Opinion
2018-UP-133
03-28-2018
M. Rita Metts, of Metts Law Firm, of Columbia, for Appellant. Marion H. (Mark) Grier, Jr., of Lancaster, for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard February 6, 2018
Appeal From Lancaster County Harry Clayton Walker, Jr., Special Referee
M. Rita Metts, of Metts Law Firm, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Marion H. (Mark) Grier, Jr., of Lancaster, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In this appeal from the special referee's order, Kevin Waiters (Appellant) asserts the court erred by: (1) declaring deeds executed by certain heirs to be void and finding there was no evidence of adverse possession, (2) failing to properly value the property at issue, (3) admitting certain evidence, (4) finding Appellant's family cut trees on the property, (5) failing to allow Appellant the opportunity to purchase the property prior to trial, and (6) proceeding with the partition action once it became aware of missing heirs who were not served. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
As to issue 1: Jones v. Leagan, 384 S.C. 1, 10, 681 S.E.2d 6, 11 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When it is asserted by the defendant, adverse possession is an affirmative defense."); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 327, 656 S.E.2d 382, 392 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Generally, affirmative defenses to a cause of action in any pleading must be asserted in a party's responsive pleading."); id. ("The failure to plead an affirmative defense is deemed a waiver of the right to assert it." (quoting Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 21, 640 S.E.2d 486, 497 (Ct. App. 2006))); Harkins v. Greenville Cty., 340 S.C. 606, 616, 533 S.E.2d 886, 891 (2000) (noting the appellant has the burden of presenting an adequate record on appeal); Rule 201(b), SCACR ("Only a party aggrieved by an order, judgment, sentence or decision may appeal.").
As to issue 2: Jones, 384 S.C. at 10, 681 S.E.2d at 11 ("Normally, an action to quiet title to property is an action in equity."); Kiawah Resort Assocs. L.P. v. Kiawah Island Cmty. Ass'n., 421 S.C. 538, 544, 808 S.E.2d 521, 524 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In an appeal from an action in equity, tried by a judge alone, we may find facts in accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence." (quoting U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Ass'n v. Bell, 385 S.C. 364, 373, 684 S.E.2d 199, 204 (Ct. App. 2009))); id. ("However, this broad scope of review does not require an appellate court to disregard the findings below or ignore the fact that the trial judge is in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses." (quoting Bell, 385 S.C. at 373, 684 S.E.2d at 204)); id. ("Moreover, the appellant is not relieved of his burden of convincing the appellate court the trial judge committed error in his findings." (quoting Bell, 385 S.C. at 373, 684 S.E.2d at 204)); Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006) ("It is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved.").
As to issue 3: Pye, 369 S.C. at 564, 633 S.E.2d at 510 ("It is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved.").
As to issue 4: Rule 201(b), SCACR ("Only a party aggrieved by an order, judgment, sentence or decision may appeal."); Kiawah Resort Assocs., 421 S.C. at 544, 808 S.E.2d at 524 ("In an appeal from an action in equity, tried by a judge alone, we may find facts in accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence." (quoting Bell, 385 S.C. at 373, 684 S.E.2d at 204)); id. ("However, this broad scope of review does not require an appellate court to disregard the findings below or ignore the fact that the trial judge is in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses." (quoting Bell, 385 S.C. at 373, 684 S.E.2d at 204)); id. ("Moreover, the appellant is not relieved of his burden of convincing the appellate court the trial judge committed error in his findings." (quoting Bell, 385 S.C. at 373, 684 S.E.2d at 204));
As to issue 5: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-61-25(A) (Supp. 2017) (stating if a partition action is filed, "the court shall provide for the nonpetitioning joint tenants or tenants in common who are interested in purchasing the property to notify the court of that interest no later than ten days prior to the date set for the trial of the case"); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-61-25(B)-(D) (Supp. 2017) (requiring the court allow the joint tenants or tenants in common to purchase the property according to the terms of the statute after such a request is made); Pye, 369 S.C. at 564, 633 S.E.2d at 510 ("It is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved.").
As to issue 6: Pinckney v. Atkins, 317 S.C. 340, 344, 454 S.E.2d 339, 342 (Ct. App. 1995) (providing "all heirs at law or devisees of the deceased person shall be parties . . ." to a partition action); Rule 17(f), SCRCP ("In all actions for partition all tenants in common shall be parties . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-67-40 (2005) (stating an unknown heir may be made a party to a partition action by serving the heir by publication).
AFFIRMED.
LOCKEMY, C. J, and WILLIAMS and KONDUROS, JJ, concur