Opinion
Case No. 4:04 cv 75.
October 29, 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the following motions:
1) Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Production of Documents and for Protective Order Limiting Discovery filed by the defendant, Alexander Pala, on August 17, 2007 (DE 281);
2) Motion to Quash Subpoena for Telephone Records filed by the movant, Robert W. Thacker, Judge, White Circuit Court, on August 30, 2007 (DE 284);
3) Motion to Compel Defendant Pala to Sign Release Forms for IRS and Social Security and F.R.C.P 26(a) Compliance filed by the plaintiff, Annare L. Loubser, on August 31, 2007 (DE 286);
4) Motion to Limit Discovery to the Issue of an Alleged Conspiracy, Against the Plaintiff, Between Private and State Actors, on the Basis of Plaintiff's National Origin filed by the defendants Alexander R. Pala, R. Dennis Hoover, and William B. Weist, on September 13, 2007 (DE 312);
5) Motion for a Court Order to Compel Defendant White County Abstract and Title Company to Produce Tax Returns, Financial Statements and Addresses and Phone Numbers of Employees with Discoverable Information to Plaintiff Loubser Per Her Request for Production of Documents filed by the plaintiff on September 25, 2007 (DE 334);
6) Motion for a Court Order to Compel Defendant Steven Fishel to Produce Tax Returns, Financial Statements to Plaintiff Loubser Per Her Request for Production of Documents filed by the plaintiff on September 25, 2007 (DE 336);
7) Motion 60(a) Correction of Caption and Clerical Mistake filed by the plaintiff on March 29, 2007 (DE 237); and
8) Motion to Quash Subpoena to Indiana Clerk Kevin Smith filed by the movant, Kevin Smith, on October 16, 2007 (DE 355).
For the reasons set for below, the Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Production of Documents and For Protective Order Limiting Discovery filed by the defendant, Alexander Pala (DE 281) is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash Subpoena for Telephone Records filed by the movant, former defendant Judge Robert W. Thacker (DE 284) is GRANTED; the Motion to Compel Defendant Pala to Sign Release Forms for IRS and Social Security and F.R.C.P 26(a) Compliance filed by the plaintiff (DE 286) is DENIED; the Motion to Limit Discovery to the Issue of an Alleged Conspiracy Against the Plaintiff Between Private and State Actors on the Basis of Plaintiff's National Origin filed by the defendants Alexander Pala, R. Dennis Hoover, and William B. Weist (DE 312) is DENIED AS MOOT; the Motions to Compel production of various tax returns, financial statements, addresses, and phone numbers filed by the plaintiff (DE 334, 336) are DENIED; the Motion 60(a) Correction of Caption and Clerical Mistake filed by the plaintiff (DE 237) is GRANTED; and the Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by the movant Kevin Smith (DE 355) is GRANTED.
Background
The factual setting of this cause of action revolves around the White County, Indiana divorce proceedings between the plaintiff, Annare L. Loubser, and her former husband and defendant here, Alexander Pala. The additional defendants include numerous individuals connected in some manner to the divorce proceeding. These defendants include judges who presided over the divorce proceedings, the attorneys who represented both Loubser and her former husband, the attorney who represented Loubser in a subsequent bankruptcy matter, the county court reporter, witnesses who testified at hearings in the divorce proceeding, a property appraiser and title companies who provided information on the value of marital property, and a doctor who provided testimony on her former husband's claim of disability.Loubser has alleged that her divorce proceedings in the White County court were the product of a far-reaching conspiracy among these defendants to deprive her of due process and to hide assets fraudulently in order to skew the division of marital property in her former husband's favor. She claims that the defendants conspired to damage her business and to deny her ability to relocate. In addition to due process violations, she alleges that she has been denied equal protection on the basis of race, alleging in more than 20 of the complaint's several hundred paragraphs her belief that the defendants considered her "a f***ing South African bitch who makes too much f***ing money." The complaint appears to credit defendant Terry Smith, an attorney who represented her former husband, with making this statement a number of years before the divorce, however, it is a refrain throughout Loubser's complaint and subsequent filings through which she has characterized the attitude of all defendants.
