Opinion
CIVIL NO. H-00-786
February 14, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Leonard A. Lyles ("Lyles") worked as a car shuttler for Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc. ("Alamo") for less than a month in August and September of 1999. Lyles had been referred to Alamo by Allines, Inc. ("Allines"), a temporary placement agency. On September 11, 1999, plaintiff Lyles was fired by Alamo.
In this civil action, Lyles has sued both Alamo and Allines. In Count I of the amended complaint, Lyles, an African-American male, has asserted a claim of discriminatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"). Count II asserts a claim of abusive discharge under Maryland law. Substantial compensatory and punitive damages are sought, as well as attorneys' fees, costs and other relief.
Pursuant to Scheduling Orders entered by the Court, the parties have engaged in discovery. Presently pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Alamo and a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Allines. The parties have submitted memoranda and numerous exhibits in support of and in opposition to the pending motions, including affidavits and excerpts from depositions taken during discovery. Plaintiff did not timely file an opposition to Allines' motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff has now indicated that he does not oppose the granting of that motion. An Order will therefore be entered granting the motion for summary judgment of defendant Allines.
Defendant Alamo has also filed a motion to preclude certain evidence relied upon by plaintiff in opposing Alamo's motion for summary judgment.
A hearing has now been held in open court on Alamo's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the motion for summary judgment of defendant Alamo will also be granted.
I Background Facts
Defendant Allines is a temporary employment agency which is in the business of assisting corporate clients in meeting their temporary staffing needs. Allines had a contract with Alamo whereby it would provide Alamo from time to time with temporary workers to fill so-called "car shuttler" positions at Alamo's facility located at Baltimore-Washington International Airport ("BWI"). Allison Dowla ("Dowla") was the Placement Coordinator at Allines whom Alamo would contact when it needed a temporary worker.
In August of 1999, Alamo requested Allines to furnish a temporary worker to be placed in the position of car shuttler. Plaintiff Lyles was hired by Allines and referred to Alamo. Lyles reported for work at Alamo on August 6, 1999. Alamo's facility at BWI included four areas, namely the rental counter in the airport terminal, the garage where customers would pick up and drop off cars, the Quick Turn-around Area ("QTA") where cars were vacuumed and washed and the main base where Alamo's administrative offices were located. From time to time, Lyles complained to his supervisors that Alamo had not posted notices of employee rights as required by federal and state labor law. Waverly Yates ("Yates") was one of Lyles' supervisors. According to Yates, although Lyles' work performance was initially acceptable, it began to deteriorate over time.
After two weeks on the job, Lyles' driver's license was suspended because of his failure to pay child support, and Allines transferred him from Alamo to another temporary position. When his driving privileges were restored, Lyles was on September 6, 1999 put back to work at Alamo as a car shuttler. During the entire time when Lyles worked at Alamo's facility, Alamo paid Allines for his services, and Allines issued paychecks to Lyles.
The Operations Manager for Alamo was Edward Davis ("Davis") a white male. Over a period of time, plaintiff's supervisors became more and more dissatisfied with his performance. On September 11, 1999, when Lyles reported for work at Alamo, Davis told him that his services were no longer needed because he was not satisfactorily performing the duties assigned to him.
Allines mistakenly paid Lyles twice for working the same hours. When in October of 1999 Lyles refused to return the money erroneously paid to him, Allines elected not to assign Lyles to any further placements.
On December 7, 1999, Lyles filed a charge of discrimination with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations. He alleged that he had been subjected to discrimination by both Alamo and Allines because of his race, and because he was a whistle blower who had exposed Alamo as being in violation of federal and state labor law. On December 20, 1999, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined that, based upon its investigation, it was unable to conclude that the information furnished by Lyles established a violation of Title VII. On March 20, 2000, plaintiff Lyles, proceeding pro se, paid the necessary filing fee and filed in this Court a complaint for employment discrimination on a form provided by the Clerk. Thereafter, plaintiff obtained private counsel who filed an amended complaint asserting the claims which are presently before the Court.
In its Memorandum and Order of November 17, 2000, this Court denied as untimely plaintiff's motion to enlarge discovery and his motion for leave of Court to file a second amended complaint.
