Opinion
DBDCV195015034S
11-26-2019
Angel Lorenzo v. David Maiga et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): D’Andrea, Robert A., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
D’Andrea, Robert A., Judge.
The defendants, David Maiga, Scott Erfe, Anthony Corcella, Lieutenant Boyd, and Officer Verdura ("defendants"), move to dismiss all claims of the plaintiff Angel Lorenzo’s ("plaintiff") complaint dated February 7, 2019. First, the claims are against them in their official capacity, and, as such, are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The defendants further move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief as they are not justiciable. Finally, the defendants move to dismiss all claims for injunctive relief, as plaintiff has failed to meet the prerequisites for injunctive relief.
FACTS
Plaintiff brings this action against defendants who are employees of the Connecticut Department of Correction ("DOC"). Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated when, after it was discovered that he had access to a cellular phone within the Cheshire Correctional Institution ("Cheshire") (a felony violation according to state statutes), the DOC officers attempted to gain information about the origins of the cellular phone by attempting to coerce plaintiff into divulging the requested information. After investigators found a cell phone in plaintiff’s cell in early 2018, he was issued a class A disciplinary report for contraband for his having the cell phone, and a class A disciplinary report for felony misconduct in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-251 and 53a-254. Plaintiff alleges that he was repeatedly questioned about the origin of the cell phone, and that the defendants allegedly threatened to place him on high security status (HSS) if he did not cooperate with the investigating officers. On April 4, 2018, defendant Maiga allegedly contacted defendant Corcella to inform him that plaintiff would be placed on HSS at the request of defendant Erfe. This, according to plaintiff, was done without any formal hearing, which plaintiff alleges that he should have been afforded, and that defendants Maiga, Corcella, and Erfe violated DOC administrative directive 9.5 for failing to provide plaintiff with a notification of hearing for placement. Plaintiff admits to having received a notification of decision for his change to HSS. Plaintiff is suing each defendant in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment for the alleged constitutional violations, as well as an injunction to be removed from HSS, to receive a parole hearing, to receive a restoration of risk reduction earned credit, and to receive an expungement of the disciplinary report of felonious conduct.
LEGAL STANDARD
"A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 346, 977 A.2d 636 (2009). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006). "Jurisdiction over the person, jurisdiction over the subject matter, and jurisdiction to render the particular judgment are three separate elements of the jurisdiction of the court." Bridgeport v. Debek, 210 Conn. 175, 179, 554 A.2d 728 (1989). "Whenever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." FDIC v. Peabody N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "Whenever a court discovers that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case." Pet v. Dept. of Public Health, 207 Conn. 346, 351, 542 A.2d 672 (1988).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction. "Sovereign immunity rests on the principle and on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds and property." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 314, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). The doctrine of sovereign immunity "protects the state, not only from the ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate whether it is so liable." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 165, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000). The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies not only to the State itself, but also its officers and agents. Schub v. Dept. of Social Services, 86 Conn.App. 748, 862 A.2d 748 cert. denied, 273 Conn. 920, 871 A.2d 1029 (2005). This is "because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 65, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
The Supreme Court has stated that "a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). "We have long recognized the validity of the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent ... We have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." Id. at 313. To permit an injured party to bring an action for monetary damages against the state (where there is no other explicit statutory authorization), the legislature created the Office of the Claims Commissioner. Id. at 317-18. The plaintiff must seek a waiver from the Claims Commissioner before filing an action in General Statutes § 4-165, provides for qualified immunity for state employees and "makes clear that the remedy available to plaintiffs who have suffered harm from the negligent acts of a state employee who acted in the scope of his or her employment [is to] bring a claim against the state [at] the office of the claims commissioner." Id. at 319. Plaintiffs are required to obtain a waiver from the Office of the Claims Commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-141 et seq. before filing this lawsuit in court.
"[W]hen a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). General Statutes § 4-165 provides that: "No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter." It is well established that a negligence claim brought against state employees is barred by the statutory immunity granted under General Statute § 4-165 where the alleged conduct was within the scope of employment and was not reckless, malicious or wanton. See Miller at 319 ("[S]tate employees may not be held personally liable for their negligent actions performed within the scope of their employment"). "[I]n order to establish that the defendants’ conduct was wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must provide, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one’s acts ... [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action. [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragalia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 116, 891 A.2d 106 (2006). This statutory immunity is immunity from suit, as well as liability. Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 381, 802 A.2d 814 (2002); Manifold, at 113.
