrelevant since Ball was not charged with weapons possession and Petitioner has not preserved a federal question with regard to it; 3) the violent propensities of a victim are only relevant under Pennsylvania law when a defendant asserts self-defense; therefore, there was no error in not allowing Maldonado to cross-examine on that subject; and, 4) Petitioner failed to preserve a federal question with regard to the hearsay testimony and failed to demonstrate prejudice as to its admission.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55, a federal court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person held pursuant to a state-court judgment only if the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2144 (2004).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the Supreme Court held that a federal court must first decide what is the applicable clearly established law. 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S. Ct. at 1511; see also Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 2000). The court must then determine whether the state court's decision was "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" that law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S. Ct. at 1512. The Supreme Court distinguished the two clauses of Section 2254(d)(1), holding that "a decision by a state court is `contrary to' our clearly established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S. Ct. at 1519. "[A] run-of-the mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases to the facts of a prisoner's case [does] not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)'s `contrary to' clause." Williams at 406, 120 S. Ct. at 1520. The Supreme Court further stated that the "unreasonable application" clause of Section 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to "grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts" of the petitioner's case. Williams 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523. It is the petitioner's burden to show the state court applied the controlling legal principle to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641, 123 S. Ct. 1848, 1853, 155 L.Ed.2d 877 (2003).
The Third Circuit has held that Section 2254(d)(2) requires a review of the record to determine whether the state court's findings were unreasonable in light of the state court record. Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 234 (3d Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) is limited by its own language to those claims "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "An `adjudication on the merits' has a well settled meaning: a decision finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground." Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2004). "[A] state court may render an adjudication or decision on the merits of a federal claim by rejecting the claim without any discussion whatsoever." Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 605-07 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1000, 123 S. Ct. 1914, 155 L.Ed.2d 828 (2003).
All four of Maldonado's claims and objections were raised in his appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which considered and rejected each of them. Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 2933 EDA 2000 (Pa.Super.Ct., May 30, 2002). Maldonado's claims all fall under the rubrick of the Sixth Amendment. Maldonado has not identified any decision of the trial court or the appellate court which is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the jurisprudence surrounding the Sixth Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST., Amend. VI.
Maldonado first claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to cross-examine Ball about Ball's upcoming arrest for murder. The state court correctly identified the principles announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 674 (1984), as those governing the analysis of Maldonado's claim. In Strickland, the Court established a three-prong test to analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The defendant must show counsel's performance was deficient, without strategic or resonable basis, and the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
Counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the impending arrest with Ball because Ball did not know at the time he testified he was about to be arrested; therefore, his testimony could not have been unduly influenced by a desire to make a deal with the prosecutors. The state court's decision that counsel was not ineffective is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland. Therefore, Maldonado is not entitled to relief on his first claim.
Maldonado's second contention is the trial court erred in suppressing the statement Ball made about possessing a gun. The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Cree v. Hatcher, 969 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding the rule that a crimen falsi is automatically admissible must be interpreted narrowly because it limits the broad discretion of a trial judge with regard to the admissibility of evidence). A trial judge has a duty to limit the jury's exposure to only that evidence which is probative and relevant U.S. v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, the Superior Court found the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he found the statement Ball made about his own gun irrelevant in Maldonado's case. The exclusion of irrelevant evidence comports with applicable federal law.
Maldonado's third contention is the trial court denied him an opportunity to confront Ball regarding Ramos's prior actions. The trial court retains wide latitude to limit cross-examination to avoid confusion or irrelevant testimony. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986). The victim's propensity to violence is only relevant when a defendant claims self-defense. Commonwealth v. Amos, 445 Pa. 297, 284 A.2d 748 (1971). The trial court may, again, exclude evidence it deems irrelevant without trespassing on constitutional norms. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435. Thus, the limits the trial court imposed on the cross-examination of Ball were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, relevant constitutional law.
Maldonado's fourth claim of error is the trial court erred by improperly admitting hearsay which suggested that someone named "Angel" had stolen Ramos's crack cocaine and that Ramos called out to "Angel." Petitioner fails to state a federal question regarding the admission of hearsay. The Superior Court cited only Pennsylvania rules and law in concluding the hearsay was admissible as a present sense impression. Federal habeas review is not available to reexamine a state court's determination of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991). Therefore, Petitioner's claim is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Petitioner has met the threshold requirements of Section 2254: he is a person in custody as the result of a state court conviction and that he has exhausted his state remedies. None of the issues which he raises, however, is contrary to clearly-established federal law and none presents an unreasonable application of that law. Therefore, after an independent review, we agree with Magistrate Judge Scuderi's Report and Recommendation and enter the following:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of September, 2004, upon careful and independent consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and respondents' answer thereto, and after review of the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge Peter B. Scuderi, and any objections made thereto, IT IS ORDERED:
1. Petitioner's Objections to the Report and Recommendation are OVERRULED:
2. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED.
3. The petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED.
4. There is no basis for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.