II Summary Judgment Principles
It is well established that a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). Where, as here, the nonmoving party will bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, "the burden on the moving party (at the summary judgment stage] may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).One of the purposes of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to require a plaintiff, in advance of trial and after a motion for summary judgment has been filed and properly supported, to come forward with some minimal facts to show that the defendant may be liable under the claims alleged. See F.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party "fail[s] to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof," then "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment." Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323.
While the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985), "when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "`A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a fact issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely.'" Barwick, 736 F.2d at 958-59 (quoting Seago v. North Carolina Theaters, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 640 (E.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968)). Moreover, only disputed issues of material fact, determined by reference to the applicable substantive law, will preclude the entry of summary judgment. "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
In the absence of the necessary minimal showing by the plaintiff that the defendant may be liable under the claims alleged, the defendant should not be required to undergo the considerable expense of preparing for and participating in a trial. See Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323-24;Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has stated that, with regard to motions for summary judgment, the district courts have "an affirmative obligation . . . to prevent "factually unsupported claims and defenses' from proceeding to trial." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323-24)
Applying these principles to the facts of record here, this Court has concluded that the motion for summary judgment of defendant Alamo must be granted.
III Applicable Law
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's race. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). In order to prevail on the Title VII claim asserted by him in Count I, plaintiff must prove that, but for defendant's motive to discriminate, he would not have been subjected to the adverse employment action in question. Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 458 (4th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff may meet this burden under ordinary principles of proof using direct or indirect evidence or, in the alternative, under the judicially created proof scheme established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) and reaffirmed in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).
Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff must initially establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of employment discrimination. In order to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination in these proceedings, plaintiff must here establish: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he was discharged by his employer; (3) that at the time of his discharge he was performing his job at a level which met his employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) that following his discharge he was replaced by someone of comparable qualifications outside the protected class. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718, 719 (4th Cir. 1996); Williams, 871 F.2d at 455.
If the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of employment discrimination, then the defendant has the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff's employment. O'Connor, 84 F.3d at 719. The articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge of plaintiff rebuts the inference of discrimination raised by his proof of a prima facie case. At that point, the ultimate burden shifts back to plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered explanation was a pretext and that defendant intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his race. Id. In order to defeat defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must point to evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant's action was based upon his race or that defendant's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000), the Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's so-called "pretext-plus" approach and held that a plaintiff in a Title VII case may prevail by only showing that the employer's proffered reason for its action was pretextual because such a showing is "simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination." Id. at 2108. Thus, "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Id., 120 S.Ct. at 2109.
If Lyles was an employee of Alamo, his employment was clearly at will. In Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. App. 31, 47 (1981), the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized a cause of action for abusive discharge by an employer of an at will employee when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy. See also Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. App. 442, 467-68 (1985). To prevail on his claim for abusive discharge, plaintiff must prove (1) that he was discharged; (2) that his dismissal violated some clear mandate of public policy and (3) that there is a nexus between the protected activity and the decision to fire him. Leese, 64 Md. App. at 468; Shapiro v. Massengill, 105 Md. App. 743, 764 (1995).
IV Count I — Discriminatory Discharge (a) Alamo's Status as Plaintiff's Employer
In support of its motion seeking summary judgment on Count I of the amended complaint, defendant Alamo first argues that the facts here do not indicate that Alamo was plaintiff's "employer" for purposes of Title VII. Most courts deciding the issue of employee status in Title VII cases have utilized the combination of both the economic realities test and the common law right of control test. Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1983). As the Fourth Circuit has noted, the determination of whether a plaintiff is an "employee" under both Title VII and the ADEA is an "involved question." Id. The economic realities test looks to many factors including the "permanency of the relation[ship], the skill required, the investment in the facilities for work, and opportunities for profit or loss from an individual's activities. . . ." Id. (quoting Bartles v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)).
Applicable common law principles likewise require consideration of many factors in determining whether an employment relationship exists between an employer and an individual. Ordinarily, the question of whether an employment relationship exists will be a question of fact. Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 230 (1982). Factors to be considered include: (1) the power to select and hire the employee, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power to control the employee's conduct, and (5) whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company, Inc. v. Imbraguglio, 346 Md. 573, 590-91 (1997)
When these many factors are considered, this Court concludes that it cannot be determined as a matter of law on the record here that defendant Alamo was not the employer of plaintiff Lyles. Disputes of material fact exist as to this issue. Although Allines selected Lyles and sent him to Alamo and although Lyles' wages were paid by Allines, Alamo had the power to control plaintiff's conduct and to discharge him. Under the circumstances here, the Court concludes that defendant Alamo is not entitled to the entry of summary judgment as to Count I of the amended complaint on the ground that plaintiff Lyles was not under Title VII an employee of Alamo at the time of the matters in suit.
