Opinion
No. 110, 2003
Submitted: August 12, 2003
Decided: October 7, 2003
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County Cr. I.D. No. 0209003846
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 7th day of October, 2003, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
1) Merl Lofland appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, of forgery second degree and criminal impersonation. Lofland argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he gave to the police, in which Lofland identified himself as Roger Bungy.
2) Shortly after midnight on September 5, 2002, Wilmington Police Officer Donald Witte spotted Lofland and another man standing by the passenger side of a white minivan on Bowers Street, a well-known drug area in Wilmington, Delaware. One of the men was leaning inside the van. When Witte approached, the men immediately started walking in opposite directions. Lofland headed toward a nearby housing project, but Witte blocked Lofland's path with his police car.
3) Witte thought that Lofland's behavior was consistent with drug activity, so Witte ordered him to stop and place his hands on the police car for a weapons pat down search.
When Witte asked Lofland for his name, Lofland gave the name Roger Bungy. Witte issued Lofland a summons for loitering, which Lofland signed with the name Bungy.
4) Witte later became suspicious about Lofland's identity, and went to Bungy's residence. After talking with Bungy's mother, Witte called Bungy at work. Bungy told Witte that his friend, Merl Lofland, had just called and told Bungy that he had used his name when stopped by the police in order to avoid being arrested for two outstanding capiases. Witte followed up on the information he had been given and determined that the person he stopped, who claimed to be Bungy, was Lofland.
5) Lofland moved to suppress his false identification on the ground that Witte had no reasonable suspicion that Lofland had committed a crime and no probable cause to arrest him for loitering. The trial court held a suppression hearing and concluded that Witte had an articulable suspicion to stop Lofland pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1902(a). We agree.
6) Witte knew that Bowers Street was a drug trafficking area, and he saw Lofland engaged in conduct that was "consistent with drug activity." When pressed about the significance of what he observed (two men next to a minivan with one man's head leaned into the passenger side of the car), Witte explained:
"They have what they call touters out there in Riverside. What happens is that the touters approach the vehicle, find out what the people want, go out into the courtyards to get from the dealer — that's the way it's done in Riverside." Given Witte's knowledge of the way drug deals were done in that neighborhood, his observation of Lofland's conduct was enough to create a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Lofland was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs.
Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999).
7) Lofland also argues that Witte lacked probable cause to arrest him for loitering.
That argument is moot, however, since Lofland was acquitted of the loitering charge.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.