Loubser's initial complaint was filed on October 14, 2004, and amended on December 28, 2004. (DE 113) After the defendants filed a series of motions to dismiss, the Honorable Allen Sharp dismissed Loubser's claims, relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well as the "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction. (DE 155) On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Specifically, the appellate court stated that "[i]t is highly improbable that the suit has any merit, but the allegations are not so fantastic that the suit can be dismissed out of hand, as being obviously frivolous, as in Lee v. Clinton , 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000)." Loubser v. Thacker , 440 F.3d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2006). The appellate court upheld the dismissal of the claims against Indiana state court judges Robert Thacker and Rex Kepner, but it held that Loubser's allegations of conspiracy were sufficiently stated and outside the reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
The remaining issue is whether the allegations of conspiracy are sufficiently informative to survive dismissal. The issue is close. Although conspiracy is not something that Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires be proved with particularity, and so a plain and short statement will do, it differs from other claims in having a degree of vagueness that makes a bare claim of "conspiracy" wholly uninformative to the defendant. Federal pleading entitles a defendant to notice of the plaintiff's claim so that he can prepare responsive pleadings. That is why courts require the plaintiff to allege the parties, the general purpose, and the approximate date of the conspiracy. But this information can be found in the plaintiff's complaint, though in disjointed form. (internal citations omitted)
Loubser , 440 F.3d at 442-43
Returning to the district court, Loubser filed an amended complaint that expanded on her initial 115 paragraph, 40-page effort to reach, in its amended version, 669 paragraphs across 138 pages. The amended complaint has alleged a conspiracy to deprive Loubser of equal protection and due process rights (Count I); to corrupt her divorce proceedings on the basis of her race in order to deprive her of her livelihood (Count II); to deprive her of property without due process (Count III); to deprive her of liberty without due process on the basis of race (Count IV); to deprive her of the pursuit of happiness without due process on the basis of race (Count V); to corrupt her divorce proceedings on the basis of race by preventing her from gaining access to relevant documents (Count VI), altering the transcript of state court hearings (Count VII), committing various acts of perjury during the divorce proceedings (Count VIII), and using "clout in to the community to procure a favorable verdict" for her ex-husband (Count XI); to deny Loubser the liberty to live where she wanted (Count IX); to attempt to "run plaintiff Loubser out of Monticello as a physical therapist" (Count XII); to "turn the blind eye to state remedy for deprivation of plaintiff Loubser's constitutionally protected rights" (Count X); and, finally, to use coercion through legal process in retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights (Count XIII).
The amended complaint again prompted a series of motions to dismiss. ( See DE 211, 212, 215, 224, 228, 239, 252) On June 26, 2007, Judge Sharp issued an order granting some of these motions in part and dismissing the defendants Meg Babcock, Sondra Rumple, Kathy J. Freeman, William Roth, Candace Roth, Gregory Roth, Rusty Roth, Kindra Roth, Jillian Roth, David Deiner, Ronald N. Halsen, Michael Hamilton, Douglas Radersdorf, Thomas A. Grzesik, Lawrence Culp, and Frederick Henney. Judge Sharp further stated that "the court has determined to now convert all of the remaining motions to dismiss by the remaining defendants into motions for summary judgment." The remaining parties were provided a discovery deadline of December 31, 2007, and a deadline in which to file any supporting motions or briefs of February 1, 2008. As the parties have engaged in discovery, numerous disputes have arisen giving rise to series of motions filed by the plaintiff and the remaining defendants.
On the basis of this order, the motions at DE 211, 212, 228, 239 and 252 were DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The motions at DE 215 and 224 were GRANTED IN PART and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART. The motion at 254 was DENIED AS MOOT. The clerk is DIRECTED to terminate each of these motions.
