Opinion
November 24, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Kristin Booth Glen, J.).
Appeal from the order of same court, entered February 5, 1992, which upon respondent's default, granted petitioner's motion to hold respondent in contempt, unanimously dismissed.
We agree with the IAS Court that under the so-ordered stipulation of January 26, 1990, respondent is liable for the reasonable value of petitioner's attorney's fees for enforcement services provided by him since July 1989. While paragraph 5 of the stipulation, which relieves respondent of any obligation to pay fees in the event he makes certain monthly payments, is in conflict with paragraph 6, which makes respondent responsible for petitioner's attorney's fees in the event he fails to make a certain escrow payment, this ambiguity need not be resolved in favor of respondent, the nondrafter, because to do so would create an absurd result (White/Tishman E. v Banko, 171 A.D.2d 401, 402, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 857) by rendering paragraph 6 meaningless (Two Guys v S.F.R. Realty Assocs., 63 N.Y.2d 396, 403).
The appeal from the February 5, 1992 order holding respondent in contempt is dismissed since no appeal lies from an order entered upon default (CPLR 5511). Respondent's motion to vacate his default was properly denied. "While disposition on the merits is favored, this preference does not justify vacating a default judgment where the moving party fails to satisfy the two-prong burden of showing a meritorious defense and reasonable excuse for the default" (Dimitratos v City of New York, 180 A.D.2d 414). Rejection of respondent's excuse was not an abuse of discretion (see, supra, at 415), and, because both prongs must be satisfied there was no need to reach the merits of respondent's defense.
We have considered respondent's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Carro, J.P., Milonas, Ellerin, Wallach and Kupferman, JJ.