Opinion
1:19-cv-12154-NLH-MJS
01-17-2024
M.D. and S.H., individually and on behalf of their minor child L.D., Plaintiffs, v. VINELAND CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION d/b/a VINELAND CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; KEVIN DEHMER, Interim Commissioner of Education; and NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Defendants.
ROBERT CRAIG THURSTON THURSTON LAW OFFICES LLC Counsel for Plaintiffs JACLYN MICHELLE FREY KERRY SORANNO LAURIE LEE FICHERA OFFICE OF NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD J. HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX Counsel for the State Defendants JAY D. BRANDERBIT KENT & MCBRIDE, P.C. Counsel for Vineland City Board of Education
ROBERT CRAIG THURSTON THURSTON LAW OFFICES LLC
Counsel for Plaintiffs
JACLYN MICHELLE FREY KERRY SORANNO LAURIE LEE FICHERA OFFICE OF NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD J. HUGHES JUSTICE COMPLEX
Counsel for the State Defendants
JAY D. BRANDERBIT KENT & MCBRIDE, P.C.
Counsel for Vineland City Board of Education
OPINION
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Pending before the Court are the motions for partial summary judgment of Plaintiffs M.D. and S.H. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against Defendants New Jersey Department of Education (“NJDOE”), Interim Commissioner of Education Kevin Dehmer, and the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (“NJOAL”) (collectively “State Defendants”), (ECF 106), and Defendant Vineland City Board of Education d/b/a Vineland City Public Schools (“VPS”), (ECF 108), and the parties' joint motion to seal, (ECF 111). For the reasons expressed below, the parties' motion to seal will be granted and Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment will be denied without prejudice.
I. Background
L.D. is a minor child with multiple disabilities who is eligible for special education and related services. (ECF 108-2 at ¶ 4; ECF 116-1 at ¶ 4). M.D. and S.H. are L.D.'s parents who reside in Vineland, New Jersey, making VPS their Local Educational Agency (“LEA”) as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (ECF 108-2 at ¶¶ 1, 5-6; ECF 116-1 at ¶¶ 1, 5-6).
On January 14, 2015, Liya Beyderman, M.D. of NeMours duPont Pediatrics recognized L.D.'s diagnoses of “Neurological disorder NOS consistent with Tics and associated with a DSM-V of ADHD- combined type complicated by behavioral dysregulation, fine motor skill delays, and anxiety.” (ECF 108-4 at 2). In addition, L.D. was later diagnosed with vision issues including “convergence excess, oculomotor dysfunction (deficiency of pursuits and saccades), and visual processing deficits” that could manifest in double vision, poor reading comprehension, headaches, and eye strain. (Id. at 3-4).
An evaluation in October 2015 showed that L.D. struggled in areas including math fluency and sentence composition. (Id. at 4-5). L.D. attended Vineland Public Charter School (“VPCS”) during the 2015-16 school year and a Section 504 plan incorporating Dr. Beyderman's diagnoses was implemented in 2016 and was to be carried over for the 2016-17 school year. (Id. at 5-7). L.D. did not meet grade-level standards in Language Arts during his final marking period of fourth grade and teachers across multiple subjects commented on L.D.'s difficulties with effort and focus. (Id. at 8-9).
Plaintiffs enrolled L.D. in VPS for the 2016-17 school year and a Section 504 meeting was held in September 2016 and a Section 504 plan similar to the one used at VPCS was implemented for L.D., including incorporation of Dr. Beyderman's diagnoses. (Id. at 10-13). On December 5, 2016, following an October 2016 progress report that indicated that L.D. exhibited poor time management and did not complete assignments, S.H. wrote to Mary Shadinger and the Petway Elementary School Child Study Team referencing L.D.'s diagnoses of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), dysgraphia, and anxiety; raising concerns about L.D.'s ability to timely complete written work; and requesting learning and occupational therapy (“OT”) evaluations. (Id. at 13-15). A December 6, 2016 Child Study Team Referral Form indicated that L.D. was receiving first-marking-period grades of C in Language Arts, Mathematics, Science, and Social Studies and that he was being referred due to challenges with focusing and completing tasks in the time allotted. (Id. at 1617). During a December 22, 2016 meeting, VPS proposed that an evaluation of L.D. was not warranted. (Id. at 19).
