Summary
In Lopez v. Crown Mark, Inc., 2000 WL 1010257 (E.D. La. July 19, 2000)(Sear, J.), the plaintiff was injured when he tripped over abox and claimed that his accident was caused by the manufacturer's failure to warn.
Summary of this case from Vienne v. American Honda Motor CompanyOpinion
Civil Action No. 99-3648 SECTION "G"
July 19, 2000
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Background
In this action, plaintiff Jose Francisco Lopez brings a claim against defendant CM International d/b/a Crown Mark Incorporated ("Crown Mark") under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, La. R.S. § 9:2800.52, et seq. Crown Mark removed the action from state court. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as plaintiff is a citizen of Louisiana, defendant is a citizen of Texas, and plaintiff's damages allegedly exceed $75,000.000. Presently before me is defendant's motion for summary judgment.
plaintiff was employed for five years by the Buy For Less budget outlet, a furniture retail outlet located in New Orleans, Louisiana. At the time of the accident, he served as general manager. On March 1, 1997, plaintiff went into the storeroom to retrieve an item requested by a customer, a box containing a glass top for a coffee table. On his way in and out of the storeroom plaintiff walked down the same aisle. This area contained items that were damaged, or damaged boxes, which had been placed there at plaintiff's direction. The box plaintiff was going to retrieve, the one containing the glass table top, was five feet long and two and one half feet wide, and weighed sixty-seven pounds. plaintiff lifted the glass top box over his head to carry it back through the storeroom to the front of the store where the customer waited. As he turned to walk up the aisle of the storeroom, plaintiff tripped and fell, injuring his neck when the box he was carrying fell on him.
facts outlined are undisputed, as reflected by the statements of material facts and the parties' memoranda in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
plaintiff alleges that the Crown Mark box over which he tripped was open, with merchandise sticking out six inches into the aisle. The evidence indicates, however, that he did see the box before tripping and did not examine the box afterward, and he admits that he is unable to provide any information as to how the box came to be opened or what part or parts of the box were open.
Plaintiff seeks to recover under the Louisiana Product Liability Act on grounds that the box he tripped over lacked an adequate warning under 9:2800.57 and/or had a design defect under 9:2800.56, and the glass top box he was carrying also lacked an adequate warning.
Discussion
I. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This language "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." A complete failure of proof on an essential element renders all other facts immaterial because there is no longer a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex corp. v. catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Id.
The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact." However, the movant need not support the motion with materials that negate the opponent's claim. As to issues on which the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point to an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claim; the non-moving party must then designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the opponent cannot simply "rest on the allegations in [the] complaint" and must present more than a metaphysical doubt about the material facts. Further, a claim that additional discovery or a trial might reveal facts of which the non-moving party is currently unaware is insufficient to defeat the motion. Nevertheless, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and justifiable inferences from the underlying facts are drawn in his favor, and any doubts are resolved against the moving party.
International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 1414-15 (5th Cir. 1987).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
II. Louisiana Products Liability Act
The Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA" or "Act") establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products. See La.R.S. 9:2800.52 (West 1997). Although it is clear from plaintiff's state court petition and memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion that his claims are product liability claims, and plaintiff does not urge any alternative theories of liability, he cursorily notes in his statement of disputed material facts that it is disputed "whether defendant is seller or manufacturer."
On the very first page of his memorandum in opposition, plaintiff declares "There is certainly no dispute that this is a 'defective' product case" and "clearly a case involving the lack of an adequate warning."
Like the vast majority of plaintiff's purported disputed material facts, this is actually an issue of law.
The definition of a manufacturer for purposes of the Act includes "a person or entity who labels a product as his own or who otherwise holds himself out to be the manufacturer of the product," La.R.S. 9:2800.53(1) (a), and "[a] seller of a product of an alien manufacturer if the seller is in the business of importing or distributing the product for resale and the seller is the alter ego of the alien manufacturer." 1 La.R.S. § 9:2800.53(1)(d)
It is undisputed that Crown Mark sells furniture to various retail stores throughout the United States. Crown Mark imports its products from foreign countries, including China, Malaysia and Indonesia, and subsequently resells them through its chain of distribution. See Affidavit of Cornette at p. 2. Crown Mark has its identifying symbol placed on the boxes containing its furniture, and substantially assumes warranty obligations made in connection with the furniture it sells to retail stores. Id. Pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2800.53(1)(a) and/or (d), Crown Mark is a manufacturer for purposes of the Louisiana Products Liability Act, and Lopez's remedies are limited to the Louisiana Products Liability Act.
