Opinion
H049986
12-14-2022
In re the Marriage of AARON LONGINOTTI and CLAUDIA KARPALA. v. CLAUDIA KARPALA, Respondent. AARON LONGINOTTI, Appellant,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 20FL002516
GREENWOOD, P. J.
After the trial court allowed respondent Claudia Karpala to move to Germany with the child she shares with appellant Aaron Longinotti, Claudia sought an award of child support and need-based attorney's fees and costs. In doing so, she alleged that Aaron received significant financial contributions from his parents, Rick and Aviva Longinotti (the Longinottis). Claudia alleged these contributions were gifts and asked the court to consider them when evaluating the parties' relative financial circumstances for purposes of its need-based attorney's fees award. Aaron contended that the contributions were loans that he must repay, and that neither he nor his parents could pay Claudia's attorney's fees. The trial court determined that the contributions were gifts, finding that Aaron's evidence to the contrary was not credible. It ordered Aaron to pay $53,000 of Claudia's attorney's fees and an additional $20,000 in anticipated attorney's fees for the appeal of a custody order.
As several of the people involved in this matter share the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names for the sake of clarity.
On appeal, Aaron argues that the trial court failed to make the findings required by Family Code section 2030, that the court erred in applying relevant legal authority, and that the court's findings and inferences are not supported by substantial evidence. We will affirm the order.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Aaron and Claudia married in 2016. They have one child from the marriage. The parties agree that the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution in 2021.
Following a trial in December 2021, the trial court granted Claudia's request to relocate with the then three-year-old child to Germany. The parties then disputed when Claudia was authorized to move to Germany with the child. In January 2022, Aaron filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging that the trial court erred in authorizing Claudia to remove the child to Germany before the automatic stay set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 had expired. We denied the petition as moot after the trial court complied with our alternative writ directing the trial court to enter a new order recognizing that the automatic stay mandated by Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 extends for 30 days from the filing of a final statement of decision. In February 2022, Aaron also appealed the custody order and filed a petition for writ of supersedeas seeking a further stay of the trial court's move-away order. We denied the request for a further stay, and Aaron dismissed his appeal from the custody order in May 2022.
"[I]n the absence of a writ or order of a reviewing court providing otherwise, the provisions of a judgment or order allowing . . . removal of the minor child from the state are stayed by operation of law . . . for a period of 30 calendar days from entry of judgment or order by any other trial court." (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7.) On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the docket in case number H049677 addressing Aaron's petition for writ of mandate and request for stay.
On appeal, the parties do not dispute that this additional custody litigation resulted in each party incurring additional attorney's fees, or that Claudia cited to the additional litigation as a basis for seeking need-based attorney's fees and costs. Aaron does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding fees based on the facts of the custody litigation. We will not discuss that litigation except where relevant to address the issues raised in this appeal from the attorney's fees order.
In March 2022, Claudia filed a request for guideline child support and attorney's fees and costs. She alleged that Aaron's parents "heavily subsidized" the parties' finances during the marriage. After the parties separated, Claudia contended Aaron's parents continued to provide significant financial support to Aaron, paying for his daily expenses, education, and on-going legal fees, in addition to providing him "monthly gift money."
Aaron opposed the request for attorney's fees and costs. He alleged that the litigation had exhausted all of his savings, requiring him to cash out his IRA in 2021. He had no income, as he was a full-time student, working towards a master's degree in psychology. Aaron claimed that his parents were loaning him money to pay for rent and living expenses, with the expectation that he would repay the loans. He had also borrowed money to pay his attorney's fees and costs. While he had been paying his own school tuition, because he had run out of savings, he anticipated borrowing additional funds for that purpose as well. At the time, the total debt he claimed to owe his parents was $226,000. Aaron's parents paid him these funds from their savings, which were exhausted, and a home equity line of credit.
