Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0080
02-14-2017
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DAVID ANTHONY LUNSFORD, Petitioner/Appellee, and DESIREE JEANINE GONZALES, Respondent/Appellant.
COUNSEL Remick West-Watt, PLC, Tucson By J.M. Stanlee West-Watt, Maulik P. Shah, and Daniel G. Barker Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Lalosh Law, P.L.L.C., Tucson By Diane M. Lalosh Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the superior court in Pima county
No. D20142334
The Honorable Dean Christoffel, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Remick West-Watt, PLC, Tucson
By J.M. Stanlee West-Watt, Maulik P. Shah, and Daniel G. Barker
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Lalosh Law, P.L.L.C., Tucson
By Diane M. Lalosh
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Miller authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Espinosa concurred. MILLER, Judge:
¶1 Desiree Gonzales appeals the dissolution decree of the family court, contending the court erred in its conduct of the trial, decisions about parenting time and legal decision-making, and attribution of income to her. We conclude the court did not err and we affirm the decree.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the decree. In re Marriage of Foster, 240 Ariz. 99, ¶ 2, 376 P.3d 702, 703 (App. 2016). Gonzales and Lunsford were married in 2010 and had a son, K.L., in 2012. In 2014, while Gonzales was pregnant with their daughter, K.G.L., they both filed petitions for dissolution of marriage. The family court consolidated the two dissolution proceedings.
¶3 At a temporary-orders hearing in August 2014, the court ordered the continuation of the parenting time agreement that was already in place. Under that agreement, Lunsford took K.L. for several mornings per week, and overnight for one night on the weekend. In November, Gonzales filed a new motion for temporary orders, contending Lunsford's overnight parenting time was "negatively affecting the well-being" of K.L., who had become "inconsolable at night." Gonzales also sought help from Kathryn Seidler, a licensed clinical social worker.
¶4 In May 2015, Gonzales took K.L. to the emergency room "for concerns over possible sexual assault," and told the doctor he was complaining of rectal pain and putting his fingers in his rectum. The doctor found that K.L.'s rectum was slightly inflamed, though there were "[n]o obvious cuts or signs of direct trauma." The Tucson Police Department (TPD) and Department of Child Safety (DCS) were both notified. Both TPD and DCS dismissed their cases.
¶5 Gonzales also contacted Seidler about the incident, sending her an email describing K.L.'s behaviors. Seidler initially responded that it sounded as if K.L. was exhibiting symptoms of sexual abuse trauma and recommended he be seen by another therapist. The other therapist met with K.L. and did not render any opinions regarding visitation changes. After learning that DCS and TPD had determined not to investigate the allegations, Seidler changed her opinion and determined that Gonzales and Lunsford should continue with the parenting plan already in place. Seidler later explained that she was not concerned about possible abuse, and thought K.L. might have just had a rash.
¶6 At a temporary-orders hearing the following month, Gonzales described her concerns regarding K.L., and the court reviewed the reports from the hospital, TPD, and therapists. Based on the opinions of the therapists and in light of the fact that TPD and DCS were not investigating, the family court denied the motion for temporary orders regarding parenting time.
¶7 In July, Gonzales contacted K.L.'s pediatrician about another incident in which K.L. asked her to tickle his penis. She did not bring K.L. with her and apparently did not tell the doctor that K.L. was being seen by therapists. The incident was again reported to DCS and TPD. Gonzales then obtained an ex parte order of protection from a different judge. Lunsford contested the order, and the family court held a hearing that continued into the first day of trial in August. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from a DCS employee, Gonzales, Gonzales's mother, and one of K.L.'s therapists, and reviewed a video recording Gonzales had made of K.L.'s behaviors. The therapist testified she had not observed any evidence K.L. was sexually abused. Gonzales testified that after she had received the order of protection, DCS informed her it had determined the claims were unsubstantiated. The court dismissed the order of protection.
