Opinion
23A-DC-2306
11-08-2024
Natalee Mace, Appellant-Respondent/Cross-Appellee v. Monti Mace, Appellee-Petitioner/Cross-Appellant
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Christine A. DeSanctis DeSanctis Law, LLC Lafayette, Indiana Cynthia Phillips Smith Law Office of Cynthia P. Smith Lafayette, Indiana. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Melinda O'Dell O'Dell Family Law, LLC Brownsburg, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Morgan Superior Court The Honorable Sara A. Dungan, Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 55D03-2209-DC-001564.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Christine A. DeSanctis DeSanctis Law, LLC Lafayette, Indiana Cynthia Phillips Smith Law Office of Cynthia P. Smith Lafayette, Indiana.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Melinda O'Dell O'Dell Family Law, LLC Brownsburg, Indiana.
Kenworthy and DeBoer, Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Natalee Mace ("Wife") and Monti Mace ("Husband") were married for approximately 19 years when Husband petitioned to dissolve their marriage. While they were married, the couple had two children and accumulated assets and debts. The trial court dissolved the marriage; determined custody, parenting time, and child support; and divided the marital estate. After the decree was issued, Husband filed a motion to correct scrivener's error on the marital balance sheet. Shortly after Husband's motion was filed, Wife filed the present appeal. The trial court ruled on Husband's motion after the clerk issued its notice of completion of the clerk's record in this appeal.
[¶2] Wife presents multiple issues on appeal which we revise and restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred by ruling on Husband's motion to correct scrivener's error after the clerk filed the notice of completion of clerk's record in this appeal;
2. Whether the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate;
3. Whether the trial court erred in calculating child support obligations; and
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Husband attorney's fees.
Husband cross-appeals, presenting two issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it omitted a purported loan from Husband's mother as a marital debt; and
2. Whether the trial court erred by declining to award Husband credit for marital debts paid during the pendency of the dissolution.
[¶3] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶4] Husband and Wife were married in October of 2003, had two sons, and lived together in Martinsville, Indiana. The couple's two sons, born in 2007 and 2009, were diagnosed with autism and have special needs regarding school and treatment. For most of the marriage, Husband worked as an independent contractor as a State Farm Insurance agent. During the children's infancy, Wife spent the majority of her time caring for them. Later, she began working outside the home while also managing the needs of the children. On September 27, 2022, Husband filed a petition for the dissolution of the marriage.
[¶5] The trial court conducted a final hearing on Husband's petition over four days in May and July 2023. Husband and Wife shared the marital residence for most of the pendency of the dissolution, and Husband asked the trial court to award him credit for expenses he paid for the marital residence and the children during the course of the proceedings. In May 2023, Wife obtained a residence in Bloomington, Indiana, without notifying Husband or the trial court until the last day of the final hearing.
[¶6] On September 1, 2023, the trial court entered its decree dissolving the marriage; dividing the marital property; and establishing custody, parenting time, and child support. In its decree, the trial court made the following relevant findings:
21. The Court finds that [Husband's] income does vary but is correctly outlined in Exhibits 51 and 75 ([Husband's] Child
Support Obligation Worksheets). The Court determines that [Husband's] income is averaged to $2,498.63 weekly.
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24. Further, [Wife] obtained employment at PALS (People and Animal Learning Services) just two weeks prior to the final days of trial in this case. [Husband] testified that he was not aware of [Wife's] employment until this information was shared with his counsel in the form of exhibits. [Wife] testified that she works twenty (20) hours per week and receives a wage of $18.00 per hour.
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29. The Court will decline to impute [Wife's] income per [Husband's] request in Exhibit 51, but shall impute [Wife] at fulltime wages of $720.00 per week ($18.00 per hour x 40 hours per week).
30. The Court finds that [Husband's] receipt of health insurance cost reimbursement from State Farm reported annually on his W-2 and then deducted as an expense on his 1040 Schedule A is not income for child support purposes. [Husband] receives reimbursement for this expense from State Farm, which essentially provided the family with a low-cost/no-cost health insurance coverage that significantly reduced the family's medical expenses. This policy will continue to benefit the children by providing coverage for their medical expenses, which will continue to be substantial. Therefore, the Court does not include this health insurance reimbursement in the Court's Child Support Obligation Worksheet.
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47. The marital estate shall be divided equally amongst the parties as further outlined herein and as outlined in the attached property division and Marital Balance Sheet (Attachments B and C).
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70. The Court finds that there is not enough evidence to support Husband's claim that the parties owed his mother $28,737.93 for funds she loaned them to purchase their former marital residence in 2012 or 2013. There was no promissory note nor was it documented on the closing statement as a loan or gift.
Furthermore, Mother testified that at the time of closing, she was never told that this money was a loan expected to be paid back. Therefore, the Court does not include the debt on the parties' marital balance sheet.
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74. At trial, Wife requested a significant deviation from the presumption of a 50/50 division of the marital estate.
75. Husband requests a 50/50 division of all marital property as well as an offset for postseparation contributions he has made.
76. The Court finds that based upon the evidence and all the statutory factors to consider in dividing marital property, it is a just and equitable distribution for each party to have fifty percent (50%) of the marital estate.
77. Under such distribution, Husband owes to Wife $46,395.95 as equalization payment; a judgment is entered in favor of Wife and against Husband.