Under Louisiana product liability law, plaintiff must prove that a characteristic of defendant's product rendered the product unreasonably dangerous for reasonably anticipated uses of the product, and that damage was proximately caused thereby. La.R.S. 9:2800.54 (West 1997). A product may be unreasonably dangerous in one of four ways: unreasonably dangerous in construction, design, for lack of an adequate warning and for failure to conform to an express warranty. Id. § 2800.54(B). Plaintiff relies on two of these — inadequate warning and design defect — in connection with the products involved in this action, the coffee table box over which he tripped and the glass top box that he was carrying.
A. Coffee Table Box
Lopez maintains that the coffee table box over which he tripped lacked an adequate warning and/or was unreasonably dangerous in design, causing his fall. He argues that there should have been some warning on the box proclaiming "Careful! Corner Area."
A product is unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning about the product has not been provided if, at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, the product possessed a characteristic that may cause damage and the manufacturer fails to provide an adequate warning of that characteristic to users and handlers of the product. La. R.S. 9:2800.57(A). A manufacturer is not, however, required to provide an adequate warning about the product if the product is not dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user or handler of the product, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the products characteristics, or if the particular user knows or should reasonably be expected to know of the danger. La.R.S. 9:2800.57(B)(1) and (2).
It is undisputed that, as store manager, Lopez had knowledge of the existence of and location of damaged boxes in the aisle down which he was walking, and he was aware that objects frequently protruded from boxes in that aisle. See Deposition of Jose Francisco Lopez at pp. 40-41. A manufacturer is not liable for failing to provide an adequate warning when the user had knowledge of the dangerous characteristic, as Lopez did.
Further, the proximate cause of Lopez tripping was not the lack of a warning because plaintiff admits that he did not see the box before he tripped. When no causation is present because the plaintiff never looked at the product in question, the question of the adequacy of the warning need not even be reached. See Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 829 (La. 1987).
plaintiff also alleges that the box over which he tripped was unreasonably dangerous in design because it lacked reinforced corners to prevent the object inside from popping out of the box. However, plaintiff admits that he never examined the box over which he tripped and it is no longer in his possession. Deposition of Jose Francisco Lopez at p. 70. Accordingly, there is no way to prove that the object lacked such reinforced corners, or that the object inside it protruded because of an unreasonably dangerous design as opposed to subsequent mishandling by Buy For Less employees. A reasonable inference is that the protrusion happened due to the use and handling of the box after it left Crown Mark's possession. In order to create a genuine issue of material fact, reasonable inferences such as this one must be overcome. See Myles v. Cain's Coffee Co., Inc., 756 So.2d 632, 634 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 2000). Because the evidence is missing here and the plaintiff is unable to relate the nature of the damage to the box, plaintiff cannot overcome the inference.
B. The Glass Box
Plaintiff's only claim regarding the box containing the glass table top is that his injuries were caused by the lack of an adequate warning indicating that two persons were necessary to lift the box.
A manufacturer is not responsible for warning of a danger that is or should be obvious to an ordinary user with ordinary knowledge about the product. See La. R.S. 9:2800.57(B); Myles, 756 So.2d at 634. The danger of injury resulting when a single person lifts a large, cumbersome, sixty-seven pound object is clearly open and obvious to the ordinary user, so defendant did not have a duty to warn handlers of this risk.Id. see also Oubre v. EZ Serve, 713 So.2d 818 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1998).
Further, plaintiff cannot prove that the lack of a warning caused his accident. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that on the day of the accident the store was extremely busy. See Deposition of Jose Francisco Lopez at p. 80. He admits he should have asked for help, but moved the box by himself because all of the other employees were busy. Id. at pp. 131, 134. Further, he did not use the store's dolly to move the box because it was in use and he did not want to keep the customer waiting. Id. at pp. 134-135. This indicates that even if a warning had been present on the box, plaintiff would have moved it by himself. Plaintiff felt that the box had to be moved immediately and he was unwilling to wait for assistance, so the injury would have occurred even absent any warning. In these circumstances, defendant is not liable.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment IS GRANTED.