Opinion
11-26-1952
LOS ANGELES COUNTY v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE et al. * Civ. 18748.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Lee B. Stanton, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents (named in petition) and appellants. Kenny & Morris and Eleanor V. Jackson, Los Angeles, for intervenors and appellants. Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gerald G. Kelly, Asst. County Counsel, and John B. Anson, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for petitioner and respondent (on appeal).
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
v.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE et al. *
Nov. 26, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 1952.
Hearing Granted Jan. 22, 1953.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Lee B. Stanton, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents (named in petition) and appellants.
Kenny & Morris and Eleanor V. Jackson, Los Angeles, for intervenors and appellants.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gerald G. Kelly, Asst. County Counsel, and John B. Anson, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for petitioner and respondent (on appeal).
WOOD, Justice.
In a petition for a writ of mandate, filed in the superior court, the Department of Social Welfare of California and its director, and the Social Welfare Board of California and its members, were named as respondents. They are the appellants herein. The appeal is from a judgment ordering them to set aside orders which they made upon certain appeals by recipients of old age security and aid to needy blind.
In May, 1949, the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County adopted a new policy with respect to giving financial aid to an indigent person whose spouse is a recipient of old age security or aid to needy blind, when the spouses are living together. That policy was to the effect that in determining the amount to be given monthly as such indigent aid, the amount received monthly by the indigent person's spouse as old age security or blind aid should be deducted from the amount which the board of supervisors determined was needed monthly for the support of the husband and wife, living together, as a family unit. Thus, if the supervisors determined that the amount needed monthly for the support of the husband and wife, living together, was $90, and if the husband received $75 per month as old age security, the amount of $15 would be allowed to the wife as indigent aid. Prior to adopting such new policy, the board of supervisors, in determining the amount needed by an indigent spouse, did not regard the old age security or blind aid of the other spouse as family income.
Old age security in the sum of $75 per month is provided by the federal, state, and county governments jointly to persons who have attained the age of 65 years and who have certain residence requirements and certain limited property holdings. The amount paid by each government per month is as follows: federal, $30; state, $38.58; county, $6.42.
Aid to the needy blind in the sum of $85 per month is also provided by those governments to persons with certain degrees of blindness who have certain residence requirements and certain limited property holdings. The amount paid by each government per month is as follows: federal, $30; state, $41.25; county, $13.75.
Applications for old age security and aid to the needy blind are made to, and determined by, the board of supervisors. Such old age security and blind aid are paid by the county with its own money and money furnished by the state and federal governments.
Also applications for indigent aid are made to, and determined by, the county. Such aid is furnished by the county from its own funds and facilities. At the time said new policy of the supervisors (regarding aid to indigents) was adopted, ten certain persons, among many others, were recipients of old age security in the sum of $75 each per month; and one person, among many others, was a recipient of aid to the needy blind in the sum of $85 per month. (The names of those eleven persons are stated in the petition herein.) The amounts received by them were the maximum amounts allowed by statute. At the time of adopting the new policy, each of said persons was married and was living with his or her spouse. Also at said time, each spouse of each such recipient was an applicant for indigent aid. After the new policy became effective, the board of supervisors reconsidered the matter of the amount of aid to be awarded, upon the basis of need, to said indigent spouses. In fixing the amount to be so awarded upon such reconsideration, the board made a determination as to the amount required to meet the needs of the husband and wife living together and then deducted from said amount the amount of old age security or blind aid received by the spouse of the indigent person, and the difference between those amounts (if the amount needed by husband and wife exceeded the amount of old age or blind aid) was the amount awarded as indigent aid. Under the former method of fixing the amount to be awarded to an indigent spouse (wherein old age or blind aid of the other spouse was not regarded as family income), the total amount received by the husband and wife was larger than the total amount received by them under the new method. It may be stated generally that the total amount received monthly by the husband and wife, under the former method, exceeded the total amounts received monthly by them, under the new method, in various sums ranging from approximately $12 to $48.
