Opinion
CV-22-00280-PHX-SPL)
03-27-2023
Jesus Macias, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Drue Kaplan-Seikmann, et al., Defendants.
SEALED ORDER
Honorable Steven P. Logan United States District Judge
Before the Court is Defendant Dr. Tasha Haggar's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 76). The Court rules as follows.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Jesus and Francine Macias, divorced parents of four daughters, initiated this action on February 19, 2022, on behalf of themselves and their four minor children. (Doc. 1). On December 23, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. 62). The SAC alleged claims against eighteen defendants, all related to the investigation and removal of the children from their parents' custody by the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) and resulting dependency proceedings in Maricopa County Superior Court that were eventually dismissed in February 2020. (Doc. 62). Fourteen defendants have answered the FAC. (Docs. 69, 70, 73). Three defendants have been dismissed. (Docs. 77, 88). The Court will summarize the allegations against the remaining defendant, Dr. Tasha Haggar, who has filed the pending Motion to Dismiss.
As of April 2016, all four daughters, the oldest two of whom are severely autistic, resided with Ms. Macias. (Doc. 62 at 3). On April 21, 2016, DCS received an anonymous report of child abuse and neglect stating, among other things, that the children were on severe food restrictions consisting of limited water and a small amount of bean soup and carrots for each meal. (Doc. 62 at 11). This set off nearly four years of conflict between Ms. Macias and DCS.
On May 25, 2016, DCS filed an In-Home Dependency Petition in juvenile court in Maricopa County requesting that the four children be declared dependent as to both Mr. and Ms. Macias. (Doc. 62 at 23). As part of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court ordered Ms. Macias to undergo a psychological evaluation. (Doc. 62 at 39). Defendant Haggar conducted the examination on November 26, 2016. (Doc. 62 at 40). She administered three tests for personality disorders on Ms. Macias, none of which produced results consistent with a disorder. (Doc. 62 at 40). Various other Defendants allegedly contacted Defendant Haggar before and after the examination to provide false information and suggest that Ms. Macias suffered from Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another (“Factitious Disorder”), previously known as Munchausen's By Proxy. (Doc. 62 at 40). On January 30, 2017, Defendant Haggar issued a report concluding that Ms. Macias had an “Other Specified Personality Disorder”-a DSM-5 disorder with no objective diagnostic criteria-and that there was some evidence that Ms. Macias may have Factitious Disorder, though a diagnosis could not be confirmed. (Doc. 62 at 41).
On June 8, 2018, Defendant Haggar performed a second evaluation of Ms. Macias. (Doc. 62 at 48). Her report following that evaluation stated that Ms. Macias did not meet the full criteria for any personality disorders but concluded, allegedly at the insistence of DCS, that Ms. Macias showed symptoms of Borderline Personality Disorder and Narcissistic Personality Disorder. (Doc. 62 at 48). Defendant Haggar's second report also diagnosed Ms. Macias with an “Other Specified Personality Disorder.” (Doc. 62 at 48).
On November 29, 2017, DCS petitioned the juvenile court for permanent severance of Ms. Macias's parental rights. (Doc. 62 at 43). The proceedings culminated in a 20-day severance trial held over a ten-month period, during which Defendant Haggar testified at some point. (Doc. 62 at 43, 48). On January 17, 2020, the juvenile court denied the petition to terminate Ms. Macias's parental rights, finding that DCS had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family. (Doc. 62 at 48-49). With respect to Defendant Haggar, the juvenile court found her generally credible and accepted her personality disorder diagnosis, concluding that “the results of the psychological evaluations support both the conclusion that [Ms. Macias] has a diagnosis that likely caused or contributed to the neglect of her children, and that this condition might successfully be addressed in therapy and therapeutic visitation.” (Doc. 55 at 8). The juvenile court's January 17, 2020 minute entry also indicates that the juvenile court would transfer the Maciases' family court case to itself given its knowledge of the matter, noting that Ms. Macias “is nowhere near being granted any legal decision-making authority (and may never be), nor is she now in a position to get unsupervised parenting time.” (Doc. 55 at 18). Finally, on February 21, 2020, the juvenile court dismissed the dependency matter in its entirety. (Doc. 62 at 52). Still, Ms. Macias's interaction with her children was limited to, at most, supervised visitation from no later than August 2016 through late 2020. (Doc. 62 at 37, 52).
The Court grants Defendant Haggar's request for judicial notice to the extent it takes judicial notice of the issuance of the juvenile court's January 17, 2020 minute entry and its contents, but not the truth of those contents. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Chatman v. Ferrell, No. CV-17-03826-PHX-DLR, 2018 WL 3209389, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2018); (Doc. 60 at 5). Further, because this Order quotes from the juvenile court's minute entry, which was filed under seal, the Court will seal this Order. The parties also quote from the minute entry in their public filings, however, so the Court will unseal this Order on April 10, 2023 unless any party objects prior to that date.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that the moving party is liable. Id. Factual allegations in the complaint should be assumed true, and a court should then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Facts should be viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
The SAC asserts three counts against Defendant Haggar: (1) Count Four, a § 1983 claim for judicial deception; (2) Count Five, a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to commit judicial deceptions; and (3) Count Ten, for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Doc. 62). Defendants make a plethora of arguments as to why the claims should be dismissed, and the Court will address them in turn.
a. Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations defense is ordinarily raised in a responsive pleading, but it “may be raised in a motion to dismiss if the running of the statute is apparent from the face of the complaint.” Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482, 484 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987). Still, “‘[d]ismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) “only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled”' or had otherwise not yet accrued.” ARA Inc. v. City of Glendale, No. CV-17-02512-PHX-GMS, 2018 WL 1411787, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2018) (quoting TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Court addresses the statute of limitations for the § 1983 claims followed by the IIED claim.
i. Section 1983
Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, so “federal courts apply the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state's law regarding tolling . . . .” Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). Arizona's statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. A.R.S. § 12-542. Under A.R.S. § 12-502(A), the running of the limitations period for acts occurring during childhood is tolled until the child reaches age eighteen.
Though state law determines the limitations period and tolling, “[f]ederal law determines when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run for a § 1983 claim.” Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.” Id.
Plaintiffs argues that the earliest date the statute of limitations began to run was February 21, 2020, when the dependency proceedings were dismissed. (Doc. 81 at 6). But they do not explain how dismissal of the dependency action somehow alerted them to their injury from Defendant Haggar's alleged judicial deception, and the Court finds no grounds for such a conclusion. Plaintiffs further argue that the harm to Ms. Macias continued to run beyond February 21, 2020 based on the restrictions imposed on her parental rights. (Doc. 81 at 6). But accrual depends on when a plaintiff knows or should know of an injury, not on whether there is continuing harm resulting from that injury. With respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, it is clear on the face of the SAC that they should have known of their injury no later than January 17, 2020, when the juvenile court denied the termination petition and stated, allegedly based in part on misrepresentations by Defendant Haggar, that Ms. Macias was not in a position to receive unsupervised parenting time. Because this action was not filed until more than two years later, on February 19, 2022, the § 1983 claims by Ms. and Mr. Macias as individuals will be dismissed based on the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations is tolled, however, for the § 1983 claims brought on behalf of the four minor children under A.R.S. § 12-502(A).
ii. IIED
In Arizona, “[a] claim for IIED must be brought within two years of the accrual date.” Mahon v. Hammond, No. 1 CA-CV 14-0539, 2016 WL 337493, at *3 (Ariz.Ct.App. Jan. 28, 2016). An IIED claim accrues when “the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying the cause.” Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 898 P.2d 964, 966 (Ariz. 1995); see also Alexander v. City of Mesa, No. CV-14-00754-PHX-SPL, 2015 WL 13655673, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2015).
Here, too, Plaintiffs' claim accrued no later than January 17, 2020, when they knew or should have known, based on the juvenile court's minute entry, of Defendant Haggar's allegedly false diagnoses of Ms. Macias and the juvenile court's conclusion that Ms. Macias should not have unsupervised parenting time. Plaintiffs do not allege any conduct by Defendant Haggar after that date. Again, then, Ms. and Mr. Macias's individual IIED claims are barred by the statute of limitations, but the statute of limitations is tolled for the claim on behalf of the minor children under A.R.S. § 12-502(A).
b. Judicial Deception
Moving to the merits, Defendant Haggar argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for judicial deception. There is “a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from judicial deception and fabrication of evidence in the context of civil child custody cases.” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021); see also David v. Kaulukukui, 38 F.4th 792, 804 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[A] parent and child's constitutional right to familial association is violated when a state official interferes with a parent's lawful custody through judicial deception.” (emphasis added)). To allege a violation of that right, a plaintiff must plead “(1) a misrepresentation or omission (2) made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth, that was (3) material to the judicial decision.” Id. at 1147. A misrepresentation is material if the court would have made a different decision had it received truthful information. See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part on other grounds, 661 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011) (mem.).
The Court previously held that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendant Haggar was a state actor for § 1983 purposes under the joint action test. (Doc. 60 at 6-7).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have pled judicial deception against Defendant Haggar. They sufficiently allege that she deliberately ignored her own clinical findings and misrepresented Ms. Macias's condition and actions to the juvenile court. (Doc. 62 at 41-42, 52). They have further pled that those misrepresentations, including the personality disorder diagnosis, were material to the juvenile court's decision to place continued restrictions on Ms. Macias's parenting time, such as supervised visitation. (Doc. 62 at 52; Doc. 55 at 8, 18). Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that through her material misrepresentations, Defendant Haggar interfered with the children's constitutional right to familial association with their mother, and have therefore stated a § 1983 judicial deception claim on behalf of the children.