¶8 After the dismissal, the family court proceeded with trial regarding dissolution matters, which continued to the next day. The court heard testimony from Gonzales again, as well as K.L.'s other therapist and Lunsford. The court ruled from the bench to grant joint decision-making, but granted Lunsford final authority for medical issues. Parenting time as to K.L. was set at one week on and one week off. Lunsford's parenting time with K.G.L. was limited to every weekend except for one each month, days only, with overnights to be added when she was nine months old.
¶9 Consistent with her pretrial request, Gonzales asked the family court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the court ordered the parties to submit proposed findings. The court issued an order with its findings and conclusions, and issued a final decree. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Gonzales's Opportunity to Be Heard
¶10 Gonzales argues she was denied the opportunity to be heard and to present all of her evidence because the family court limited Gonzales's and Lunsford's testimony to one hour each on the second day of trial.
¶11 "[A] trial court has broad discretion over the management of a trial, and although it may place time limitations on trial proceedings, any limitations must be reasonable under the circumstances." Gamboa v. Metzler, 223 Ariz. 399, ¶ 13, 224 P.3d 215, 218 (App. 2010); see also Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 22(1) ("The court may impose reasonable time limits on all proceedings or portions thereof and limit the time to the scheduled time."). Rigidity is disfavored, and "limits should be sufficiently flexible to allow adjustment during trial." Gamboa, 223 Ariz. 399, ¶ 13, 224 P.3d at 218, quoting Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85, ¶ 29, 977 P.2d 807, 813 (App. 1998). We review the imposition of time limits for an abuse of discretion, and we will not reverse unless a party can demonstrate it was harmed by the time limits. Brown, 194 Ariz. 85, ¶ 30, 977 P.2d at 813.
¶12 Gonzales requested a two-day trial, which the family court set at the final pre-trial conference. However, the contested order of protection hearing continued well into the first day of trial. Despite this, Gonzales was given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence. The court consolidated the order of protection and divorce cases for purposes of the hearing, and Gonzales and one of K.L.'s therapists testified about his behavioral issues and how they should affect Lunsford's custody, which was a key factor to be determined at trial. Moreover, Gonzales testified three times—once at the order of protection hearing and twice during trial. The court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the trial. See Gamboa, 223 Ariz. 399, ¶¶ 14-16, 224 P.3d at 218.
¶13 And even had the family court erred, Gonzales has not shown she suffered harm due to the time limitation. See id. ¶ 17. Such a showing requires, at minimum, an offer of proof stating what the evidence would have shown. Id. Gonzales argues she was prejudiced for two reasons: she had audio and video recordings of K.L. that were not viewed at trial, and she was "prevented from presenting all of her testimony with regard to why she left a good paying job to stay home with her newborn child." With regard to the first argument, some of the audio and video recordings were viewed at the hearing on the protection order, after which the court expressed concern about Gonzales's interview techniques with K.L. Moreover, Gonzales testified repeatedly about the behaviors K.L. had been exhibiting. Finally, she does not indicate in her briefs what the additional testimony or videotapes would have demonstrated that was not already before the court.
¶14 Regarding Gonzales's argument that she was not able to fully explain why she left her job, she never objected below regarding that time constraint, nor is there any indication in the record that it limited her testimony. At the end of the first day of trial, the court asked if the parties wanted to use the remaining twenty-five minutes to introduce testimony as to child support and then "start . . . clean" the next day with the decision-making and parenting time issues. Both parties agreed, and Gonzales testified. She explained she had resigned from her position as an intelligence officer with the Department of Homeland Security to work as an independent insurance agent, and was not yet earning any income in this line of work. She told the court she had left her job because she was going to be required to take a five-week business trip, and that she wanted a job that would allow her to run a business and take care of her children at the same time. Her testimony was not cut off, and there was time for both cross-examination and re-direct. At the conclusion, the court asked Gonzales's counsel if there was anything else, and she did not indicate Gonzales had further testimony regarding why she left her job. Moreover, Gonzales does not explain in her briefs what she would have said had she been provided more time. There is no indication Gonzales suffered prejudice due to the amount of time spent on the issue of why she left her job. See id. ¶ 18.
