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granting summary judgment for defendant hospital on Title VI claims brought by nurses who had been employed at hospital, since plaintiffs did not dispute that hospital received federal funds only in the form of Medicare and Medicaid and that it received no federal funds for the purpose of employing individuals
Summary of this case from Gilmore v. University of RochesterOpinion
1:02CV00738
December 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Louise E. Luallen, Tina C. Ntuen, Velvet Garriques, Mariana Williams, Linda Glasgow, and Brenda K. Smith have filed suit against Defendants Guilford Health Care Center and Medical Facilities of North Carolina, Inc. claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) ("Title VII"), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Title VI"). Defendants reached a settlement with Glasgow and Smith, and their claims were voluntarily dismissed with prejudice on December 15, 2003. With regard to Luallen, Ntuen, Garriques, and Williams (collectively, "Plaintiff's"), this matter is now before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs' claims.
Defendants note that Plaintiff's improperly identify Guilford Health Care Center as "Guilford Health Care" and Medical Facilities of North Carolina, Inc. as "Parent Corporation Medical Facilities of North Carolina, Incorporated." For purposes of this motion, the court will assume that Defendants are correct in their assertion that the proper names of Defendants are Guilford Health Care Center and Medical Facilities of North Carolina, Inc. and will refer to them as such.
I. BACKGROUND
On various dates between August 1996 and August 2000, Plaintiff's were individually hired as nurses by Guilford Health Care Center ("GHCC"). Plaintiff's occupied various positions and shifts; all were either registered or licensed practical nurses and some held supervisory positions. During their time at GHCC, Plaintiff's, each of whom is black, came to feel that they were being discriminated against on the basis of their race. In March 2001, Luallen approached GHCC Administrator Laura Lucas with these concerns.
Subsequently, several black nurses, including but not limited to Plaintiff's, met with Ms. Lucas to discuss alleged discrimination at GHCC. Their complaints included concerns that job openings were not advertised in-house, some supervisors were rude, breaks were disproportionate, work duties were unequal, and discipline was handled disparately. A second meeting, again consisting solely of black employees and Ms. Lucas, was held in April 2001. GHCC claims to have addressed at least some of the concerns raised at these meetings.
At various times between August 20 and December 27, 2001, Luallen, Ntuen, and Garriques were fired by GHCC. Williams resigned her position on July 23, 2001.
All four Plaintiff's now allege that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of § 1981 and Title VI; Luallen and Ntuen allege discrimination in violation of Title VII. The three Plaintiff's who were fired also allege discriminatory retaliation in violation of § 1981 and Title VI; of these three, only Luallen and Ntuen allege retaliation in violation of Title VII. The fourth Plaintiff, Williams, alleges that her resignation was a constructive discharge in violation of § 1981 and Title VI. All of these claims were included in a single complaint, filed September 6, 2002.
On June 19, 2003, the court issued a motion schedule requiring motions for summary judgment to be filed no later than September 5, 2003, with responses due by September 15, 2003. The order expressly provided "[t]his schedule will not be further modified except for good cause shown." On September 16, 2003, Plaintiff's moved for an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, which had been timely filed on September 5, 2003. The court denied this motion; Plaintiff's filed their response on October 1, 2003, more than two weeks late.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Strike
Defendants have moved to strike Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the response was untimely. Defendants charge that Plaintiff's have not shown good cause for their late filing and, as such, the response should be stricken.
Since Plaintiff's moved for an extension of time after their filing deadline passed, their response can only be accepted if they demonstrate that their tardiness resulted from "excusable neglect." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 897, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3193 (1990); LR7.3(k). The Supreme Court has set forth factors to consider in determining whether excusable neglect has caused a delay in filing. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1498 (1993). These factors include "the danger of prejudice to the [non-movant], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id. Although the Court's decision considered excusable neglect as the phrase is used by Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1), the Fourth Circuit has said that the approach taken inPioneer has "general application to the consideration of excusable neglect." Skinner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, No. 98-1627, 1999 WL 261944, at *2 (4th Cir. May 3, 1999).