L.D. received C grades in Language Arts and Science during the second marking period and a D in Mathematics, the latter down from a C during the first marking period. (Id. at 27). S.H. emailed Heidi Nieves, school psychologist for VPS, on February 16, 2017 seeking re-referral for testing and specialeducation services. (Id. at 32). The 2016-17 PARCC standardized test was administered that spring and L.D.'s Mathematics score met expectations while his Language Arts/Literacy score did not; ranked him below cross-state, state, district, and school averages; and exhibited the lowest possible score in Writing. (Id. at 54-55).
During a meeting held on March 16, 2017, the VPS Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) Team referenced L.D.'s diagnoses of ADHD, dysgraphia, and anxiety; determined that L.D. was suspected to have a disability that adversely impacted his educational performance; and authorized educational, psychological, social history, and OT evaluations, to which Plaintiffs consented. (Id. at 33-35).
Stephanie Cooper, OTR/L of VPS performed an OT evaluation on April 26, 2017 and concluded that L.D.'s visual-motorintegration delays were insufficient to affect his education and did not recommend school OT. (Id. at 38-39). A private OT evaluation conducted by Tameka L. Johnson, MOT, OTR/L of NeMours duPont Pediatrics on April 10, 2017 using the WOLD Sentence Copy Test and King Devick Test indicated that L.D.'s saccadic eye movements interfered with his ability to read and the speed and legibility with which he was able to write and set several short-term goals. (Id. at 35-37).
On June 8, 2017, VPS issued a notice for continuation of accommodation via a Section 504 plan - as of that date the authorized evaluations had not all been completed, L.D. had not been deemed eligible for special-education services, and an IEP was not in place. (Id. at 40-41). L.D. received final grades of a D in Mathematics and C in Language Arts, Science, and Social Studies, the latter of which he performed at below grade level. (Id. at 41-42).
Nieves, Bernice Longini - VPS's learning disabilities teacher consultant, and Leona Porter - social worker for VPS, performed a psychological evaluation on July 11, 2017 that noted a discrepancy between L.D.'s potential as evidenced by his IQ and his academic performance and that his ADHD, dysgraphia, and anxiety “appear[ed] to be impacting him to the point that he [wa]s not progressing in a general education setting.” (Id. at 43-45). On that same day, Porter conducted a social-history evaluation that similarly found that L.D.'s ADHD, dysgraphia, and anxiety appeared to be affecting him and his ability to progress in a general education setting. (Id. at 46). Longini performed an educational evaluation on July 12, 2017 that showed that L.D.'s composite scores in written expression and math fluency ranked in the twelfth and second percentiles, respectively, and found that L.D.'s ADHD, dysgraphia, and anxiety seemed to affect his progress in a general education setting. (Id. at 47-48).
An IEP meeting for L.D.'s sixth-grade year was held on August 16, 2017 during which L.D. was deemed eligible for special education and related services on account of his ADHD, dysgraphia, and anxiety diagnoses. (Id. at 51). The IEP established six goals - one in Reading, one in Writing, and four in Mathematics; set forth that Plaintiffs would be informed of progress every two months; and provided daily in-class resources for multiple subjects and door-to-door transportation but did not include Extended School Year (“ESY”) services. (Id. at 5354). The IEP expressly referenced multiple evaluations, but not Johnson's April 10, 2017 OT evaluation and August 14, 2017 letter. (Id. at 52).
Don D. Blackburn, O.D., of Delaware Vision Academy conducted a vision evaluation of L.D. on August 25, 2017. (Id. at 55-56). The evaluation concluded that L.D.'s vision deficiencies impacted his ability to reach his potential and may have resulted in his changing the beginnings or endings of words, skipping or repeating lines of text, and struggling to shift his attention from the chalkboard to his book, among other effects. (Id. at 56-57).