Aaron provided a declaration from his father, Rick, in support of his claims. Rick declared that the Longinottis provided support to Aaron and Claudia during their marriage, in the form of rent-free living or direct payment of their rent and living expenses. After the parties separated, the Longinottis offered to contribute to Claudia's rent for three years, commencing in March 2021. When Claudia left for Germany with the parties' child in January 2022 in violation of our temporary stay, the Longinottis offered to buy her return ticket to the United States, and to make a financial contribution toward rent in the United States. Rick indicated that the Longinottis loaned Aaron money for his attorney's fees and living expenses, claiming they expected Aaron to repay the loans once he earned over $5,000 per month. Rick alleged that the Longinottis had "drained [their] only investment account and [were] now loaning Aaron funds out of [their] home equity line of credit." Attached to the declaration is a "loan agreement," indicating that the Longinottis gave Aaron interest free loans totaling $226,000 from July 10, 2021, through February 15, 2022. A handwritten note on the agreement states, "Payment on principal of $40,000 Dec 1, 2021 - RL."
At the hearing on her request, Claudia asked the court to consider monetary gifts received by Aaron in making child support and attorney's fees orders, in accordance with In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529 (Smith). Aaron argued that he did not have any income, and did not expect to have income for at least another year. He attempted to distinguish Smith and other caselaw by contending that the money he received from his parents was in the form of loans that he would be required to repay, citing the declaration provided by his father addressing his parents' financial situation.
Guided by this court's decision in In re Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718 (Alter), the court imputed Aaron with income for purposes of calculating child support, based on the recurring gifts he received from his parents to pay for his living expenses. The court noted that it was not until Claudia sought an award of attorney's fees that Aaron mentioned having to pay his parents back for the amounts they were giving him. The court found the evidence proffered concerning the Longinottis' expectation that Aaron would repay them not to be credible.
Regarding the attorney's fees request, Claudia alleged that the Longinottis owned numerous properties, some of which produced rental income. She also noted that after representing that they could no longer afford to finance Aaron's litigation, his parents subsequently paid for an expert and at least two additional lawyers on his behalf to challenge her request to relocate to Germany with the child. Claudia further argued that the Longinottis' claim that the money they provided to Aaron was a loan was contradicted by Aaron's mother's deposition testimony, wherein she indicated there was no end to what they would pay and did not believe that the money was a loan to Aaron. Claudia did not introduce the deposition testimony into evidence. To the extent Aaron would have to take a loan from his parents to pay attorney's fees, Claudia cited In re Marriage of Hofer (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 454 (Hofer) for the proposition that the court can require a party to borrow money under appropriate circumstances.
Aaron argued that none of the legal authority cited by Claudia allowed the court to consider the Longinottis' purported assets as a basis for paying an attorney's fee award, contending that doing so effectively would make the parents a party to the litigation. He argued that there was no evidence before the court concerning the Longinottis' assets or ability to pay Claudia's attorney's fees apart from Rick's declaration.
The trial court granted Claudia's request for attorney's fees, reiterating its finding that the payments from the Longinottis to Aaron were "regular, recurrent monetary gifts intended to support for living expenses." Citing Smith, the court determined it could consider the Longinottis' payment of Aaron's fees as a gift in determining whether to grant Claudia's request. While noting factual differences between this case and Hofer, the court found the Hofer opinion relevant, stating, "I don't have confidence that I know the full extent of [the Longinottis'] money, assets available or the amount they actually do give [Aaron] every month." The court further indicated that Aaron's "credibility in this regard is affected by his failure to disclose the E-Trade accounts on his income and expense declarations, and they aren't attached to his income and expense declaration now, where he did take the time to include other documents he would have the court consider, including the statement from the Sapphire account that shows a purported debt there." The court expressed doubt over Aaron's explanations regarding his arrangement to repay the Longinottis, and found a "strong indication" in its review of the "history of the income and expense declarations" "that [the Longinottis] were providing [the parties] all of the income they need to meet their living expenses." That Aaron had expenses that exceeded his income and minimal balances on his credit cards provided "substantial evidence" to the court "that [Aaron] was having all of his living expenses met by [the Longinottis] at this time." Aaron had not disclosed these payments on the income and expense declaration he filed in support of a 2022 fee waiver request. The court relied on circumstantial evidence, including an offer by the Longinottis to pay Claudia $250,000 to stay in California, to determine that the Longinottis had "substantial assets."