DEFENDANTS’ POSITION
"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc., 260 Conn. 46, 51, 794 A.2d 498 (2002). "Sovereign immunity rests on the principle and on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds and property." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 314, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). The doctrine of sovereign immunity "protects the state, not only from the ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate whether it is so liable." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 165, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000). The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies not only to the State itself, but also its officers and agents. Schub v. Dept. of Social Services, 86 Conn.App. 748, 862 A.2d 748 cert. denied, 273 Conn. 920, 871 A.2d 1029 (2005). This is "because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 65, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
The Supreme Court has recognized three narrow exceptions to sovereign immunity: "(1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity; (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority." Columbia Air Services, at 349.
The first exception only applies to claims for monetary damages. Miller at 321. "For a claim made pursuant to the second exception, complaining of unconstitutional acts, [the Court] require[s] that the allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests." Columbia Air Services at 350 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). "For a claim under the third exception, the plaintiffs must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess of their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts that reasonably support those allegations." Id.
As to the first exception, the plaintiff is not seeking any monetary damages; therefore, this exception is not applicable to the set of facts presented here, and had it been a claim for money damages the plaintiff has not obtained authorization to sue from the Claims Commissioner. See General Statutes § 4-160(c) ("In each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner ... the claimant shall allege such authorization and the date it was granted." The plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first exception to sovereign immunity. As to the second exception, which applies solely to claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, such exception does not apply to plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as he has failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating an incursion upon a constitutionally-protected interest. Plaintiff alleges that he was placed on HSS without a proper hearing and that as a result, his right to due process was violated. "The ‘standard analysis’ for a claim of a violation of procedural due process proceeds in two steps; We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient." Galarza v. Erfe, 2019 WL 121784, *5 (D.Conn. Jan. 7, 2019) (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (per curiam)). Constitutional rights, including the liberty interests that trigger due process protections, of inmates are distinguished from the liberty interests of free citizens due to the already-severely restrictive nature of incarceration. See id. Further, the Supreme Court has determined that in order for an inmate to make a viable due process claim, the plaintiff must show that the action of the officers, or the state must create an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (1995). The Sandin Court also determined that a prisoner may be subjected to more restrictive confinement conditions under the discretion of the management of the facility. Id. at 485. "Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law." Id. The Second Circuit has further surmised that the factors that determine whether a prisoner has suffered atypical and significant hardship include "the extent to which the conditions of the disciplinary segregation differ from other routine prison conditions and the duration of the disciplinary segregation." Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Wright v. Coughlin, 132 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1998)).
In his Complaint, plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating that his HSS designation imposed any restrictive conditions that constitute an "atypical and significant hardship" and therefore, has failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of any liberty interest that would require due process. See Galarza, 2019 WL 121784, at *6 ("Because Galarza does not allege that his ‘High Security’ designation was accompanied by restrictive conditions that constitute a substantial and atypical hardship, he has not alleged plausible grounds to conclude that his constitutional right to procedural due process was violated.") (citing Groomes v. Frazir, 2017 WL 7410991, *3 (D.Conn. 2017)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to implicate an incursion upon his due process rights. As a result, the second exception does not apply to Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief and declaratory relief based on a due process violation.
Finally, as to the third exception, the plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate that any of the defendants committed wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of their statutory authority. Plaintiff was placed on HSS after an investigation by defendants Boyd and Verdura revealed that plaintiff committed a violation of DOC’s penal disciplinary code for possession of a cellular telephone. Based on these findings, plaintiff was issued a class A disciplinary report for contraband by a non-defendant officer as well as a class A felonious misconduct disciplinary report for violating § § 53a-251 and 53a-254 of the General Statutes. Based on these violations, DOC officials, operating within the scope of their duty and responsibility to maintain a safe and secure facility, determined that the plaintiff should be placed on HSS. Moreover, plaintiff received notice of his change in status to HSS.
