Opinion
(August Term, 1847.)
1. A defendant, who is sued upon a judgment obtained before a justice of the peace has no right to plead that he was an infant when that judgment was rendered.
2. A judgment by a justice of the peace, though not a matter of record, determines, between the parties, their respective rights in the matter of controversy. Neither party can, in a subsequent proceeding to enforce it, deny or contest the matters of fact ascertained by it.
APPEAL from CABARRUS Fall Term, 1846; Dick, J.
The plaintiffs had obtained a judgment against the defendant Adeline before her intermarriage with the other defendant. That judgment lay dormant for twelve months and more, when the warrant in the present case, on the former judgment, was issued against both the defendants. The case was taken to the county court by appeal, when the defendants pleaded the general issue and former judgment. In the Superior Court, to which the case was carried, it was tried on the same pleas as in the county court. On the trial the defendants alleged and were allowed to prove that the defendant Adeline was, at the time of the rendition of the first judgment, and then was, an infant. The court held that the defense could not avail the defendants in this action. A verdict being rendered for the plaintiff and judgment rendered thereon, the defendants appealed.
Thompson for plaintiff.
No counsel for defendants.
In the opinion of his Honor below we concur. The judgment of a justice is not a matter of record, but to many purposes it has the qualities of one. It determines, between the parties, their respective rights in the matter of controversy. Neither party (423) can, in a subsequent proceeding to enforce it, deny or contest the matter of fact ascertained by it. In an action of debt upon it, as this is, its validity cannot, in pleading, be impeached or affected by any supposed defect or illegality in the transaction on which it is founded; and, consequently, it is not necessary to state the circumstances or consideration on which it is founded. 1 Chit. Pl., 354. It is well settled that, in pleading to a scire facias to revive a judgment or to an action of debt upon it, no matter of defense can be pleaded which existed anterior to the recovery of the judgment. E East., 258; 4 East., 311. The infancy of the defendant Adeline at the time the first or original judgment was obtained might have been a good defense. She either did make it on that trial or she did not. If she did, it is then res adjudicata, and she is concluded by it, as the judgment is in full force. If she did not, then she is, by the principle before stated, excluded from making it now. That judgment not only ascertained the amount due to the plaintiff, but that she was in law bound to pay it. But an effectual answer in this case is that the plea of infancy was not tendered by the defendants. When she married the other defendant, Solomon Fair, it was an existing debt of hers, and in this action the plaintiff has a clear right to recover it.
PER CURIAM. No error.
Cited: Spillman v. Williams, 91 N.C. 489.
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