(b) Discriminatory Discharge
Plaintiff first argues that there is direct evidence in the record here of defendant's motive to discharge him because of his race. The Court must disagree. Plaintiff has not on this record met his burden of proving discriminatory intent by direct evidence or by sufficiently probative indirect evidence. He has not produced direct evidence of defendant's stated purpose to discriminate and/or circumstantial evidence of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact.See Goldberg v. B. Green Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1988).
As direct evidence of Alamo's discriminatory intent, plaintiff relies on a statement made by plaintiff's supervisor Yates during his deposition. When asked by plaintiff's attorney whether employees had approached him before about discrimination problems in the past, Yates stated that employees had not come to him but that he had overheard certain employees "say that there had been discriminating [sic] to them." Yates further stated that he "had no knowledge of whatever the discrimination they were talking about."
Plaintiff's reliance on this testimony of Yates is misplaced. The testimony in question is not competent evidence of a discriminatory intent on the part of Davis when he fired Lyles. This testimony is hearsay and is not direct evidence on which a jury might rely in finding that Lyles was fired because he was an African-American. That unnamed and unknown employees made general statements to Yates concerning discrimination is not admissible evidence in this case.
Defendant Alamo contends that the evidence in question is also not admissible because plaintiff's attorney was able to elicit the pertinent Yates testimony as the result of a prior ex parte contact with Yates in violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. Relying on this ground, defendant has filed a motion to preclude this evidence. Since the Court has determined on other grounds that the evidence is inadmissible, it is not necessary to rule on defendant's motion to preclude, which will be denied as moot.
Since neither the direct nor the circumstantial evidence relied upon by plaintiff in this case is of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant's motive to discharge him because of his race, the Court must resort in this case to the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme to determine if plaintiff's Title VII claim alleged in Count I should proceed to trial. Plaintiff asserts that he has made out a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Three of the elements have in fact been satisfied. It is not disputed here that plaintiff as an African-American is a member of a protected class and that he was discharged after working for Alamo. Moreover, there is evidence that, following plaintiff's discharge, he was replaced by a white male with comparable qualifications. However, plaintiff has not here produced material evidence indicating that, at the time of his discharge, he was performing his job at a level which met his employer's legitimate expectations.
Yates, an African-American male, was one of plaintiff's supervisors. According to Yates, Lyles' work performance was initially satisfactory but after several weeks on the job his performance began to deteriorate. Lyles often could not be found for work assignments. He frequently spent work time reading the newspaper, getting a snack or soda, or making personal telephone calls on one of Alamo's business telephone lines located in the QTA area. Yates personally had to direct Lyles on multiple occasions to refrain from tying up the telephone line for long periods of time with personal telephone calls. Yates reported to Davis that Lyles' work performance had become unsatisfactory. Both Williams and Roberts also told Davis that Lyles was not keeping focused on his job. In her affidavit, Dowla confirmed that Davis contacted her in September of 1999 and informed her that Alamo did not wish to retain Lyles as a temporary worker because he socialized too much and did not perform his job to the best of his abilities. The evidence here establishes that at the time of his discharge, plaintiff was not performing his job at a level which met the legitimate expectations of defendant Alamo.
Richard Williams ("Williams") and Wanda Roberts ("Roberts") also supervised Lyles. Like Yates, Williams and Roberts were also African-Americans. All three of plaintiff's supervisors reported to Davis, the Operations Manager.
In his recent affidavit, Lyles states that his supervisor Williams told him that he did not go to Davis and say that Lyles did a bad job and that Williams further said that Lyles did what was asked of him. The evidence in question is inadmissible as hearsay. There is no reason why plaintiff could not have taken the deposition of Williams in this case or obtained an affidavit from him. Williams' statement would then have been made firsthand and under oath and would be admissible evidence in this case.