Parenting Time and Legal Decision-Making
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
¶15 Gonzales argues the family court erred by failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record as regards legal decision-making and parenting time, pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403. Section 25-403 provides that the court shall determine parenting time in accordance with the best interests of the child and shall consider all relevant factors, including eleven enumerated considerations. § 25-403(A). Furthermore, "[i]n a contested legal decision-making or parenting time case, the court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child." § 25-403(B); see also In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, ¶ 5, 38 P.3d 1189, 1191 (App. 2002) (family court's order which failed to make requisite § 25-403 findings "deficient as a matter of law"; court of appeals could not determine whether family court had considered appropriate factors).
¶16 Gonzales maintains, without citation to authority, that § 25-403(B)'s requirement that the findings be "on the record" means the family court must orally pronounce its findings in open court contemporaneously with its parenting time or legal decision-making ruling. Thus, she reasons, the family court should have made no rulings until it made statutory findings. We have never construed § 25-403(B) in this manner. To the contrary, we have held the court may make the requisite statutory findings in a separate order or minute entry, as it did here. See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, ¶ 11, 304 P.3d 1093, 1096 (App. 2013) ("Failure to make [§ 25-403] findings in an order or on the record constitutes an abuse of discretion.") (emphasis added).
¶17 Gonzales further argues the family court did not duly consider the evidence at trial and instead simply adopted Lunsford's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law "almost verbatim" after the hearing. She maintains the court abdicated its "duty to exercise its independent judgment in making findings." Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 135, 796 P.2d 930, 937 (App. 1990); see also Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, ¶¶ 11-15, 304 P.3d at 1096-97 (vacating and remanding where family court essentially delegated its judicial decision-making role by adopting custody evaluator's proposed plan wholesale while failing to make § 25-403 findings).
¶18 Elliott makes clear that a court may adopt a party's proposed findings of fact so long as "those findings are consistent with the ones [the court] reaches independently after properly considering the facts." 165 Ariz. at 134, 796 P.2d at 936. Contrary to Gonzales's assertion, a comparison of Lunsford's proposed findings with the court's ultimate findings shows myriad additions and alterations manifesting the court's independent exercise of judgment. Although the court apparently referred to Lunsford's proposed findings when compiling its own, as evidenced by a similar numbering structure, the court also added more than ten paragraphs of findings concerning every § 25-403(A) factor as well as the best interests of the children. The record shows the court exercised independent judgment in its fact finding, and did not merely "rely upon [Lunsford] to prepare findings that support[ed] its judgment." Elliott, 165 Ariz. at 134, 796 P.2d at 936; see also Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, ¶ 14, 304 P.3d at 1096-97. The court did not abuse its discretion.
Best Interests of K.L.
¶19 Gonzales contends the family court abused its discretion when it awarded equal parenting time with the parties' son, K.L., because there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that it was in his best interests.
¶20 "Arizona's public policy makes the best interests of the child the primary consideration in awarding child custody." Downs v. Scheffler, 206 Ariz. 496, ¶ 7, 80 P.3d 775, 778 (App. 2003). The family court made findings of fact as to each of the eleven factors to be considered when determining legal decision-making and parenting time. See A.R.S. § 25-403. We review the family court's order for an abuse of discretion. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, ¶ 11, 304 P.3d at 1096. A court abuses its discretion when the record is "devoid of competent evidence to support the decision." Borg v. Borg, 3 Ariz. App. 274, 277, 413 P.2d 784, 787 (App. 1966), quoting Fought v. Fought, 94 Ariz. 187, 188, 382 P.2d 667, 668 (1963).
¶21 Gonzales appears to focus on § 25-403(A)(8), whether there was child abuse. She challenges the family court's order and decree point by point, and generally argues the court erred in how it weighed the evidence. First, we determine whether the record showed competent evidence supporting the ruling, then we address each of Gonzales's additional arguments.