Appellant's App. Vol. II at 29-30, 35, 39-41 (emphasis added). The trial court did not award Husband post-filing credit for marital expenses in its findings or marital balance sheet. Additionally, the marital balance sheet appeared to have an omission which ultimately led to an error in calculating the marital estate. The balance sheet included a $23,017.57 loan as a marital debt but did not assign this debt to Husband or Wife. Thus, this value was included in calculating the net marital estate but was not then used in calculating the equalization payments.
[¶7] On September 27, 2023, Husband filed a motion to correct scrivener's error, seeking to have the trial court amend the decree to reflect the omitted $23,017.57 loan and recalculate the equalization payment. The next day, Wife filed her notice of appeal with this court. On October 2, 2023, the clerk filed its notice of completion of the clerk's record in this appeal. The trial court held a hearing on Husband's motion on November 29, 2023, where both parties argued whether the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on Husband's motion. On December 4, 2023, the trial court granted Husband's motion, amending its original balance sheet and ordering Husband to make a new equalization payment of $34,887.17. Wife now appeals and Husband cross-appeals. Additional facts will follow.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[¶8] The trial court issued findings sua sponte in its dissolution decree.
Because the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Without reweighing the evidence or reassessing witness credibility, we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and, if so, whether those findings support its judgment. See, e.g., S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023).Cooley v. Cooley, 229 N.E.3d 561, 564 (Ind. 2024). "Any issue not covered by the findings is reviewed under the general judgment standard, meaning a reviewing court should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence." Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123-24 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)).
1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Ruling on Husband's Motion to Correct Scrivener's Error
[¶9] First, we address Wife's jurisdictional issue. Wife claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case when it granted Husband's motion to correct scrivener's error. We review jurisdictional claims de novo. Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners Ass'n, 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1004 (Ind. 2023).
[¶10] Wife claims that Indiana Appellate Rule 8 barred the trial court from ruling on Husband's motion. Our Supreme Court has recently explained the jurisdictional limits imposed by this rule:
As a general rule, trial courts may revisit a ruling when the matter remains in fieri-in other words, pending judgment. In re Estate of Lewis, 123 N.E.3d 670, 673 (Ind. 2019). But once judgment is entered, an appeal is filed, and the clerk's record is
complete, Appellate Rule 8 divests the trial court of "jurisdiction to act upon the judgment appealed from until the appeal has been terminated." Schumacher v. Radiomaha, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. 1993).Conroad Assocs., 205 N.E.3d at 1005. Even after the completion of the clerk's record, "trial courts nevertheless retain authority 'over matters which are independent of and do not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal.'" Id. (quoting Crider v. Crider, 15 N.E.3d 1042, 1064-65 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014)). Such matters include "reassessing costs, correcting the record, or enforcing the judgment." Id. (quoting Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind. 1995)).
[¶11] Husband filed his motion to correct scrivener's error on September 28, 2023; Wife filed her notice of appeal the following day. The CCS indicates that the trial court granted Husband's motion two months after the clerk filed its notice of completion of the clerk's record. Thus, the only question for us is whether the trial court's decision on Husband's motion was independent of or interfered with the subject matter of Wife's appeal. See Conroad Assocs., 205 N.E.3d at 1005. Wife argues that, by granting the motion, the trial court made a substantive change to its judgment, and therefore, it lacked jurisdiction to make the change. We cannot agree.
[¶12] Here, the trial court granted Husband's motion to correct scrivener's error because it made a mistake while preparing the marital balance sheet. The record shows that, while the trial court was preparing the marital balance sheet for its decree, the trial court's computer system went down, so it prepared the marital balance sheet by hand. The trial court used whiteout to omit Husband's purported loan from his mother from the list of marital debts. In doing so, the trial court also (and mistakenly) crossed out the $23,017.57 loan from the column of Husband's debts that was in the row just above the purported loan from his mother. The loan was already listed in the column of marital debts and the trial court's findings indicated that Husband should be responsible for this loan. Thus, this mistake resulted in Husband's total debt, and in turn the equalization payment, being inconsistent with the trial court's findings.
[¶13] The trial court granted Husband's motion, correcting its omission and adjusting the equalization payment. Wife relies on this court's decision in Rosentrater v. Rosentrater, 708 N.E.2d 628 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), to claim that the trial court made a substantive change in adjusting the equalization payment. In Rosentrater, a month after the trial court entered the dissolution decree, the wife filed a motion to correct scrivener's error, arguing that the decree should reflect an increase in the husband's investment portfolio. 708 N.E.2d at 629. The trial court granted that motion, changing the portfolio amount on the decree. Id. We reversed the trial court's decision, determining that changing the value of the portfolio in the decree was a substantive change instead of a scrivener's error. Id. at 631.
[¶14] Unlike in Rosentrater, here, the trial court's new order corrected an omission from the initial order without adding any items to the balance sheet or issuing additional findings. The trial court's findings indicate that Husband would be responsible for this loan, and both Husband and Wife included the loan as a marital debt to be paid by Husband in their proposed marital balance sheets. The value of the loan was already included as a marital debt on the trial court's original decree; in the subsequent corrected order, the trial court simply apportioned the $23,017.57 loan to Husband (which was what each party had requested). Further, we note that, on appeal, Wife has not challenged the amount of the loan or whether Husband should be responsible for paying the loan. Thus, we conclude that the correction made by the trial court's grant of Husband's motion did not interfere with the subject matter of Wife's appeal and the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the error. See Conroad Assocs., 205 N.E.3d at 1005.
2. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In Its Division of the Marital Property
[¶15] Both parties argue the trial court erred regarding the division of marital property.
The division of marital property in Indiana involves a two-step process. First, the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate. O'Connell v. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). This consists of both assets and liabilities, Miller v. Miller, 763 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), and encompasses "all marital property," whether acquired by a spouse before the marriage or during the marriage or procured by the parties jointly, [Eads v. Eads, 114 N.E.3d 868, 873 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018)]. Once the court identifies the marital estate, it must then distribute the property in a "just and reasonable" manner. O'Connell, 889 N.E.2d at 10-11 (citing [Ind. Code] § 31-15-7-5).Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 226-27 (Ind. 2022) (emphasis added). Regarding the parties' claims: (a) Husband and Wife contend the trial court erred by failing to identify the property to include in the estate, (b) Wife argues the trial court erred in valuing certain property, and (c) Wife asserts the trial court erred in assigning some of Husband's credit card debt to her. We address each claim in turn.
a. Inclusion of Certain Property in the Marital Estate Wife's Claims
[¶16] Wife claims that the trial court's failure to include certain assets in the marital estate led to an unequal division of property. The division-of-property statute calls for a presumptive equal division of the marital property. I.C. § 31-15-7-5. A party can rebut this presumption with "relevant evidence . . . that an equal division would not be just and reasonable." Id.
This evidence may include:
• each spouse's contribution to the property's acquisition, regardless of whether the contribution produced any income;
• the extent to which a spouse acquired property, either before the marriage or through inheritance or gift;
• each spouse's economic circumstances at the time of divorce;
• the parties' conduct during the marriage, as it related to the disposal or dissipation of assets; and
• the parties' respective earnings or earning ability.Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (citing I.C. § 31-15-7-5(1) to (5)). "The party challenging the 'trial court's division of marital property must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute.'" Id. at 225 (quoting Wanner v. Hutchcroft, 888 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008)). Wife claims that the trial court erred by (i) omitting a life insurance policy from the estate and (ii) setting aside Husband's premarital property from the marital estate.
i. Life Insurance Policy
[¶17] Wife claims the trial court erred in omitting from the marital estate a life insurance policy Husband owned over his mother where he was the beneficiary. Husband testified to the existence and cash value of this policy, but Wife does not show us any other evidence on the record regarding this policy. The trial court did not include the policy in its findings or its final balance sheet. "We observe that, even if a trial court errs in excluding an asset from the marital estate, we may find such error to be harmless." Crider, 15 N.E.3d at 1061 (citing Helm v. Helm, 873 N.E.2d 83, 89 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007)). The policy has a cash value of $237 and it is unclear from the record whether the trial court intended to include it as a marital asset. Even if we assume the trial court erred, Wife has not demonstrated that this omission has affected her substantial rights. Thus, we cannot say that this omission amounts to reversible error. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(a); Crider, 15 N.E.3d at 1061.
ii. Husband's Premarital Personal Property
[¶18] Wife contends the trial court erred by setting aside Husband's personal property he acquired before their 19 years-long marriage. These items include Husband's Camaro, firearms, collectible toys, and vintage video game systems, which were all given a value of $0 on the marital balance sheet. The trial court found the following regarding Husband's personal property:
49. Husband shall also keep the 1968 Chevrolet Camaro he inherited from his father. Since this vehicle was a gift to Husband before the parties' marriage, the Court includes the vehicle in the marital estate but sets it and its value aside to Husband.
50. All other personal property shall be divided according to Husband's proposal in Exhibit 33.
Appellant's App. Vol. II at 35. Exhibit 33 was an appraisal of all the personal property in the marital residence, and the trial court did not issue any findings on the firearms, toys, and video game systems that Husband acquired prior to the marriage. Husband also admitted exhibit 33A which was the appraisal report with Husband's proposed division of the personal property. Husband claims that "[r]eading paragraphs 49 &50 of the Decree Order together and in context with the trial testimony indicates that the reasoning used in paragraph 49 is extended to paragraph 50 with regard to those items," Appellee's Br. at 20, meaning Husband believes the trial court set these items aside from the marital estate.
[¶19] Husband points to our Supreme Court's decision in Roetter v. Roetter to claim that the trial court did not err in setting aside his premarital assets from the marital estate. There, the trial court considered all the property in the marital estate, set aside the husband's premarital property from the marital estate subject to division, and ordered an unequal division of the remaining marital property in favor of the wife. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 224. On appeal, the wife argued that the trial court erred by failing to include the husband's premarital property in the "net marital estate" subject to division. Id. at 228-29. Our Supreme Court noted that it would have been a "better approach" to include all marital property in the divisible marital pot but ultimately determined that the trial court did not err in setting aside Husband's marital property. Id. at 229. The Court held that
[s]o long as it expressly considers all assets and liabilities, and so long as it offers sufficient findings to rebut the presumptive equal division, a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate and we will assume that it applied the law correctly.Id. (emphasis added) (citing Luttrell v. Luttrell, 994 N.E.2d 298, 305 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013)).