Plaintiff's own assertions that at all times his job performance was satisfactory do not constitute competent evidence. The self-perception of a plaintiff as to his qualifications in a suit like this one is irrelevant; what matters is "the perception of the decision maker." Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1067 (4th Cir. 1980); Pfeifer v. Lever Bros. Co., 693 F. Supp. 358, 364 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd 850 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1988); Douglas v. PHH Fleet America Corp., 832 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (D. Md. 1993). This Court should not act as a "super-personnel department" and undertake to determine whether a defendant's perceptions of an employee's qualifications are erroneous, without regard to the defendant's "ability to assess the full dimension of its employees' qualifications and its ability to view its employees in a work environment. . . ." Evans v. Technologies Applications Services Co., 875 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 (D. Md. 1995).
Even assuming, arguendo, that this Court were to find that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination on the present record, summary judgment in favor of defendant as to Count I would still be granted. Defendant Alamo has in this case articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination of plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff in turn has presented no material evidence which would raise a triable issue as to the question of pretext. It cannot be inferred on the record here that defendant's action was based upon plaintiff's race. The record in this case does not disclose that Davis or Lyles' supervisors at any time uttered racial slurs or displayed hostility to African-American employees. Indeed, all three of plaintiff's supervisors and a majority of Alamo's temporary employees were African-Americans.
Evidence of discriminatory motive on the part of defendant Alamo does not exist in this record. Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence "`of a stated purpose to discriminate of sufficient probative force to reflect a genuine issue of material fact.'" EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 941 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848). A plaintiff's own conclusory assertions of discrimination in and of themselves are insufficient in a Title VII case to prove discriminatory animus and counter substantial evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment action. Williams, 841 F.2d at 456; Gairola v. Commonwealth of Va., Dept. of General Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1288 (4th Cir. 1985)
Counsel for plaintiff argues that evidence in the record that Lyles was discharged because Alamo was undergoing a reduction in force is proof of pretext on the part of Alamo. However, the deposition testimony of Davis and other evidence of record clearly establishes that a reduction in force was not the reason why Lyles was fired. When Lyles asked Davis why he was being discharged, Davis mentioned that the end of the summer was Alamo's slow season and that Alamo did not need as many people at such times. However, Davis informed Lyles at the time that he was not being let go because of a reduction in force but because "you don't do what we ask you to do."
Plaintiff argues that Count I also includes a claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and that evidence of record indicates that defendant Alamo has violated that provision of Title VII. Pursuant to § 2000e-3, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge . . . or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this subchapter."
On the record here, this Court is satisfied that there is no claim of plaintiff under § 2000e-3 presently existing before the Court in this case. That statutory provision permits an employee to assert a claim of discriminatory retaliation. But previously plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to present this same claim to the Court by way of a new Count III to be added to his amended complaint. In his proposed Count III, plaintiff alleged that on multiple occasions he attempted to keep defendant in compliance with Title VII and that he was wrongfully discharged because he asserted his Title VII rights. However, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint was denied by this Court as untimely in its Memorandum and Order of November 17, 2000. There has been no discovery pertaining to any claim asserted in this case by plaintiff under § 2000e-3, and it is improper for Lyles' attorney to now argue that such a claim has always been included as a part of Count I of the amended complaint.
For these reasons, defendant Alamo is entitled to summary judgment as to Count I of the amended complaint.
(c) Abusive Discharge
Maryland follows the common law rule that an at will employment contract can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time. Adler, 291 Md. at 35. In Adler, the Court of Appeals recognized for the first time that an at will employee may under Maryland law assert a claim for abusive discharge when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 47.
In Count II of his amended complaint, plaintiff asserts that his discharge contravenes the public policy expressed in laws requiring employers to post certain federal and state labor provisions. According to plaintiff, he complained to his supervisors at Alamo that notices of employee rights were not being displayed as required by law and that Alamo discharged him because he had made those complaints. On the record here, this Court finds and concludes that plaintiff has not proved a cause of action for abusive discharge under Maryland law.
The Adler case was certified to the Court of Appeals of Maryland by this Court. After being returned here, plaintiff Adler was awarded substantial compensatory damages by a jury. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed that award, concluding that plaintiff Adler had not properly stated and proved a cause of action for abusive discharge under Maryland law. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987). As noted by the Fourth Circuit in its Adler opinion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had confined the abusive discharge cause of action to situations where continued employment was "threatened not by genuine dissatisfaction with job performance but because the employee has refused to act in an unlawful manner or attempted to perform a statutorily prescribed duty . . ." 830 F.2d at 1306 (quoting Adler, 291 Md. at 42). The Fourth Circuit further noted that the Maryland Court had recognized that, to be considered equally by a court in a case of this sort, is the fact "that the employer has an important interest in being able to discharge an at will employee whenever it would be beneficial to his business." Id. Determining where the line is to be drawn "depends in large part on whether the public policy is sufficiently clear to provide the basis for a tort or contract action for wrongful discharge." Id.
In Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 575 (D. Md. 1982), the undersigned denied defendant's motion to dismiss Adler's abusive discharge claim and permitted that claim to be presented at a trial.
Here plaintiff has not shown that the public policy relied upon by him was sufficiently clear to form a sound basis for a claim of abusive discharge. He has not shown that he was fired because he refused to act in an unlawful manner or because he attempted to perform a statutorily prescribed duty.
Plaintiff has alleged that Alamo had "an obligation to post Federal and State labor laws and to post signs in conspicuous locations regarding the rights of employees in the workplace." Evidence of record establishes that Alamo did in fact post the notices in question in a conspicuous place on its premises. Both the federal 5-in-1 poster and a poster describing worker's compensation rights were posted on the wall next to the door leading to the main base break room. The main base break room is used by all Alamo employees. Orientations for new employees are held in that room, and car shuttlers often use the main base break room when they bring cars to the main base for service. In his deposition, plaintiff admitted that he had reported to the main office on his first day of work and that occasionally he went back there during the time when he worked for Alamo to pick up cars as well as to drop them off. Other employees likewise went to the main base break room on occasion. Plaintiff also admitted that when he complained to Davis about the posters, he was told that they were posted outside the main base break room. Davis testified that he offered to take Lyles to see the posters, but Lyles has denied in a recent affidavit that any such offer was made. However, the record here indicates that Lyles, having been advised that the posters were in place at the main office, did not go there to verify that fact. In any event, as he admitted during his deposition, Lyles himself, when he made complaints to Alamo management, was aware of his employee rights under both state and federal labor law.
Plaintiff contends that the notices should also have been posted at the QTA area where he performed most of his work. Evidence of record indicates that there had been postings at the QTA area on an earlier occasion but that the notices had fallen off the door there before plaintiff started to work at Alamo.
The Court is satisfied that facts of record here establish that defendant Alamo did in fact post the required notices in a conspicuous location at its BWI facilities. Plaintiff has not here shown that defendant violated a "clear mandate" of public policy by not posting labor law signs both in the QTA area and also in the main base area. Nor has he shown that he was fired because he attempted to perform a constitutional or statutorily prescribed duty. In Lee v. Denro, Inc., 91 Md. App. 822, 825 (1992), the Court of Special Appeals held that an at will employee may not sue her employer for abusive discharge because she was fired when she disputed the defendant's test procedures in the presence of an FAA. inspector. In her Opinion, Judge Motz noted that an employee who is dismissed for raising objections to the employer's business, management or safety practices, even if correct in his allegations, does not state a cause of action for abusive discharge. Id. at 835. As the Supreme Court observed in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930), "the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable quality and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection." (quoted with approval in Adler, 291 Md. at 46; emphasis added in Adler).
That Opinion was authored by Judge Diana Motz, who is now a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Since plaintiff's complaints to Alamo were unfounded and since his state law claim is not based on actionable conduct recognized by the Court in Adler, plaintiff has not in this case met his burden of showing that he was subjected to an abusive discharge when his employment was terminated by Alamo. Accordingly, the claim asserted by plaintiff in Count II of the amended complaint must also fail.
V Conclusion
For all the reasons stated herein, this Court concludes that plaintiff Lyles has not shown on the record here that defendant Alamo is liable for damages under either Count I or Count II of the amended complaint. Since plaintiff has conceded that defendant Allines is entitled to summary judgment, both the motion of defendant Allines and the motion of defendant Alamo will be granted. An appropriate Order will be entered by the Court.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum Opinion of today, it is this 14th day of February, 2001 by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
ORDERED:
1. That the motion of defendant Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. to preclude certain evidence is denied as moot;
2. That the motion of defendant Allines, Inc. for summary judgment is hereby granted;
3. That the motion of defendant Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. for summary judgment is hereby granted; and
4. That judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants, with costs.