¶22 Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the decree, Marriage of Foster, 240 Ariz. 99, ¶ 2, 376 P.3d at 703, the record reveals that two child therapists, DCS, and TPD all found the claims of abuse unsubstantiated. One therapist, Seidler, met with K.L. three times and also met with Gonzales and Lunsford. In May, after receiving an email from Gonzales detailing K.L.'s behaviors, Seidler responded that it sounded like K.L. had been sexually abused, but revised her opinion two weeks later. By the time of trial she was no longer concerned that K.L. had been sexually abused and recommended split parenting time. Another therapist with expertise in child trauma, Juliet Fortino, met with K.L. five times, and found K.L. to be age-appropriate with no signs of abuse. TPD and DCS, which had both opened cases based on reports by Gonzales, closed their cases without substantiating the claims. Reasonable evidence supports the family court's finding that Lunsford did not abuse K.L.
¶23 Gonzales argues Fortino was not qualified to render an opinion as to K.L.'s behaviors because she did not describe them in detail or show the videos she had reviewed during her testimony, and because she is not an evaluator. Likewise, Gonzales appears to argue Seidler was not qualified to render an opinion because she misstated K.G.L.'s age. Gonzales did not challenge either therapist's expertise or offer a competing therapist evaluation below; therefore, we do not address these arguments. See Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Bergin, 239 Ariz. 507, ¶ 12, 372 P.3d 1031, 1035 (App. 2016).
¶24 Gonzales also contends the family court improperly delegated its decision to an expert witness when it "placed great weight on the testimony of Juliet Fortino who was not qualified to testify and had not conducted the kind of evaluation necessary to ascertain whether the young child had been subjected to any kind of sexual abuse trauma." See Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, ¶ 14, 304 P.3d at 1096-97 (family court abused discretion by using custody evaluator report as baseline for custody). While the court did rely on Fortino's opinion, it also relied on the opinion of the other therapist, the fact that DCS and TPD had both closed their cases, and the court's own finding that the video and audio showed Gonzales had "regularly interrogated [K.L.] . . . in a non-professional, highly inappropriate manner which could cause false memories or statements to be made by the child." The record does not reflect that the court placed its decision in the hands of the expert witness. Cf. id. Moreover, as noted above, sufficient evidence supports the finding that there was no child abuse.
¶25 Gonzales further argues the family court placed insufficient weight on reports made by K.L.'s pediatrician and a psychologist. But we do not re-weigh the evidence on appeal. Reeck v. Mendoza, 232 Ariz. 299, ¶ 14, 304 P.3d 1122, 1126 (App. 2013). To the extent Gonzales claims no evidence supports the court's finding that she "did not inform the child's pediatrician of either the therapist or the counselor and their opinions concerning the behavior of the child," we note that the pediatrician's report, which contains a detailed summary of her consultation with Gonzales, does not make any reference to earlier visits to therapists and indeed recommends counseling. When questioned about it, Gonzales said she did not recall whether she had mentioned the therapists' findings. The court reasonably inferred that she had not. See Summers v. Gloor, 239 Ariz. 222, n.1, 368 P.3d 930, 932 n.1 (App. 2016) ("We view the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's orders.").
¶26 Gonzales also argues the family court erred in its finding that "the relationship between [K.L.] and [Gonzales] is problematic as a result of her reactions to his normal 3 year old activities." Psychologist Holly Joubert noted upon viewing the videos that Gonzales and her family should be asked to "cease and desist asking the child any questions about his behavior" because the questioning was sometimes leading. The court also noted Gonzales's interview technique was concerning. Moreover, although Seidler stated there should be no issues with Gonzales caring for K.L., she also said Gonzales should consider individual counseling because she did not know if there was something that was "triggering this fear" with regard to K.L.'s behaviors. Competent evidence supports the court's finding that Gonzales's reactions to K.L.'s behavior were problematic. The court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Lunsford equal parenting time with K.L.
Best Interests of K.G.L.
¶27 Gonzales argues the family court abused its discretion when it awarded Lunsford overnight parenting time with their infant daughter, K.G.L. Without citation to the record, Gonzales argues the court did not take into account the child's needs with regard to breastfeeding. However, Seidler testified that the infant could drink pumped milk or formula, and Lunsford testified that she took bottles. Competent evidence supports the court's findings regarding K.G.L. The court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Lunsford overnight parenting time with K.G.L.