[¶20] At trial, Husband asked the trial court to set aside his premarital property from the marital estate and put their values as zero on the marital balance sheet. On appeal, Husband claims that the trial court granted his request, properly set the property aside, and listed their values as $0 "to simplify the math in order to divide the remainder of the marital estate equally between the parties." Appellee's Br. at 21.
[¶21] However, we disagree with Husband's assertion that we can apply Roetter to the present case. Importantly, the trial court here found that "based upon the evidence and all the statutory factors to consider in dividing marital property, it is a just and equitable distribution for each party to have fifty percent (50%) of the marital estate." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 40. We reiterate that the marital estate includes "'all marital property,' whether acquired by a spouse before the marriage or during the marriage or procured by the parties jointly." Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 227 (quoting Eads, 114 N.E.3d at 873)). Based upon the holding in Roetter, setting aside premarital property from the marital estate as Husband suggests would be proper only if the trial court had ordered an unequal division of property. See id. at 229.
By setting aside Husband's premarital property, the trial court erroneously excluded significant value from the marital estate. The personal property appraisal listed the value of Husband's premarital property as follows: the Camaro at $16,000, the firearms at $2,325, the toys at $500, and the video games systems at $425. Additionally, the trial court listed seven silver bars as an asset on the marital balance sheet but listed the value as $0. Husband testified that he had been given these silver bars prior to the marriage and wanted those separated from all other marital property as well. See Appellee's Br. at 20. He claimed the silver bars were worth "the spot price of silver." Tr. Vol. II at 98. In excluding this property from the marital estate, the trial court effectuated an unequal division of the marital property in favor of Husband. Thus, the trial court clearly erred in its division of the marital property.
Husband's Claim
[¶22] Husband argues that the trial court erred by not including in the marital estate an alleged $28,737.93 loan from his mother. The exclusion of a liability from the marital estate is within the trial court's discretion. See Bringle v. Bringle, 150 N.E.3d 1060, 1070 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). The trial court ultimately found that there was insufficient evidence to prove the existence of the loan.
[¶23] Husband claims that he owed $28,737.93 to his mother because she loaned him that amount for a down payment on the marital residence. We addressed a similar claim in Macher v. Macher, 746 N.E.2d 120 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). There, Macher claimed the trial court erred when it determined that money his parents had provided him to purchase a home was a gift instead of a loan. Macher, 746 N.E.2d at 124. Although Macher's mother testified that it was a loan, there was no promissory note or documentary evidence about the loan and no payments had been paid or requested on the loan. Id. Due to the conflicting evidence, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the money was a gift. Id.
[¶24] Here, Husband did not sign a promissory note for the loan, there was no documentation memorializing the loan, his mother testified that the loan existed but she was unaware of the amount for the outstanding balance, and Wife testified that she had not learned about this alleged loan until after the divorce. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that there was not enough evidence to demonstrate that Husband owed his mother $28,737.93. See Macher, 746 N.E.2d at 124. Additionally, Husband's argument amounts to a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Cooley, 229 N.E.3d at 564.
b. Valuation
[¶25] Wife claims the trial court erred in valuing certain marital property. "We review a trial court's valuation of an asset in a marriage dissolution for an abuse of discretion. With respect to findings of fact about an asset's value, a trial court has not abused its discretion if sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences support that valuation." Bingley v. Bingley, 935 N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ind. 2010) (internal citation omitted) (citing Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)). In particular, Wife claims the trial court abused its discretion in valuing (i) Husband's Crypto Digital Wallet, (ii) Husband's business, and (iii) Husband's State Farm Credit Union Account.
i. Husband's Crypto Digital Wallet
[¶26] Regarding Wife's argument related to the value the trial court provided for Husband's crypto digital wallet in its balance sheet, it appears that Wife complains that the trial court should have valued this asset as of the date of the filing instead of another date. Instead of adopting a value for this asset of $10,287, as Wife requested, the trial court valued the crypto digital wallet as $1,135.08. Husband explained how the funds were used post-filing - essentially for school tuition and furniture that was awarded to Wife. Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court did not err by valuing the crypto digital wallet as $1,135.08.
We are left guessing this is the issue because the entirety of Wife's argument on this point is only two sentences, and both sentences merely address the difference between the Court's valuation and another valuation established closer to the filing date.
ii. Husband's Business
[¶27] Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing Husband's business. Husband is a self-employed insurance agent for State Farm, and his business is an S corporation where he is the sole shareholder of the business. The trial court valued Husband's business at negative $65,896 due to outstanding loans. At trial, Husband provided the business's proposed value by subtracting the business's outstanding debts from its retained earnings in the business's 2022 tax return. The debts exceeded the earnings, resulting in the negative $65,896 valuation. The business's outstanding debts were loans that Husband had provided to the business in his capacity as the sole shareholder, meaning that the negative $65,896 was debt that the business owed to Husband. Wife argues that the trial court erred in its valuation because the outstanding debts on the business are payable to Husband. We agree with Wife.