As noted by Defendants, the delay in this case causes their motion for summary judgment to be considered very near to the date of trial, requiring that they begin trial preparation before their dispositive motion is decided. Additionally, this court's consideration of the motion for summary judgment was delayed not only by Plaintiffs' late filing, but also by the consideration of this meritorious motion to strike. Plaintiffs' delay has thus prejudiced Defendants and impacted the judicial proceedings.
As to the third and fourth factors, the reason for the delay and whether the movant acted in good faith, Plaintiff's provide only limited insight. In their motion for an extension of time, Plaintiff's stated, "Counsel is in need of additional time to respond. There are six plaintiff's and a large volume of material to consider. Counsel is engaged in other matters and need[s] the additional time to respond." (Pls.' Mot. Enlarge. Time ¶ 3.) Since Plaintiff's failed to respond to Defendants' motion to strike, the court is without further explanation that might support a finding of excusable neglect. This lone statement by Plaintiff's as to the cause of the delay merely indicates a lack of preparedness. While this reason may represent neglect, it is certainly not excusable and does not exhibit good faith.
Finally, although a delay of two weeks is not egregious, Plaintiffs' failure to timely respond to the motion for summary judgment and complete failure to respond to the motion to strike continue a pattern of general neglect with regard to discovery deadlines and production. Plaintiff's failed to timely provide Defendants' initial discovery requests and repeatedly failed to rectify inadequate discovery responses, culminating in this court's grant of a motion to compel on June 17, 2003. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel at 2, Exs. G-J.)
A party's chronic failure to adhere to deadlines is one factor a court may consider in determining whether excusable neglect explains a failure to file. Kirby v. General Elec. Co., 210 F.R.D. 180, 193 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
Plaintiff's also expressly agreed to the summary judgment motion schedule set by this court on June 19, 2003. This schedule required Plaintiff's to file their response to any motion for summary judgment by September 15, 2003. The court stated that the schedule would not be further modified absent good cause shown and expressly noted that it would "not accept as a showing of 'good cause' that Plaintiff's have persisted in refusing to turn over discovery." Plaintiff's failed to comply with the schedule, did not request an extension of time until after the deadline for filing had passed, and, when their request was denied, did not file their response until October 1, 2003.
Since Plaintiff's have not shown that any of the factors expressed inPioneer weigh in their favor, they have failed to show that their delay resulted from excusable neglect. As such, the court will grant Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiffs' response to the motion for summary judgment. Since Plaintiff's failed to file their response within the time required, the motion will be considered uncontested. LR7.3(k).
Although an uncontested motion "ordinarily will be granted without further notice," the court declines to summarily grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment and will proceed to consider the merits. LR7.3(k).
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where an examination of the pleadings, affidavits, and other proper discovery materials before the court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). If the moving party has met that burden, the nonmoving party must then persuade the court that a genuine issue does remain for trial.
When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (citations omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). However, there must be more than just a factual dispute; the fact in question must be material and the dispute must be genuine. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). Although the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513, "bare allegations unsupported by legally competent evidence do not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact." Solis v. Prince George's County, 153 F. Supp.2d 793, 807 (D. Md. 2001). Summary judgment should be granted unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant on the evidence presented.McLean v. Patten Cmtys., Inc., 332 F.3d 714, 719 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2509-10).
2. Claims Against Defendant Medical Facilities of North Carolina
Plaintiff's have named both their employer, GHCC, and Medical Facilities of North Carolina, Inc. ("MFNC") as defendants. Plaintiff's allege that MFNC is the parent company of GHCC and a proper party to this action. Defendants dispute this contention, claiming that MFNC merely provides GHCC with various management services, including payroll and billing functions and various consulting services. Defendants state that MFNC is not the parent company of and owns no ownership interest in GHCC. Defendants have provided an affidavit from Ron Covington, vice president of MFNC, confirming these assertions. (Covington Aff. ¶¶ 2-3). Since Plaintiff's do not dispute Defendants' contentions, the court will grant summary judgment in favor of MFNC on all Plaintiffs' claims.
Even though Plaintiffs' response has been stricken, the court has reviewed the response and accompanying evidence and finds that neither source offered any fact or argument to dispute Defendants' assertion that MFNC is not a proper party to this suit.