L.D. was disciplined for multiple behavioral infractions during the 2017-18 school year, including an incident that led to referral to the Child Study Team. (ECF 108-5 at 20-24). A March 14, 2018 appointment with Susan J. Blumenfeld of NeMours duPont Pediatrics confirmed diagnoses of neurological disorder, ADHD, dysgraphia, and anxiety. (ECF 108-6 at 3-4). L.D. scored a 727 in Language Arts/Literacy on his 2017-18 PARCC standardized test administered in Spring 2018 - below school, district, state, and cross-state averages - including the lowest possible score in Writing. (ECF 108-5 at 57-58). L.D.'s overall score of 757 in Mathematics placed him on track to proceed to the next grade level, though his expression of mathematic reasoning did not meet expectations, and L.D.'s 201718 scores were overall below his 2016-17 scores with the exception of Writing - which was the lowest possible both years. (Id. at 59-60; ECF 108-6 at 1).
S.H. wrote to Theresa Godlewski, director of special education, on February 22, 2018 expressing disagreement with district evaluations and requesting an Independent Educational Evaluation (“IEE”)/ neuropsychological evaluation with Margaret J. Kay, Ed.D. NCSP, FABPS be paid for at public expense. (ECF 108-4 at 121-22). Godlewski replied on March 1, 2018 that evaluations would be conducted in accordance with New Jersey Administrative Code 6A:14-2.5(c)(3) and Kay could not conduct the evaluation as she did not hold a New Jersey certification. (Id. at 132). Godlewski's response also included a list of potential neuropsychological and OT/speech evaluators with a link to additional possible agencies and a notation that “[o]ther N.J. Certified Neuropsychologists may be used but we will need to secure a copy of their certification and W-9.” (Id. at 133-34). Plaintiffs' then-counsel wrote to Godlewski on March 29, 2018 objecting to the denial of an evaluation with Kay. (ECF 108-5 at 10-12).
Plaintiffs themselves paid for an evaluation with Kay at a cost of $4,000. (ECF 108-7). Kay found that, while intelligent, L.D.'s academic performance suffered from issues with information processing, impulse control, involuntary tics, and defiant behaviors - with written work causing the most difficulty. (Id. at 12-13). Kay suggested that L.D. be medically evaluated for Tourette Syndrome and included recommendations for accommodations and specially designed instruction. (Id. at 12-21).
An IEP meeting was held on April 17, 2018 during which VPS rejected the possibility of out-of-district placement, L.D. was declared ineligible for ESY services, and a plan was not ultimately implemented. (ECF 108-2 at ¶¶ 179-80; ECF 109; ECF 116-1 at ¶¶ 179-80). A subsequent meeting was held on June 20, 2018, the draft IEP for which stated that out-of-district placement and ESY services were not warranted and to which Plaintiffs did not consent. (ECF 109-1 at 5-6, 20). Plaintiffs thereafter unilaterally withdrew L.D. from enrollment at VPS and filed a due process complaint seeking reimbursement of tuition, transportation, and other costs related to L.D.'s enrollment at Centreville-Layton School (“CLS”) in Delaware; compensatory education; and reimbursement of the cost of Kay's IEE and expert witness fees. (ECF 108-8 at 2; ECF 109-2). VPS did not respond to the withdrawal or due process complaint. (ECF 108-2 at ¶ 212; ECF 116-1 at ¶ 212).
The parties did not agree to mediate and a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Dean J. Buono was scheduled for August 2, 2018. (ECF 106-4 at 28-31). Counsel for VPS requested an adjournment to accommodate a separate trial and the hearing was postponed to August 16, 2018. (Id. at 51, 54). ALJ Buono held a settlement conference with the parties on August 16, 2018, the parties did not settle, and the case was reassigned to ALJ Kathleen Calemmo. (ECF 106-2 at ¶ 21; ECF 106-5 at 1; ECF 115-1 at ¶ 21).
Hearing dates before ALJ Calemmo were scheduled for November 2, November 13, November 27, and November 30, 2018, with the November 2 and November 27 dates later deemed unnecessary. (ECF 106-5 at 5-7). Kay provided an expert report and testified at a combined cost of $7,000.17. (ECF 108-8 at 7). A telephone conference was thereafter scheduled for December 13, 2018. (106-5 at 18-19). The parties submitted closing briefs and ALJ Calemmo held another conference call on January 16, 2019. (ECF 106-6 at 1-7). On February 11, 2019, ALJ Calemmo issued a final decision denying compensatory education and reimbursement of L.D.'s placement at CLS and Kay's IEE. (ECF 108-4 at 74-120).