Lastly, while Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated DOC’s administrative directives by not providing him with an adequate hearing for his placement on HSS, it is well-established that allegations that prison staff have failed to comply with internal directives do not amount to constitutional violations. See Sandin, at 481-82. (prison directives, which are designed primarily to guide correctional staff, do not confer rights on inmates). Accordingly, all due process claims against the defendants in their official capacity for injunctive and declaratory relief are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his first amendment rights under the Constitution when they attempted to coerce him into providing information as to the origin of the cellular phone was found in his cell. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated his fourteenth amendment due process rights and his rights by failing to provide him with a hearing before putting him on HSS.
General Statutes § 52-29 provides guidance as to the court’s role and ability to render declaratory judgment. Connecticut courts have provided further guidance on the specific nature of declaratory judgments. "A declaratory judgment action is not a ‘procedural panacea’ for use on all occasions but is a special statutory proceeding to be used only in accordance with the statute and rules adopted to implement the statute." ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 88 Conn.App. 471, 476, 869 A.2d 1254 (2005). Moreover, declaratory judgments are rendered in order to establish "the existence or nonexistence (1) of any right, power, privilege or immunity; or (2) of any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such right, power, privilege or immunity does or may depend, whether such right, power, privilege or immunity now exists or will arise in the future." Id. (citing Practice Book § 17-54). Consequently, a declaratory judgment "may not be utilized merely to secure advice on the law ... it may be employed in a justiciable controversy where the interests are adverse, where there is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement, and where all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof ..." Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Netherlands Insurance Co., 312 Conn. 714, 727, 95 A.3d 1031 (2014). Further, a party pursuing declaratory relief must demonstrate, "a justiciable right in the controversy sought to be resolved contract, property or personal rights ... as such will be affected by the [court’s] decision ... A party without a justiciable right in the matter sought to be adjudicated lacks standing to raise the matter in a declaratory judgment action." Id. at 728-29. Plaintiff in this case lacks a right that would be directly affected by a declaratory judgment.
Plaintiff does not cite any specific current deprivation of his first amendment rights that would make him eligible for declaratory judgment. As such, plaintiff lacks standing to raise a claim for declaratory relief stemming from any prior alleged violation of his first amendment rights. See Travelers, at 728-29. Accordingly, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief stemming from any alleged first amendment violation. See Manning v. Feltman, 149 Conn.App. 224, 231, 91 A.3d 466 (2014) ("The issue of standing implicates [the] court’s subject matter jurisdiction.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering defendants Maiga and Corcella, (or their agents), to immediately remove him from HSS, arrange for him to have a new parole hearing, reinstate his risk reduction earned credit, and expunge his disciplinary report; claims which are not closely related to the injury that he claims to have suffered as a result of the alleged violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. However, plaintiff fails to meet the prerequisites to obtain injunctive relief. The fundamental prerequisites for injunctive relief requires a plaintiff to plead and prove, at a minimum, that (1) he has no (other) adequate legal remedy and (2) he would suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive relief. Pequannock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 259 Conn. 592, 598, 790 A.2d 1178 (2002). "The extraordinary nature of injunctive relief requires that the harm complained of is occurring or will occur if the injunction is not granted. Although an absolute certainty is not required, it must appear that there is a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm." Karis v. Alexandra Realty Corp., 179 Conn. 390, 402, 426 A.2d 784 (1980).
Plaintiff cannot establish these prerequisites for injunctive relief as plaintiff makes no allegations that he is suffering any irreparable harm in his current placement on HSS nor does he allege that he has no other adequate legal remedy to correct any alleged wrong. Additionally, injunctive relief is traditionally issued as a measure to prevent future injury or deprivation to a claimant as opposed to "righting a wrong" or correcting a potential mistake made by a defendant. It is preventative rather than punitive (as it is suggested to be, in this case, by plaintiff’s claims.) "[An action for an injunction] is a preventive remedy and not punishment for past conduct." William Scholhorn Co. v. Playthings Jewelry & Novelty Workers International Union, 14 Conn.Supp. 22, 27 (1946).
