Opinion
2:24-cv-02812-SVW(E)
07-08-2024
MARK JAMES LYON, Petitioner, v. GENA JONES, Warden, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Stephen V. Wilson, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, a state prisoner seeking parole, filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody” on April 5, 2024. Respondent filed a “Motion to Dismiss” on June 5, 2024. On the same date, Respondent lodged a transcript (“TR.”) of Petitioner's January 11, 2023 hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”). Petitioner filed “Petitioner's Objections to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, etc.” on June 20, 2024.
BACKGROUND
In 1987, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder (Petition at 2). Petitioner received a prison sentence of 25 years to life plus two years for a firearm enhancement (id.).
In 2010, the Board found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. See Lyon v. De La Jour, CV 12-767 l-ABC(E). Petitioner then sought habeas relief from this Court, arguing, inter alia, Petitioner had been denied a fair hearing by an unbiased tribunal. See id. By Judgment entered January 10, 2013, this Court rejected all of Petitioner's arguments on the merits.
In 2015, the Board again found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. See Lyon v. Ndoh, CV 17-1963-SVW(E). Petitioner again sought habeas relief from this Court, arguing a host of challenges to the fairness of the proceedings before the Board. See id. By Judgment entered November 16, 2017, this Court rejected all of Petitioner's arguments on the merits.
In the present case, Petitioner challenges the Board's 2023 finding of Petitioner's parole unsuitability, as well as the state courts' subsequent failure to grant Petitioner relief from that finding.
GENERAL LAW REGARDING HABEAS REVIEW
Under the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996” (“AEDPA”), a federal court may not grant an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-26 (2002); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-09 (2000).
“Clearly established Federal law” refers to the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision on the merits. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if: (1) it applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court law; or (2) it “confronts a set of facts ... materially indistinguishable” from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 8 (citation omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
Under the “unreasonable application” prong of section 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief “based on the application of a governing legal principle to a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76 (citation omitted); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24-26 (state court decision “involves an unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if it identifies the correct governing Supreme Court law but unreasonably applies the law to the facts).
“In order for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (citation omitted). “The state court's application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.'” Id. at 520-21 (citation omitted); see also Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2004), cert, dism'd, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005). “Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported,... or could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). This is “the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1).” Id. at 102 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Habeas relief may not issue unless “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the United States Supreme Court's] precedents.” Id. “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
Additionally, federal habeas corpus relief may be granted “only on the ground that [Petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In conducting habeas review, a court may determine the issue of whether the petition satisfies section 2254(a) prior to, or in lieu of, applying the standard of review set forth in section 2254(d). Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 736-37 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
SPECIFIC LAW REGARDING HABEAS REVIEW OF PAROLE
“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“Greenholtz”). In some instances, however, state statutes may create liberty interests in parole release entitled to protection under the federal Due Process Clause. See Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. The Ninth Circuit has held that California's statutory provisions governing parole create such a liberty interest. Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011).
In Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220-21 (2011), the United States Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether California law creates a liberty interest in parole, but observed that the Ninth Circuit's affirmative answer to this question “is a reasonable application of our cases” (citations omitted).
The California Supreme Court has held, as a matter of state law, that “some evidence” must exist to support a parole denial. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1212, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169,190 P.3d 535 (2008). In Swarthout v. Cooke, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected the contention that the federal Due Process Clause contains a guarantee of evidentiary sufficiency with respect to a parole determination. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220 (“No opinion of ours supports converting California's ‘some evidence' rule into a substantive federal requirement.”); see also Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711,717 (9th Cir. 2011) (issue is not whether Board's parole denial was “substantively reasonable,” or whether the Board correctly applied state parole standards, but simply was “whether the state provided Miller with the minimum procedural due process outlined in [Swarthout v.] Cooke”).
“In the context of parole,... the procedures required are minimal.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. Due Process requires that the State furnish a parole applicant with an opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons for a denial of parole. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; see Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. “The Constitution does not require more.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; accord Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220 (citation omitted); see also Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d at 1046 (“there is no substantive due process right created by the California parole scheme”). In the parole context, then, “[d]ue process is satisfied as long as the state provides an inmate seeking parole with ‘an opportunity to be heard and ... a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.'” Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220).
DISCUSSION
Contrary to Petitioner's arguments, Petitioner plainly received all the process that was due during the 2023 hearing before the Board (TR. 3-55). Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to be heard, and he availed himself of that opportunity. He argued the matter through his counsel and on his own behalf. After the Board made its decision, the Board explained the reasons for that decision. Such procedures are clearly “sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.” Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d at 1046 (citing Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220).
