Opinion
FA124023894S
01-26-2016
Renee Litt v. Jonathan Litt
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Michael E. Shay, Judge Trial Referee.
The plaintiff wife (" wife"), by the name of Renee Koblentz, and the defendant husband (" husband") were married in New York, New York, on December 13, 1997. They are the parents of three minor children, to wit: Dylan, age 15; Carly, age 13; and Chloe, age 10. At the time of the hearing, Attorney Louise Truax, the Guardian ad Litem, submitted to the court a Custody and Parenting Plan (#270.00) dated March 15, 2015, with an Addenda attached thereto dated October 22, 2015. Both parties were sworn and canvassed, and the court approved the Plan. The parties have lived separate and apart since the wife moved out of the family home in November 2013. The husband has continued to reside in the marital home at 71 Old Church Road, Greenwich, Connecticut.
The principal bone of contention revolves around the enforcement of a certain premarital agreement (Exhibit #28) which was executed by the parties in New York on December 8, 1997, five days prior to their wedding. The agreement itself was drafted by a mediator in New York. Among other things, the prenuptial agreement requires the husband to pay to the wife a lump sum not to exceed $2,500,000.00 " as soon as is practicable" after the happening of certain events, such as the filing for divorce. To date, he has not made the payment, but from time to time, the husband has made advances to the wife for which he seeks reimbursement. The wife has questioned the validity of certain of these claims as falling outside the ambit of the agreement. The court requested briefs by the parties regarding certain related legal issues.
The husband is 51 years old, and he is in apparent good health. He holds a B.A. from Columbia University (1987) and an MBA from New York University (1990). He began his career as a financial analyst and pension manager at Salomon Brothers, and later joined Citigroup. There he worked as a Managing Director and Senior Global Real Estate Equity Analyst. His team at Citi was consistently considered the " best analyst." Later, after leaving Citigroup, he founded Land & Buildings Capital Growth Fund, LP. He told the court that over the course of his career he had " evolved an investment strategy" which he described as " selective activism" and " concentrated portfolio." In connection with this fund, the husband formed Litt CCD Holdings, LLC, in which he holds an 80% interest, and No-Ah Trading, LLC, in which he holds a 73.3% interest. The husband also established a Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (" GRAT") from which he has received substantial payments. His net annual income according to his Financial Affidavit is $3,274,056.00. During the years 2013 through 2014, the husband's annual average adjusted gross income as reported on the joint federal income tax returns (Exhibits #21, #23, and #9) was $1,890,157.00. According to the wife's expert, the husband's total income for 2014 (the most recent last full year), including unrealized gains, was $3,701,270.00. He told the court that he works 60 to 80 hours per week, and it is clear from his testimony that the timing and amount of income withdrawn from his business is largely within his control.
The wife is 47 years old, and she described her health as " great." She holds a bachelor's degree, and she was employed at the time of the marriage. At present, she is a homemaker. The husband has paid her $30,000.00 per month pendente lite non-taxable alimony and child support per a written Stipulation (Exhibit #27) dated October 30, 2013, which was approved by the court. The husband reserved his right to claim that these payments are an offset against any obligation to pay spousal maintenance, which, under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, cannot exceed a lifetime cap of $1,250,000.00. The wife argues that the payments are for temporary support and are distinguishable from periodic spousal maintenance, and therefore cannot be used as an offset.
As set forth in separate schedules in the Prenuptial Agreement (Exhibit #28), each party brought assets to the marriage, the husband significantly more so. His schedule lists a variety of assets totaling $1,829,583.00, along with the disclosure of an anticipated bonus in the amount of $1,600,000.00 pre-tax. For her part, the wife disclosed a variety of assets totaling $57,248.00.
The major asset in contention is the husband's interest in Land & Buildings Investment Management, LLC, including related entities like Litt CCD Holdings, LLC, an investment holding firm in which he owns an 80% interest, an interest in No-Ah Trading LLC in which he owns a 73% stake, as well as future performance allocations The wife offered the testimony of an expert, Vladimir V. Korobov, as to value of the husband's various business other interests, as well as to determine his income for the year 2014 and the first seven months of 2015. Mr. Korobov gave very lucid and credible testimony, and the wife offered his report (Exhibit #2) in evidence. The witness found a fair market value of these interests to be $15,753,300.00. The husband did not offer an expert in this regard.
