Opinion
2:20-cv-10657
04-13-2023
JOHN C. LYLES SR., Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR A NEW TRIAL [58]
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff John C. Lyles sued Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company in Genesee County Circuit Court for breach of contract and violation of the Michigan Uniform Trade Practices Act. ECF 1, PgID 6-10. Defendant removed the case. Id. at 1-3. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found for Defendant. ECF 55; 57. Plaintiff then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) or for a new trial under Rule 59. ECF 58. Defendant responded. ECF 61. For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion.
Based on the parties' briefing, the Court will resolve the motion on the briefs without a hearing. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2),.
LEGAL STANDARD
“No later than [twenty-eight] days after the entry of judgment . . . [a] movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). A court may grant a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law if “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find [the way it did].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). “In a diversity action such as this, a [S]tate law standard of review is applied when a Rule 50(b) motion is based on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to support the jury's verdict.” In re Brown, 342 F.3d 620, 626-27 (6th Cir. 2003). The Michigan standard is that “[i]f reasonable jurors could honestly have reached different conclusions, the motion should [] be[] denied. If reasonable jurors could disagree, [the court does not have] the authority to substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” Matras v. Amoco Oil Co., 424 Mich. 675, 681-82 (1986) (footnote omitted). Thus, “judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the jury, and reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion in favor of the moving party.” Tisdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).
Under Rule 59(a), “[t]he [C]ourt may, on motion, grant a new trial . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” “[T]he authority of trial judges to grant new trials” under Rule 59(a) “is large.” Gasperini v. Ctr. for the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433 (1996). Indeed, “[t]he trial judge in the federal system has discretion to grant a new trial if the verdict appears to the judge to be against the weight of the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moved for relief under Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 based on three grounds: the verdict was inconsistent; the jury reached an impermissible compromise verdict; and the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. ECF 58, PgID 354-63. The Court will consider each ground in turn.
I. Inconsistent Verdict
“When a jury returns a verdict which is inconsistent, the trial court must attempt to reconcile the verdict. Where a verdict cannot be reconciled, a new trial must be granted.” Ferlito v. Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., 771 F.Supp. 196, 201 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (citing Hopkins v. Coen, 431 F.2d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 1970)), aff'd sub nom., Ferlito v. Johnson & Johnson, 983 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1992). But “even if the answers to jury interrogatories and the verdict do conflict, federal law favors upholding the verdict if there exists some legal basis, supported by the evidence, upon which the verdict could be based.” Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distrib., Inc., No. 08-CV-10983, 2012 WL 1402818, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2012), aff'd, 763 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff argued that the verdict was inconsistent for two reasons. First, Plaintiff argued that “Ms. Braun testified that the mistakes in the submitted estimates and inventories were not the type of misrepresentations or concealments that resulted in the denial of a claim.” ECF 58, PgID 354. Second, Plaintiff argued that “[t]he jury . . . did not determine if Mr. Lyles . . . suffered an accidental loss to his home.” Id. at 355.
The first argument fails because the testimony of one witness does not render a verdict inconsistent. The premise of a motion to overturn a verdict as inconsistent is that the verdict is internally inconsistent, not that the verdict is inconsistent with the testimony of a single witness. See Ferlito, 771 F.Supp. at 201. And there was a legal basis, supported by evidence, on which the jury verdict could have been based. See Innovation Ventures, LLC, 2012 WL 1402818, at *6. Indeed, the jury examined the evidence and determined that Plaintiff had made material misrepresentations such that he could not recover under the contract. ECF 55, PgID 341; see Exhibit 1, Page 30 (“This policy is void as to you . . . if you or any other insured under this policy has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to this insurance, whether before or after the loss.”). Thus, the jury verdict was not inconsistent. Because there was a legal basis supported by evidence for the jury verdict, the first argument raised by Plaintiff falls short.
The parties submitted a copy of the parties' insurance contract to the Court as Plaintiff's Exhibit B. A copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit B is an exhibit to the present order. The Court will refer to it as Exhibit 1.