Each of the eleven persons, acting through the Citizens Committee for Old Age Pensions, sent a letter to the Director of the Department of Social Welfare, stating that he (or she) was dissatisfied with the action of the board of supervisors and was appealing to said department to prohibit the board of supervisors from considering his (or her) $75 old age security grant as family income and allotting a portion of it to meet the needs of his wife (or husband), who is a general relief applicant. The spouse who was an applicant for general or indigent relief was not a party to the appeal.
The Social Welfare Board notified the county that the board would hear the appeals on August 24, 1950. The county, acting through its superintendent of charities, sent a letter on August 17, 1950, to the Social Welfare Board stating that neither the Social Welfare Board nor the Department of Social Welfare of California had jurisdiction over the general relief policy of the county of Los Angeles, and that no representative of the Department of Charities of Los Angeles County would appear at the hearing for the purpose of discussing general relief.
On August 24, 1950, the Social Welfare Board decided that it would hear the appeals; and thereafter the matters were continued to October 20, 1950. On October 18th, the County of Los Angeles filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court (action No. 579018, superior court). An alternative writ of mandate was issued and an order was made temporarily restraining the Social Welfare Board from proceeding further with the appeals. The eleven persons, who had appealed to the Department of Social Welfare, intervened in said action as respondents. On October 30, 1950, the superior court denied the petition for a writ of mandate, discharged the alternative writ and the temporary restraining order. The county appealed from that judgment, and an opinion on that appeal has been filed this day, Cal.App., 250 P.2d 716.
On November 17, 1950, the Social Welfare Board commenced the hearings in said eleven matters. The county of Los Angeles filed written objections to the jurisdiction of the Social Welfare Board, and the objections were overruled. The said board made findings in each of the eleven matters. Some of the findings in the matters pertaining to old age security were, in substance, as follows: Since July 1, 1949, Los Angeles County, pursuant to order of its board of supervisors, has followed the policy of treating payments under the old age security program as income to a family unit, comprising the recipient of such aid and his ineligible spouse, and applying such program payments to the general relief needs of the spouse; the result has been to require the old age security recipient, through duress, to support his (or her) indigent spouse or to let him (or her) starve or live apart; a further effect has been to divert a portion of old age security to the support of a spouse of a recipient, thus diverting federal or state funds from the purpose for which they were appropriated, and to subsidize the general relief program of Los Angeles County; in the application of said policy Los Angeles County has treated the spouses who were recipients of old age security as paupers on a par with their indigent spouses; by said policy and practice the county has made restricted payments of old age security; federal funds granted to California, on condition that they be used exclusively for old age assistance, have been alienated and diverted to the payment of general relief for indigent spouses; by such practice the county has failed to provide the recipients of old age security with the protection, care, and assistance to which they are entitled under standards established by the old age security law.
The Social Welfare Board made determinations of issues, pertaining to old age security, in substance, as follows: The Social Welfare Board had no general jurisdiction over general relief policy as such; it is not authorized to enforce the duty of the county to make general relief payments to aid indigent persons; however, in order to conform with the requirements of the federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq., the Legislature of California has enacted section 2141 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, whereunder it is the duty of the Department of Social Welfare and the Social Welfare Board to supervise and pass upon the measures taken by the county boards of supervisors for the care of needy aged citizens to the end that they shall receive suitable care and that there shall be throughout the State a uniform method of treatment of aged persons based upon their individual needs and circumstances; it is the duty of the Social Welfare Board to take corrective action wherever a policy of a county obstructs the administration of laws respecting old age security, and such action may take the form of accepting jurisdiction in appeals of adversely affected recipients of old age security, especially where funds granted for such security are restricted in use, alienated and diverted to other purposes; the policy of the board of supervisors in treating old age security as income to the family unit for the purpose of determining need for general relief adversely affects realization of the purposes of old age security; the grant of old age security is for the use of the recipient alone; the basic purposes of the federal and state statutes are violated by the said practice of the county; and it is the duty of the Department of Social Welfare to terminate this policy of the county in order that California shall not be disqualified for further receipt of federal grants-in-aid for old age assistance.