The trial court found, "the facts are consistent with [Aaron] having unlimited access to funds to pay for his legal fees," such that it had concern "that [Claudia] will be, is, has been financially out matched and that's the situation that the law asked the court, compels the court to address." It determined that Claudia had need for $53,000 to pay her trial attorney, and $20,000 to retain counsel to defend against Aaron's appeal from the move-away order.
The trial court issued a written order in April 2022, consistent with the findings and orders it made at the hearing. Aaron timely appealed from that order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).)
Although the April 2022 order includes child support orders, Aaron does not dispute them on appeal. Nor does he dispute the trial court's findings regarding Claudia's need for attorney's fees under section 2030. He bases his appeal on the court's findings regarding his ability to pay Claudia's fees. We focus our discussion accordingly.
A. General legal principles.
Family Code section 2030 requires the trial court to ensure that each party in a dissolution proceeding has access to legal representation "by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party, or to the other party's attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney's fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding." (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) When a party requests fees under section 2030, the trial court must make three explicit findings when ruling on the request: "[1] whether an award of attorney's fees and costs . . . is appropriate, [2] whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and [3] whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties." (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2); In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050 (Morton).) Where the findings demonstrate a disparity in access to funds to pay for counsel and that one party has the financial ability to pay for the legal representation of both, the court must grant a needs-based attorney's fees request. (Id. at pp. 1053-1054.)
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
"The purpose of section 2030 is to ensure parity. 'The idea is that both sides should have the opportunity to retain counsel, not just (as is usually the case) only the party with greater financial strength.' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056.) Thus, under section 2032 the court must consider what is "just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties," (§ 2032, subd. (a)) as well as "the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party's case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320." (§ 2032, subd. (b); In re Marriage of Dietz (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 406.) The trial court's task is "to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances." (§ 2032, subd. (b).) In short, the intent of sections 2030 and 2032 is to award fees to a requesting party who has a demonstrated financial need so that both parties can fairly litigate their family law case.
We review an order granting fees and costs under section 2030 for abuse of discretion and will not reverse the trial court's order absent a showing that no judge could reasonably have made the order, favorably viewing all evidence in support of the order and upholding findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Schleich (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 267, 295.) We consider whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the court followed established legal principles, as a failure to do so is itself an abuse of discretion. (See Morton, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039; Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 721.) We presume that the trial court's order is correct, such that Aaron, as the appellant, has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate any error. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.)
Claudia included limited citations to the record in her respondent's brief. We will disregard any unsupported assertions in the brief. Both Aaron and Claudia reference in their briefs matters that occurred, and provide documents in their appendices that were filed, after the trial court issued the order being reviewed in this appeal. On appeal, this court disregards matters that occurred after the rendition of the order being appealed, except in limited circumstances that are not present in this appeal. (See Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813; Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 382-383.) We will not consider pleadings and other evidence that was not before the trial court at the time it issued the April 26, 2022 order. Similarly, absent evidence that the certified transcript of the deposition of Aaron's mother was before the trial court, we will not consider that transcript, provided by Claudia in her appendix.
B. The trial court made the findings required by section 2030.
Relying on the court's written statement of findings, Aaron first contends the trial court erred by failing to make the findings required by section 2030. Based on our careful review of the record, we discern no error here. The court indicated in its statement, "there is a considerable disparity between the parties," and "[Claudia] clearly has the need to pay for an appellate attorney and the bill with [her trial attorney]. It further stated, "The court must consider whether there is parity with the two sides being equally represented and in order to come close to achieving parity the court finds that a fee order is needed and appropriate under the facts and the law." The court considered the Longinottis' payment of Aaron's expenses and attorney's fees in determining whether to order Aaron to pay Claudia's fees and found there was evidence of Aaron's ability to pay through funds from his parents. The trial court sufficiently complied with the requirements of section 2030 in setting forth these findings, as it addressed the appropriateness of an attorney's fees award, the disparity in the parties' access to funds, and Aaron's ability to pay. (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).)