[¶28] Wife cites our decision in Bringle v. Bringle, 150 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020), where we addressed the issue of shareholder debt in a business valuation during a divorce proceeding. There, Bringle was the sole shareholder of a company, and he claimed that he owed his company $659,707 due to a loan that the shareholders had taken from the company. Bringle, 150 N.E.3d at 1067. We noted that "[f]or income tax purposes, an S corporation owned by a single shareholder is a disregarded entity," id. (citing City of Kokomo v. Estate of Newton, 136 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 n.4 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019)), meaning that the sole shareholder and the company are "one and the same," id. On appeal, Bringle claimed this was a valid debt he owed the company, but, at trial, he had indicated that this debt was shown on the balance sheet for tax purposes. Id. Additionally, there was "no evidence of interest payable on the shareholder debt, no repayment schedule, no due date, and no demand feature." Id. at 1067-68.
[¶29] We ultimately determined that Bringle "cannot be both a debtor and a creditor with respect to the same debt." Bringle, 150 N.E.3d at 1068. We described the nature of this "debt" where Bringle (the individual) owed a debt to Bringle (the corporation):
As the alter ego of his Company, [Bringle] has no enforceable legal obligation to pay the debt to himself. Here the "debt" consists of a bookkeeping entry and is not otherwise documented. There is no evidence that this debt is, in fact, collectable....
Further, because [Bringle] is both the debtor and the creditor, the liability is inherently unenforceable.Id.
[¶30] Here, we have similar circumstances. Husband bases his negative valuation of his business on the premise that Husband, in his capacity as the sole shareholder of his insurance business, owes Husband the individual in the amount of $65,896. There is no documentary evidence of these loans outside the figures on the business's tax returns. Further, Husband valued his business by subtracting this alleged debt from the business's assets, but Husband testified that the total assets on his tax return were "a complete fiction" and that the figures on his tax returns were not "trued up" because he wanted to avoid paying capital gains taxes. Tr. Vol. II at 228. Thus, we conclude that this alleged debt Husband is owed from his business is merely a bookkeeping entry and not an enforceable debt. See Bringle, 150 N.E.3d at 1068.
[¶31] On appeal, Husband points to his testimony where he claimed the business had no value and his accountant's testimony calling the business a worthless asset. However, a business without value is significantly different from a business worth negative $65,896. In fact, Husband's accountant testified that the numbers Husband pointed to on the tax returns have nothing to do with whether the business has a positive or negative value and that the debts and the assets of the business balance out. Because there is no evidence that the business's debt to Husband needs to be repaid and the record does not support a negative valuation for the business, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the business at negative $65,896.
iii. State Farm Credit Union Account
[¶32] Wife contends that the trial court erred in valuing the amount in Husband's State Farm Credit Union Account. In its findings, the trial court provided that "Husband shall retain the funds in his State Farm business accounts at State Farm Credit Union (6769)." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 36. The trial court listed the value of the account as $0, and Wife claims that the value should be $35,533.57. We agree with Wife.
[¶33] The evidence does not support a valuation for this account at $0. Both Husband and Wife provided account statements demonstrating that this account was valued at $35,533.57 when Husband filed his petition for dissolution. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by valuing the account at $0.
[¶34] Husband claims that this account belonged to his mother and should not be included as a marital asset. The account statements show that Husband shares this account with his mother, but other evidence shows that Husband's mother has very little involvement or familiarity with the account. At the hearing, Husband's mother testified that she did not know how much money was in the account, she never checked the account, and the only information she receives about the account is what Husband provides to her. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Husband's argument that this account belonged to his mother. Husband further argues that the trial court valued the account at $0 because it was setting it aside from the marital estate like his personal property. However, as discussed above, it would be erroneous to separate the account from the marital estate because the trial court did not order an unequal division of marital property. See Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 229.
c. Credit Card
[¶35] Lastly, we consider Wife's claim concerning Husband's Chase Sapphire credit card. The trial court's findings indicate that Wife shall be responsible for the debt associated with Husband's Chase Sapphire credit card. However, on the marital balance sheet the trial court apportioned the $19,167.80 balance from this card to Husband.
[¶36] Husband agrees that the trial court erred and that he should be solely responsible for this debt. At the hearing, Husband testified that he should pay the debt on this credit card. Additionally, both parties indicated this card as a marital debt to be paid by Husband in their proposed marital balance sheets. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in allocating Husband's credit card debt to Wife.
3. The Trial Court Erred in Calculating Husband's Child Support Payment
[¶37] Wife argues that the trial court failed to comply with the Child Support Guidelines in determining child support obligations.
A trial court's calculation of child support is presumptively valid, and we will reverse a support order only for clear error. Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 738 (Ind. 2015); Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008). That is, reversal is proper only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court or is contrary to law. See Bogner, 29 N.E.3d at 738.Wierks v. Mazellan, 171 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). Wife claims that the trial court failed to comply with the Child Support Guidelines when (a) calculating Husband's weekly gross income and (b) calculating Wife's weekly gross income.
a. Husband's Weekly Gross Income
[¶38] Wife contends that the trial court failed to comply with the Child Support Guidelines by excluding Husband's W-2 income from his weekly gross income. "The calculation of the weekly gross income of both parents is the 'starting point' when determining a parent's child support obligation." Degrado v. Degrado, --N.E.3d --, 2024 WL 4019414 at *4 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024) (quoting Meredith v. Meredith, 854 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006)). Child Support Guideline 3(A)(1) defines weekly gross income as "actual weekly gross income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if unemployed or underemployed, and the value of in-kind benefits received by the parent." The Guidelines also define weekly gross income for self-employment:
Weekly Gross Income from self-employment, operation of a business, rent, and royalties is defined as gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses. In general, these types of
income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business should be carefully reviewed to restrict the deductions to reasonable out-of-pocket expenditures necessary to produce income. These expenditures may include a reasonable yearly deduction for necessary capital expenditures. Weekly Gross Income from self-employment may differ from a determination of business income for tax purposes.
Expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a parent in the course of employment, self-employment, or operation of a business should be counted as income if they are significant and reduce personal living expenses. Such payments might include a company car, free housing, or reimbursed meals....Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(2)(2023) (emphasis added). The commentary to Indiana Child Support Guideline 3 provides: "In calculating Weekly Gross Income, it is helpful to begin with total income from all sources. This figure may not be the same as gross income for tax purposes."
The Child Support Guidelines were revised on January 1, 2024. The Child Support Guidelines cited herein reflect the Child Support Guidelines in effect when the trial court issued child support obligations for Husband and Wife.
[¶39] Here, Husband was self-employed as a State Farm agent. Husband received income as the only shareholder of his insurance business, but he also received a salary from the business in his individual capacity. At the trial court, Husband argued that his salary, as reflected on his W-2, was reimbursement from State Farm for the health insurance payments he had made on behalf of the family. In turn, Husband excluded his W-2 income from his weekly gross income in his Child Support Worksheet. The trial court found the following:
The Court finds that [Husband's] receipt of health insurance cost reimbursement from State Farm reported annually on his W-2 and then deducted as an expense on his 1040 Schedule A is not income for child support purposes. [Husband] receives reimbursement for this expense from State Farm, which essentially provided the family with a low-cost/no-cost health insurance coverage that significantly reduced the family's medical expenses. This policy will continue to benefit the children by providing coverage for their medical expenses, which will continue to be substantial. Therefore, the Court does not include this health insurance reimbursement in the Court's Child Support Obligation Worksheet.
Appellant's App. Vol. II at 30. Wife claims that the trial court erred by omitting Husband's W-2 income while Husband argues that his W-2 reflects healthcare reimbursement costs and should not be included in his weekly gross income. We agree with Wife.
[¶40] We recently addressed an argument similar to Husband's in Degrado, 2024 WL 4019414 at 4-5. There, Mr. Degrado received reimbursements from his employer for out-of-pocket expenses he paid during the course of his work. Id. at 4. On appeal, Degrado argued that these reimbursements should be excluded from his weekly gross income for calculating child support because they were excluded from his taxable income. Id. at 4-5. We held that even if reimbursements were excluded from taxable income "this does not mean that such reimbursements cannot be included in the determination of Father's income when calculating his child support obligation." Id. at 5.
[¶41] The Child Support Guidelines expressly include salaried wages in its definition of weekly gross income. Child Supp. G. 3(A)(1) ("Weekly gross income of each parent includes income from any source, except as excluded below, and includes, but is not limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses ....). Thus, Husband's salary as reflected in his W-2 fits squarely within the definition of weekly gross income.
[¶42] Husband also characterizes his W-2 income as a legitimate business deduction that should not be included in weekly gross income. In doing so, Husband only focuses on his income as the sole shareholder in his insurance business while ignoring the fact he receives a salary in his individual capacity reflected in his W-2. While this W-2 income is ultimately deducted, it is still income received by Husband.
[¶43] To illustrate, Husband's 2022 W-2 shows $15,750 in wages for the year. Husband deducts this amount from the business's gross receipts as "[c]ompensation of officers," Appellee's App. Vol. III at 2, while also deducting the same amount from his individual gross income as a "[s]elf-employed health insurance" deduction, id. at 75. Despite ultimately being deducted from the gross amount for his business and individual income, Husband still received $15,750 in wages. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Husband's arguments, and we conclude that the trial court erred by omitting Husband's W-2 wages from his weekly gross income.
b. Wife's Weekly Gross Income
[¶44] Wife also claims that the trial court erred in calculating her weekly gross income. Here, the trial court imputed Wife's income to be $720 a week, reflecting a 40-hour work week at $18 per hour. Wife claims that this amount is too high and does not comply with the Child Support Guidelines, arguing her weekly gross income should only reflect the 20 hours a week she was working at the time of the hearing.
[¶45] The evidence demonstrated that Wife was capable of obtaining and working a full-time job. The trial court issued the following findings related to Wife's ability to work:
23. [Wife] contends that she was incapable of working during the marriage due to the needs of the children. However, the evidence showed that [Wife] was only physically with the children for a short period of time immediately after Husband's Petition for Dissolution was filed, and that the parties usually had the assistance of a caregiver for the children. [Wife] worked full time outside the home in 2021. The children currently attend school at a facility that does not require or request [Wife's] presence during the school day.
* * *
25. If [Wife] looked for employment as she claimed during her testimony, that information was not provided nor updated in her discovery responses. See Exhibits 63-67.
26. [Wife] is capable of earning substantially more income than her current part-time employment provides. While the Court recognizes that [Wife] desires to work less in order to be available for the children, it also finds that this is an option most parents would take given the chance.
