Opinion
2014-01-29
In the Matter of ZINA L. (Anonymous), also known as Zinaida L. (Anonymous), petitioner-appellant, v. Eldred L. (Anonymous), respondent; Laurie L. (Anonymous), nonparty-appellant.
Linda C. Braunsberg, Staten Island, N.Y., for petitioner-appellant. Lisa Lewis, Brooklyn, N.Y., attorney for the child, nonparty-appellant Laurie L.
Linda C. Braunsberg, Staten Island, N.Y., for petitioner-appellant. Lisa Lewis, Brooklyn, N.Y., attorney for the child, nonparty-appellant Laurie L.
Matthew M. Lupoli, Flushing, N.Y., for respondent.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the mother and the subject child appeal from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Hepner, J.), dated June 15, 2012, which, after a hearing, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The allegations in a family offense proceeding must be “supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence” (Family Ct. Act § 832; see Matter of Khan–Soleil v. Rashad, 108 A.D.3d 544, 545, 969 N.Y.S.2d 104; Matter of Jarrett v. Jarrett, 102 A.D.3d 695, 956 N.Y.S.2d 898; Matter of Scanziani v. Hairston, 100 A.D.3d 1007, 955 N.Y.S.2d 162; Matter of Daoud v. Daoud, 92 A.D.3d 878, 940 N.Y.S.2d 869; Matter of Mamantov v. Mamantov, 86 A.D.3d 540, 541, 927 N.Y.S.2d 140). The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, and the Family Court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal ( see Matter of Pearlman v. Pearlman, 78 A.D.3d 711, 712, 911 N.Y.S.2d 87; Matter of Creighton v. Whitmore, 71 A.D.3d 1141, 898 N.Y.S.2d 585; Matter of Gray v. Gray, 55 A.D.3d 909, 867 N.Y.S.2d 110; Matter of Charles v. Charles, 21 A.D.3d 487, 799 N.Y.S.2d 822).
Here, contrary to the appellants' contention, the record supports the Family Court's determination that the evidence adduced at the hearing was insufficient to establish that the father committed the family offenses of assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree against either the mother or the child ( see Family Ct. Act § 812[1]; Penal Law §§ 120.00, 120.05, 120.15, 240.26; Matter of Khan–Soleil v. Rashad, 108 A.D.3d at 545, 969 N.Y.S.2d 104). Accordingly, the petition was properly dismissed.
In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the appellants' remaining contention. MASTRO, J.P., COHEN, MILLER and HINDS–RADIX, JJ., concur.