Aside from the husband's business, the principal family asset is the marital home at 71 Old Church Road, Greenwich, Connecticut. The real property was acquired in joint names in survivorship in November 2001, by means of a Warranty Deed. (Exhibit #31.) The parties filed a written Stipulation (#272.00) dated October 5, 2015, that the value of the real estate is $5,100,000.00. They further stipulated on the record that there is a current mortgage balance of $960,000.00. The wife contends that her undivided one-half interest was a gift to her. For his part, the husband contends that the home was paid for out of his earnings, and that as a marital asset, it is subject to the $2,500,000.00 cap. During the pendency of this action, the husband made certain improvements to the home, particularly with regard to the children's bedrooms.
Other assets include various bank and investment accounts, retirement accounts, cars, a boat, and household furnishings. Principal among these are several investments made as a result of the husband's previous employment, including Archipelago Partners, LP, Citigroup Capital Partners I, LP, Citigroup Employee Fund of Funds, LP, and one-half of the joint UBS Private Equity Fund, LLC, all totaling $260,000.00 according to Mr. Korobov's Report. In addition, he has a remaining Annuity payment from the Litt 2008 GRAT likewise valued by Mr. Korobov in the amount of $200,600.00.
As to the cause of the breakdown, the husband testified that when the wife admitted to a brief affair, that revelation was " devastating, " and that his " world fell apart." Nevertheless, he believes that, he was " not sure" of the cause of the breakdown, and " never thought about it." Although, he did tell the court that he believes that the marriage irretrievably broke down three to six months after the wife filed for divorce in 2012, he also claimed that the wife " checked out of the marriage" in 2008. For her part, the wife testified that the husband was " controlling" in all aspects of the marriage, but it was the prenuptial agreement that " hung like a dark cloud" over it, a constant reminder of the husband's lack of trust. She referred to it as " the onus of the pre-nup." The wife frequently raised this issue with her husband. It, in essence, smothered the relationship and snuffed out any real chance that the marriage would last long-term. She was remorseful about her affair, and she called it a " horrible scar." (Exhibit #44.) " You never give me gifts, " she once told her husband. On the occasion of the husband's 40th birthday, the wife asked him to " tear up" the agreement. His response: " That would be a poor decision." Although she told the court that she believed the marriage had broken down irretrievably as early as October 2011, nevertheless, she continued to work toward reconciliation. For his part, the husband was not shy about lavishing gifts on himself, like a new Tesla, which he acquired while the case was pending, and without the wife's consent. The parties tried marriage counseling three times, one of them (significantly) prior to the marriage regarding the negotiation and execution of the prenuptial agreement. The husband told her that he would not marry her without the agreement.
In his Answer, the husband has pled the existence of the prenuptial agreement, and the wife has pled ten special defenses by way of avoidance. While the court overuled the husband's objections to the special defenses in limine, nevertheless, during the course of the trial, the court has found that the testimony and evidence did not support said defenses, as set forth below in the discussion of the law. The trial took place over the course of five days, including final argument, which concluded on October 30, 2015. The court kept the evidence open for one week, until November 6, 2015, in order to give the husband's counsel an opportunity to review wife's attorney's affidavit of fees, at which time the evidence closed.
LAW
Enforceability of the Prenuptial Agreement
" A prenuptial agreement is subject to the same principles of contract interpretation as other contracts." Montoya v. Montoya, 91 Conn.App. 407, 415, 881 A.2d 319 (2005) [reversed in part on other grounds]. " A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage . . ." Creatura v. Creatura, 122 Conn.App. 47, 51-52, 998 A.2d 798 (2010) . Similarly, New York law provides that, " when interpreting a contract, such as the parties' antenuptial agreement, the document must be read as a whole to determine the parties' intent, giving practical interpretation to the language so employed so that the parties' reasonable expectations are realized." DelDuca v. DelDuca, 304 A.D.2d 610-11 [2d.Dept. 2003]. Moreover, there is no claim of " misrepresentation, fraud, or undue influence" in the choice of law. Elgar v. Elgar, 238 Conn. 839, 848, 679 A.2d 937 (1996). Absent proven facts, a court will not infer or presume fraud. On the contrary, an agreement is presumed valid in the absence of fraud. In the Matter of Sunshine, 51 A.D.2d 326, 327-28, 381 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976). Moreover, New York has a " strong public policy favoring individuals ordering and deciding their own interests through contractual arrangements." Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 97 N.Y.2d 188, 193, 764 N.E.2d 950, 738 N.Y.S.2d 650 (2001). In light of the foregoing principles, in reviewing the Agreement in question, this court has arrived at the conclusion that, read as a whole, except for the award of child support and some aspects of the award of alimony/spousal maintenance, it was the intention of the parties that New York domestic relations law would apply, and that there was no claim that the choice of law was arrived at through misrepresentation, fraud, or undue influence--quite the contrary. In fact, the parties had the benefit of counsel, as well as a mediator in arriving at the terms of their premarital agreement.
