Opinion
09-21-2016
In the Matter of Pamela LOCKLEY, et al., petitioners, v. HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW YORK CITY, et al., respondents.
Pamela Lockley, Brooklyn, N.Y., and Lavonda Jones, Brooklyn, NY, petitioners pro se (one brief filed). Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow and Ingrid R. Gustafson of counsel), for respondent New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, sued herein as Housing Preservation and Development of New York City. Peter C. Neger, New York, N.Y. (Stephen M. Medow of counsel; Erik Wilson on the brief), for respondents RY Management Co., Inc., Linden Plaza Preservation, Linden Plaza Associates, Linden Plaza Group, LLC, and Linden Plaza Housing, LLC.
Pamela Lockley, Brooklyn, N.Y., and Lavonda Jones, Brooklyn, NY, petitioners pro se (one brief filed).
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow and Ingrid R. Gustafson of counsel), for respondent New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, sued herein as Housing Preservation and Development of New York City.
Peter C. Neger, New York, N.Y. (Stephen M. Medow of counsel; Erik Wilson on the brief), for respondents RY Management Co., Inc., Linden Plaza Preservation, Linden Plaza Associates, Linden Plaza Group, LLC, and Linden Plaza Housing, LLC.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, SANDRA L. SGROI, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
Opinion Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review (a) a determination of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development dated May 22, 2012, which, after a hearing, granted the application of the respondent Linden Plaza Preservation for a certificate authorizing it to commence a proceeding to evict the petitioner Pamela Lockley from her apartment, and (b) a determination of the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development dated May 29, 2012, which, after a hearing, granted the application of the respondent Linden Plaza Preservation for a certificate authorizing it to commence a proceeding to evict the petitioner Lavonda Jones from her apartment.
ADJUDGED that the determinations are confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.
Under New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (hereinafter HPD) rules, a housing company participating in the Mitchell–Lama housing program (see Private Housing Finance Law § 10 et seq. ) is prohibited from initiating an eviction proceeding based upon a holdover or a breach of the terms of the lease “without the issuance of a certificate of eviction by HPD following an administrative hearing by an HPD designated hearing officer” (28 RCNY 3–18[a]; see Wong v. Gouverneur Gardens Hous. Corp., 308 A.D.2d 301, 304, 764 N.Y.S.2d 53 ). “To annul an administrative determination made after a hearing directed by law at which evidence is taken, a court must conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination” (Matter of Rabinovich v. Commissioner of Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of N.Y., 107 A.D.3d 1002, 1002, 966 N.Y.S.2d 915 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 7803[4] ; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 179–181, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 ; Matter of Delgrande v. Greenville Fire Dist., 132 A.D.3d 987, 18 N.Y.S.3d 178 ).
Here, substantial evidence was adduced at the respective administrative hearings to support HPD's determinations that the petitioners breached the terms of their respective leases by failing to comply with the request of the respondent Linden Plaza Preservation (hereinafter the landlord) for certain recertification documents which the landlord was obligated to collect in order to comply with governmental requirements. Therefore, the landlord was entitled to certificates authorizing it to commence an eviction proceeding against each of the petitioners (see generally 28 RCNY 3–18[a]; Matter of Rabinovich v. Commissioner of Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev. of City of N.Y., 107 A.D.3d at 1002, 966 N.Y.S.2d 915 ). The petitioners' remaining contentions are either not properly before this Court, as they were not raised at the administrative level (see Matter of Peckham v. Calogero, 12 N.Y.3d 424, 430, 883 N.Y.S.2d 751, 911 N.E.2d 813 ; Matter of Calenzo v. Shah, 112 A.D.3d 709, 712, 976 N.Y.S.2d 555 ; Matter of Moro v. Mills, 70 A.D.3d 1269, 1269–1270, 896 N.Y.S.2d 493 ), or without merit.