The present action followed. (ECF 1). Relevant to the present motions, the amended complaint alleges legal error in the standard applied for whether a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) was provided (Count 1), denial of a FAPE (Count 2), IDEA procedural violations (Count 3), systemic violation of the ten-day peremptory hearing date (Count 8), systemic violation of the adjournment rule (Count 9), systemic violation of the forty-five day rule amounting to denial of a FAPE (Count 20), and procedural violations of the IDEA (Count 21). (ECF 26 at ¶¶ 224-234, 279-314, 488-517). In a March 21, 2022 opinion and order the Court granted State Defendants' motion to dismiss in part, including claims advanced against individual ALJs. (ECF 72 at 21-22; ECF 73).
Plaintiffs filed the pending motions for summary judgment, (ECF 106; ECF 108), to which Defendants opposed (ECF 115; ECF 116; ECF 120) and Plaintiffs replied, (ECF 121; ECF 122; ECF 123).
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
The Court exercises original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims brought under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' statelaw claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Further, the Court has jurisdiction to review the administrative decision below pursuant to the provisions of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); see also K.E. v. N. Highlands Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 840 Fed.Appx. 705, 709 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).
B. Motions for Summary Judgment
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine when “the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party'” and a fact is “‘material' if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Facts and evidence are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id.
These familiar principles apply here, see Moorestown Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. S.D., 811 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1064-65 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2011); however, district courts apply what is referred to as “‘modified de novo' review” when presented with appeals of administrative decision under the IDEA, see D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting P.P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 2009)). Under this standard, “[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct” and courts are obligated to explain any departure from those findings. Id. (quoting P.P., 585 F.3d at 734). An ALJ's legal determinations, however, are reviewed de novo. S.D., 811 F.Supp.2d at 1064. The appropriateness of an IEP is a question of fact. D.S., 602 F.3d at 564.
A court's decision is to be based on the evidence as developed at the administrative proceedings unless additional evidence is presented. See M.G. v. N. Hunterdon-Voorhees Reg'l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 778 Fed.Appx. 107, 110 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)). “The party challenging an administrative decision bears the burden of persuasion and ‘faces the additional hurdle of overcoming a presumption that the Hearing Officer's findings were correct.'” Id. (quoting Andrew M. v. Del. Cnty. Off. of Mental Health & Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Ridley School Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of persuasion before the district court as to each claim challenged.”)
III. Analysis
A. IDEA Procedural Safeguards
Plaintiffs' brief supporting their motion for partial summary judgment against State Defendants references multiple procedural safeguards including LEAs' obligation to respond to due process complaints, New Jersey's ten-day peremptory hearing rule, and regulations relating to adjournments and the forty-five-day timeline for final decisions. (ECF 106-1 at 12-13). The Court briefly summarizes these procedures for clarity.
The IDEA requires procedures providing an opportunity for parties to file a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); see also S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Children with disabilities (and their parents) who claim violations of the IDEA can file a complaint with a due process hearing officer.” (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6))). If the LEA did not previously provide the parent with written notice regarding the subject matter of the due process complaint, the LEA must send a response within ten days of receiving the complaint explaining why the agency proposed or refused to take the relevant action and describing the alternatives considered by the IEP team and why they were rejected; each evaluation procedure, assessment, record, or report relied upon; and the factors relevant to the LEA's proposal or refusal. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I); see also N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(e) (“When a parent requests a due process hearing . . . and the district board of education has not sent a prior written notice to the parent regarding the subject matter contained in the parent's due process request, the district board of education shall send a written response to the parent within 10 days of receiving the petition.”).
Once a due process complaint is filed, the parties have a thirty-day resolution period to settle the matter to the parents' satisfaction. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b). This period may be waived by the parties. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i); C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 72 n.12 (3d Cir. 2010). If the parties do not arrive at a resolution within thirty days, “the due process hearing may occur, and all of the applicable timelines for a due process hearing . . . shall commence,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(1), and the case is transmitted to the NJOAL, N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(h)(4).
