Opinion
B330782
04-25-2024
MILLER LIU, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LANTERPRISE, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
Miller Liu, in pro per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Thomas Business Law Group and Stephen J. Thomas for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 20PSCV00849, Wesley L. Hsu and Peter A. Hernandez, Judges.
Miller Liu, in pro per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Thomas Business Law Group and Stephen J. Thomas for Defendant and Respondent.
FEUER, J.
Miller Liu appeals from a judgment following the trial court's grant of Lanterprise, Inc.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Liu has forfeited his claims of error because he fails to provide record citations or any legal authority to support his arguments. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Prior Lanterprise Action and Default Judgment
On February 21, 2020 Lanterprise filed a complaint against Liu and his wife, Natalie Liu, for breach of contract and a common count for goods and services rendered (the Lanterprise action). As to the breach of contract cause of action, Lanterprise alleged that on September 30, 2018 the Lius entered into a written contract with Lanterprise for construction of an Accessory Dwelling Unit (ADU) on the Lius' property located in Rowland Heights. Lanterprise "performed all promises required of it under the Contract except those excused or made impossible by actions of defendants." On August 11, 2019 Lanterprise presented the Lius with an invoice for completed work, and the Lius failed to pay the amount due. With respect to the common count, Lanterprise alleged, "From September 2018 to August 2019, defendants became indebted to Plaintiff for goods and services rendered to defendants at defendants' request for which defendants promised to pay a fixed price." Lanterprise sought damages of at least $25,000 on each count.
Natalie Liu is not a party to this action.
"'The common count is a general pleading which seeks recovery of money without specifying the nature of the claim.'" (Title Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1992) 4 Cal.4th 715, 731; accord, Korchemny v. Piterman (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1047 ["'A common count is not a specific cause of action, however; rather, it is a simplified form of pleading normally used to aver the existence of various forms of monetary indebtedness.'"].)
On April 27, 2020 Lanterprise filed a request for entry of default against the Lius. The court clerk entered the default on the same day. The trial court subsequently denied the Lius' motions to set aside the entry of default, to quash, and for reconsideration. On January 12, 2021 the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Lanterprise against the Lius, awarding Lanterprise $25,000 in damages and $503.70 in costs.
Judge Peter A. Hernandez entered the default judgment in the Lanterprise action and presided over the initial motions filed prior to March 2023 in this action.
B. Liu's Complaint in This Action
On December 7, 2020 Liu filed a complaint for breach of contract and "intentional destruction of property" against Lanterprise, Waiming Li (Lanterprise's owner and chief executive officer), and Weiheng Zhen (the construction manager involved in construction of the ADU on Liu's property) (collectively, the Lanterprise defendants). Liu alleged that as construction of the ADU progressed, he made payments by check totaling "$170,000 towards the $180,000 projected costs for building the ADU." Further, on August 15, 2019 Li presented Liu with a two-page change order for "'Outside Improvements'" for gas connections, a gas meter, water connections, a water meter, and drainage, totaling $21,965 in additional costs. Liu alleged the Lanterprise defendants breached the contract by failing to finish construction of the ADU and attempting to charge Liu an additional $21,965 for outside improvements that were included in the contract. Further, Liu was excused from paying Lanterprise the remaining $10,000 of project costs as a result of the breach. Liu also alleged in the cause of action for intentional destruction of property that the Lanterprise defendants drilled a hole in one of the new metal pipes, causing water to leak, and removed an expensive electrical breaker in the ADU.
C. The Lanterprise Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings
On August 23, 2021 the Lanterprise defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. They argued Liu was barred from bringing this action because he was required to assert his claims in a compulsory cross-complaint in the prior Lanterprise action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 426.30. They further argued Liu could not avoid the compulsory cross- complaint bar by alleging Li and Zhen were the alter egos of Lanterprise.
Code of Civil Procedure section 426.30 provides: "(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, if a party against whom a complaint has been filed and served fails to allege in a crosscomplaint any related cause of action which (at the time of serving his answer to the complaint) he has against the plaintiff, such party may not thereafter in any other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause of action not pleaded. [¶] (b) This section does not apply if either of the following are established: [¶] (1) The court in which the action is pending does not have jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the person who failed to plead the related cause of action. [¶] (2) The person who failed to plead the related cause of action did not file an answer to the complaint against him." Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
In his opposition, Liu argued the compulsory cross-complaint bar of section 426.30, subdivision (a), did not apply because Liu did not file an answer to the complaint in the prior Lanterprise action. (§ 426.30, subd. (b)(2).) Liu asserted that he was precluded from answering the Lanterprise complaint because the court clerk entered a default against him after he failed to timely answer the complaint, and the trial court denied his motion to set aside entry of default. Liu also argued section 426.30 did not apply to Li and Zhen because they were not parties to the Lanterprise action. On November 19, 2021 the trial court denied the Lanterprise defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, agreeing with Liu that the compulsory cross-complaint bar pursuant to section 426.30, subdivision (a), did not apply.
On February 3, 2022 the Lanterprise defendants again moved for judgment on the pleadings. They argued the action was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel (claim and issue preclusion) because Liu's causes of action were necessarily decided against him by the default judgment in the Lanterprise action. In his opposition, Liu argued the Lanterprise defendants waived their claim preclusion defense by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense in their answer. The trial court agreed and denied the motion.
