Opinion
12-07-2016
Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York, NY (Linda M. Brown and Miriam Skolnik of counsel), for appellant. Mallilo & Grossman, Flushing, NY (Jessica Kronrad of counsel), for respondent.
Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York, NY (Linda M. Brown and Miriam Skolnik of counsel), for appellant.
Mallilo & Grossman, Flushing, NY (Jessica Kronrad of counsel), for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Brathwaite Nelson, J.), dated December 7, 2015, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell while descending a staircase in her apartment building in Queens. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging negligence. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of her accident. The Supreme Court denied the motion. We reverse.
The Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the plaintiff's General Municipal Law § 50–h hearing transcript, which demonstrated that the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of her fall (see Cohen v. A.C.E. Rest. Group. of N.Y., LLC, 140 A.D.3d 1111, 33 N.Y.S.3d 764; Ackerman v. Iskhakov, 139 A.D.3d 987, 30 N.Y.S.3d 850 ; Williams v. Vines, 128 A.D.3d 1056, 10 N.Y.S.3d 311 ; Blocker v. Filene's Basement # 51–00540, 126 A.D.3d 744, 5 N.Y.S.3d 265 ; Zanki v. Cahill, 2 A.D.3d 197, 768 N.Y.S.2d 471, affd. 2 N.Y.3d 783, 780 N.Y.S.2d 307, 812 N.E.2d 1257 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiff's affidavit merely raised feigned issues of fact designed to avoid the consequences of her earlier General Municipal Law § 50–h hearing testimony, and thus, was insufficient to defeat the defendant's motion (see Diaz v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 141 A.D.3d 556, 559, 36 N.Y.S.3d 161 ; Bluth v. Bias Yaakov Academy for Girls, 123 A.D.3d 866, 866, 999 N.Y.S.2d 840 ; Cuebas v. City of Yonkers, 97 A.D.3d 779, 780, 948 N.Y.S.2d 688 ; see also Lesaldo v. Dabas, 140 A.D.3d 708, 710, 32 N.Y.S.3d 321 ).
In light of our determination, the defendant's remaining contentions need not be addressed.