From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Mackay v. Uinta Co.

U.S.
May 26, 1913
229 U.S. 173 (1913)

Summary

holding that a plaintiff who failed to challenge removal procedures prior to entry of final judgment effectively waived the right to claim that irregularities in the removal process deprived the court of jurisdiction over a case otherwise properly before it

Summary of this case from Board of Regents, Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon

Opinion

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 190.

Argued March 14, 17, 1913. Decided May 26, 1913.

Where the defects in service of process and in procedure in the state court are waivable, and after removal there is presented to the Circuit Court a controversy involving more than $2,000 and between citizens of different States, that court has jurisdiction and the method of getting the case before the court cannot operate to deprive it of jurisdiction. Removal proceedings are in the nature of process to bring the parties before the Federal court. The defendant may waive defects in removal proceedings if jurisdiction actually exists, and if he does so the court will not of its own motion inquire into the regularity of the proceedings.

THE facts, which involve the validity of the removal of this cause from the state to the Federal court and the jurisdiction of the latter thereover, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Barnard J. Stewart, with whom Mr. Charles B. Stewart, Mr. Samuel W. Stewart and Mr. Daniel Alexander were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. John W. Lacey for defendant in error.


On December 8, 1908, the Uinta Development Company, a corporation of the State of Wyoming, brought an action in a Wyoming court against John C. Mackay, a resident and citizen of Utah, to recover $1,950 damages for a trespass upon land of the Development Company, situated in Wyoming.

On January 8, 1909, Mackay duly filed his answer. On March 2 the plaintiff, by leave of court, filed an amended petition, which Mackay answered. On May 3 he filed an amended answer, which, in addition to denying many of the allegations of the amended petition, set up a counterclaim for $3,000 damages.

The claims of the parties were so related that either could have been interposed as a counter-claim to the other; or they could have been determined in different suits — subject to the provision that, under the Wyoming statute, a defendant who failed to set up his counter-claim and subsequently made it the subject of a separate action could not recover costs if he prevailed therein. No Federal question was presented in the plaintiff's suit or defendant's original answer, but Mackay's amended answer and counter-claim were grounded upon certain statutes of the United States. This counter-claim for $3,000 was filed after the expiration of the time in which he was required to plead to the original petition.

But, notwithstanding the delay, Mackay, the non-resident, without objection on the part of the Development Company, filed in the state court a petition to remove the case to the United States Circuit Court for the District of Wyoming. An order removing the case was granted on the theory that the parties were citizens of different States; that the construction of the Federal statutes was necessarily involved, and that the amount in dispute, as disclosed by the counter-claim, exceeded $2,000. The transcript was duly filed in the United States court. Both parties appeared. The plaintiff filed in the United States court a reply to Mackay's counterclaim, and the case, which was docketed as " Uinta Development Company v. John C. Mackay," was submitted to the court for determination without a jury. Judgment was entered in favor of the Development Company and thereupon Mackay took the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals, assigning errors relating to rulings made in the course of the trial, but neither party raised any question as to its power to determine the cause. On these facts the Circuit Court of Appeals certified to this court various questions as to whether Mackay could remove the case to the United States court, among them the following:

4. "Assuming that the removal at the instance of Mackay was not in conformity with the removal statute, and assuming that as respects his claim against the Development Company all the jurisdictional elements were present which were essential to enable the Circuit Court to take cognizance thereof, if he had commenced an action thereon in that court, and assuming that in such an action the Development Company lawfully could have set up its claim as a counter-claim and thereby have enabled the court to take cognizance thereof, Did the parties by appearing in the Circuit Court and there litigating both claims to a final conclusion in a single cause, without any objection to the jurisdiction of the court or to the manner in which its jurisdiction was invoked, enable that court to take cognizance of the controversy and to proceed to a final judgment therein with like effect as if they had invoked the jurisdiction of that court in the first instance through an action commenced therein by Mackay upon his claim and through the interposition by the Development Company of its claim as a counter-claim in that action?"

This question must be answered in the affirmative and that fact makes it unnecessary to consider the status of the parties in the state court and who was technical plaintiff and who technical defendant, or whether Mackay, a non-resident defendant, sued in a state court for $1,950, could, by filing a counter-claim for $3,000, acquire the right to remove the case to the United States court. The case was removed in fact, and, while the parties could not give jurisdiction by consent, there was the requisite amount and the diversity of citizenship necessary to give the United States Circuit Court jurisdiction of the cause. The case, therefore, resolves itself into an inquiry as to whether, if irregularly removed, it could be lawfully tried and determined.

