Summary
observing that "the record is silent as to any request by appellant for an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate either the existence or terms of the settlement agreement."
Summary of this case from Powers v. Magitech Corp.Opinion
No. 84-283
Decided November 21, 1984.
Courts — Contracts — Settlements — Court not required to conduct evidentiary hearing prior to signing entry reflecting the settlement agreement, when.
O.Jur 3d Compromise etc. § 60.
In the absence of allegations of fraud, duress, undue influence, or of any factual dispute concerning the existence of the terms of a settlement agreement, a court is not bound to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to signing a journal entry reflecting the settlement agreement.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County.
In 1979 appellant, Robert E. Mack, instituted this action against appellee, Polson Rubber Company, in the Court of Common Pleas of Portage County alleging that appellee violated the terms of a pension plan by denying appellant disability compensation under the plan. At a pretrial conference held on September 11, 1981, the trial judge was informed that the parties had reached a settlement in the case. The trial judge accordingly caused the case to be removed from the trial docket.
The settlement reached by the parties called for appellee to pay appellant a lump sum of $11,250 and commence monthly payments of $120.04 for the remainder of appellant's life. In return, appellant was to execute a Release and Stipulation of Dismissal of the action. Copies of the Release and Stipulation of Dismissal were forwarded by appellee's counsel to counsel for appellant. In November 1981 a check in the amount of $11,250 was mailed to appellant's counsel. Appellee began making the agreed upon monthly payments the following month.
After failing to receive the executed Release and Stipulation of Dismissal by February 1982, appellee's counsel contacted counsel for appellant. Appellee's counsel was informed that the check and settlement documents had been lost.
Appellee thereafter filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and for Attorneys' Fees. By this motion, appellee requested that the court issue a final judgment in accordance with the settlement reached by the parties. Appellant never opposed this motion. An oral hearing was conducted on this motion. It is undisputed that at this hearing, appellant's counsel admitted that a settlement agreement had been reached, the terms of the agreement were the same as those identified by appellee, and the only reason for appellant's non-compliance with the settlement agreement was that appellant had subsequently become dissatisfied with the agreement.
In June 1982 the trial court issued a judgment entry that decreed the settlement agreement entered into by the parties was valid and existing and ordered appellee to reissue a draft in the amount of $11,250 and continue to make the required monthly payments. Appellant was ordered to execute the Release and Stipulation of Dismissal. Appellant took no action on this entry. Thereafter, in April 1983, the trial court issued another judgment entry. This entry reiterated that the settlement agreement was valid and binding upon the parties, went on to completely set forth the terms and conditions of the settlement, released appellee from further actions, claims, or demands by appellant, and rendered final judgment in favor of appellant pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.
Appellant appealed to the court of appeals and, in a single assignment of error, argued that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on appellee's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
McLaughlin, McNally Carlin Co., L.P.A., and Mr. Clair M. Carlin, for appellant.
Buckingham, Doolittle Burroughs Co., L.P.A., Mr. John L. Reyes and Mr. Bruce C. Scalambrino, for appellee.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether an evidentiary hearing is required prior to issuing a judgment entry enforcing a settlement agreement between parties in the absence of a factual dispute as to the existence or the terms of the settlement agreement. Appellant argues that before the trial court may order enforcement of a settlement agreement reached by the parties, the court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to factually determine whether a settlement agreement had been reached and, if so, what the terms of that agreement were. Appellant maintains that in the absence of such factual findings, it was improper for the trial court to enforce the settlement agreement.
The syllabus in Spercel v. Sterling Industries (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 36 [60 O.O.2d 20], states:
"1. Where the parties in an action for an accounting and royalties voluntarily enter into an oral settlement agreement in the presence of the court, such agreement constitutes a binding contract.
"2. In order to effect a rescission of a binding settlement agreement entered into in the presence of the court, a party must file a motion to set the agreement aside; and, in the absence of such motion, a trial court may properly sign a journal entry reflecting the settlement agreement."
Thus, under Spercel, supra, the trial court does possess the authority to enforce a settlement agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties to a lawsuit since such an agreement constitutes a binding contract. In Spercel, supra, a party to a settlement agreement refused to comply with its terms and filed a petition to vacate the agreement. This court refused to allow the unilateral rescission of the settlement agreement solely on the basis that the party seeking rescission had changed his mind and become dissatisfied with the agreement. As we noted in Spercel, supra, at 40:
"To permit a party to unilaterally repudiate a settlement agreement would render the entire settlement proceedings a nullity, even though, as we have already determined, the agreement is of binding force."
The only difference ostensibly between the instant case and the situation we confronted in Spercel, supra, is that in the latter, the settlement agreement was entered into in the presence of the court. Nonetheless, we do not believe that particular distinction is of such a character to take the instant case outside the holding in Spercel, supra, for a number of reasons. Initially, appellant made no motion to vacate or set aside the settlement agreement prior to the issuance of the judgment entry enforcing the agreement. Further, appellant's counsel admitted that the parties had entered into a settlement agreement and did not dispute any of the terms or conditions of the agreement. Additionally, the record is silent as to any request by appellant for an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate either the existence or terms of the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, in the absence of allegations of fraud, duress, undue influence, or of any factual dispute concerning the existence or the terms of a settlement agreement, a court is not bound to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to signing a journal entry reflecting the settlement agreement. Cf. Morform Tool Corp. v. Keco Industries, Inc. (1971), 30 Ohio App.2d 207 [59 O.O.2d 320], and Bolen v. Young (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 36.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN and J.P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.