Opinion
CASE NO. C11-1387JLR
November 23, 2011.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CROSS MOTIONS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Brenda Little filed an 18 count complaint against Defendants State of Washington ("the State"), Washington State Bar Association ("the WSBA"), Seattle School District No. 1 ("the Seattle School District"), and Clover Park School District. (Compl. (Dkt. # 16).) Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ( See Dkt. ## 20, 22, 24, 27.) Ms. Little then moved to voluntarily dismiss the State with prejudice (Dkt. # 32), which the court granted (Order (Dkt. # 14)). Ms. Little also filed cross motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to dismiss the WSBA's, Seattle School District's, and Clover Park School District's motions to dismiss. ( See Dkt. ## 33, 34, 36.) Defendants' motions to dismiss and Ms. Little's cross motions are now before the court. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the balance of the record, and the governing law, and having determined oral argument unnecessary, the court GRANTS the WSBA's, Seattle School District's, and Clover Park School District's motions to dismiss (Dkt. ## 20, 22, 27), and DENIES Ms. Little's cross motions (Dkt. ## 33, 34, 36). The court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Little's complaint and GRANTS her leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of entry of this order.
The caption of Ms. Little's complaint identifies her as "an attorney on leave." (Compl. (Dkt. # 16) at 1.)
II. BACKGROUND
Earlier this year, Ms. Little filed a lawsuit against the State of Washington, the WSBA, the Seattle School District, the Clover Park School District, and other defendants, alleging that the defendants violated her rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. ( See Cause No. 11-0091GMK Compl. (Dkt. # 6).) The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relied can be granted, and gave Ms. Little leave to file an amended complaint. (Cause No. 11-0091GMK Opinion and Order (Dkt. # 18).) Rather than amending her complaint, Ms. Little voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit. (Cause No. 11-0091GMK Order of Dismissal (Dkt. # 21).)
Now Ms. Little brings a complaint against the Defendants alleging 18 different causes of action. ( See generally Compl.) Four of those causes of action — Count VIII for conversion, Count XI for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Count XII for hostile work environment, and Count XIII for failure to accommodate — were brought solely against the State and have now been dismissed with prejudice. The remaining fourteen causes of action are: (1) civil conspiracy against all Defendants; (2) fraud against the WSBA; (3) burglary against the Seattle School District and the WSBA; (4) attempted assault against the WSBA; (5) tortious interference against all Defendants; (6) violation of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"), RCW 19.86, et seq., against all Defendants; (7) breach of fiduciary duty and contract against the WSBA; (8) false representation, misrepresentation, and injurious falsehood against all Defendants; (9) violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution against the WSBA; (10) violation of privacy under the Washington State Constitution against the WSBA; (11) denial of equal protection against the WSBA; (12) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 contract claim against all Defendants; (13) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Seattle School District and the Clover Park School District; and (14) intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Seattle School District and the Clover Park School District. ( See generally Compl.)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss all of Ms. Little's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ( See Dkt. ## 20, 22, 27.) When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005). The court must accept all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Wyler Summit P'ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). The court, however, need not accept as true a legal conclusion presented as a factual allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' ... Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The court has carefully reviewed Ms. Little's complaint and has determined that each of her causes of action fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ms. Little's complaint is inadequate because (1) many counts are supported only by conclusory allegations that do not satisfy the pleading requirements set forth in Iqbal; and (2) other counts are supported by allegations that are so confusing that they do not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)'s requirement that a complaint contain a " short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). The court discusses below why each count is deficient and therefore must be dismissed. The court, however, grants Ms. Little leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of entry of this order.
Count I — Civil Conspiracy: Ms. Little alleges that Defendants entered into a conspiracy (Compl. ¶ 13), but does not allege specific factual allegations in support of this conclusion as required by Iqbal.
Count II — Fraud: The court is unable to understand the nature of Ms. Little's fraud claim against the WSBA. ( See Compl. ¶ 16-25.) Ms. Little makes allegations regarding alleged misrepresentations on the WSBA's website, alleges that the WSBA improperly operated as an Article III court, and alleges that the WSBA knew or should have known that having "attorney general involvement violated the principals of separation of powers." ( Id. ¶ 16-19.) Ms. Little makes further allegations regarding a "constitutional conflict of interest" that "hastened Little's disbarment proceedings." ( Id.¶ 20.) The complaint contains additional allegations related to Ms. Little's disbarment, but they do not appear to support a theory of fraud. ( See id. ¶ 23-25.) Because the court cannot understand Ms. Little's fraud allegations, the complaint does not contain a "short and plain statement" showing that she is entitled to relief as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).
Count III — Burglary: Ms. Little alleges that (1) she discovered that someone had broken into her car, removed everything from the glove box, and stacked it neatly on the passenger seat; (2) she was afraid that a bomb or tracking device has been placed in the car; and (3) her "mind immediately came to Seattle School District" and that she also suspected the WSBA. (Compl. ¶ 28-32.) These allegations do not create a reasonable inference that the Seattle School District or the WSBA were liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Count III - Attempted Assault: Ms. Little alleges that shortly after the WSBA voted to disbar her, two different men followed her home on two different occasions. (Compl. ¶ 35-36.) Such allegations are far from sufficient to state a claim for attempted assault against the WSBA.
There are two Count IIIs.