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Aaron to pay Claudia's attorney's fees.
Aaron argues that the trial court erred by wrongly interpreting Smith and Hofer to conclude that he had received regular gifts from his parents that could provide the basis for a fees award. He further contends there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's factual findings characterizing his parents' financial contributions as gifts, their ability to pay Claudia's fees, and other inferences the court drew in ruling on Claudia's request. We conclude that the trial court followed established legal principles and did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order. We further conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the findings necessary to support the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Claudia.
Aaron does not dispute that the trial court can award attorney's fees under section 2030 upon a finding of disparity and ability to pay. He contends the trial court improperly applied case precedent to determine that he had the ability to pay Claudia's fees. He first argues that the holding in Smith does not support the trial court's order. In Smith, the trial court ordered one party to pay the other's attorney's fees and costs under section 2030 based on evidence that the payor's father paid her attorney's fees from funds described as a loan against the payor's future inheritance. The appellate court affirmed, holding that it was proper for the trial court to consider these funds in determining the parties' relative circumstances. (Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-534.) The evidence showed that the payor's father intended to continue supporting the payor's litigation efforts through the end of the proceedings. (Id. at p. 534.) "It was well within the trial court's discretion to consider such regular, substantial infusions of cash as part of its determination of the relative circumstances of the respective parties and their ability to maintain or defend the proceedings. . . . [¶] Indeed, to conclude the trial court was required to exclude those funds from consideration would vitiate one of the primary purposes of section 2030 and section 2032, to prevent one party from being able to 'litigate[ ] [the opposing party] out of the case,' by taking advantage of their disparate financial circumstances. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Rather, it is appropriate for the trial court to "look[] to the economic reality of the situation, rather than the labels [the payor] prefers to apply." (Ibid.)
In so holding, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the payor's father was not obligated to continue paying her attorney's fees and could stop doing so at any time. "This circumstance, however, does not distinguish the funds [the payor] received from her father from any other source of income:' "Few, if any, sources of income are certain to continue unchanged year in and year out. . . ." [¶] . . . It is irrelevant that there is no legal obligation on the part of the donor to continue making the gifts. . . .' (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 736-737, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 849.) The trial court acted within its discretion by rejecting [the payor's] plea of poverty for purposes of apportioning the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties." (Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.)
In Alter, this court held that the trial court has discretion to consider recurring gifts of money as income for purposes of calculating guideline child support. (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722-723.) The payor spouse admitted that his mother paid for many of his living expenses, although he claimed that his mother loaned him the money, producing unitemized promissory notes that were signed on the same day. (Id. at p. 724.) The payee spouse argued that the payor's mother commenced providing the couple $4,000 per month "on a regular basis" during the marriage, money the payee understood to be a gift, not a loan. (Id. at p. 725.) The trial court included $7,000 per month in non-taxable income in determining the payor's income for calculating child support. (Id. at p. 726.) On appeal, this court concluded that "nothing in the law prohibits considering gifts to be income for purposes of child support so long as the gifts bear a reasonable relationship to the traditional meaning of income as a recurrent monetary benefit. But while regular gifts of cash may fairly represent income, that might not always be so. Therefore, the question of whether gifts should be considered income for purposes of the child support calculation is one that must be left to the discretion of the trial court." (Id. at p. 737.)