Discussion
A party may "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Relevancy is construed broadly to encompass "any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case." Chavez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 206 F.R.D. 615, 619 (S.D. Ind. 2002) ( quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders , 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 2389, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978)). Even when information is not directly related to the claims or defenses identified in the pleadings, the information still may be relevant to the broader subject matter at hand and meet the rule's good cause standard. Sanyo Laser Prods., Inc. v. Arista Records, Inc. , 214 F.R.D. 496, 502 (S.D. Ind. 2003). See Adams v. Target , No. IPOO-1159-C-T/G, 2001 WL 987853 at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2001) ("For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action").
A party may seek an order to compel discovery when an opposing party fails to respond to discovery requests or has provided evasive or incomplete responses. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(2)-(3). The burden "rests upon the objecting party to show why a particular discovery request is improper." Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protection Dist. , 235 F.R.D. 447, 449-50 (N.D. Ill. 2006). The objecting party must show with specificity that the request is improper. Graham v. Casey's General Stores , 206 F.R.D. 253, 254 (S.D. Ind. 2002). That burden cannot be met by "a reflexive invocation of the same baseless, often abused litany that the requested discovery is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, unduly burdensome or that it is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Burkybile v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. , No. 04 C 4932, 2006 WL 2325506 at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Rather, the court's broad discretion in deciding discovery matters should consider "the totality of the circumstances, weighing the value of material sought against the burden of providing it, and taking into account society's interest in furthering the truth-seeking function in the particular case before the court." Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp. , 281 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2002) ( quoting Rowlin v. Alabama , 200 F.R.D. 459, 461 (M.D. Ala. 2001)). In addition, "[s]ubpoenas, like all discovery, are limited to relevant information." Manufacturer Direct, LLC v. Directbuy, Inc. , No. 2-5-CV-451, 2007 WL 496382 at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 12, 2007) (citing Syposs v. United States , 181 F.R.D. 224, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The reach of a subpoena issued pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 is subject to the general relevancy standard applicable to discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).").
In her motion to correct the complaint, Loubser seeks to refile a complaint listing all of the defendants in the caption and correcting instances in paragraphs 11 and 12 when she cited to Title 28 of the U.S. Code but intended to cite to Title 42. This motion to make these corrections is GRANTED. In correcting the caption, the plaintiff is reminded that numerous defendants have been dismissed.
Next, defendants Pala, Hoover, and Weist seek a protective order limiting discovery "to the issue of the creation and/or existence of an alleged conspiracy." Following the decision of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Sharp's order in June 2007, this is an accurate portrayal of the issue remaining in this case. In practice, its application as a discovery limitation is applied with less ease.
Loubser's complaint alleges a civil conspiracy under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C § 1985(3). To establish § 1983 liability through a conspiracy, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) a state official and private individ-ual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights; and (2) those individual(s) were willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents.
Reynolds v. Jamison , 488 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 2007)
In distinction, a claim of conspiracy under § 1985(3) requires that a plaintiff demonstrate:
(1) the existence of a conspiracy, (2) a purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of a conspiracy, and (4) an injury to person or property or a deprivation of a right or privilege granted to U.S. citizens.
Hernandez v. Joliet Police Department , 197 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Majeske v. Fraternal Order of Police, Local Lodge No. 7 , 94 F.3d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1996)
A plaintiff invoking § 1985(3) must allege "some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Brokaw v. Mercer County , 235 F.3d 1000, 1024 (7th Cir. 2000) ( citing Griffin v. Breckenridge , 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). See also Curry v. Advocate Bethany Hospital , 204 Fed. Appx. 553, 557-58 (7th Cir. 2006).