The Social Welfare Board made orders, in the appeals regarding old age security, as follows: Los Angeles County is directed and ordered to discontinue immediately the aforesaid policy of treating a portion of the old age security as income of the recipient's indigent spouse, and restricting the use of such portion to the relief of the indigent spouse, thereby alienating and diverting such portions of the old age security to which the recipient of old age security is entitled; if said county fails to comply with said order within 30 days, the Department of Social Welfare is directed to adjust the claims of the county to disallow reimbursement from federal and state funds in such portion as old age security payments to the recipients of old age security were restricted to the use of indigent spouses of such recipients.
With respect to aid to needy blind, the findings of fact, determination of issues, and order of the Social Welfare Board were in substance the same as the findings, determinations, and orders with respect to old age security.
The trial court found, among other things, that each of said eleven persons was and is receiving the maximum amount of old age assistance or aid to needy blind to which each person was and is eligible; the spouse of each said person applied to the county for general relief, and the county has in each case determined eligibility for the amount and kind of relief to be given to said spouse and has granted said relief in the manner determined by it; said spouses who applied for such relief are not parties to the appeals filed with the Social Welfare Board; none of said eleven persons appealed upon the ground that the supervisors ordered a payment of old age security or aid to blind less than the maximum to which he was entitled by law; in each case the appellant and the spouse applying for general relief were living together and sharing a common residence; the county declined to be present at the hearing before the Social Welfare Board on August 24, 1950, on the grounds (1) that said board had no jurisdiction to control, review or determine eligibility for general relief or the amount and type of general relief to be paid by the county, and (2) the sole issue raised by each appellant was the inadequacy of the general relief payment by the county to the spouse of the appellant and that said board had no jurisdiction to determine the general relief policy of the county; at the hearing on November 17, 1950, the county filed written objections to the jurisdiction of said board, and the objections were overruled; the board proceeded to hear, and did render its decision in, the said matters; the findings of fact, determination of issues, and the orders made by the board determine the eligibility for and the amount and type of general relief to be paid by Los Angeles County to applicants for general relief, and said orders threatened to, and the board announced that it would, withhold payment of federal and state funds due to the county for old age and blind aid programs unless the county complies with the determination of said board as to the eligibility for and the amount and type of general relief to be paid by the county; the action of the board with respect to each appeal is void and in excess of and without jurisdiction in that: (a) said orders determine the eligibility for and the amount and type of general relief to be paid by the county for general relief, (b) the orders withhold payment of federal and state funds due to the county for administration of old age assistance and aid to needy blind, (c) the orders illegally coerce and compel the county to grant general relief in amounts found by said Social Welfare Board, contrary to the statute which gives the board of supervisors sole and exclusive authority to determine eligibility for and amount and type of general relief, including the right of the supervisors to determine the amount of property an applicant may be permitted to own while receiving general relief, and including the further right to determine whether work will be required as a condition to the receipt of general relief; said orders determine the amount of general relief to be paid by the county to persons who are not parties to the proceedings before the Social Welfare Board and who are not under the jurisdiction of said board; the action of said board constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion because there is no evidence to support certain of its findings of fact (specifically referred to in the findings of the court); the said determination of issues and said orders of the board constitute a prejudicial abuse of discretion because they are based on findings which are not supported by the evidence and are in excess of the board's jurisdiction; and that petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
The judgment of the trial court was that findings of fact, determination of issues, and orders of the Social Welfare Board in each of the eleven appeals are void; that a writ of mandate issue requiring the respondents (named in the petition) to set aside the said findings of fact, determination of issues, and orders; that respondents (named in the petition) deny the appeals and desist from any action whereby they withhold any portion of federal and state funds due to the county; that the matter of the eleven appeals is remanded to the said respondents with directions to proceed in conformity with said judgment.