3. Plaintiffs' Claims under § 1981
Plaintiffs' first cause of action is asserted pursuant to § 1981. Although this statute expressly guarantees only an equal right to make and enforce contracts, courts have held that it also provides a basis for at-will employees to claim employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that an at-will employment relationship may serve as a predicate contract for a § 1981 claim of employment discrimination). As such, § 1981 provides Plaintiff's with a cause of action to assert that their former employer, GHCC, discriminated or retaliated against them on the basis of race.
When considering discrimination or retaliation claims asserted pursuant to § 1981, courts should apply the analysis employed in Title VII claims. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2002); Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 n. 7 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Gairola v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285-86 (4th Cir. 1985)). Under the long established Title VII burden-shifting scheme, absent direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff's are required to show a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Bryant, 288 F.3d at 133. If Plaintiff's are able to show a prima facie case, the burden is on Defendants to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse treatment. Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). If Defendants make this showing, Plaintiffs' claims will only survive summary judgment if Plaintiff's demonstrate that the reason articulated by Defendants is merely pretextual. Bryant, 288 F.3d at 133.
By failing to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's have also failed to produce any direct evidence of discrimination. As such, the court will consider only whether Plaintiff's have established a prima facie case with regard to each of their allegations, and whether Defendants have articulated a legitimate, rather than pretextual, reason for any disparate treatment.
As mentioned above, the court reviewed Plaintiffs' response and accompanying evidence. In their response, Plaintiff's did not assert that they had produced any direct evidence of discrimination. The court's own examination of Plaintiffs' evidence also failed to reveal any direct evidence of discrimination.
a. Discrimination Claims
In order to succeed on their § 1981 claims, Plaintiff's must produce evidence sufficient to support each element of a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973); Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff's must show that (1) they are members of a protected class, (2) they suffered an adverse employment action, (3) their job performance was satisfactory, and (4) employees who were not members of the protected class were treated differently, or other circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.See Dugan v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716, 720-21 (4th Cir. 2002); Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 (4th Cir. 2002).
To establish their prima facie case, Plaintiff's have shown that they are members of a protected class and, by way of their depositions, have alleged some treatment that might constitute an adverse employment action. See Defs.' Notice of Filing, Exs. J, K, N, 0. For example, Plaintiff Luallen claims that black nurses were not promoted, were granted fewer and shorter breaks, and received less compensation. (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. J at 36-37, 49, 88.) Plaintiff Ntuen asserts that she was demoted, denied a plaque she earned, and was not invited out to lunch with other nurses. (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. N at 56, 108, 130, 138.) The remaining Plaintiff's allege similar discriminatory acts, including unequal work requirements and disparate disciplinary procedures. (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Exs. J at 47, 0 at 36-37, 102.)
In order to succeed at trial, Plaintiff's would have to demonstrate that at least one of the incidents alleged rose to the level of an adverse employment action, creating an inference of unlawful discrimination. However, many of the incidents Plaintiff's describe do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action as a matter of law. Adverse employment actions include only those acts that negatively impact the "terms, conditions, or benefits" of Plaintiffs' employment. Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001). Claims that Ntuen was denied a plaque after completing a training program and that some Plaintiff's were not invited to social activities cannot be considered adverse employment actions because the terms, conditions, and benefits of Plaintiffs' employment were not affected. See, e.g., id. at 869 (noting that disparate application of workplace policies and minor workplace annoyances do not constitute adverse employment actions); Mangum v. Postmaster Gen. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 1:02CV00561, 2003 WL 22741191, at *4 n. 4 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2003) (quoting Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997)) ("[N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.").
As to the remaining allegedly discriminatory acts, whether or not they rise to the level of adverse employment actions, Plaintiff's have failed to provide any evidence suggesting they were racially motivated. Plaintiffs' claim of disparate work requirements, for example, rests mainly on their belief that certain nurses did not handle medical carts, while others consistently had to do so. There is no evidence from which to conclude that this duty was imposed on the basis of race. In fact, both black and white employees of GHCC agree that the duty was handled by nurses of either race in varying positions of authority. (Matos Aff. ¶ 23; Clapp Aff. ¶ 6; Walker Aff. ¶ 6; Roberson Aff. ¶ 9.) This fact supports the stated policy that the medical carts can be handled by virtually any nurse and are assigned on an as-needed basis. (Lucas Aff. ¶ 30; Patrum Aff. ¶ 22; Matos Aff. ¶ 23.)
