Opinion
04-21-00583-CV
02-08-2023
Merardo MACAL, Appellant v. Aizar J. KARAM, Jr., Appellee
From the County Court at Law, Starr County, Texas Trial Court No. CC-21-73 Honorable Orlando Rodriguez, Judge Presiding.
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Irene Rios, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice.
Appellant Merardo Macal challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment against him in a trespass-to-try-title suit. We affirm.
Background
On May 13, 2020, appellee Aizar J. Karam, Jr., purchased a 33.63-acre tract of land in Starr County, Texas. On February 16, 2021, Karam filed a trespass-to-try-title suit against Macal, alleging that Macal refused to vacate the land and insisted he had title to it. Karam filed his trespass-to-try-title suit in the County Court at Law in Starr County, Texas.
Karam moved for traditional summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to judgment in his favor because the summary judgment evidence conclusively established that he had title to the land and that Macal had no interest in it. According to the motion, Karam had purchased the land from three individuals ("predecessors-in-interest"). Before Karam purchased the land, his predecessors-in-interest were involved in a title dispute with Macal concerning the land. Karam's predecessors-in-interest prevailed in the title dispute and the 229th Judicial District Court in Starr County, Texas, rendered a judgment in favor of Karam's predecessors-in-interest and against Macal. The district court's judgment, which was signed on June 27, 2019, ordered Karam's predecessors-in-interest to recover title and possession of the land from Macal. Karam supported his summary judgment motion with proof, including a copy of the district court's June 27, 2019 judgment in favor of his predecessors-in-interest and the warranty deed conveying the land from his predecessors-in-interest to him.
Macal filed a response in opposition to the summary judgment motion, in which he argued:
While this court [may] have concurrent jurisdiction with the 229th to adjudicate issues pertaining [to] real property issues involving title, the 229th [District Court] has "[d]ominant [j]urisdiction" over the parties in the present case. A trial court (229th) has an affirmative duty to enforce its judgment. The Declaratory Judgment Act expressly empowers a trial court to make supplemental rulings to aid enforcement of a judgment. A trial court has the inherent power to enforce its previously entered judgment. A trial court is vested with explicit statutory authority and [an] affirmative duty to enforce its judgment.(citations omitted).
The trial court granted Karam's summary judgment motion and signed a final judgment ordering that Karam was vested with superior title and possession of the land as against Macal, and that Macal was divested of all right, title, and interest in the land. The final judgment also ordered Macal to vacate the land immediately. Macal filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. Macal appealed.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 512 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. 2017). To prevail on a motion for traditional summary judgment, the movant has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c). "[I]ssues a non-movant contends avoid the movant's entitlement to summary judgment must be expressly presented by written answer to the motion or by other written response to the motion." McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166(c). An appellate court's review of a summary judgment is limited to those issues presented to the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ("Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.").
The Texas Property Code provides that "[a] trespass to try title action is the method of determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property." Tex. Prop. Code § 22.001(a). A trespass-to-try-title action is used to clear problems in the chain of title or to recover possession of land unlawfully withheld from a rightful owner. Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 736 (Tex. 2018). To prevail, the plaintiff in a trespass-to-try-title action must establish that he has superior title to the land. Id.
Discussion
Dominant Jurisdiction/Enforcement of Prior Judgment
In his first issue, Macal claims the trial court's judgment should be reversed because the district court had dominant jurisdiction over the parties' controversy as well as a duty to enforce its prior judgment.
Macal does not contend that the county court lacked jurisdiction over the Karam's trespass-to-try-title suit. In his brief, he acknowledges that in Starr County the county court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court to adjudicate matters involving title to real property. See Tex. Gov't Code § 25.2162(a)(2) (providing that a county court at law in Starr County has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in controversies involving title to real property).
Dominant jurisdiction is a matter of proper venue, rather than a court's power to hear a dispute. Lares v. Muniz, No. 04-20-00603-CV, 2022 WL 2821083, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 20, 2022, no pet.). "As a rule, when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other cases should abate." Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex. 2001); see In re Red Dot Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. 2016) ("In instances where inherently interrelated suits are pending . . . the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction."). "The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts." Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974). "Any subsequent suit involving the same parties and the same controversy must be dismissed if a party to that suit calls the second court's attention to the pendency of the prior suit by a plea in abatement." Id.
As illustrated above, dominant jurisdiction requires, at a minimum, the pendency of two suits involving the same parties and the same controversy. See In re Red Dot Bldg. Sys., 504 S.W.3d at 322; Perry, 66 S.W.3d at 252; Curtis, 511 S.W.2d at 267. Here, however, when Macal asserted dominant jurisdiction in his summary judgment response, Karam's suit in the county court was the only suit pending. The district court's suit involving Macal and Karam's predecessors-in-interest and the land had already been resolved. We, therefore, conclude that dominant jurisdiction was not applicable in this case.
To the extent Macal contends that Karam's trespass-to-try-title suit should have been filed in the district court because it had a duty to enforce its prior judgment, his argument is without merit. The only cases Macal cites to support this argument involve instances in which a party brought an action to enforce the court's judgment. See In re Crow-Billingsley Air Park, Ltd., 98 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Tex. 2003); Texas Workforce Comm'n v. Buske Lines, Inc., No. 12-09-00364-CV, 2010 WL 4258749, at *3 (Tex. App.-Tyler Oct. 27, 2010, pet. denied). In this case, Karam did not bring an action to enforce the district court's judgment. Karam filed a trespass-to-try-title suit and the district court's judgment was part of the proof establishing his trespass-to-try-title claim. We, therefore, conclude that the district court's duty to enforce its judgment was not applicable in this case. Remaining Issues
In his second issue, Macal argues Karam was precluded from using the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to seek relief from the trial court. In his third issue, Macal argues the trial court's judgment was an impermissible collateral attack on the district court's prior judgment. Neither of these arguments was presented in Macal's summary judgment response. Because Macal presented these arguments for the first time in his motion for new trial, he has waived them, and we may not consider them as grounds for reversal. See White Lion Holdings, L.L.C. v. State, No. 01-14-00104-CV, 2015 WL 5626564, at *9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 24, 2015, pet. denied) (holding that an argument omitted from a summary judgment response and asserted for the first time in a motion for new trial was waived on appeal); see also Escondido Res. II, LLC v. Justaphor Ranch Co., LC, No. 04-14-00905-CV, 2016 WL 2936411, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 18, 2016, no pet.) (concluding that affirmative defenses not presented in appellant's written response to the summary judgment motion could not be considered as grounds for reversal on appeal); Tex.R.Civ.P. 166(c) ("Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.").
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.