The Office of Special Education Programs is to contact the Clerk of the NJOAL for a peremptory hearing date that “shall, to the greatest extent possible, be convenient to all parties but shall be approximately 10 days from the date of the scheduling call.” N.J.A.C. 1:6A-9.1(a). A final decision must be reached and mailed to the parties within forty-five days of the expiration of the thirty-day period. 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a); see also N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(j) (“A final decision shall be rendered by the administrative law judge not later than 45 calendar days after the conclusion of the resolution period . . . .”). Both state and federal law contemplate adherence to the forty-five-day timeline absent a request for adjournment or extension by the parties. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c); N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7(j); see also C.P. v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., No. 1912807, 2022 WL 3998700, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2022) (“[I]f no specific adjournments are requested by the parties, a final decision must be rendered within 45 days after the end of the 30-day resolution period.”).
An IDEA procedural violation may rise to a denial of a FAPE, but “only if such violation causes substantive harm to the child or his parents.” C.H., 606 F.3d at 66 (quoting Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also D.S., 602 F.3d at 565 (“A procedural violation is actionable under the IDEA only if it results in a loss of educational opportunity for the student, seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or causes a deprivation of educational benefits.” (citing Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007))). Courts reviewing a parent's challenge to whether their child was provided a FAPE “must (1) consider whether the school district complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements and (2) determine whether the educational program was ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits,'” with the focus being the appropriateness of the IEP at the time it was developed. D.S., 602 F.3d at 564-65 (quoting Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also M.A. v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 592 Fed.Appx. 124, 130 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that “[t]he ‘primary mechanism for delivering a FAPE' is the IEP” (quoting M.R., 680 F.3d at 269)). Relief depends on the type of violation - a school district's purely procedural violation may entitle a plaintiff to injunctive relief for prospective compliance while a district's denial of a FAPE may entitle a plaintiff to compensatory relief such as compensatory education or tuition reimbursement. See C.H., 606 F.3d at 66.
B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against State Defendants (ECF 106)
Plaintiffs seek entry of summary judgment against all State Defendants as to Counts 8, 9, and 20 of the amended complaint and Count 21 as to the NJDOE and NJOAL. (ECF 26 at ¶¶ 279-314, 488-517; ECF 106; ECF 106-1 at 1). In their supporting brief, Plaintiffs cite State Defendants' duty to ensure that procedural safeguards are established and maintained and monitor and enforce LEAs' compliance with them. (ECF 106-1 at 10-12). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that NJDOE failed to enforce VPS's obligation to file a response to their due process complaint and Plaintiffs were entitled to default, the practice of holding settlement conferences rather than peremptory hearings violates New Jersey Administrative Code, several adjournments were ordered without the request of either party, and these and other violations resulted in a months-long delay in issuing a final decision that violated state and federal law ensuring a decision within forty-five days of the resolution period. (Id. at 14-22).
Before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, State Defendants assert that they have not had the opportunity to conduct discovery and cannot verify material facts, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). (ECF 120 at 10-11). Summary judgment is rarely appropriate when discovery is incomplete, State Defendants argue. (Id.).
Plaintiffs reply that the counts for which they seek summary judgment pertain to the administrative record and how the case proceeded and thus discovery is unnecessary, Section 1415(i)(2) applies rather than Rule 56, and State Defendants' arguments must therefore fail. (ECF 123 at 4-5). The Court is not so convinced.
First, as noted by a court in this District faced with a case in a similar procedural posture, Rule 56 applies even in cases in which administrative decisions are to be reviewed pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). See S.D., 811 F.Supp.2d at 1064-65 (“Because this matter is pending before the Court on motions for summary judgment, the well-settled principles of summary judgment also apply.” (citing Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty. v. Hunter, 84 F.Supp.2d 702, 705 n.2 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 2000)). Plaintiffs themselves cite S.D. as the applicable standard of review. (ECF 106-1 at 7). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found that “an IDEA action filed in federal district court is properly characterized as an original ‘civil action,' not an ‘appeal'” and is thus governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jonathan H. v. The Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) and Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 216 F.3d 380, 387-88 (4th Cir. 2000)) (discussing compulsory counterclaims).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a court may defer or deny a motion, permit time for discovery, or enter other orders when a nonmovant demonstrates that they are unable to present facts essential to their opposition. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). “If discovery is incomplete, a district court is rarely justified in granting summary judgment, unless the discovery request pertains to facts that are not material to the moving party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Here, State Defendants' opposition has been accompanied by the declaration of Carolyn Labin,