The defendants' objections largely flow from doubt that Loubser's evidence of a conspiracy will reach beyond mere speculation. However, these concerns are more suitable in support of a motion for summary judgment and are premature as an argument to support a general limit upon discovery. In their motions, these defendants complain that the case already has generated "literally boxes of pleadings and filings," and they characterize the current discovery requests as over-reaching attempts to relitigate the issues of the divorce. Subsequent motions suggest that this characterization may be accurate, at least in part. However, in this motion, the defendants ask generally for an order limiting discovery to the issue of conspiracy. This question has been defined by the Seventh Circuit and the district court as the relevant issue in this matter. Consequently, relevancy itself, defined under the discovery rules, provides the limit that the defendants seek. Accordingly, the motion (DE 312) is DENIED AS MOOT.
The defendants also have filed a series of motions addressed to specific objections to Loubser's discovery requests. In the first of these, Pala seeks a protective order regarding subpoenas that have been issued to 1) his telephone service provider, seeking records of all incoming and outgoing calls from certain numbers between January 2001 and January 2005; 2) seven banks, seeking "any and all documents in your possession or control pertaining to Alexander R. Pala;" 3) an insurance company, also seeking all documents pertaining to Pala; and finally 4) the president of Tippecanoe Country Club, seeking the club's bylaws, as well as member lists, reserved tee times, and players paired in tournaments over a three-year period.
Loubser supports the request for Pala's financial and insurance information as discovery aimed at finding "what stuff he moved and where to." This request flows from the argument that Pala hid assets, consequently causing an unfair division of the marital property in the state divorce proceeding. However, while Loubser's claim of deprivation resulting from a constitutional conspiracy may give rise to distinct damages — see Nesses v. Shepard , 68 F.3d 1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Then the conspiracy did no harm and without harm there is no tort, a principle as applicable to constitutional torts as to common law torts.") — any remedy that seeks to realign the division of marital property or spousal support ordered in the state divorce proceeding is distinct from damages flowing from a constitutional tort. It is only the latter damages that are relevant to Loubser's claim in this court. The irrelevance of these documents is further made clear when Loubser, in support of these subpoenas, claims that "Defendant Pala hid assets they were moved out of Prudential accounts during the divorce proceedings to downplay Pala's actual financial condition to justify large rewards." (Response, DE 294, p. 3) It is clear that this information is relevant only to a remedy that alters the outcome of the state court proceeding. See Rizzo v. Sheahan , 266 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2001) ( quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp. , 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)) ("Thus, `the pivotal inquiry is whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether [she] is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.'").
Loubser supports her request for three years worth of phone records, as well as the membership information from the Tippe-canoe Country Club over the same duration, as information "relevant to show nexus between co-conspirators." Specifically, Loubser requested a record of all incoming and outgoing calls from the home of Judge Robert Thacker and the White County Courthouse. As stated, this request clearly asks for volumes of irrelevant information. The White County Court certainly received a multitude of phone calls during this three-year period that were wholly unrelated to the plaintiff's divorce proceedings. Likewise, during this same three-year period, records of all incoming and outgoing calls from Judge Thacker's residence will produce primarily irrelevant information that also infringes on privacy. See e.g. Lewis v. Chicago Housing Authority , No. 91 C 1478, 1991 WL 173247 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1991).
However, the burden and overbreadth of these requests is matched by another form of irrelevance. Specifically, it can, and should be fully expected, that the defendants in this matter, for instance attorneys practicing in White County, had numerous occasions to call the White County Court. Likewise, Loubser alleges that Judge Thacker's daughter was a friend of Jillian Roth, a defendant who has been dismissed from this action. Consequently, it can be expected that the two spoke on a variety of subjects unrelated to Loubser's divorce, and Loubser's request in no way limits itself to discovery relevant to her claim of a conspiracy.