Appellants herein (Department of Social Welfare, Social Welfare Board, and the eleven intervenors), contend that: (1) the Department of Social Welfare and the Social Welfare Board proceeded within their jurisdiction; (2) the Social Welfare Board did not abuse its discretion, and (3) the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction.
As to the first contention, appellants argue to the effect that the Department of Social Welfare had jurisdiction to make said orders on appeal because it was the single state agency authorized to supervise the joint administration of federal-state-county aid to needy aged and blind, and that Los Angeles County in regarding such aid as family income, when determining the amount of indigent aid to be paid from county funds to a spouse of a recipient of old age security or blind aid, was making a restricted payment of social security funds (federal, state and county) in violation of a regulation against restricting or limiting such payments.
Respondent (County of Los Angeles) agrees that the Department of Social Welfare has authority to supervise the acts of the counties in the administration of old age security and blind aid. In such administration 'grants-in-aid' are made to the counters by the federal and state governments. Division III of the Welfare and Institutions Code pertains to 'Old Age Security-Administration', and section 2141 of that code, which is in said Division, provides: 'The State Department of Social Welfare shall supervise and pass upon the measures taken by the county boards of supervisors for the care of needy aged citizens * * *.' Division V of said code pertains to 'Aid to Needy Blind', and section 3078 of that code, which is in said Division, provides: 'The Department of Social Welfare may, on behalf of the State, at any time inquire into the management by any county of aid to blind persons under the provisions of this chapter * * *.' Section 103 of said code provides: 'The Social Welfare Board hereby established, shall advise the director in the performance of his duties * * *. The board shall have the power and it shall be its duty to adopt, promulgate, repeal and amend rules and regulations consistent with law for the administration of welfare. Except as otherwise provided by law, the board shall establish minimum standards of public assistance, not in conflict with law, for all relief purposes for which State grants-in-aid are made to the counties. The board shall have no administrative or executive functions other than those set forth in this code.' (Italics added.)
Respondent contends that the Department of Social Welfare does not have any authority in the matter of determining the necessity for, or the amount of, indigent aid which is paid by the county alone. Division IV of the Welfare and Institutions Code pertains to 'County Aid and Relief to Indigents', and section 2500 of that code, which is in said Division, provides that every county shall relieve and support all indigent persons, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported by their relatives or friends or by state institutions. There is no provision in said Division giving the Department of Social Welfare or the Social Welfare Board any administrative or executive function in the matter of indigent aid which is provided by the counties. It seems to be conceded by appellants that neither the department nor the board has any authority in the matter of indigent aid by the counties. In the decisions of the Board of Social Welfare on the appeals it is stated, as above shown, that the board 'has no general jurisdiction over General Relief policy or practice as such.' It is the position of the Social Welfare Board that the county did not grant sufficient aid to the indigent spouse, and that the result thereof was that the other spouse, who was a recipient of old age security or blind aid was compelled to divert some of his old age security or blind aid in meeting the needs of his indigent spouse; and that although the Social Welfare Board has no general jurisdiction over the general policy of the county in indigent relief matters, it does have a special or limited jurisdiction under circumstances where, in the judgment of the Social Welfare Board, the county allows an insufficient amount of indigent aid to one spouse and thereby in effect restricts or limits the use of the old age security or blind aid of the other spouse. In other words, it seems to be the position of appellants that under such circumstances the Social Welfare Board is not supervising the county in the matter of indigent aid but it is taking 'corrective action' to prevent the county from granting aid to a spouse in an amount which the Social Welfare Board believes has the effect of restricting the payments of old age security or blind aid to the other spouse. Relief by way of old age security and aid to needy blind, furnished by federal, state and county governments, is separate and distinct from relief by way of indigent aid furnished by the county. As above indicated, the matter of allowing indigent aid is for the exclusive determination