Petitioner appears to allege that the Board mischaracterized evidence and made erroneous findings. Notwithstanding Petitioner's efforts to characterize these allegations as implicating federal due process, the allegations implicate only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the decision of the Board. Again, federal due process does not guarantee evidentiary sufficiency with respect to the decision of the Board. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220-22. Regardless of whether the Board erred in its characterizations, or in its findings, federal habeas relief is unavailable. See id.
As Petitioner previously argued in Lyon v. De La Jour, CV 12-767 l-ABC(E) and in Lyon v. Ndoh, CV 17-1963-SVW(E), Petitioner appears to argue herein that the Board was not impartial. As in the prior cases, Petitioner's argument fails. While a prisoner is entitled to have his or her parole application considered by a “neutral and detached body” that is “free from bias or prejudice,” O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1096 (1991), administrative adjudicators are presumed to act with honesty and integrity. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 496-97 (1976); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). To overcome this presumption, a petitioner alleging bias “must show that the adjudicator has prejudged or reasonably appears to have prejudged, an issue.” Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). A petitioner may make this showing in two ways. First, “the proceedings and surrounding circumstances may demonstrate actual bias on the part of the adjudicator.” Id. Second, a petitioner may show that “the adjudicator's pecuniary or personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings ... create[d] an appearance of partiality that violates due process. ...” Id. Petitioner has not made either showing. The record demonstrates that the Board reviewed the evidence, listened to the presentations of Petitioner and his counsel, and rendered an individualized determination of Petitioner's unsuitability for parole (TR. 3-55).
Petitioner argues that the Board erroneously failed to grant him “elderly parole” pursuant to section 3055 of the California Penal Code. Such argument fails to raise any issue cognizable on federal habeas corpus. “[A] mere error of state law is not a denial of due process.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 222 (citation and quotations omitted); see Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal habeas will not lie for errors of state law”); see also Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 881 (1997) (habeas petitioner may not “transform a state law issue into a federal one” merely by invoking general principles of federal constitutional law). Accordingly, courts uniformly have held that claims predicated on California's “elderly parole” statute fail to raise any issue cognizable on federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., Spain v. Houston, 2021 WL 2750447, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 1,2021), adopted, 2021 WL 2712368 (C.D. Cal. July 1,2021); Ogle v. Pollard, 2021 WL 698199, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 11607152 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2021); Thomas v. Borla, 2019 WL 3503022, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019).
Petitioner also appears to argue substantive and procedural challenges to the state courts' failure to grant him relief from the Board's decision. These challenges do not raise any issue cognizable on federal habeas corpus. With regard to substantive challenges, again, the 2023 denial of parole did not violate federal law, given the procedural rights afforded to Petitioner at that time. Any state court's failure to rectify any state law error committed by the Board (or any state law error committed by the state courts themselves) would not raise a cognizable federal issue. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 222; Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d at 1105. As to procedural challenges to the state courts' decisions, procedural errors on state collateral review are not addressable through federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1012 (1989); see also Owens v. Nool, 2010 WL 144364, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2010) (state court's failure to explain reasons for denying collateral petition does not raise an issue cognizable on federal habeas corpus); accord Stewart v. Sisto, 2008 WL 5178835, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2008).
To the extent Petitioner argues that the continuing denial of parole has rendered his sentence violative of the Eighth Amendment, the argument does not merit federal habeas relief. “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle' that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.'” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). However, “[g]enerally, so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth amendment grounds.” United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The California Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of California law, “the Board's denial of parole does not prevent inmates serving indeterminate terms ... from challenging their continued incarceration as cruel or unusual under the California Constitution.” In re Palmer, 10 Cal. 5th 959, 968, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 292, 479 P.3d 782 (2021); see also In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1096, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 104 P.3d 783 (2005), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 844 (2005), disapproved on other grounds, In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 190 P.3d 535 (2008) (“even if sentenced to a life-maximum term, no prisoner can be held for a period grossly disproportionate to his or her individual culpability for the commitment offense.... Such excessive confinement, we have held, violates the cruel or unusual punishment clause (Art. I, § 17) of the California Constitution.”) (citations omitted). However, the California Supreme Court's holdings concerning the application of state law do not apply in this federal habeas case. Again, federal habeas relief is unavailable for mere violations of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law”) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1,5 (2010) (per curiam) (“it is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State's criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts”) (original emphasis); Smith v. Broomfield, 2022 WL 1412284, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 1405658 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2022) (petitioner claimed that state court failed correctly to apply California Supreme Court decisions (In re Palmer and In re Dannenberg) holding that a parole denial may cause a lawfully imposed indeterminate sentence to become constitutionally excessive; federal court ruled that such claim alleged only state law error not cognizable on federal habeas review).