Under any of Loubser's theories, relevant information regards not the fact of contact between these parties, whether on the golf course or the phone, but an intentional conspiracy motivated by racial animus. Burdensome discovery that has the ability to show nothing with respect to the content of any relevant communication and instead shows only communication between parties who, it can be freely admitted, had multiple legitimate reasons to communicate, will be denied. If Loubser seeks discovery of circumstantial evidence regarding the alleged co-conspirators' and defendants' formation of a race-based plan to deprive Loubser of constitutional guarantees, the request must be targeted in this manner. In fact, the record suggests that such requests have been made, without objection. See e.g. First Request for Production of Documents and Things (DE 299) (seeking, among others, all communication or correspondence with the other defendants, as well as dates on which the parties played golf). Accordingly, the Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Production of Documents filed by the defendant, Alexander Pala (DE 281), and the Motion to Quash Subpoena for Telephone Records filed by the movant, Judge Robert Thacker (DE 284) are GRANTED.
In addition to the defendants' motions to quash, Loubser has filed a series of motions to compel seeking financial statements and tax records of some defendants, and health care, income tax and social security records of her former husband. The claim of relevancy on which Loubser grounds these requests is her oft-repeated statement that the defendants were motivated by their belief that Loubser "made to much f***ing money." Consequently, she seeks discovery designed to compare her income to that of these defendants. However, under § 1985(3), Loubser's conspiracy claim, to the extent she purports it is based on economic discrimination, is not colorable and consequently not relevant. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott , 463 U.S. 825, 837, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3361, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) ("[W]e find no convincing support in the legislative history for the proposition that the provision was intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities. Such a construction would extend § 1985(3) into the economic life of the country in a way that we doubt that the 1871 Congress would have intended when it passed the provision in 1871."); Bowman v. City of Franklin , 980 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1993). Further, to the extent that Loubser alleges that economic discrimination rests behind her § 1983 claim — granting Loubser's complaint a broad reading to conclude that she states a "class of one" equal protection claim and also alleges that the subject of the conspiracy between private and state actors reached beyond race to her economic discrimination theory — it is grounded on nothing more than the alleged statement, credited to a single, private individual years before the divorce — that she makes "too much f***ing money." Based upon the subject matter of this claim, the court concludes that Fishel's and White County Abstract's income records are not relevant. The motion to compel tax returns and financial statements from Steven Fishel (DE 366) and the motion to compel tax returns and financial statements from White County Abstract (DE 334) are DENIED.
Loubser made a similar request on defendant Pala, seeking his consent to the release of medical, income tax, and social security records. Loubser provides no argument to support the threshold relevancy requirement and instead argues that Pala has waived any objection to the request by not filing a timely objection. Pala counters by noting that the request, contained only in a letter, was not properly served according to the Federal Rules. Pala is not entirely clear on how this written request was deficient. However, the court notes that the local rules of this court require the filing of all discovery in pro se litigation. See Local Rule 26.2(e). A glance at the docket further makes clear that the parties understand this requirement. (See e.g. DE 268-280; 283; 288; 291-294; 296; 299-308; 314 — 321; 324-331; 330; 338; 339; 346-348; 350-351; 353) Nevertheless, this request was not filed. The Federal Rules provide the court with discretion to declare that a party has waived an objection to discovery. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b); Autotech Technologies Limited Partnership v. Automationdirect.com, Inc. , 236 F.R.D. 396, 398 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Under these circumstances, and absent any rationale supporting the relevancy of this information, the motion to compel Pala to sign release forms (DE 286) is DENIED.