of the board of supervisors of the county. See Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal.App.2d 467, 470, 235 P.2d 217. The amount to be allowed to an applicant for such aid is based upon the needs of the applicant as determined by the board of supervisors. The appeals herein, to the Department of Social Welfare, were by recipients of old age security and by a recipient of blind aid. Each of those appellants was receiving the maximum amount which he could receive under the law, namely, $75 per month for old age security and $85 per month for blind aid. None of the appellants asserted, as a ground for appeal, that he had not received his full allotment of old age security or blind aid. In their letters to the Department of Social Welfare, which constituted the petitions for hearings of the appeals, the appellants stated that they were dissatisfied with the action of the board of supervisors and they were appealing to the department to prohibit the board of supervisors from considering their old age security or blind aid as family income and allotting a portion of it to meet the needs of appellants' indigent spouses. It is to be noted that they did not state they were dissatisfied with the action of the supervisors as to the amounts of their awards. The purpose of the appeals was to obtain orders of the Social Welfare Board enjoining or 'correcting' the board of supervisors with respect to the manner in which it determines the amount needed as indigent aid. Section 2182 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, in effect at the times involved herein, provided that if a recipient of old age security is dissatisfied with the action of the board of supervisors, he had the right of appeal to the Department of Social Welfare. Section 3086 of said code, in effect at the times involved herein, provided that a recipient of aid to the needy blind also had the right of appeal to said department. In both said sections it is provided that: 'The State Social Welfare Board shall consider the appeal, and shall dismiss the appeal or award aid as prescribed in this chapter.' It thus appears that such recipients have the right of appeal in matters pertaining to awards of old age security and blind aid; and that the power of the board on appeal is limited to dismissing an appeal or making an award of such security or aid. As above shown, there was no question on those appeals regarding the amount of old age or blind aid which had been awarded. The Social Welfare Board could not award any such aid on the appeals, because each appellant was receiving the maximum amount allowable. There is no provision in said sections to the effect that the Social Welfare Board may enjoin the board of supervisors in matters pertaining to indigent aid or in any matter. The spouses of the appellants (referred to in the appeal petitioners), who were applicants for county indigent aid, were not parties to the appeals and could not have been such parties. They were ineligible for old age security or blind aid. The recipients of old age security or blind aid were not authorized to appeal on behalf of their spouses who were applicants for county indigent aid. The matter of reviewing the award of indigent aid by the county was not before the Social Welfare Board. That board could not make an award for such aid. The orders made by that board on appeal, in practical effect, direct the county to discontinue its policy in determining the needs of certain applicants for indigent aid and to pay a greater amount for indigent aid,--those matters being within the exclusive province of the board of supervisors. Also, since indigent aid is paid from county taxes, those orders, in practical effect, direct the board of supervisors with respect to another matter within its exclusive province--that of fixing the rate of taxation. The orders made on the eleven appeals were attempts to do indirectly that which could not be done directly. If the spouses, who were applicants for county aid, considered themselves aggrieved as to the action of the board of supervisors in awarding indigent aid, their remedy would have been by a proceeding in the superior court to review the action of that board. The Social Welfare Board did not have jurisdiction to make the orders.
It is to be noted that after the superior court decided (in May, 1951) that said board did not have jurisdiction to make the orders, two bills regarding the matters here involved were presented to the Legislature--one of which was to the effect that old age security was income of the recipient only; and the other bill was to the effect that aid for the needy blind was income of the recipient only. The bill regarding blind aid became the law in September, 1951, and since then the county has not considered blind aid in fixing the amount of indigent aid for spouses of the needy blind. The Legislature did not pass the bill regarding old age security.
By reason of the above conclusion regarding jurisdiction, it is not necessary to discuss the contention of appellants that the Social Welfare Board did not abuse its discretion.