Removal proceedings are in the nature of process to bring the parties before the United States court. As in other forms of process, the litigant has the right to rely upon the statute and to insist that, in compliance with its terms, the case shall be taken from the state to the Federal court in the proper district, on motion of the proper person, at the proper time, and on giving the proper bond. But these provisions are for the benefit of the defendant and intended to secure his appearance. When that result is accomplished by his voluntary attendance, the court will not, of its own motion, inquire as to the regularity of the issue or service of the process, — or, indeed, whether there was any process at all, since it could be waived, in whole or in part, either expressly or by failing seasonably to object. Powers v. C. O. Ry., 169 U.S. 92, 98.

What took place in the state court may, therefore, be disregarded by the court because it was waived by the parties, and regardless of the manner in which the case was brought or how the attendance of the parties in the United States court was secured, there was presented to the Circuit Court a controversy between citizens of different States in which the amount claimed by one non-resident was more than $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs. As the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter the parties could have been realigned by making Mackay plaintiff and the Development Company defendant, if that had been found proper. But if there was any irregularity in docketing the case or in the order of the pleadings such an irregularity was waivable and neither it nor the method of getting the parties before the court operated to deprive it of the power to determine the cause.

The Fourth question certified to us by the Circuit Court of Appeals is answered in the affirmative.


Summaries of

Mackay v. Uinta Co.

U.S.
May 26, 1913
229 U.S. 173 (1913)

holding that a plaintiff who failed to challenge removal procedures prior to entry of final judgment effectively waived the right to claim that irregularities in the removal process deprived the court of jurisdiction over a case otherwise properly before it

Summary of this case from Board of Regents, Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon

holding that a plaintiff who failed to challenge removal procedures prior to entry of final judgment effectively waived the right to claim that irregularities in the removal process deprived the court of jurisdiction over a case otherwise properly before it

Summary of this case from Atrium, Ltd. v. Steve Hendrick & Assocs., Inc.

holding that a plaintiff who failed to challenge removal procedures prior to entry of final judgment effectively waived the right to claim that irregularities in the removal process deprived the court of jurisdiction over a case otherwise properly before it

Summary of this case from Banking v. Glen at Broadstone, LLC

In Mackay v. Uinta Development Co., 229 U.S. 173, 33 S.Ct. 638, 57 L.Ed. 1138 (1913), the Court was asked to answer a certified question about whether the federal court had jurisdiction to decide a removed case when the removal was "not in conformity with the removal statute," but the defendant nonetheless appeared and litigated in the federal forum.

Summary of this case from Peterson v. BMI Refractories

In Mackay, a matter was removed from state court, despite the fact that while the counterclaim exceeded the jurisdictional amount, the plaintiff's claim did not; consequently, the matter was not within the removal jurisdiction of the federal district court and thus was "irregularly removed."

Summary of this case from Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.

In Mackay v. Uinta Development Company, 229 U.S. 173, 175, 33 S.Ct. 638, 639, 57 L.Ed. 1138, the Supreme Court found "it unnecessary to consider the status of the parties in the state court, and who was technical plaintiff and who technical defendant, or whether Mackay, a nonresident defendant, sued in a state court for $1,950, could, by filing a counterclaim for $3,000, acquire the right to remove the case to the United States court."

Summary of this case from Sheets v. Shamrock Oil Gas Corp.

In Mackay, the plaintiff brought suit under state law to recover $1,950—less than the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement at the time, which was $2,000.

Summary of this case from Caprio v. Gorawara

In Mackay the action was brought in state court between two citizens of different states, but the amount in controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction was met only by means of the defendant's counterclaim.

Summary of this case from Cofield v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

In Mackay, the case was removed without plaintiff's objection, and the Court allowed the removal because the damages in the complaint and the counterclaims together exceeded the minimum jurisdictional amount required at the time.

Summary of this case from No Regrets Properties v. Neighborhood Sports Pub Concepts

In Mackay, the Court held that the district court's diversity jurisdiction over the improperly removed case was invoked because the parties were diverse and the counterclaim exceeded the required jurisdictional amount, although the original claim was below the jurisdictional amount.

Summary of this case from FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A. v. GACHIENGU

In Mackay, a defendant improperly removed a case that was not subject to removal according to the terms of the removal statutes in existence at the time.

Summary of this case from Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Arndt
Case details for

Mackay v. Uinta Co.

Case Details

Full title:MACKAY v . UINTA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

Court:U.S.

Date published: May 26, 1913

Citations

229 U.S. 173 (1913)
33 S. Ct. 638

Citing Cases

FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A. v. GACHIENGU

Recognizing the difference between original and removal jurisdiction in cases in which both state and federal…

Peterson v. BMI Refractories

The Supreme Court has long treated the technical requirements of the federal removal statutes as procedural,…