Opinion
2003-199 Q C.
Decided December 22, 2003.
Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Civil Court, Queens County (P. Kelly, J.), entered October 29, 2002, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and denied his cross motion for summary judgment.
Order unanimously affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., ARONIN and PATTERSON, JJ.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action alleging that defendants negligently damaged his leased vehicle while servicing same and breached a settlement agreement wherein they agreed to lease him a specified new vehicle after the expiration of his current lease at the same rate. Inasmuch as the purported lease was not in writing, signed by the party against whom enforcement was sought, describing the goods leased and the lease term, it violated the statute of frauds and cannot be enforced (UCC 2-A-20 1 [1] [b]). Plaintiff also failed to establish the damages, if any, he sustained as a result of defendants' negligence. A review of defendants' moving papers established that defendants were negligent in servicing plaintiffs vehicle and damaged same. Defendants stated that they provided plaintiff with a loaner vehicle at no cost for one month and paid for the repairs made to his vehicle. In addition, plaintiff incurred no cost when returning his vehicle to GMAC after the lease expired for the subject vehicle. While plaintiff claimed that defendants provided him with a loaner vehicle for only two days, plaintiff failed to proffer evidence establishing his damages for loss of use of his vehicle such as receipts for a rental vehicle or expert testimony as to the rental value of a similar vehicle (see 8B NY Jur 2d, Automobiles § 1135; Roundtree v. Singh, 143 AD2d 995). In light of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the lower court properly dismissed plaintiffs complaint and denied plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment.
We note that plaintiff argues that defendants Joe Fox and Sam Fox should be held individually liable for the acts of the corporate defendant. Insofar as said liability is sought to be imposed based on their capacity as officers of the corporation, it is well settled that a corporate officer may not be held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of his official relationship to it ( see Bernstein v. Starrett City. Inc., 303 AD2d 530; Felder v. R K Realty, 295 AD2d 560; Clark v. Pine Hills Home, 112 AD2d 755). Moreover, in order to pierce the corporate veil to hold the individual defendants-owners liable, plaintiff was required to show that the individual defendants exercised complete domination over the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked and committed a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in plaintiff's injury ( see Old Republic Natl. Tit. Ins. Co. v. Moskowitz, 297 AD2d 724, 725). Plaintiff failed to make this requisite showing. In any event, it has been held that piercing the corporate veil is an equitable form of relief which the Civil Court lacks the power to grant (see 19 W. 45th St. Realty Co. v. Doram Elec. Corp., 233 AD2d 184).