Appellants also contend that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the Department of Social Welfare, since the state had not consented to be sued in this kind of action. The contention is not sustainable. Mandamus is the remedial writ to correct decisions of administrative agencies which are in violation of law. Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm., 17 Cal.2d 321, 329, 109 P.2d 935.
Appellants also contend that the 'final' decisions of the Board of Social Welfare are not subject to review upon the petition of a county. They argue that after the 'final decision' of the board, the county is no longer an interested party or any party entitled to a writ of mandamus; that the board's decisions are not subject to judicial review except at the request of the recipients. They cite section 104.5, subdivision (c), of the Welfare and Institutions Code which provides: 'If an appeal, hearing, or rehearing is not heard by the board, a report of the proceedings shall be prepared by the referee conducting it and the report * * * shall be presented to the board for final decision. Only the board may make such final decision.' They also cite section 104.6 of that code which provides: 'The board of supervisors of each county shall comply with and execute every award of the State Social Welfare Board in favor of an applicant for or recipient of aid to the aged, aid to the blind * * * which is directed to the board of supervisors.' The first of said sections pertains to procedure when an appeal or hearing is before a referee. The interpretation of that section is that the report of the referee is not final, but that the final decision under such procedure is to be made by the board. Apparently, the last sentence of that section, namely, 'Only the board may make such final decision', was not intended as a provision to exclude a court review of the board's decision. In any event, however, that section and the other section, relate to decisions pertaining to old age security and aid to the needy blind, and do not pertain to indigent aid. The requirement as to compliance by the supervisors pertains only to awards 'in favor of an applicant for or recipient of aid to the aged, aid to the blind, * * *.' No award was made by the Social Welfare Board to any of the eleven appellants. As above stated, the appellants were receiving the maximum award allowable. By the decisions of the board herein, the county was ordered, as above stated, to change its policy in determining the amount of indigent aid. The superior court has jurisdiction to review decisions of an administrative agency when the agency has exceeded its authority. Board of Trustees v. State Board of Equalization, 1 Cal.2d 784, 787, 37 P.2d 84, 96 A.L.R. 775.
Another contention of appellants is that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction by reviewing the action of the board prior to the time the board had issued a final order to stop reimbursement of the county for administrative expenses. They argue that the second part of the order of the board was conditional, that is, that unless the county changed its policy within 30 days federal and state funds would be withheld; that until the Department of Social Welfare actually refuses to approve the county's claim for such funds, there in no final order to be reviewed by the court. The board ordered the county to discontinue immediately its policy regarding indigent aid. That part of the order was not conditional. This contention is not sustainable.
Appellants also contend that the court exceeded its jurisdiction by not requiring the county to exhaust its administrative remedies by requesting reconsideration. Under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a writ of mandamus may be issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order. The inquiry 'shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; * * *.' In McPheeters v. Board of Medical Examiners, 82 Cal.App.2d 709, at page 717, 187 P.2d 116, at page 120, it was said: 'Administrative proceedings should be completed before the issuance of a judicial writ. An exception, of course, appears when the administrative board is without jurisdiction.' See Bernstein v. Smutz, 83 Cal.App.2d 108, 115, 188 P.2d 48. This contention is not sustainable.
Appellants also assert that the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the board to dismiss the appeals. They argue that the court may not substitute its discretion for that of the board, and that the matter should have been remanded to the board for further action in the light of the court's determination of the law. As above stated, under the provisions of section 2182 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the board on appeal was empowered to dismiss the appeals or award aid. No question as to the amount of an award was involved on the appeals. Since the board had no jurisdiction in the matter of indigent aid, the only further action that could be taken by the board would be to dismiss the appeals. The court ordered the board to enter an order denying the eleven appeals, and ordered the matter of the appeals remanded to the board with directions to proceed in conformity with the judgment. The court did not exceed its jurisdiction.
The judgment is affirmed.
SHINN, P. J., and VALLEE, J., concur. --------------- * Subsequent opinion 260 P.2d 41.