28. With a shared parenting plan and the children's current school schedule, both parents are equally capable of full-time employment.
Appellant's App. Vol. II at 29-30. Wife does not challenge any of these findings, and thus we accept them as proven. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)). The facts permit us to conclude, as the trial court must have done, that Mother was voluntarily underemployed at the time of the hearing.
[¶46] The Child Support Guidelines provide:
If a court finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just cause, child support shall be calculated based on a determination of potential income. A determination of potential income shall be made by determining employment potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor's employment and earnings history, occupational qualifications, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record or other employment barriers, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community.
Child Supp. G. 3(A)(3). At the time of the hearing, Wife was receiving $18 an hour at her job, and the trial court calculated Wife's potential income by multiplying her hourly wages by a 40-hour a week schedule. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Wife's argument that the trial court failed to comply with the Child Support Guidelines in calculating her potential income. We conclude that the trial court did not err in calculating Wife's weekly gross income for child support.
In the trial court order, Wife's income was characterized as an imputed income. For purposes of this decision, whether her income is characterized as "imputed" or "potential" is of no moment. The trial court did not err.
4. The Trial Court Erred by Declining to Award Husband Credit for Mortgage Payments
[¶47] Husband cross-appeals, claiming the trial court erred by not awarding him credit for post-filing marital debts. Husband seeks credit for $65,315.16 worth of family expenses he paid throughout the dissolution proceedings, claiming he should be awarded half of this amount from Wife's equalization payment. Husband seeks credit for expenses related to (a) mortgage payments made on the marital residence and (b) other marital expenses.
a. Mortgage Payments
[¶48] During the pendency of the dissolution proceedings, Husband and Wife lived together in the marital residence while Husband continued to pay the mortgage on the home. In its decree, the trial court ordered the marital residence to be sold and required Husband to pay any related expenses, including the mortgage payments, until the property could be sold. Additionally, the trial court awarded Husband credit for any amount for which he reduced the principal on the mortgage from the time the decree was entered until it was sold. The trial court's balance sheet did not provide a dollar value for the marital residence, but it does provide the following language: "Value of Sale Offer 11-18-22." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 48. Because the marital residence was ultimately divided 50/50 between the parties, Husband argues that he should be given credit for his mortgage payments made during the dissolution process. We agree with Husband.
[¶49] Husband points us to our decision in Grimes v. Grimes, 722 N.E.2d 374 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). There, Grimes had been paying the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the marital residence during the dissolution proceedings, and the trial court dissolved the marriage with issues related to marital residence still pending. Grimes, 722 N.E.2d at 376 n.2. Later, in its final decree, the trial court ordered the marital residence to be sold and the couple would split the net proceeds 50/50. Id. The decree also ordered Grimes to continue paying the expenses on the marital residence until it sold but awarded him 50% credit for payments made after August 1, 1998-six weeks after the marriage had been dissolved. Id.
[¶50] On appeal, Grimes argued that the trial court erred by only awarding him credit for 50% of his mortgage payments. Grimes, 722 N.E.2d at 380. We noted that, by continuing to pay the mortgage payments, Grimes was increasing the amount of equity in the marital residence, ultimately increasing the net proceeds of the sale. Id. at 381. By only providing 50% credit for his mortgage payments, Grimes was not "fully reimbursed for the increase in equity brought about by his payments" because he only received "one half of the net proceeds after he receives a fifty percent (50%) reimbursement." Id. We concluded that "by only reimbursing [Grimes] fifty percent (50%) of the amounts he paid since August 1, 1998, until the sale of the marital residence, the trial court effectuated an unequal distribution of the marital property." Id. at 380
[¶51] Although there is a distinction in the timelines between Grimes and the present case, we find the general holding of Grimes instructive. Here, the trial court valued the marital residence on November 18, 2022-10 months before the trial court entered its decree dissolving the marriage. The trial court was within its discretion to choose this date for valuation. Baglan v. Baglan, 137 N.E.3d 271, 277 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (citing Quillen, 671 N.E.2d at 102) ("A trial court has discretion when valuing the marital assets to set any date between the date of filing the dissolution petition and the date of the hearing."). Husband paid 100% of the mortgage payments after the trial court's valuation date, increasing the net profits of the sale of the marital residence, and the trial court ordered a 50/50 division of marital property. Although the trial court properly awarded Husband credit for payments made after the dissolution, Husband received no credit for his payments that increased the equity in the home from November, 18, 2022, until the trial court issued its decree on September 1, 2023. Thus, Husband was not fully reimbursed for the increased equity resulting from his mortgage payments in this timeframe. See Grimes, 722 N.E.2d at 380-81. We conclude that the trial court erred in declining to award Husband credit for his mortgage payments.
[¶52] Husband provided evidence showing that he made eight mortgage payments in the amount of $1,547.34 from November 18, 2022, until the decree was entered, but this evidence does not indicate what percentage of these payments went to the principal. We remand to the trial court to award credit to Husband in the amount that these payments reduced the principal on the mortgage.
Husband sought credit for ten mortgage payments made, but two of these payments occurred before November 18, 2022.
b. Other Marital Expenses
[¶53] Husband contends that he should be awarded credit for expenses made for the benefit of Wife and the children during the pendency of the dissolution. These expenses amount to $49,841.76 and include tuition and therapy for the children, medical expenses for Wife and the children, as well as taxes and costs related to the marital residence.
