Opinion
23A-CR-2707
06-27-2024
Tavon T. Macklin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Anna Onaitis, Holden Zionsville. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita, Catherine E. Brizzi, Amanda L. Martin-Nelson.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Shatrese M. Flowers, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D28-2112-MR-38096.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Anna Onaitis, Holden Zionsville.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita, Catherine E. Brizzi, Amanda L. Martin-Nelson.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[¶1] Tavon Macklin appeals his murder conviction. He argues that the State only presented circumstantial evidence to prove he committed murder and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On February 21, 2021, Eugenio and Emma Roman were working at their restaurant, Taqueria El Maguey, which was located at the intersection of 38thStreet and Moller Road. Emma briefly left the restaurant that evening to drive a sick waitress to her home. While she was gone, at 9:54 p.m., Eugenio walked out of the restaurant and into the parking lot toward his truck.
[¶4] At 9:57 p.m., a dark SUV occupied by at least three people drove into the parking lot. Eugenio was standing next to his truck. The driver stopped the SUV near Eugenio for a moment then circled the parking lot. The driver returned to a parking spot closer to Eugenio, and two men dressed in black clothing and wearing ski masks exited the SUV. The two men ran toward Eugenio. One of the two men shot Eugenio five times in the back and once in his left hand. The men then appeared to look through Eugenio's pockets and his truck before returning to the SUV. The SUV, with all three occupants, then left the scene of the shooting.
[¶5] Johnny Silguero, who was parked nearby, saw the two men wearing dark clothing and ski masks approach Eugenio and then heard gunshots. He heard the driver of the vehicle yell "hurry up, let's go" and saw the two men return to the vehicle. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 135. He called 911 and reported the shooting. When law enforcement officers and medics arrived, they determined that Eugenio had died.
[¶6] On February 23, police officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrested Macklin. The arresting officers discovered a cell phone and a 9-millimeter pistol in Macklin's possession. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 64. Five of the bullet cases found at the murder scene were fired from that pistol. Id. at 81-83. In addition, Macklin's DNA was found on one of the fired cartridge casings. Id. at 50. Macklin's cellphone's location was the intersection of 38th Street and Moller Road between 9:57 p.m. and 10:08 p.m. on February 21. Id. at 116-20. And IMPD's Digital Forensics Unit determined that Macklin's cellphone was used to search for news articles concerning Eugenio's murder on February 22 and 23. Id. at 109-112.
[¶7] On December 17, the State charged Macklin with murder and Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Macklin's jury trial commenced on August 14, 2023. The jury found Macklin guilty of murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. Macklin admitted to the serious violent felon enhancement. The trial court held his sentencing hearing on October 18 and imposed an aggregate fifty-eight-year sentence.
[¶8] Macklin now appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his murder conviction.
Discussion and Decision
[¶9] Macklin contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction. Our standard of review is well settled.
When an appeal raises "a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses ...." We consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences that support the [judgment]. "We will affirm 'if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'"Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Joslyn v. State, 942 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 2011)).
[¶10] To prove that Macklin committed murder, the State was required to show that he knowingly or intentionally killed Eugenio. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2023). Macklin claims that the "State's circumstantial evidence builds a web too weak to support [] Macklin's guilt as the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt." Appellant's Br. at 9.
[¶11] We agree with Macklin that the State did not present any direct evidence identifying him as the shooter. However, a conviction for murder can be sustained based solely on circumstantial evidence. See Snow v. State, 118 N.E.3d 50, 60 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied.
In a circumstantial case, no single piece of evidence in isolation-no "smoking gun"-is offered to persuade the jury to convict. Yet a jury may be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, by looking at "a web of facts in which no single strand may be dispositive." Kriner v. State, 699 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. 1998). Indeed, the "evidence in the aggregate may point to guilt where individual elements of the State's case might not." Id. Just as in the probable cause context, when presented with a sufficiency challenge we look at the "whole picture" without taking a "divide-and-conquer approach" to individual pieces of evidence. See McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 529 (Ind. 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176-77 (Ind. 2022).
[¶12] In Young, a man was shot and killed while he was at a gas station. Young appealed his conviction and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove his identity as the shooter. Id. at 1176. During Young's jury trial, the State presented surveillance camera footage that established Young's presence at the gas station minutes before the shooting. Id. at 1174. Young was smoking a cigarette and wearing a white shirt, dark pants, and white shoes with horizontal stripes. Id. The murder victim knew Young, and Young saw the victim at the gas station before he left. Id. at 1177. Surveillance camera footage also established that when he left the gas station, Young drove his car to a nearby alleyway. Id. Two minutes after Young drove away from the gas station, surveillance video camera footage showed a person near the alleyway toss a lit item. Id. at 1177-78. Video surveillance from a nearby business showed the shooter appear near the alleyway entrance, shoot multiple rounds at the victim, and then run back to the alley before disappearing from view. Id. at 1178. The shooter's pants, shirt, and shoes were the same that Young was seen wearing on the surveillance video from the gas station. Id. And law enforcement officers found a cigarette butt where the lit item was discarded, which contained Young's DNA. Id. Young's cellphone location data was turned off when the shooting occurred, but his phone had been used to search for videos on disassembling and cleaning a Glock .40 caliber pistol in the two weeks after the shooting, which was the same type of gun used to shoot the victim. Id. at 1175, 1178.
[¶13] After considering the evidence presented, our supreme court observed that the jury could reasonably have inferred that Young spotted the victims at the gas station, drove somewhere nearby with alleyway access, tossed his cigarette in the alleyway, ran to the gas station to carry out the shootings, walked back up the alleyway to get away, and later looked up how to clean the weapon he had used. His deactivated location data suggested he was concealing his activity. No single "smoking gun" was presented, but we cannot say that a reasonable fact-finder was unable to draw the conclusion that Young was guilty. Id. at 1178. Moreover, in rejecting Young's claim that "the evidence necessarily left room for reasonable doubt[,]" our supreme court noted that it cannot substitute the court's "weighing of the evidence for that of the jury. Nor will we divide and conquer the evidence by interpreting each piece individually in the defendant's favor, rather than considering the composite picture and drawing reasonable inferences in support of the verdict." Id. at 1178-79.
[¶14] Macklin claims that the "web of evidence in this case is far weaker than that in Young" because "there is no [video] recording from which [] Macklin can be identified at the scene of the shooting." Appellant's Br. at 14. In addition, Macklin notes that there is no evidence that Macklin and Eugenio knew each other. Finally, Macklin argues that "there is no indication when or even if [he] touched the bullet base on which his DNA was found." Id. at 14.
[¶15] Like the defendant in Young, Macklin focuses on certain pieces of evidence in isolation to argue that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction. Macklin was arrested approximately thirty-six hours after Eugenio was murdered, and he had a 9-millimeter pistol in his possession. The State presented evidence that the same pistol fired five of the six cartridge cases and bullet bases found at the murder scene. Macklin's DNA was found on one of the recovered cartridge cases. The location data recovered from Macklin's cellphone established that he was present at the location of the crime scene when the shooting occurred. During the two days following Eugenio's murder, Macklin used his cellphone to search for news articles about the shooting. Moreover, the facts supporting Macklin's conviction are far more persuasive than those our supreme court affirmed in Young.
[¶16] Considering this evidence in the aggregate, the jury could have reasonably found that Macklin shot Eugenio. Macklin's argument to the contrary is simply an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which our court will not do. See Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1195. We therefore affirm Macklin's murder conviction.
[¶17] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.