Opinion
No. COA13–51.
2013-07-2
Catherine MACK, individually, and Jacatherine McLaughlin, a minor child, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Catherine Mack, Plaintiffs v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF ROBESON COUNTY, Defendant.
Perry Perry & Perry, P.A., by Maria T. Singleton, for plaintiff-appellants. Hogue Hill, LLP, by Wayne A. Bullard, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal by plaintiffs from orders entered 8 August 2012 by Judge James Gregory Bell in Robeson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 May 2013. Perry Perry & Perry, P.A., by Maria T. Singleton, for plaintiff-appellants. Hogue Hill, LLP, by Wayne A. Bullard, for defendant-appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Catherine Mack (“Mack”), individually, and Jacatherine McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”), a minor child, by and through her guardian ad litem, Mack (collectively “plaintiffs”), appeal from the trial court's orders dismissing plaintiffs' claims based on common law negligence and granting summary judgment in favor of The Board of Education of the Public Schools of Robeson County (“defendant”) as to plaintiffs' constitutional claim. We affirm.
I. Background
On 4 March 2009, McLaughlin was a freshman and Cierra James (“James”) was a senior at Red Springs High School (“RSHS”) in Red Springs, North Carolina. James approached McLaughlin and initiated a verbal altercation with her. James then physically attacked McLaughlin with a box cutter. During the altercation, McLaughlin sustained injuries to her face, neck and scalp. Although none of the school personnel were present when the fight began, Brian McDonald (“McDonald”), a teacher and coach at RSHS, heard the commotion and responded almost immediately.
Daniel Ryberg, the principal at RSHS (“Principal Ryberg”), conducted an investigation of the altercation. Principal Ryberg determined that McLaughlin had been sending notes to James prior to the incident. McLaughlin was suspended for 10 days and did not appeal her suspension. She attended RSHS on a half-day schedule for the remainder of the school year.
James was suspended for the remainder of the school year. She also pled guilty to simple assault and pled no contest to possession of a weapon on educational property. James was sentenced to thirty days in the custody of the Sheriff of Robeson County. That sentence was suspended and she was placed on supervised probation for twelve months.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint and then an amended complaint against defendant in Robeson County Superior Court. Plaintiffs alleged defendant's negligence caused McLaughlin's injuries that required treatment in excess of $10,000.00 for past and future medical expenses. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendant violated her right to the opportunity for an education free from psychological abuse and harm.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the common law negligence claim on the basis of sovereign immunity and a motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' constitutional claim. After a hearing, the trial court entered orders granting both of defendant's motions on 8 August 2012. Plaintiffs appeal.
Although plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's orders granting defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, their argument on appeal is limited to the trial court's summary judgment order.
II. Standard of Review
“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ “ In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523–24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)). A defendant may establish their right to summary judgment by “ ‘(1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiff's case is non-existent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense.’ “ Draughon v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C.App. 208, 212, 580 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2003) (quoting James v. Clark, 118 N.C.App. 178, 181, 454 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1995)). “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Jones, 362 N.C. at 573, 669 S.E.2d at 576 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
III. Constitutional Claim
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' constitutional claim. We disagree.
Article I, Section 15 of the North Carolina Constitution states that “[t]he people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 15. In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that they had a cognizable claim under this constitutional provision based upon our Supreme Court's holding in Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 678 S.E.2d 351 (2009). In Craig, the Court held that a local school board does not have sovereign immunity against claims brought by students under the North Carolina Constitution. Id. at 342, 678 S.E.2d 351,678 S.E.2d at 357. However, the Court did not hold that the plaintiff in that case necessarily had a viable constitutional claim. See id. at 340, 678 S.E.2d at 355 (“This holding does not predetermine the likelihood that plaintiff will win other pretrial motions, defeat affirmative defenses, or ultimately succeed on the merits of his case.”). Instead, the Craig Court “simply declined to consider the substantive viability of the state constitutional claims that the plaintiff attempted to assert pursuant to N.C. Const. art. I, § 15.” Doe v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 731 S.E.2d 245, 250–51 (2012). As this Court has previously explained, the Court in Craig
simply held ... that the existence of common law claims that were barred by the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity did not operate to bar the plaintiff from attempting to assert any constitutional claims that he might have otherwise had against the defendant while expressly declining to address the extent to which his constitutional claims had substantive merit. Fothergill v. Jones Cty. Bd. of Educ., 841 F.Supp.2d 915, 918 (E.D.N.C.2012) (holding that “the court in Craig expressly declined to rule on the merits of that constitutional claim....”); Collum v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 2010 WL 702462, *2, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15824, *7 (W.D.N.C. Feb.23, 2010) (holding that the Supreme Court in Craig “simply stated that the plaintiff in that case was not precluded from asserting the state constitutional claim, without reaching the merits of that claim”).
Id. at ––––, 678 S.E.2d 351, 731 S.E.2d at 251. Thus, while Craig permits plaintiffs to attempt to raise a constitutional claim, this Court must make an independent determination of the merits of that claim. See id.
Plaintiffs' constitutional claim in the instant case is essentially identical to the claim considered by this Court in Doe . In that case, the plaintiff alleged that an employee of the defendant's school board made sexual advances on her and induced her to engage in various types of sexual activity. Id. at ––––, 731 S.E.2d at 247. The plaintiff brought claims against the defendant for negligent hiring and negligent supervision and retention, as well as a claim for the violation of her right to a sound basic education under Article I, Section 15 of the North Carolina Constitution. Id. In assessing this claim, this Court examined the scope of this constitutional right pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997). Id. at ––––, 488 S.E.2d 249, 731 S.E.2d at 252–53. Under Leandro, the right to a sound basic education includes the following:
(1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable the student to function in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices with regard to issues that affect the student personally or affect the student's community, state, and nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in post-secondary education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal education or gainful employment in contemporary society.
346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. The Doe Court specifically noted that no decisions by our Courts have extended the scope of the right in N.C. Const. art. I, § 15 “beyond matters that directly relate to the nature, extent, and quality of the educational opportunities made available to students in the public school system.” ––– N.C.App. at ––––, 731 S.E.2d at 252–53. As a result, this Court concluded that “public school students [do not] have a state constitutional right to recover damages from local boards of education for injuries sustained as the result of a negligent failure to remain aware of and supervise the conduct of public school employees.” Id. at ––––, 731 S.E.2d at 253.
In the instant case, plaintiffs also alleged a violation of McLaughlin's constitutional rights under N.C. Const. art. I, § 15, claiming that the injuries she sustained denied her the “opportunity for an education free from psychological abuse and harm.” Just as the Doe Court found that the plaintiff had no constitutional right to recover damages for injuries sustained as the result of a negligent failure to remain aware of and supervise the conduct of public school employees, we find no constitutional right for plaintiffs to recover from defendant for injuries sustained from a negligent failure to remain aware of and supervise the conduct of other public school students. Plaintiffs presented no evidence of any actions by defendant which impacted the “nature, extent, and quality of the educational opportunities made available to students in the public school system,” and thus, plaintiffs' constitutional claim fails as a matter of law. See id. Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. This argument is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that the trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs failed to forecast evidence of a cognizable constitutional claim arising under N.C. Const. art. I, § 15. The trial court's order is affirmed.
Affirmed. Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).