In so ruling, we rejected the payor's contention that the money he received from his mother was a loan. "The evidence amply supports the [trial] court's conclusion [that the money was a gift]. [The payor's] mother had paid many of the children's expenses for most of their lives. She had given [the parties] $4,000 per month during their marriage. She had paid the bulk of [the payor's] legal bills associated with this litigation, and had volunteered to make up the difference in [the payor's] support payments. There was no evidence that [the payor] had ever repaid any of the money. A logical inference would be that [the payor's] mother was very generous and did not expect to be repaid." (Alter, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 731.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it relied on Smith and Alter here as the record demonstrates that Aaron had a regular income stream provided to him by his parents. While Aaron asserted that his parents loaned him money and did not gift it to him, the trial court found the Longinottis' claims that they expected to be repaid, and that they had run out of funds to pay Aaron's expenses, not credible. Aaron contends that the trial court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence, but whether or not a reasonable trier of fact might have weighed credibility differently, sufficient evidence supported the trial court's findings here. The declaration from Aaron's father confirms that the Longinottis provided support to Aaron and Claudia during their marriage in the form of rent-free accommodations or direct payment of expenses. After the parties separated, the Longinottis offered in March 2021 to contribute to Claudia's rent for three years. When Claudia went to Germany with the parties' child in January 2022, the Longinottis offered to buy her return ticket to the United States, and to make a financial contribution toward her rent. The declaration does not include any indication that the Longinottis expected Aaron and/or Claudia to repay any of the financial contributions they offered to Claudia after the parties separated; there is no evidence these amounts were included in the loan agreement attached to Rick's declaration. Rick confirmed that the Longinottis provided on-going financial support to Aaron for his attorney's fees and living expenses. The trial court was entitled to doubt the claim that the Longinottis could not afford to assist Aaron, or that their assistance was going to stop at any point in the near future.
Evidence in the form of Rick's declaration distinguishes the case before us from the authorities cited by Aaron. The appellate courts in In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313-1314, and In re Marriage of Schultze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 531-532, determined there was insufficient evidence to support a trial court finding that gifts or loans from a payor spouse's parents would continue in the future. Here, Rick provided a declaration stating that the Longinottis' intended to continue their provision of financial assistance to Aaron.
Aaron cites the loan agreement and record of partial repayment attached to Rick's declaration to argue that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's characterization of the funding stream from his parents as gifts. But the trial court did not find Rick credible when he asserted that the Longinottis' recurring financial support was a loan." 'The trial court sits as trier of fact and it is called upon to determine that a witness is to be believed or not believed. This is the nature of fact finding. "The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence . . . ." [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'In that role, the judge may reject any evidence as unworthy of credence, even uncontradicted testimony. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'We do not judge credibility on appeal. An adverse factual finding is a poor platform upon which to predicate reversible error.' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 319.)
Additional evidence in the record further supports the trial court's finding that Aaron was receiving gifts and not loans from his parents. Aaron disclosed a $40,000 "loan" from his parents in the income and expense declaration he filed in August 2021.In the same document, he reported that his parents were paying $4,854 for various of his expenses, as well as an additional $1,416 per month as a gift towards his legal fees. In March 2021, Aaron also filed a declaration with the trial court in response to Claudia's move-away request, confirming that his parents subsidized the parties' living expenses during their marriage, had offered to rent Claudia a unit in the complex where the parties were living, and to provide other financial assistance to Claudia while Aaron completed his degree, without characterizing any of this assistance as requiring repayment. As confirmed by Rick in the declaration he provided regarding attorney fees and costs, in November 2021, the Longinottis agreed to support Claudia financially "once [she] had agreed to an equitable custody schedule," again without describing the support as a loan. In seeking to persuade Claudia to return from Germany with the child in 2022, Aaron sent her messages indicating that his parents would pay money to an apartment manager once Claudia located a place to stay in the area where he lived. The evidence of the Longinottis' willingness to pay Claudia's expenses in an effort to maintain the child locally, without evidence that their offers were conditioned on reimbursement of the sums paid, supports the trial court's finding that the Longinottis were willing and able to provide financial support to Aaron and his family without the need for repayment, despite their assertions to the contrary at the attorney's fees hearing.