[¶54] We addressed a similar claim in Priore v. Priore, 65 N.E.3d 1065, 1073-74 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). There, the trial court did not enter a provisional order identifying the obligations to pay ongoing marital expenses, and Mr. Priore requested a credit against his equalization payment for marital expenses during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings. Priore, 65 N.E.3d at 1073-74. These expenses included, in part, education-related and medical related expenses for the children as well as expenses for the marital residence. Id. at 1074. The trial court denied Priore's request, finding that, in the absence of a provisional order, these payments were voluntarily given. Id. On appeal, Mr. Priore argued that this denial was an abuse of discretion because these payments benefitted the family during the dissolution proceedings and the trial court erred in finding the payments were gratuitous. Id. at 1073-74. We noted that "no provisional order was entered, and [Mr. Priore] likely, as the party with higher earning ability, would have been ordered to pay many of these household expenses provisionally during the dissolution proceedings." Id. at 1074. Because Husband likely would have been ordered to pay these expenses and the trial court has "broad discretion in the division of the marital estate," we concluded that the trial court did not err in finding these payments were gratuitous and denying Mr. Priore's request for credit. Id.
[¶55] Similarly, the trial court here did not enter a provisional order establishing obligations to pay ongoing marital debts. Additionally, Husband did not seek an order for child support, maintenance, or allocation of expenses between the parties during the pendency of the dissolution. Husband seeks credit for healthcare and educational expenses for the family as well as household repairs and supplies. As the substantially higher earner, Husband likely would have been ordered to pay many of these expenses during the dissolution proceedings and the trial court was within its discretion to consider these payments voluntarily given. See Priore, 65 N.E.3d at 1074. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Husband's request for a credit against his equalization payment. See id.
5. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Awarding Attorney's Fees to Husband
[¶56] Wife claims the trial court erred in awarding Husband attorney's fees. "We review a trial court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or misinterprets the law." River Ridge Dev. Auth. v. Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020) (internal citation omitted) (citing Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank, 972 N.E.2d 835, 843 (Ind. 2012), abrogated in part on other grounds by Cosme v. Clark, 232 N.E.3d 1141, 1148-50 (Ind. 2024)).
[¶57] The trial court may award a party a reasonable amount in attorney's fees to cover the cost of maintaining a marital dissolution action. I.C. § 31-15-10-1.
In determining whether to award attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding, trial courts should consider the parties' resources, their economic condition, their ability to engage in gainful employment and earn income, and other factors bearing on the reasonableness of the award. A party's misconduct that directly results in additional litigation expenses may also be considered. Consideration of these factors promotes the legislative purpose behind the award of attorney's fees, which is to ensure that a party who would not otherwise be able to afford an attorney is able to retain representation.Eads, 114 N.E.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted).
[¶58] Here, the trial court determined that Wife's misconduct throughout the proceedings prolonged the dissolution process and increased costs. The trial court provided the following relevant findings justifying an award of attorney's fees for Husband:
86. Husband incurred unnecessary additional attorney fees and costs in order to procure information not provided by Wife or not provided by her in a timely manner. At trial, it was clear that Wife had not appropriately supplemented her discovery responses with basic information such as her new address upon relocation or her new job and new wages.
87. Husband incurred substantial additional attorney fees to procure information necessary for trial, including third party requests for information regarding Wife's retirement accounts.
88. Additionally, Husband testified that he incurred unnecessary attorney fees to research and potentially defend against Wife's claim that his business had a value in excess of $287,000.00 (see Wife's Exhibit LLL). Much court time was spent discussing the income and value of Mace Insurance and Financial Services. At the last day of trial, Wife's final marital balance sheet (Exhibit LLL) indicated that Wife finally placed a value of $0.00 upon Husband's business interests.
89. Much court time was used by Wife to discuss each party's contributions to caring for the children, when in reality they were only really arguing over one night in a two-week time period. Much court time was used by Wife regarding tensions in the household, when that is certainly expected when parties are living together in the same house with a divorce pending.
Appellant's App. Vol. II at 42.
[¶59] Wife does not challenge these findings, so we accept them as true. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). Instead, Wife asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Cooley, 229 N.E.3d at 564. While it is clear that Husband's economic condition is much better than Wife's, that one factor alone does not override the other factors pointing to a reasonable attorney fee award. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Husband $8,818.00 in attorney's fees.
Conclusion
[¶60] We affirm in whole the trial court's ruling on Husband's motion to correct scrivener's error and its award of attorney's fees to Husband. We affirm the trial court's child support obligation for Wife. We affirm the trial court's denial of Husband's request for credit on childcare and household expenses while reversing the trial court's denial of Husband's request for credit on the mortgage payments.
[¶61] We affirm the trial court's decision to exclude Husband's purported loan from his mother as a marital debt and the life insurance policy over his mother as a marital asset. We reverse on all other issues concerning the division of marital property. We remand with instructions for the trial court to include all marital property in the marital estate, value Husband's business and State Farm Credit Union account consistent with the evidence, correct its finding concerning Husband's Chase Sapphire credit card, include Husband's W-2 income in his child support obligation, and award credit to Husband for mortgage payments.
[¶62] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.