Opinion
No. 03-CV-2359 (FB)
November 13, 2003
PETER C. LOMTEVAS, Ozone Park, NY, for the Plaintiff
ELIOT SPITZER, ESQ., New York, NY, for the Defendant
CHARLES F. SANDERS, New York, NY, for the Defendant
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, pro se plaintiff Peter C. Lomtevas, an attorney, alleges in his complaint that the definition of "child support" under the New York Family Court Act ("NYFCA") is inconsistent with the meaning of that term under the federal Social Security Act and is therefore unconstitutional as violative of the Supremacy Clause. Defendant State of New York moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or, alternately, on abstention grounds. The Court determines that abstention is appropriate under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and dismisses the complaint.
I.
Lomtevas's complaint states that in a divorce proceeding approximately sixteen years ago, he was awarded sole custody of a minor child and ordered to make "a $50 weekly payment that was labeled as `child support' in the divorce judgment[,]" Compl. at ¶ 4; that his ex-wife "abducted their child to Germany 16 years ago and raised him to adulthood without [his] knowledge of his whereabouts[,]" id.; that she initiated a proceeding against him in New York Family Court under the NYFCA to collect $39,000 in child support arrears, apparently because he did not make the weekly payments during the child's absence, see id.; and that he is challenging the Family Court action.Lomtevas's prayer for relief requests that the Court "strik[e] . . . th[e allegedly unconstitutional] definition, and . . . refer . . . that provision to New York's legislature to rewrite that definition such that it will parallel the federal definition." Id. at ¶ 5. He also seeks an "[a]n evaluation by New York State of all divorce decrees' child support orders being enforced under New York's unconstitutional definition of child support, and refunds for improperly assessed payments and arrears to victimized parents." Id.
II.
"[F]ederal abstention [under Younger] rests foursquare on the notion that, in the ordinary course, `a state proceeding provides an adequate forum for the vindication of federal constitutional rights.'" Diamond ""D"" Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002). " Younger abstention is required when three conditions are met: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is implicated in that proceeding; and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of the federal constitutional claims." Id. "In determining whether the `important state interest' requirement has been met, [courts]. . . do not look narrowly to [the state's] interest in the outcome of the particular case/but rather look to `the importance of the generic proceedings to the state.'" Philip Morris, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 123 F.3d 103, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365, (1989)).Here, each of the three conditions is satisfied. First, there is an ongoing state proceeding; Lomtevas is challenging the Family Court action. Second, the NYFCA's definition of "child support" and actions to enforce child support orders under the NYFCA implicate not only important state interests, but also issues of comity. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) ("Family relations are a traditional area of state concern."); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States."); Alleyne v. City of New York, 244 F. Supp.2d 214, 216 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that in a prior decision in that case, "the Court held that because the State Proceeding involved the important, traditional state interest of family relations and was adequate to resolve plaintiff's constitutional claims, the doctrine of abstention applied."). Finally, Lomtevas will be able to challenge New York's definition of "child support" and its application to his case in the ongoing state court proceeding, if he has not done so already. He does not allege, and there is no reason to believe, that the New York courts could not afford him the opportunity for judicial review of his constitutional challenge. Because the Younger abstention conditions are satisfied, the Court dismisses Lomtevas's complaint. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 719 ("federal courts not only have the power to stay the action based on abstention principles, but can also . . . decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by . . . dismissing the suit.").
CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion is granted, and the complaint is dimissed.
SO ORDERED.