Legal Decision-Making and Authority for Medical Decisions
¶28 Gonzales argues the family court abused its discretion by denying her unilateral legal decision-making powers and giving Lunsford authority for the children's medical-related decisions. We review the court's order for an abuse of discretion, Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, ¶ 11, 304 P.3d at 1096, again referring to the factors listed in § 25-403(A).
Gonzales also argues the family court was required to determine whether there was a material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child before making a change to "a previous custody order," citing Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, 79 P.3d 667 (App. 2003). But unlike in Owen, in which a party sought modification of a final decree, id. ¶¶ 2-6, temporary orders are "preparatory in nature [and] made in anticipation of further resolution of the issues at trial," see Villares v. Pineda, 217 Ariz. 623, ¶ 11, 177 P.3d 1195, 1197 (App. 2008). Cf. A.R.S. §§ 25-404(B) (temporary custody orders vacated if underlying dissolution dismissed), 25-315(F)(1) ("A temporary order . . . [d]oes not prejudice the rights of the parties . . . that are to be adjudicated at the subsequent hearings in the proceeding.").
¶29 In this case, Gonzales appears to argue that several of the family court's findings under § 25-403(A), which supported its conclusion regarding legal decision-making, were factually incorrect. Gonzales generally challenges the court's findings as to factors set forth in § 25-403(A), including the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parents; the mental and physical health of the parties; which parent was more likely to allow frequent, meaningful contact with the other parent; whether Gonzales intentionally misled the court; and whether there was child abuse.
¶30 Competent evidence supports each of the family court's conclusions. As noted above, under § 25-403(A)(2), the court found that Gonzales's relationship with K.L. was problematic, which is supported by testimony and reports by Seidler and Joubert.
¶31 Regarding § 25-403(A)(5), the court found "substantial question[s] . . . concerning [Gonzales's] . . . failure to pay attention to expert opinion and recommendations and to continually seek to show father as a monster not deserving of time with his children." Although Gonzales argues the court incorrectly found she had gone to the pediatrician after the therapists stated K.L. was behaving normally, testimony and a report both support the court's finding that the therapists had rendered opinions before the visit to the pediatrician.
Gonzales also argues there is no evidence that Seidler had rendered an opinion before the hearing on the emergency order, but Seidler's opinion that the schedule should not change was reviewed one month earlier, at the hearing on the motion for temporary orders.
¶32 Under § 25-403(A)(6), as to which parent would be more likely to allow frequent, meaningful contact with the other parent, the family court found there was "no doubt that if left to her own devices, [Gonzales] would not permit [Lunsford] to have any parenting time with either of his children." Evidence showed Gonzales repeatedly had tried to limit Lunsford's parenting time, refusing to allow K.L. to go with Lunsford, and only allowing him to visit K.G.L. for short periods at Gonzales's home.
Gonzales also argues there was no evidence her mother aided in interfering with Lunsford's parenting time. But Lunsford testified that when he had visited her parents' house to see K.G.L. he was confined to one room where he would be videotaped, and her mother would not let him have a bottle or toys to use. Further, when he attempted to contact Gonzales's mother after K.G.L.'s birth, she never responded. --------
¶33 Regarding § 25-403(A)(7), the family court found that Gonzales intentionally misled the court, relying on Gonzales's repeated attempts to limit parenting time even after multiple therapists informed her K.L.'s behavior was not concerning. Testimony and reports from the therapists support this finding. Finally, regarding § 25-403(A)(8), as to whether there has been child abuse, as noted above, competent evidence supports the court's finding that Lunsford had not abused the children.
¶34 Gonzales also argues the family court was incorrect in other factual findings not linked to any specific § 25-403 factors. First, she disputes the finding she had "on multiple occasions, without the knowledge of or consent of Appellee . . . taken the parties' minor son to medical practitioners making repeated allegations of inappropriate sexualized behavior." She contends that although she did take K.L. to the hospital to report his behaviors, she did not take him with her to the pediatrician when she made the second report. While Gonzales is correct, this error does not alter the purpose and result of her reports—Gonzales did indeed go to medical practitioners multiple times to make allegations, and each time, the practitioners reported the claims to DCS or TPD. Moreover, Gonzales fails to explain why this error was material.