As to the allegations regarding unequal promotion opportunities, Plaintiff's collectively were able to recall four instances in which promotions were available but not posted. Of these, two went to black employees, one of which was Plaintiff Ntuen. (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Exs. N at 108-09, 0 at 21-23.) The evidence also does not support Plaintiffs' contentions that they were excluded from social gatherings or denied extended breaks on racial grounds. At least one black supervisor, Alfreda Matos, was a part of the "clique" engaged in these activities. (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. M at 65; Osborne Aff. ¶ 20; Matos Aff. ¶ 26.) Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that GHCC failed to support its black supervisors, specifically Plaintiff Williams. Other black supervisors state that they were promoted regularly and did not feel discriminated against. (Matos Aff. ¶¶ 2, 26; Clapp Aff. ¶ 6.) Additionally, Williams concedes that GHCC "backed [her] up" on at least two occasions when she had difficulty with two employees. (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. K at 114, 118.)
In fact, at least one GHCC employee has stated that this clique was established on the basis of whether or not individuals smoked, not on the basis of race. (Osborne Aff. ¶ 20.).
Plaintiff's have not established that they suffered adverse employment actions and have produced no legally competent evidence to support their claims to the contrary. Further, Plaintiff's have generally failed to assert the remaining elements of their prima facie case, namely that they performed their jobs satisfactorily and were treated differently than white employees.
Plaintiff's certainly have not shown that their job performance was satisfactory. To the contrary, they make no effort to deny or explain numerous disciplinary write-ups and poor work evaluations offered as evidence by Defendants. Plaintiffs' delinquencies included: use of offensive language, rudeness, and fighting with co-workers (Luallen, Ntuen, Garriques, Williams); failure to follow medical procedure, falsifying records, and other mistakes (Luallen, Ntuen, Garriques); failure to take call and other avoidance of duties (Luallen, Ntuen, Williams); failure to complete shifts, tardiness, and unexcused absences (Ntuen, Garriques); excessive use of phones (Ntuen); and failure to participate in drug testing and other in-house investigations (Garriques). (Lucas Aff. ¶ 15, Exs. A, B; Patrum Aff. Exs. A, B, H-K; Osborne Aff. Exs. A-G; Matos Aff. ¶¶ 3-13, 16, 17, Ex. C; Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. K at 190.)
Plaintiff's have also failed to show that other employees who were not members of a protected class were treated differently or, in the alternative, that their jobs were filled by individuals who were not members of a protected class. Instead, the evidence shows that white employees were equally disciplined, and in some cases terminated, for similar conduct. (Lucas Aff. ¶ 33; Patrum Aff. ¶ 36, Ex. I; Osborne Aff. ¶¶ 5, 9; Matos Aff. ¶ 10, Ex. I.) The evidence also shows that, after their positions were vacated, most of Plaintiffs' positions (Luallen, Ntuen, Williams) were filled by black applicants. (Defs.' Mem. Support Mot. Summ. J. at 13, 15; Patrum Aff. ¶ 37; Matos Aff. ¶ 2; Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. P at 3.)
In sum, Plaintiff's have failed to produce evidence that would support three of the four required elements of a prima facie discrimination case. Even if Plaintiff's had successfully carried their burden in this regard, Defendants have refuted their claims by showing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the alleged adverse employment actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Bryant, 288 F.3d at 133. For example, Plaintiff Ntuen did not receive a plaque upon completing her training program because these plaques were only available to directors of nursing, — Ntuen was an assistant director of nursing. (Patrum Aff. ¶ 11.) Further, when Ntuen was demoted, it was the result of her unsatisfactory performance, as discussed above. As to Plaintiffs' claims of disparate pay, two white nurses received bonuses, not because of their race, but because they always worked their shifts alone, handling duties that would ordinarily have been completed by three nurses. (Lucas Aff. ¶ 26; Roberson Aff. ¶ 11.) Other nurses on short-staffed shifts were not offered similar bonuses because they volunteered for this duty and did not have it full time. (Lucas Aff. ¶ 26.)
