Summary
In MacDonald v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 274 Mich. 701, it was held that where a disabled employee had had employment, compensation was stopped therefor and he had lost his employment, the department would be justified in holding that the employment had established a prima facie earning capacity but — `the ruling does not require the employee to show a change of physical condition after his discharge.
Summary of this case from Lauder v. Paul M. Wiener FoundryOpinion
Docket No. 74, Calendar No. 38,699.
Submitted January 15, 1936.
Decided March 2, 1936.
Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry. Submitted January 15, 1936. (Docket No. 74, Calendar No. 38,699.) Decided March 2, 1936.
A.H. MacDonald presented his claim for compensation against Great Lakes Steel Corporation, employer, and Michigan Mutual Liability Company, insurer, for accidental injuries sustained while in defendant's employ. On petition for determination of rate of compensation and amount due. Award to defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Charles Bowles, for plaintiff.
L.J. Carey and Geo. J. Cooper, for defendants.
Under approved agreement plaintiff was awarded compensation of $16.80 per week for total disability as a carpenter, skilled labor. He returned to work for the same employer as a watchman, unskilled labor, at $16 per week. In MacDonald v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 268 Mich. 591, we held that, while engaged in such employment, his earnings constituted a set-off against the award, reducing the latter to $9.20 per week, under the proviso in 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8427 (e), which reads:
"Provided, The compensation payable, when added to his wage-earning capacity after the injury in the same or another employment, shall not exceed his average weekly earnings at the time of such injury."
While the case was pending in this court plaintiff was discharged by defendant and has not since been employed. He petitions for reinstatement of his full original award. He makes no showing of change of physical condition or ability to work, of inability to obtain a job, that he belongs in the class of "nondescript" or "odd lot" labor, Hood v. Wyandotte Oil Fat Co., 272 Mich. 190, nor that otherwise there has been a change in his actual earning capacity since his discharge. The department refused to reinstate the original award on the ground that a wage-earning capacity had been established by the employment and no change in such capacity had been shown.
The action of the department amounts to a ruling that the actual earning of wages establishes an earning capacity under the proviso in 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8427 (e), that, prima facie, such earning capacity continues after the discharge of the employee from the employment in which the wages are earned and that the burden of showing a change of earning capacity when the employment ceases (in order to reinstate the original award or to decrease the set-off against it) is upon the employee. This is merely an application of the rule that the burden of proof of right to compensation and its amount is on the employee. The prima facie assumption of continuance of earning capacity is in accord with ordinary human experience and not unfair.
The ruling does not require the employee to show a change of physical condition after his discharge. Nor does it prevent his showing his actual earning capacity after the employment ceases, as affected by his physical condition, his ability to work, the market for his labor and other pertinent circumstances.
Plaintiff having failed to present evidence to rebut the prima facie showing of earning capacity resulting from actual employment, the award is affirmed.
NORTH, C.J., and WIEST, BUTZEL, BUSHNELL, EDWARD M. SHARPE, POTTER, and TOY, JJ., concurred.