In this matter, plaintiff is seeking an injunction for alleged actions taken by the defendants in the past, rather than for any reported ongoing injury or irreparable harm suffered as a result of these alleged violations. Consequently, plaintiff fails to meet the prerequisites for the issuance of injunctive relief.
PLAINTIFF’S POSITION
At the first short calendar hearing, the plaintiff had not had an opportunity to review the defendants’ motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss. The court, at the hearing indicated that it would have the clerk mail a copy of the documents to the plaintiff, and advised him that he is permitted to file a reply if he so chose, and the court continued the matter to November 18, 2019 to allow the plaintiff to review the defendants’ motion and supporting memorandum of law, and file a reply if he chose to do so before the next hearing, which the court scheduled for November 18, 2019. At the November 18, 2019 short calendar hearing, the plaintiff acknowledged that he received the documents, and did not file a response and did not wish to file one. When questioned by the court, he indicated that he has a valid claim in this matter, and the court will consider that as an objection to the motion to dismiss, as the plaintiff disagrees with all the positions stated by the defendants.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
"The doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Kizis at 51. "Sovereign immunity rests on the principle and on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds and property." Miller at 314. The doctrine of sovereign immunity "protects the state, not only from the ultimate liability for alleged wrongs, but also from being required to litigate whether it is so liable." Shay at 165. The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies not only to the State itself, but also its officers and agents. See Schub. This is "because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." Markley at 65.
As outlined above the Supreme Court has stated that "a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." Miller at 313. "We have long recognized the validity of the common-law principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent ... We have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." Id. at 313. To permit an injured party to bring an action for monetary damages against the state (where there is no other explicit statutory authorization), the legislature created the Office of the Claims Commissioner. Id. at 317-18.
As the defendants correctly claim, the Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to sovereign immunity preventing suits against the state of Connecticut. First, when the legislature waives the state’s sovereign immunity, such as a claim for money damages which requires approval from the Claims Commissioner before suit is allowed to proceed. Second, when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief claiming a violation the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Finally, the third exception is when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive claiming that the wrongful conduct is to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority. The plaintiff has not requested money damages, thus this provision requiring any approval by the Claims Commissioner before proceeding is not applicable and the first exception is eliminated and not applicable.
As to the second exception, the defendants allege that this does not apply to plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, as he has failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating an incursion upon a constitutionally-protected interest. Plaintiff claims that he was placed on HSS without a proper hearing and that as a result, his right to due process was violated. The plaintiff does not contest that he was in possession of a cell phone in violation of DOC penal disciplinary code. As the defendants state, the ‘standard analysis’ for a claim of a violation of procedural due process proceeds in two steps; We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient. Galarza. This issue is easily resolved by Riddick v. Chevalier, a United States District Court, District of Connecticut WL 4823153 (2013), which dictates that Connecticut "State prison directives do not confer any constitutionally protected rights on inmates." See Sandin at 481-82 (prison directives, which are designed primarily to guide correctional staff, do not confer rights on inmates). In addition, failure to comply with state created procedures does not create a protected liberty interest and fourteenth amendment due process protections are not implicated by the defendants’ alleged failure to comply with administrative directives. See Rhodes v. Hoy, No. 9:05-CV-836, 2007 WL 1343649, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 2007) (holding that due process is not implicated by failure to comply with institutional administrative procedures); see also Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1993) ("A state cannot be said to have a federal due process obligation to follow all of its procedures; such a system would result in the constitutionalizing of every state rule, and would not be administrable."), overruled in part on other grounds by Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)." Id. at *5. This opinion controls the action of this court, therefore, the plaintiff’s claims, as they involve the second exception are not valid. Finally, as to the third exception, the defendants posit that the plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate that any of the defendants committed wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of their statutory authority. Plaintiff was placed on HSS after an investigation showed that plaintiff committed a violation of DOC’s penal disciplinary code for possession of a cellular telephone, was issued a class A disciplinary report for contraband, and a class A felonious misconduct disciplinary report for violating § § 53a-251 and 53a-254 of the General Statutes which involve crimes for possessing certain prohibited items in a correctional institution. The DOC officials, operating within the scope of their duty and responsibility have an obligation to maintain a safe and secure facility, and determined that the plaintiff should be placed on HSS. Plaintiff received notice of his change in status to HSS but claims that he did not receive notice of the hearing or having been denied the right to participate in the hearing. This exemption is dealt with directly on point by Fernandez v. Armstrong, United States District Court, District of Connecticut 2005 WL 733664 (2005). "This district has previously held that failure of a correctional official to comply with the institutional grievance procedures is not cognizable in an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless the action caused the denial of a constitutionally or federally protected right." Id. at *9. This decision is clearly dispositive of his issue, as the plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that the defendants’ actions "caused the denial of a constitutionally or federally protected right." He is unhappy with the disciplinary decision, which is certainly understandable, but without more, the plaintiff has failed to state a valid cause of action, as no facts are presented to the court.
