Opinion
03-25-2016
Khalid S. MAHRAN and Kidney Care, P.C., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Michael B. BERGER, Esq., Defendant–Respondent.
Law Office of Stephen F. Szymoniak, Williamsville (Stephen F. Szymoniak of Counsel), for Plaintiffs–Appellants. Jaeckle Fleischmann & Mugel, LLP, Buffalo (Charles C. Swanekamp of Counsel), for Defendant–Respondent.
Law Office of Stephen F. Szymoniak, Williamsville (Stephen F. Szymoniak of Counsel), for Plaintiffs–Appellants.
Jaeckle Fleischmann & Mugel, LLP, Buffalo (Charles C. Swanekamp of Counsel), for Defendant–Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, DeJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
In late 2004, plaintiff Khalid S. Mahran (Mahran) offered a doctor, who was completing her residency, an opportunity to join his medical practice, plaintiff Kidney Care, P.C. The doctor, a noncitizen of the United States, subsequently entered into a retainer agreement with defendant for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance in acquiring certain immigration documents that would permit her to practice medicine in the United States. Defendant, among other things, filed an application for the immigration documents, stating that he represented the doctor as the prospective employee and plaintiffs as the sponsoring employer. The application was approved on November 7, 2005. At some point, a dispute arose between Mahran and the doctor over the terms of their employment agreement. When the dispute arose, the doctor's employment with plaintiffs was jeopardized and, consequently, so was her immigration status. Defendant ultimately obtained government approval allowing the doctor to secure employment at a hospital in another state. Plaintiffs commenced this action on November 26, 2008, alleging that defendant committed legal malpractice and breach of contract. We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Initially, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, we conclude that "the court properly granted defendant's motion with respect to the second cause of action, for breach of contract, because it was duplicative of the malpractice cause of action" (Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kenyon & Kenyon, LLP, 128 A.D.3d 1532, 1534, 9 N.Y.S.3d 513 ).
With respect to the cause of action for legal malpractice, we further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion seeking summary judgment dismissing it on the ground that it was time-barred. "A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when the malpractice is committed" (Priola v. Fallon, 117 A.D.3d 1489, 1489, 984 N.Y.S.2d 528 [internal quotation marks omitted] ), and must be interposed within three years thereafter (see CPLR 214[6] ; McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 301, 755 N.Y.S.2d 693, 785 N.E.2d 714 ). Even assuming, arguendo, that there is no question of fact with respect to the existence of an attorney-client relationship between defendant and plaintiffs, we conclude that defendant established that any malpractice occurred, at the latest, on November 7, 2005, when his representation of plaintiffs ceased upon his successful completion of the specific task for which he was initially retained, i.e., acquiring the immigration documents necessary for the doctor to commence employment with plaintiffs (see Priola, 117 A.D.3d at 1489, 984 N.Y.S.2d 528 ; International Electron Devices [USA] LLC v. Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, P.C., 71 A.D.3d 1512, 1512, 898 N.Y.S.2d 388 ). Defendant thus met his initial burden of establishing that this action, commenced on November 26, 2008, was time-barred (see International Electron Devices [USA] LLC, 71 A.D.3d at 1512, 898 N.Y.S.2d 388 ).
"The burden then shifted to plaintiffs to raise a triable issue of fact whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine" (id. ), and plaintiffs "failed to meet that burden inasmuch as [they] failed to present the requisite clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney to toll the statute of limitations" (Priola, 117 A.D.3d at 1490, 984 N.Y.S.2d 528 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The continuous representation doctrine does not apply here inasmuch as there was no continuity of services provided by defendant to plaintiffs in conjunction with the application for the doctor's immigration documents, and no mutual understanding that plaintiffs required further legal work in that regard (see M.G. McLaren, P.C. v. Massand Eng'g, L.S., P.C., 51 A.D.3d 878, 878, 858 N.Y.S.2d 340 ). Indeed, despite Mahran's assertions, his unilateral belief that defendant continued to represent plaintiffs after the immigration application process was completed is insufficient to establish the existence of a continuing relationship (see Chinello v. Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, LLP, 15 A.D.3d 894, 895, 788 N.Y.S.2d 750 ). Although the completion of that process provided the prerequisite conditions for the doctor's employment, the dispute that arose between Mahran and the doctor with respect to the employment agreement constituted a separate contractual matter concerning those parties only, and we conclude that any evidence of subsequent contact between defendant and Mahran with respect to that dispute is not indicative of a continuing attorney-client relationship, and thus is insufficient to raise an issue of fact (see M.G. McLaren, P.C., 51 A.D.3d at 878, 858 N.Y.S.2d 340 ). To the extent that plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations should be tolled during the period of defendant's continuing representation of the doctor, that contention is without merit (see Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 94, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674, 439 N.E.2d 390 ; TVGA Eng'g, Surveying, P.C. v. Gallick [appeal No. 2], 45 A.D.3d 1252, 1257, 846 N.Y.S.2d 506 ). We thus conclude that, "[i]nasmuch as the attorney-client relationship between plaintiff[s] and [defendant] ended more than three years before the action was commenced, the cause of action for legal malpractice was untimely" (TVGA Eng'g, Surveying, P.C., 45 A.D.3d at 1257, 846 N.Y.S.2d 506 ).It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.