Defendants have sufficiently demonstrated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each of these actions. Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that a defendant's burden on this point is only one of production, not persuasion). This showing would successfully rebut a prima facie case of discrimination had Plaintiff's succeeded in producing one. The evidentiary burden is then returned to Plaintiff's who must show that the legitimate reasons articulated by Defendants were merely pretextual. Bryant, 288 F.3d at 133;Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's have failed to carry that burden. The vast majority of Plaintiffs' evidence consists of their own self-serving allegations and conclusions delivered through their own filings, which this court has stricken, and depositions taken by Defendants. However, mere speculation as to an employer's discriminatory motive is insufficient to survive a summary judgment motion. See Frazier v. Bentsen, No. 95-1290, 1996 WL 445090, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 8, 1996); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff's have failed to meet their evidentiary burdens in all aspects of their discrimination claims. Since Plaintiff's did not produce evidence to support a prima facie discrimination case and did not refute Defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the allegedly adverse actions taken, the court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to these claims. Therefore, the court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' discrimination claims under § 1981.
b. Retaliation Claims
Three Plaintiff's allege that they were fired in retaliation for their participation in two nurses' meetings with GHCC's administration, during which they voiced their concerns about discrimination at GHCC. Some, if not all, of the adverse treatment described above was discussed at these meetings.
The meetings with administrators occurred on March 28 and April 27, 2001; each of the Plaintiff's was fired between four and eight months later (Luallen was terminated on August 20, 2001, Ntuen on November 11, 2001, and Garriques on December 27, 2001).
To succeed on their § 1981 retaliation claims, Plaintiff's must show that (1) they engaged in a protected activity, (2) they suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) GHCC took the adverse action because of the protected activity. See Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2003); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 190 (4th Cir. 2001). As with discrimination claims, assuming Plaintiff's show a prima facie case, Defendants can still succeed on their motion for summary judgment by showing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Aiken Reg'l, 333 F.3d at 543;Spriggs, 242 F.3d at 190.
Participation in an organized meeting with administration for the purpose of registering complaints regarding workplace discrimination is a protected activity. See Aiken Reg'l, 333 F.3d at 543-44 (finding that alerting supervisors to discriminatory practices is a protected activity); Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 650 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that filing internal discrimination complaints is a protected activity). Plaintiff's have demonstrated that they engaged in two such meetings and were later fired. The question is then one of causation; to establish their prima facie case, Plaintiff's must show that they were terminated because they engaged in a protected activity.
Plaintiff's cannot make that required showing. As discussed above, each Plaintiff engaged in multiple infractions of GHCC policy, any of which could have justified their termination. Although Plaintiff's claim that white employees were not fired for similar transgressions, the white employees Plaintiff's cite as examples have not been shown to engage in the pattern of misbehavior characteristic of each Plaintiff.
For example, Plaintiff Luallen claims she was fired when she refused to "take call," a practice by which on-call nurses may be required to come in and work. Luallen claims that it is not GHCC's policy to fire a nurse after one refusal to take call. She notes that a particular white nurse refusing to take call was not fired. However, Plaintiff's have not produced any evidence to show that this white nurse engaged in other improper behavior that would justify her firing. Conversely, Defendants have shown that, in addition to failing to take call, Luallen was fired for "insubordination, open defiance or disregard of a supervisor's instruction . . . failure to follow procedures of critical importance to [her] job . . . conduct which . . ., is harmful to [GHCC], its residents, families, associates, visitors, vendors or others . . . abusive, disruptive or offensive language or actions . . . [and] failure to exhibit customer service." (Patrum Aff. Ex. B.)