Finally, the case of Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, provides further instruction as to how to decide this motion. The Supreme Court has clearly stated
"a prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators. In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security, prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in this context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hewitt v. Helms, supra, 459 U.S. at 474, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed. 675 (1983). It therefore is not the role of this court to second-guess that decision ... See, e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768 ("that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision ... does [not] imply that a disciplinary board’s ... decisions ... are subject to second-guessing upon review"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ("[p]rison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security").Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 315 Conn. 231, 248, 106 A.3d 26 (2014).
The defendants claim that the plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating that his HSS designation imposed any restrictive conditions that constitute an "atypical and significant hardship" and therefore, has failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of any liberty interest that would require due process. The defendants’ position is an accurate portrayal of the facts here. The plaintiff does not allege that the actions taken by the defendants are not permitted, he only alleges that he is being punished for not complying with the defendants’ requests to provide information as to how he obtained the cell phone, in violation of his first amendment rights. He is, in effect, claiming that because he did not cooperate and disclose how he obtained the cell phone, that the defendants and DOC are punishing him. This is the functional equivalent of "if I cooperated, I would have received a lesser degree of punishment." That is not the same as stating that the DOC is not permitted to punish him as was done, or that the punishment was "atypical and significant hardship" and was never implemented for any other inmates with similar violations. As such, what has been provided is insufficient to establish that the actions of the defendant created an "atypical and significant hardship" entitling the plaintiff to relief from the court.
The plaintiff’s allegations, according to the defendants, fail to demonstrate that any of the defendants committed wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of their statutory authority. Plaintiff was placed on HSS after an investigation revealed that plaintiff committed a violation of DOC’s penal disciplinary code for possession of a cellular telephone in a correctional institution. The court finds that the plaintiff, again, does not allege that the defendants did not have the authority to imposed the HSS punishment, he alleges that he is being punished for not complying with the defendants’ requests to provide information as to how he obtained the cell phone, in violation of his first amendment rights. There is no allegations before the court that would indicate that the defendants did not have the authority to impose the HSS punishment.
Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering defendants to immediately remove him from HSS, arrange for him to have a new parole hearing, reinstate his risk reduction earned credit, and expunge his disciplinary report. However, according to the defendants, the plaintiff fails to meet the prerequisites to obtain injunctive relief, as he has not shown that he has no other adequate legal remedy, and would suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive relief. "The extraordinary nature of injunctive relief requires that the harm complained of is occurring or will occur if the injunction is not granted ... it must appear that there is a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm." Karls at 402.
The court agrees that the plaintiff cannot establish these prerequisites for injunctive relief, as he makes no allegations that he is suffering any irreparable harm in his current placement on HSS, nor does he allege that he has no other adequate legal remedy to correct any alleged wrong. Injunctive relief is used to prevent future injury or deprivation to a claimant as opposed to "righting a wrong," and is preventative rather than corrective. "[An action for an injunction] is a preventive remedy and not punishment for past conduct." William Scholhorn at 27. The injunction the plaintiff seeks is for actions taken by the defendants in the past. As such, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to meet the prerequisites for the issuance of injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
After a thorough review of the pleadings and argument of the parties, and after taking the facts alleged in the complaint, and any necessarily implied from the plaintiff’s allegations, and construing them in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that the defendants’ motion must be granted. The plaintiff’s claims are precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the requested relief are not justiciable, and the allegations do not meet the prerequisites for the requested injunctive relief. Based on the foregoing, it is the decision of this court that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be GRANTED.