On February 22, 2023 the Lanterprise defendants filed a third motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the affirmative defense of claim preclusion. They argued the default judgment in the Lanterprise action precluded Liu from bringing this action. After a hearing on March 23, the trial court set the motion for oral argument, explaining it would consider the third motion for judgment of the pleadings on the merits because the denials of the prior two motions for judgment on the pleadings were based on procedural defects that the Lanterprise defendants had cured. The court granted the third motion for judgment on the pleadings, and on May 4 the court entered judgment in favor of the Lanterprise defendants.
On February 15, 2023 the trial court granted the Lanterprise defendants' motion to file a first amended answer to allege claim preclusion as an affirmative defense.
Judge Wesley L. Hsu presided over the Lanterprise defendants' third motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment in this action.
Liu timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
"[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; accord, Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) "'This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' [Citations.] 'In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court's action will be made by the appellate court. "[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented."'" (Jameson, at p. 609; accord, Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 822, 833.)
Further, to overcome the presumption that the judgment is correct, the appellant "must affirmatively establish prejudicial error by providing an adequate record, citing to the record, and presenting a persuasive argument with citations to supportive legal authorities." (LNSU#1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070; accord, Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721 [appellant's "burden on appeal 'includes the obligation to present argument and legal authority on each point raised'"].) "It is not our role as an appellate court independently to review the record for error and to construct arguments for appellants that would require reversal of the judgment." (LNSU#1, LLC, at p. 1070; accord, United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.)
Liu contends the trial court erred in granting Lanterprise's third motion for judgment on the pleadings because the causes of action in the Lanterprise action and this action do not have "the same occurrence and cause," and the trial court "wrongly connected [the] two case[s]." In his statement of facts, Liu asserts the Lanterprise action involved a claim for extra work for "outdoor underground plumbing work," whereas Liu's complaint in this action alleged property damage and replacement of electrical breakers with unqualified breakers. Liu also asserts that the first judge (Judge Hernandez) denied Lanterprise's prior motions for judgment on the pleadings, yet the newly assigned judge (Judge Hsu) granted the third motion without Liu's appearance at the hearing. Liu makes these arguments without any citation to the record or legal authority to support his claims of error.
Although the trial court granted judgment in favor of Lanterprise, Lin, and Zhen, Liu only names Lanterprise as the respondent in his appellate briefs.
Liu also failed to designate for inclusion in the appellate record the minute order from the April 11, 2023 hearing on the third motion for judgment on the pleadings or a transcript or settled statement for the hearing. Further, the civil case information statement only attaches the May 4, 2023 judgment and notice of entry of judgment. We therefore cannot tell whether Liu appeared at the hearing, what arguments were made, or the basis for the trial court's order granting the third motion for judgment on the pleadings.
We acknowledge a self-represented litigant's understanding of the rules on appeal are, as a practical matter, more limited than that of an experienced appellate attorney. Whenever possible, we do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a manner that deprives litigants of a hearing. However, we are required to apply the rules on appeal and substantive rules of law to a self-represented litigant's claims on appeal, just as we would to those litigants who are represented by trained legal counsel. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; accord, County of Sacramento v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861 [a self-represented litigant "is entitled to the same but no greater consideration than other litigants"].) Thus, Liu must follow the rules of appellate procedure, which "require an appellate brief to support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation to authority and to provide a citation to the record for a factual assertion." (County of Sacramento, at p. 861; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) &(C) [an appellate brief must "[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority" and "[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears"].)
Because Liu fails to provide any citations to the record or legal authority, he has forfeited his claims of error. (LNSU#1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070 ["[W]here, as here, the appellants' opening brief makes contentions unsupported by proper record citations or cogent legal arguments, we may treat the contentions as forfeited."]; County of Sacramento v. Singh, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 861 ["we may treat a point that is not supported by cogent legal argument as forfeited"]; Lee v. Kim, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 721 ["'"When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited]."'"].) And even if we were to consider his forfeited claims of error, we do not have a sufficient record or legal argument on which to decide whether the trial court committed prejudicial error warranting reversal of the judgment.
A default judgment "'"does not apply to issues which were not raised in the pleadings. Nor, subject to the rule that the judgment is conclusive as to every fact necessary to uphold it, is a default judgment conclusive, in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action, against any defenses defendant may have, although the same defenses, if pleaded and proved in the former action, would have defeated plaintiff's recovery, because in the absence of a trial and hearing in the first suit, it cannot be said that such matters were adjudicated therein."'" (English v. English (1937) 9 Cal.2d 358, 363-364; accord, Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 149 ["'"[A] default judgment conclusively establishes, between the parties so far as subsequent proceedings on a different cause of action are concerned, the truth of all material allegations contained in the complaint in the first action, and every fact necessary to uphold the default judgment; but such judgment is not conclusive as to any defense or issue which was not raised and is not necessary to uphold the judgment."'"].) In the absence of any record of the hearing on the third motion for judgment on the pleadings or any analysis of the relationship between the causes of action in the Lanterprise action and this action, we cannot determine whether the trial court erred in finding Liu's claims were barred by claim preclusion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Lanterprise is to recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: SEGAL, Acting P. J., MARTINEZ, J.