Likewise, Ntuen was fired for withholding information, failing to follow "procedures of critical importance to [her] job," and "knowingly providing false or incomplete information to [her] supervisor, the facility administrator or corporate staff." (Patrum Aff. Ex. F.) Garriques was terminated after failing to perform the requirements of her job, receiving two prior disciplinary write-ups in the previous year, and failing to "cooperate fully with the investigation conducted by the . . . authorized staff." (Osborne Aff. Exs. G, H.) Each of these Plaintiff's committed multiple other infractions and received numerous disciplinary write-ups before committing the offenses that were specifically cited and ultimately responsible for their firing. See Lucas Aff. ¶¶ 10-12, Exs. A, B; Patrum Aff. ¶¶ 3-10, 11-16, Exs. A, H, J; Mates Aff. ¶¶ 3-13, Exs. A-D, G, H; Roberson Aff. ¶¶ 3-8.
In short, Plaintiff's have failed to show that they were fired because they engaged in a protected activity. Further, Defendants have shown numerous legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for firing each Plaintiff. Plaintiff's have not shown these reasons to be pretextual. As such, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims of retaliation under § 1981.
Plaintiffs' claims of retaliation are further refuted since at least two black nurses, Lenora Clapp and Margaret Williams, attended the meetings with Ms. Lucas but were not fired. (Clapp Aff. ¶ 6; Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. K at 235.).
c. Constructive Discharge
Plaintiff Williams voluntarily resigned from her position and so, unlike the other three Plaintiff's, does not allege retaliatory firing. Instead, she appears to assert, albeit indirectly, a constructive discharge claim.
To succeed on a constructive discharge claim, Williams must show that GHCC deliberately made her working conditions intolerable to compel her resignation. See Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995); Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1353-54 (4th Cir. 1995). Williams must then "prove two elements: (1) the 'deliberateness of [GHCC's] actions' and (2) the 'intolerability of the working conditions.'" Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1132 (quoting Martin, 48 F.3d at 1354).
To establish that her working conditions were intolerable, Williams charges that two white employees under her supervision were consistently belligerent and refused to follow her directions. (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. K at 50.) Although Williams consulted with her superiors and disciplined her two white subordinates, they persisted in their behavior. Williams claims that GHCC supervisors undermined her authority by generally failing to help her control these employees. Specifically, Williams notes that on at least one occasion, another supervisor directly overruled Williams's decision not to let them leave their shifts early.
While it may be that Williams found these working conditions intolerable, she has not produced any evidence demonstrating that fact to the court. Even if she had made such a showing, Williams has failed to show that GHCC's administration purposefully undermined her authority in a deliberate attempt to force her resignation. As evidence of a racially-based motive, Williams relies solely on her own allegations and general statements by her fellow Plaintiff's. These self-serving assertions are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and thus prevent the denial of summary judgment Plaintiff's now urge. See Frazier v. Bentsen, No. 95-1290, 1996 WL 445090, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 8, 1996); Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 963 (4th Cir. 1984).
In response to Defendants' interrogatory regarding her damages, Williams notes, "Emotional pains and mental anguish from the administration of GHCC due to the color of my skin was too severe and cannot be compared in monetary amount. $20,000." (Pis.' Notice of Filing, Ex. 3 at 5.).
In fact, it is not even clear that a lack of support for Williams existed at GHCC. As was discussed herein, Williams concedes that GHCC "backed [her] up" on at least two occasions when she was confronted by the two difficult white employees. (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. K at 114, 118.) Williams also admits that when she had problems with a white supervisor who allegedly spread rumors about her, a white administrator "stopped it immediately." (Defs.' Notice of Filing, Ex. K at 220.) Further, the Director of Nursing stated that she was "extremely surprised" when Williams announced her resignation and "repeatedly asked her if she really wanted to and told her that although there were issues with her supervisory style that she needed to work on, she really didn't need to [resign]." (Patrum Aff. ¶ 33.)
Additionally, GHCC's own employment records show no sign of discriminatory policies toward management. Since 1999, between 77 and 83 percent of GHCC's total staff consisted of black employees. (Id. ¶ 4.) In 2000, the year Williams began working at GHCC, 43 percent of the facility's management employees were black. (Id.) That number rose to 55 percent in 2001, the year Williams resigned. (Id.) These figures entirely undermine Williams's claim that black supervisors were unsupported by the administration and that GHCC deliberately caused her to resign due to her race.