In the discovery request that is the most far afield from the subject matter of this claim, Loubser has served a non-party subpoena on Kevin Smith, the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court, seeking the names of all law clerks and cases on which each clerk worked during the course of a four-year period. In response, Smith has objected to the burdensome nature of the request, noting that it entails records encompassing nearly 300 individuals and approximately 10,000 cases. He further noted the lack of any indication of relevancy in this request. Loubser suggests in only the most general terms that this discovery supports a claim of conspiracy. Presumably, Loubser believes that the denial of her various appeals and petition for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court in her divorce also were the result of this conspiracy. ( See Loubser v. Pala , table, 855 N.E.2d 1009; 844 N.E.2d 229; 812 N.E.2d 799; 798 N.E.2d 567) This is an example of overreaching and speculation at its worst. Notwithstanding the potential that the request implicates judicial immunity concerns, Loubser's only argument in support is that the records would be available under the Indiana Access to Public Records Act. This is doubtful, in light of the State's response that records describing which clerk assisted in which case do not exist. Further, the ability to reach a record under the process described by the Indiana Act does not alter the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their foundation in relevancy. In contrast, the Federal Rules, and consequently the power of the court to enforce discovery, centers upon only that information found relevant to a specific matter before the court. See Camarillo v. Pabey , Nos. 2:05 CV 455, 2:05 CV 453, 2:05 CV 187, 2006 WL 2726158 at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 21, 2006) ("While the plaintiffs may be able to pursue records under the Act, they are not able to rely on it in order to bypass the Federal Rules."). The Motion to Quash filed by the movant, Kevin Smith, Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court (DE 355) is GRANTED.
Finally, the court notes that various objections and motions continue to flow into the docket apparently raising similar issues as the motions addressed in this order. The court expects that these motions may be mooted under application of the reasoning in this order. The parties are invited to make this analysis. The court notes that further discovery disputes in this matter will result in the imposition of sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.
Federal Rule 37(a)(4)(A) states that the court shall require sanctions based upon the costs of seeking a motion to compel. Stookey v. Teller Training Distributors, Inc. , 9 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Rule 37(a)(4) clearly allows for an award of the expenses incurred in obtaining an order to compel, including attorney's fees."). Sanctions under Rule 37(a)(4) are appropriate unless the party's nondisclosure was "substantially justified." Rule 37(a)(4)(A). In addition, Federal Rule 37(c)(1) states that a party who fails to disclose, provides false or misleading disclosure, or refuses to admit information required by Rule 26(a) without "substantial justification" may be sanctioned unless such failure was "harmless." See Musser v. Gentiva Health Services , 356 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2004); Salgado v. General Motors Corp. , 150 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 1998). The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a violation is justified or harmless. See David v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003). Further, remedies provided under Rule 37 include dismissal of the action. See Federal Rule 37(b)(2)(C); Greviskes v. Universities Research Association, Inc. , 417 F.3d 752, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The district court may dismiss a case for discovery violations or bad faith conduct in litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 or under the inherent authority of the district court.").
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, "it is highly improbable that the suit has any merit." Nevertheless, this cause of action now demands significant amounts of attention to irrelevant matters. Accordingly, the plaintiff is reminded of Federal Rule 11 regarding the litigant's certification that filings are "not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 creates liability for the costs associated with any conduct that "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously."
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Quash Subpoenas for Production of Documents and For Protective Order Limiting Discovery filed by the defendant, Alexander Pala, on August 17, 2007 (DE 281) is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash Subpoena for Telephone Records filed by the movant, former defendant Judge Robert W. Thacker, on August 30, 2007 (DE 284) is GRANTED; the Motion to Compel Defendant Pala to Sign Release Forms for IRS and Social Security and F.R.C.P 26(a) Compliance filed by the plaintiff on August 31, 2007 (DE 286) is DENIED; the Motion to Limit Discovery to the Issue of an Alleged Conspiracy Against the Plaintiff Between Private and State Actors on the Basis of Plaintiff's National Origin filed by the defendants Alexander Pala, R. Dennis Hoover, and William B. Weist on September 13, 2007 (DE 312) is DENIED AS MOOT; the Motions to Compel production of various tax returns, financial statements, addresses, and phone numbers filed by the plaintiff on September 25, 2007 (DE 334, 336) are DENIED; the Motion 60(a) Correction of Caption and Clerical Mistake filed by the plaintiff on March 29, 2007 (DE 237) is GRANTED; and the Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by the movant Kevin Smith on October 16, 2007 (DE 355) is GRANTED.
The clerk is DIRECTED to terminate the motions at DE 211, 212, 215, 224 228, 239 and 252.