¶35 Gonzales argues the family court was also incorrect regarding its finding that she contacted TPD multiple times. She argues the only report to police was made by emergency room personnel, but she testified that K.L.'s behavior later "got [her] to go back to [DCS], back to TPD, and also [back] to the pediatrician." Competent evidence supports this finding. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gonzales full legal decision-making powers and giving Lunsford final decision-making with regard to medical-related decisions.
Attribution of Income for Child Support Calculation
¶36 Finally, Gonzales argues the family court abused its discretion in attributing income to her when calculating child support. We review a child support award for an abuse of discretion. Engel v. Landman, 221 Ariz. 504, ¶ 21, 212 P.3d 842, 848 (App. 2009). In doing so, we ask "not whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but whether a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances, could have made the ruling without exceeding the bounds of reason." Cook v. Losnegard, 228 Ariz. 202, ¶ 11, 265 P.3d 384, 387 (App. 2011), quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 571, 694 P.2d 1181, 1185 (1985).
¶37 Arizona's child support statutes recognize that a parent "has the duty to provide all reasonable support for that person's [child]." A.R.S. § 25-501(A). Moreover, Arizona's Child Support Guidelines provide that "[t]he child support obligation has priority over all other financial obligations." A.R.S. § 25-320 app. § 2(B). Under the Guidelines, if a parent reduces her income "as a matter of choice and not for reasonable cause, the court may attribute income to a parent up to his or her earning capacity." § 25-320 app. § 5(E); Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, ¶ 6, 975 P.2d 108, 110-11 (1999); see also § 25-501(C) ("The child support guidelines shall be used in determining the ability to pay child support and the amount of payments.").
¶38 Gonzales primarily argues there is no evidence her change in employment placed the children in financial peril. But financial peril is not required for a court to impute income to the parent who has terminated employment. See Little, 193 Ariz. 518, ¶ 13, 975 P.2d at 112. Where the change in income would not place the children in peril, "courts must consider the overall reasonableness of a parent's voluntary decision to terminate employment." Id. Possible factors for the court to consider include whether the child's unusual emotional or physical needs require the parent's presence at home or the parent is engaged in training to increase future earning capacity. See § 25-320 app. § 5(E)(2), (4). Generally, "[t]he primary task for a trial court is to decide each case based upon 'the best interests of the child, not the convenience or personal preference of a parent.'" Little, 193 Ariz. 518, ¶ 14, 975 P.2d at 113, quoting Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Ewing, 470 S.E.2d 608, 611 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
¶39 Gonzales graduated from the United States Naval Academy and worked as an intelligence officer for sixteen years. She last worked for the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence, where her income was approximately $86,000 per year. Gonzales resigned about a month before trial and started an independent insurance agency, from which she had not yet earned any income, but expected to earn minimum wage until she built up her business.
¶40 Gonzales explained that her previous job's demands on her time and an upcoming five-week business trip to Washington, D.C. would be incompatible with raising two children. Lunsford testified, however, that Gonzales had traveled when K.L. was younger, taking him with her for longer trips. Gonzales also acknowledged she had taken K.L. on previous trips and would have been able to bring both children if needed. She further admitted that Lunsford could watch the children while she was out of town.
¶41 The family court found Gonzales had left her job without adequate reason, concluding the upcoming travel schedule did not justify the unilateral decision. Competent evidence supports this conclusion. Gonzales admitted there were workable solutions regarding her upcoming trip, and does not argue that her children had unusual needs requiring her presence at home. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Gonzales's decision to quit was unreasonable.
¶42 Gonzales also argues the family court did not take into account the fact that there would be no childcare expenses if she worked at home. However, at trial Gonzales reminded the court there would be no child care costs, and the court immediately thereafter imputed only $60,000 despite the previous income of $86,000. Gonzales has not carried her burden of showing that the court abused its discretion in attributing income to her.
Disposition
¶43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the family court's decree.