Williams has failed to show that GHCC deliberately created an intolerable work environment in order to force her resignation. Since Williams has not produced any evidence to suggest that she was the victim of racially motivated constructive discharge, the court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim.
4. Plaintiffs' Claims under Title VII
Only Plaintiff's Luallen and Ntuen allege discriminatory treatment and retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII. Although this statute supports causes of action separate from those alleged under § 1981, the prima facie case requirements and subsequent evidentiary burdens are identical. See Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that it is appropriate for a district court to consider plaintiffs' Title VII and § 1981 claims together);Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 n. 7 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Gairola v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285-86 (4th Cir. 1985)). Luallen and Ntuen cite the same allegations and evidence in support of their Title VII claims as was put forth in support of their § 1981 claims. Since the evidentiary burdens under each statute are identical, Luallen and Ntuen cannot succeed on their Title VII claims for the reasons outlined in the previous discussion of their § 1981 claims. As such, the court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Luallen's and Ntuen's Title VII claims.
Plaintiff's alleging violations of Title VII must first exhaust administrative remedies by filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receiving a right-to-sue letter, a requirement not imposed in § 1981 cases. See Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000). Both Luallen and Ntuen completed that condition and are thus able to bring Title VII claims in addition to their § 1981 claims.
5. Claims under Title VI
Plaintiff's all allege that their treatment by GHCC violated Title VI. Title VI provides that "[n]o person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. However, Title VI only provides a cause of action in employment disputes when "a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." (Id.) § 2000d-3. As such, "there is no 'judicial remedy for employment discrimination by institutions receiving federal funds unless . . . providing employment is a primary objective of the federal aid.'" Barbero v. Catawba Valley Legal Servs., Inc., No. 4:94CV115, 1995 WL 757738, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 21, 1995) (quoting Trageser v. Libbie Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 628-31, 104 S.Ct. 1248, 1251-53 (1984)); see Allen v. College of William Mary, 245 F. Supp.2d 777, 785 (E.D. Va. 2003).
GHCC asserts that it receives federal funds only in the form of Medicare and Medicaid and receives no federal funding for the purpose of employing individuals. (Snuggs Aff. ¶ 3-6.) Plaintiff's do not dispute this contention. When a plaintiff fails to show any evidence that a defendant receives federal funds for employment purposes, a Title VI claim cannot be sustained. See Ingram v. Morgan State Univ., No. 95-2314, 1996 WL 13861, at * 1 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1996) (upholding dismissal of Title VI claim when plaintiff failed to show employer used federal funds primarily for employment purposes or that she was the intended beneficiary of such assistance); Grimes v. Superior Home Health Care of Middle Tenn., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1088, 1094 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (dismissing plaintiff's Title VI claim when defendant did not use federal funds primarily for employment purposes); Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Mem'l Hosp., 572 F. Supp. 1424, 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (same). As a result, the court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' Title VI claims.
Since the court has stricken Plaintiffs' response, they failed to respond to this allegation as a procedural matter. However, as noted herein, the court has reviewed Plaintiffs' response and accompanying evidence and finds that neither source offered any fact or argument to dispute Defendants' assertion that GHCC does not receive federal funds for employment purposes.
Furthermore, as set forth above, Plaintiff's have failed to show any racially motivated discrimination or retaliation. Plaintiffs' Title VI claims would be defeated on those grounds, even if Plaintiff's had shown that GHCC received federal funds for employment purposes.See Jane v. Bowman Gray Sch. of Med.-N.C. Baptist Hosp., 211 F. Supp.2d 678, 690 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (concluding that Title VI claims are appropriately analyzed under the same standards as would be applied to Title VII claims); Escobar v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., No. AW-99-1964, 2001 WL 98600, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 1, 2001) (same); Love v. Duke Univ., 776 F. Supp. 1070, 1073 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (same).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court will grant Defendants' motion to strike. The court will also grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
An order and judgment in accordance with this memorandum opinion shall be filed contemporaneously herewith. The judgment shall not invalidate any prejudgment settlements that may be reached by the parties.