There exists no United States Supreme Court opinion clearly establishing that a prisoner's continued service of a lawfully imposed indeterminate sentence following a parole denial can violate the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, as stated above, the United States Supreme Court clearly has held that “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. District courts in this Circuit have recognized the absence of clearly established Supreme Court law on the issue of whether a prisoner's continued service of a lawfully imposed indeterminate sentence following a parole denial can violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Murphy v. Matteson, 2022 WL 18539629, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2022), adopted, 2023 WL 1420369 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2023); Alve v. Neuschmid, 2021 WL 6129127, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2021); Stephen v. Matteson, 2021 WL 2912484, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2021), adopted, 2022 WL 2333972 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2022); Gibson v. Arnold, 2021 WL 6102436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2021), adopted, 2022 WL 310134 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022); Nelson v. California Dep't of Corrections & Rehab., 2020 WL 8414030, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2020), adopted, 2021 WL 706760 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021); Harris v. Long, 2012 WL 2061698, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 2061695 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2012).
In the absence of any clearly established Supreme Court law supporting an Eighth Amendment challenge, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (“Because our cases give no clear answer to the question presented,... it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law”) (citation, internal brackets and quotations omitted); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (“Given the lack of holdings from this Court [on issue presented], it cannot be said that the state court “unreasonabl[y] applied clearly established Federal law.”) (internal brackets and citation omitted).
Moreover, as discussed below, any Eighth Amendment challenge also fails under a de novo standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 736-37 (9th Cir. 2008). “The threshold determination in the eighth amendment proportionality analysis is whether [Petitioner's] sentence was one of the rare cases in which a ... comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 858 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted; emphasis added); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (“[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”). Petitioner's claim fails at this threshold level.
Where, as here, the crime is murder, even a life sentence without parole is not grossly disproportionate. See Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-585 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 211 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 924 (1993) (“Under Harmelin, it is clear that a mandatory life sentence for murder does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”). Therefore, Petitioner's Eighth Amendment challenge necessarily lacks merit. See Johnson v. Finn, 468 Fed. App'x 680, 684 (9th Cir. 2012) (denial of parole to petitioner convicted of murder not unconstitutional); Deerwester v. Valenzuela, 2015 WL 10793484, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 10793494 (Oct. 8, 2015) (rejecting contention that Board's repeated denial of parole converted the petitioner's indeterminate sentence for murder into a life sentence; “Petitioner was convicted of murder and it is beyond question that a life sentence for murder is not cruel and unusual punishment.”) (citation omitted); Garcia v. Valenzuela, 2014 WL 683795, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014) (denial of parole for a petitioner serving seven years to life for murder not unconstitutional); Duran v. Hardy, 2012 WL 4108117, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 4108117 (Sept. 18, 2012) (same); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1009 (upholding a sentence of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for a first offense crime of possession of 672 grams of cocaine as not disproportionate).
In sum, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Amendment of the Petition would be futile.
RECOMMENDATION
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) accepting and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) denying and dismissing the Petition with prejudice.
The Court has read, considered and rejected on the merits all of Petitioner's arguments. The Court has discussed herein what the Court understands to be Petitioner's principal arguments.
Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is denied. Federal habeas relief is unavailable regardless of the nature of any additional evidence Petitioner might present for the first time in federal court. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 563 U.S. 1029 (2011) (“Pinholster”); Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013), cert, denied, 573 U.S. 919 (2014) (Pinholster's preclusion of a federal evidentiary hearing applies to section 2254(d)(2) claims as well as section 2254(d)(1) claims). In any event, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing would reveal anything material to any of Petitioner's claims.
NOTICE
Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, but may be subject to the right of any party to file objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of Magistrate Judges and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No notice of appeal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of the judgment of the District Court.
If the District Judge enters judgment adverse to Petitioner, the District Judge will, at the same time, issue or deny a certificate of appealability. Within twenty (20) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation, the parties may file written arguments regarding whether a certificate of appealability should issue.