c. Conspiracy to Commit Judicial Deception
Defendant Haggar next argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a § 1983 conspiracy. To plead a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff “must show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002). As discussed above, Plaintiffs have alleged an underlying violation of the children's constitutional rights. In addition, the Court previously held that the allegations in the First Amended Complaint “collectively give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant Haggar had a shared objective with DCS and its employees to deprive Ms. Macias of her relationship with her children,” which would necessarily include a shared objective to deprive the children of their relationship with their mother, as well. (Doc. 60 at 7). The Court finds all the same allegations that led to its prior conclusion are alleged again in the SAC, including that Defendant Haggar's report included assertions contrary to her clinical findings based on instructions from DCS employees that Ms. Macias had personality disorders, that Defendant Haggar parroted DCS's narrative that Ms. Macias failed to adequately feed her children, and that Defendant Haggar received a substantial portion of her compensation from work performed by DCS. (Doc. 62 at 39-41). These allegations remain sufficient to allege a meeting of the minds to violate the children's constitutional rights. The SAC states a claim for § 1983 conspiracy on behalf of the children.
d. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must plead three elements: (1) “the conduct by the defendant must be ‘extreme' and ‘outrageous;'” (2) “the defendant must either intend to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will result from his conduct;” and (3) “severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result of defendant's conduct.” Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (Ariz. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if a defendant's conduct is unjustifiable, it does not necessarily rise to the level of ‘atrocious' and ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency' that would cause an average member of the community to believe it was ‘outrageous.'” Nelson v. Phx. Resort Corp., 888 P.2d 1375, 1386 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1994) (quoting Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987)).
Plaintiffs argue that the following acts amount to extreme and outrageous conduct by Defendant Haggar:
(1) Haggar, motivated by her long-time relationships and conflicts of interest, twice parroted DCS's false narrative that Ms. Macias starved her children because she was mentally ill; (2) Haggar did not rely on her own assessment or testing results; (3) Haggar provided two false reports to the juvenile court; and (4) even the juvenile court noted that Haggar failed to provide a psychological analysis, and instead provided “little more than an adoption of DCS arguments.”(Doc. 81 at 13). These all amount to an allegation that Defendant Haggar falsely diagnosed Ms. Macias with a personality disorder causing her to neglect her children and provided that false information to the juvenile court. Even if Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that this conduct caused the children severe emotional distress, it falls short of being sufficiently extreme or outrageous to state an IIED claim.
Certainly, the conduct Defendant Haggar allegedly engaged in is unjustifiable, but making false statements that carry severe legal consequences does not, as a matter of law, give rise to an IIED claim. Defendant Haggar's citation to Norton v. Arpaio is apt. No. CV-15-00087-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL 1409536 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2019). There, a defendant officer led an investigation that resulted in felony arrests, prosecutions, and indictments of the plaintiffs, though the charges were later dismissed. Id. at *1-2. The defendant officer was alleged to have lied in probable causes affidavits for search warrants and in a charging summary provided to the prosecutor. Id. at *10. The court found that such conduct, “while unjustifiable, is not outrageous or extreme.” Id. at *11. Similarly, in Adams v. Estrada, the plaintiff sued for IIED after he was acquitted of criminal charges stemming from an altercation with the defendant, but the court found that even if the defendant “lied to the police officer and unjustifiably stated he wished to press charges,” it was not atrocious and beyond all bounds of decency. No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0074, 2014 WL 265660, at *1, 8 (Ariz.Ct.App. Jan. 23, 2014). Much like the defendants in those cases who allegedly made false statements leading to criminal charges, Defendant Haggar allegedly made false statements during dependency proceedings leading to supervised visitation. If the conduct in Norton and Adams could not be considered extreme and outrageous, then neither can the conduct alleged here. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for IIED.
e. Statutory Immunity
Finally, Defendant Haggar asserts that she is immune from suit under A.R.S. §§ 13-3620(J) and 8-805(A). Those statutes provide qualified immunity to certain people involved in child abuse and neglect reporting and investigations. Even if those statutes apply to Defendant Haggar under the circumstances, they are inapplicable to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, the only surviving claims. “Immunity under § 1983 is governed by federal law; state law cannot provide immunity from suit for federal civil rights violations.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1144 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding state statutory immunities for child abuse investigations did not apply to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims). Plaintiffs' claims will therefore not be dismissed on these grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the only surviving claims against Defendant Haggar are the § 1983 claims-Counts Four and Five-brought on behalf of the four minor children; the other claims against Defendant Haggar will be dismissed. Leave to amend a deficient complaint should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend may be denied, however, where amendment would be futile. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the Court finds that amendment would be futile. The statute of limitations defects cannot be cured, nor can the IIED claim. Moreover, Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint twice, including once following the Court's previous dismissal of the claims against Defendant Haggar. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] district court's discretion over amendments is especially broad where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Haggar's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 76) is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
1. The Motion is granted as to all of Plaintiffs' individual claims against Defendant Haggar and as to the IIED claims brought against Defendant Haggar on behalf of their minor children J.M., S.M., A.M., and Z.M., which are dismissed with prejudice.
2. The Motion is denied as to the § 1983 claims (Counts Four and Five) brought against Defendant Haggar on behalf of Plaintiffs' minor children J.M., S.M., A.M., and Z.M.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Haggar must file an Answer to the surviving claims against her no later than April 10, 2023.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall have until April 10, 2023 to submit a motion with proposed redactions for a public filing of this Order or, if no such motion is filed, the Clerk of Court shall unseal this Order without further notice.