The second argument also fails because question two and four on the verdict form were independent of one another. Compare ECF 55, PgID 340, with id. at 341. Accordingly, it was not inconsistent for the jury to leave question two blank but to answer “yes” to question four. As written in the second question on the verdict form, Plaintiff had to prove that he suffered an accidental loss. See Exhibit 1 Page 12 (“[State Farm] will pay for accidental direct physical loss to the property.”). And as written in question four on the verdict form, the language of the policy clearly stated that “[t]his policy is void as to you . . . if you or any other insured under this policy has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to this insurance, whether before or after the loss.” Exhibit 1, Page 30. Simply put, the jury found the policy to be void based on the evidence presented at trial. And that issue lacks any connection to the question of whether Plaintiff suffered an accidental loss under the policy. Thus, the jury's decision to leave question two, whether Plaintiff suffered an accidental loss, blank but to find that Plaintiff intentionally concealed a material fact is consistent. See ECF 55, PgID 341. The verdict is therefore consistent, and the first ground for relief in the motion raised by Plaintiff must be denied.
II. Compromised Verdict
“It is a recognized duty of courts to set aside verdicts which do not represent the judgment of the jury but which are clearly compromise verdicts; but it is equally well recognized that the record must make it clear that the jury reached the result by splitting differences.” Niemi v. Ford Motor Co., 127 Mich.App. 811, 814 (1983) (cleaned up). Plaintiff argued that “[g]iven the jury's inability to reach a conclusion as to [] substantive questions [two and three] . . . it must be concluded that their verdict was a compromise.” ECF 58, PgID 358. Plaintiff contended that the two days of deliberation and abnormalities in the Court's schedule, which resulted in a one-week gap in the deliberations, are evidence that the jury compromised. Id. at 358-59. But “the proposition that this jury engaged in some sort of compromise is pure speculation.” Campbell v. Gause, No. 10-11371, 2019 WL 1434302, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2019). The Court respects but cannot quite follow the logic of Plaintiff's argument. The record is certainly not “clear” that the jury “reached the result by splitting differences.” Niemi, 127 Mich.App. at 814 (quotation omitted). And the fact that the jurors skipped questions two and three, which they apparently could not agree upon, but answered question four is strong evidence that their agreement on question four was genuine and not the result of compromise. ECF 61, PgID 393. Because the record is not clear that the jury returned a verdict that resulted from improper compromise, the Court will decline to grant Plaintiff relief based on that ground.
III. Verdict Against Great Weight of Evidence
Plaintiff next argued that “the verdict returned in this case was against the great weight of the evidence.” ECF 58, PgID 361. Plaintiff cited nine pieces of evidence and testimony that he believed greatly weigh against the verdict. Id. at 361-62. The Sixth Circuit follows a “policy of reluctance to overturn the jury's verdict” based on the sufficiency of the evidence. Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). And “new trials are not to be granted on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence ‘unless that verdict was unreasonable.'” S.E.C. v. Conaway, 698 F.Supp.2d 771, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir. 1996)). “[I]f a reasonable juror could reach the challenged verdict, a new trial is improper.” Id. (citation omitted).
None of the evidence Plaintiff cited went unrebutted. For example, David Kozma, a public adjustor Plaintiff hired, was impeached, and his opinion on the damages Plaintiff suffered was undercut by cross-examination. Indeed, cross-examination of Mr. Kozma revealed that it was his assistant, not him, who tallied the personal property damaged by the fire. And Mr. Kozma admitted that he did not closely review his assistant's work before he submitted the list of damaged property. He also admitted that her work contained errors. Moreover, Mr. Kozma could not explain how he calculated the value of some of the items of personal property; that is, he could not explain why he valued a television that was nearly twenty years old as though it were brand new.
The jury also reviewed photographs that purported to show items that Plaintiff claimed were destroyed-such as a mattress, bedroom furniture set, children's toys, and clothing-that were apparently unharmed. And Defendant presented direct and circumstantial evidence that Plaintiff misrepresented his suffered losses. For instance, Defendant presented direct and circumstantial evidence that Plaintiff filed an insurance claim for pillows, clothing, and a television that he did not own. Defendant also presented evidence that Plaintiff did not review the list of damaged property before affirming its accuracy. Besides which, the fact that the jury was empaneled for twenty days and deliberated for nearly three days is not evidence that its verdict is against the great weight of evidence. Instead, it shows that the jury carefully deliberated on and weighed all the evidence in the trial. After reviewing the evidence, the admitted exhibits, and portions of the transcript, the Court is convinced that sufficient evidence supported the verdict. And the Court is not convinced that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence or that the verdict was unreasonable. Thus, the third ground for relief fails, and the Court will deny the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff John C. Lyles Sr.'s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial [58] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or counsel of record on April 13, 2023, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/ David P. Parker
Case Manager
EXHIBIT 1 Omitted