Count IV — Tortious Interference: Ms. Little alleges that Defendants and other entities and individuals "conspired to tortuously interfere[] with Little's contractual relation" with certain of her clients when she was an attorney. (Compl. ¶ 39, 49, 52, 63, 64, 76, 77.) She alleges further that "Clover Park School District played games from the beginning" and also filed a motion for summary judgment in a lawsuit that was filed against it by Ms. Little's client. ( Id. ¶ 42-43.) These conclusory allegations, without more, do not state a claim that any Defendant tortuously interfered with Ms. Little's contractual relationship with her clients. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also Cornish Coll. of the Arts v. 1000 Virginia Ltd. P'ship, 242 P.3d 1, 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) ("Exercising one's legal interests in good faith is not improper interference," as required to establish tortuous interference.).
Count V — Violation of the CPA: Ms. Little does not make any specific factual allegations related to this claim and instead "relies upon the facts delineated in Count Four." (Compl. ¶ 85.) Count IV, however, does not contain specific factual allegations sufficient to state a cause of action for violation of the CPA.
Count VI — Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Contract: Ms. Little alleges that the WSBA created a fiduciary relationship when it made membership in its organization mandatory and that the WSBA owes her consideration for the loss of her First Amendment right to freedom of association when it "impermissibly confiscate[ed] Little's law license." (Compl. ¶ 87, 89.) Ms. Little then goes on to allege, "Attorneys may have a fiduciary duty to nonplaintiff in order to establish this fiduciary duty with Little." ( Id. ¶ 88.) This sentence makes no sense. She next discusses the six-part test for when an attorney owes a duty to a nonclient, as set forth in Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080, 1084 (Wash. 1994). Even reading the complaint in the light most favorable to Ms. Little, the court cannot understand her claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the WSBA, nor does it grasp the relevance of the six-part test explained in Trask. Further, the court cannot determine the contract which Ms. Little alleges was breached. As such, her allegations do not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Count VII — False Representation, Misrepresentation, and Injurious Falsehood: Ms. Little sets forth the elements of these causes of action in her complaint and then states that she "relies on the facts and circumstances in every paragraph of this complaint for damages." (Compl. ¶ 96-99.) The complaint, however, lacks factual allegations against each Defendant that satisfies the elements of these causes of action, and therefore does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Count IX — Fourth Amendment Right Against Search and Seizure: Ms. Little alleges that the WSBA violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by opening up an investigation without probable cause to do so. (Compl. ¶ 104.) This bare assertion, without more, does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 8 or Iqbal.
Count X — Violation of Privacy Under the Washington Constitution: Ms. Little alleges that the WSBA violated her "right to privacy when it faxed a copy of the Complaint to anyone who inquired about her." (Compl. ¶ 107.) Ms. Little also alleges that Randy Beitel called her clients and expressed that Ms. Little was incompetent and invaded her privacy by asking personal information. ( Id. ¶ 108.) The court, however, cannot discern which "Complaint" Ms. Little refers to or who Ms. Beitel is and how the WSBA would be responsible for his alleged actions. Such allegations do not create a reasonable inference with the WSBA violated her privacy. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Count XIV — Denial of Equal Protection: Ms. Little brings her equal protection claim against the WSBA because the WSBA "has only white triers of fact." (Compl. ¶ 118.) Although there are additional factual allegations in the section, they are not relevant to establishing an equal protection claim against the WSBA. The allegation that the WSBA "has only white triers of fact" is not sufficient to state a claim for the denial of equal protection.
Count XIV - 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Contract Claim: Ms. Little alleges that Defendants have a history of racial discrimination and a history of preventing African Americans the right to make and enforce contracts, and that Defendants interfered with Ms. Little's rights to make and enforce contracts. (Compl. ¶ 123-124.) These allegations merely recite some of the elements of the cause of action, and is therefore insufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under Iqbal.
There are three Count XIVs in Ms. Little's complaint.
Count XIV — 42 U.S.C. § 1983: In the third Count XIV, Ms. Little alleges, "The State and the two municipal corporations maliciously used a legal process to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which it was not designated or intended, or which was not the legitimate purpose of the particular process employees." (Compl. ¶ 130.) Assuming that the "two municipal corporations" referred to in Count XIV are meant to refer to the Seattle School District and the Clover Park School District, such an allegation is insufficient to state a cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Count XV — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Ms. Little alleges that the Seattle School District and the Clover Park School District "intentionally and deliberately inflicted emotional distress" on Ms. Little by assisting in prosecuting Little, by abusing the lawful process for unlawful purpose, by violating Ms. Little's constitutional rights, by conspiring against Ms. Little, and/or by interfering with Ms. Little's state and federal civil rights by threats, coercion, or intimidation. (Compl. ¶ 132.) These conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action under Iqbal.
B. Ms. Little's Cross Motions Pursuant to Rule 11
In response to Defendants' motions to dismiss, Ms. Little filed three cross motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to dismiss with prejudice each Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Dkt. ## 33, 34, 36.) Ms. Little's motions assert that Defendants filed their motions to dismiss in order to harass her. (Dkt. # 33-1 at 14; Dkt. # 43-1 at 16; Dkt. # 36-1 at 14.) The court concludes, however, that Defendants' motions to dismiss satisfy the requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) and (b) and were not intended to harass Ms. Little. As such, Ms. Little is not entitled to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c), and the court denies her cross motions.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkt. ## 20, 22, 27), and DENIES Ms. Little's cross motions (Dkt. ## 33, 34, 36). The court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Little's complaint and GRANTS her 30 days from entry of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and the Supreme Court's pleading standards as set forth in Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.