We agree with Aaron that the trial court incorrectly stated that Aaron did not disclose the $40,000 payment at the hearing on Claudia's attorney's fees request. Similarly, the evidence shows that Aaron did, at minimum, refer to the existence of investment and retirement accounts in his August 2021 income and expense declaration, despite failing to expressly disclose the amounts before he liquidated the accounts. To the extent that the trial court erred in its characterization of Aaron's disclosures, we conclude that these errors did not substantially impact the trial court's finding that Aaron was financially supported by his parents. (In re Marriage of Wang & Zhou (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1108.)
The Longinottis' additional assets were discussed at the hearing. The trial court noted that "There was an offer by [the Longinottis] to pay [Claudia] $250,000 if she stayed [in the United States]. There was no indication that they were asking her to pay it back." While neither party cites to the record on appeal for evidence of such an offer, in his opening brief Aaron confirms that, "The Court's information came from my mother's testimony at the trial that I had made a settlement offer to [Claudia] prior to the trial. The details of that settlement offer (that were not discussed at the trial) were that the $250,000 be paid over a ten year period." The trial court also gave credence to Claudia's claims made at the hearing that the Longinottis had significant real property assets they could and/or were using to pay Aaron's expenses. In his opening brief, Aaron confirms that the Longinottis own various real property assets, although he contends the holdings are less significant than as reported by Claudia and apparently accepted by the trial court. We treat Aaron's representation in the brief as a concession. (See Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 506, fn. 1.)
Aaron argues that the trial court improperly relied on Hofer in finding that it did not know the full extent of assets available to Aaron through his parents. In Hofer, the appellate court applied the disentitlement doctrine to dismiss the payor spouse's appeal from an attorney's fees order because he withheld evidence of his income and assets and declined to abide by the rules of discovery. (Hofer, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at pp. 458-460.) Aaron correctly notes that Hofer is distinguishable from the facts here. The court in Hofer was not considering the payment of financial support by a third party to the payor spouse. And, unlike the recalcitrant spouse in Hofer, Aaron did not refuse to comply with court-ordered discovery, although his disclosures may have been incomplete. Nor do we read Hofer as justifying the court basing an award of attorney's fees on the lack of information available from a parent who provides funds to an adult child. Thus, to the extent the trial court decided that Aaron should pay attorney's fees because he provided less than full disclosure of his assets, or because the full extent of the Longinottis' financial means was not known to the trial court, we agree that the award of attorney's fees on such bases would be improper.
However, it is a fundamental principle of appellate review that we will affirm the trial court's order if it is correct on any legal theory, even if the trial court's reasoning was wrong. (Davey v. South Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal.325 329-330; Young v. California Fish & Game Comm'n (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1192-1193.) Here, substantial evidence demonstrates that obtaining funds to pay Claudia's attorney's fees from the Longinottis will not work a miscarriage of justice on Aaron. There is a longstanding history of the Longinottis providing a recurring income stream to pay Aaron's living and legal expenses, and there is substantial evidence within the record supporting the trial court's finding that those payments were gifts, not loans. There is ample evidence that the Longinottis were willing to fund Claudia's return to the United States and to support her here if she would live locally with their grandchild. Thus the award is justified, not as a penalty for nondisclosure of assets by Aaron and the Longinottis, but because the record demonstrates that Aaron received recurring financial assistance from his parents that was, in effect, income as in Smith and Alter.
That a different result might have also been "reasonable" does not require this court to reverse the trial court's order. We consider only whether the trial court's result was unreasonable. (See In re Marriage of O'Connor (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 877, 884.) We cannot say that the trial court's decision was arbitrary in its assessment of the parties' economic reality, and thus allocated the costs of litigation so that each side had adequate representation consistent with the intent of sections 2030 and 2032. (Smith, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that there is a disparity in the parties' access to funds to retain counsel and that Aaron can pay his and Claudia's attorney's fees based on recurring gifts he receives from his parents. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the attorney's fees order.
We do not intend our affirmance here-deferentially reviewing a trial court's discretionary award of fees-as a comment on the merits of the parties' ongoing litigation in the trial court.
III. Disposition
The April 26, 2022 order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Grover, J., Lie, J.