That being the case, Article 13, § 236 Dom. Rel., Part B.3., provides in relevant part, that an antenuptial agreement is, " valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action if such agreement is in writing, subscribed by the parties, and acknowledged or proven in a manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded, " and that, " provided such terms were fair and reasonable at the time of the making of the agreement and are not unconscionable at the time of the entry of the final judgment . . ." Accordingly, under all the circumstances, the court finds that the terms of the prenuptial agreement were fair and reasonable when executed and would not be unconscionable to enforce.
Alimony or Spousal Maintenance
The parties entered into a certain Prenuptial Agreement dated December 8, 1997, just a short time prior to exchanging their vows. The agreement was the culmination of a long, stressful process that included the services of a mediator. The agreement covered the definition of property, separate and marital, as well as the distribution of same. In general, the parties agreed that the agreement would be interpreted and enforced in accordance with New York law, in particular, the Domestic Relations Law. However, one glaring exception related to the determination of alimony (separate maintenance) and child support. As to the former, Article 7 (" Spousal Maintenance") states quite clearly that: " The parties make no provision herein for the payment of spousal maintenance, as that term is defined in Domestic Relations Law 236B in the event of an occurrence of an Event of Termination and leave such a determination to be resolved in accordance with the law of New York or such other jurisdiction that may have jurisdiction over the parties ." (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, with the filing of the present action, and the husband's appearance therein, the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Connecticut Superior Court. The only specific limitation, by agreement, is a lifetime cap on payments of " spousal maintenance" payable to the wife in the amount of $1,250,000.00. For purposes of this analysis, the court has treated the term " spousal maintenance" as the equivalent of " alimony." New York Domestic Relations Law § 236B(1)(a) refers to subsection (5)(a) thereof as " temporary maintenance, " and to subsection (6) thereof as " post-divorce maintenance." Aside from the obvious distinction, the common thread between the two forms of maintenance is that any such award, shall be " paid at fixed intervals for a definite or indefinite period of time, " and shall " terminate upon the death of either party or upon the recipient's valid or invalid marriage."
The issue of the cap is significant in that the husband has argued that he is entitled to an offset for any temporary alimony that he has paid pendente lite. He asks the court to lump both temporary and permanent spousal maintenance together, notwithstanding the fact that the Domestic Relations Law of New York itself draws a distinction between the two in separate sections. Similarly, Connecticut law, which applies to such awards, has long held that there is a clear distinction between pendente lite and permanent alimony as relates to their respective purposes. Wolk v. Wolk, 191 Conn. 328, 330-31, 464 A.2d 780 (1983). In making a determination under Connecticut law whether to award alimony or not, and in the event of such an award, its amount and duration, this court must consider the statutory factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82 . Nevertheless, where the parties have entered into a valid, enforceable agreement, which agreement limits either the term or amount of alimony, or both, absent a finding of unconscionability, the agreement should be enforced, notwithstanding the fact that some of the terms thereof may have been " provident or improvident" as regards to one or both of the parties. Crews v. Crews, 295 Conn. 153, 169, 989 A.2d 1060 and 172-73 (2008). In this case, the court finds that " maintenance" as used in the Prenuptial Agreement includes both temporary and permanent alimony.
Child Support
Likewise, Article 8 (" Child Support") of the Prenuptial Agreement clearly contemplated the provision of child support for the minor children. Like alimony, while no specific order was entered, it is clear that neither party could escape this obligation. Furthermore, without the specific obligation to calculate child support in accordance with New York law, it is the obligation of the Connecticut Superior Court to apply the Child Support Guidelines as well as the applicable statutes and case law of Connecticut. Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 94-95, 995 A.2d 1 (2010); Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 367, 999 A.2d 721 (2010); and Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 205-06, 61 A.3d 449 (2013). In fact, there is an affirmative duty placed upon the trial court in all cases to make a finding of the " presumptive support amount." Kiniry v. Kiniry, 299 Conn. 308, 319-20, 9 A.3d 708 (2010).
Complicating matters is the fact that the parties have entered into a shared custody arrangement, which was approved by the court at the time of the hearing, and there is a question as to whether or not to deviate from the Child Support Guidelines. In this instance, the matter is further complicated due to the fact that the combined net income of the parties far exceeds $4,000.00 per week. However, before considering a deviation, the court must first calculate the presumptive child support amount. McKeon v. Lennon, 155 Conn.App. 423, 448, 109 A.3d 986 (2015); Budrawich v. Budrawich, 132 Conn.App. 291, 298-01, 32 A.3d 328 (2011). Once that calculation is made, the court is in a position to determine whether or not it is appropriate to deviate from that amount based upon the " deviation criteria enumerated in the guidelines, as well as the statutory factors described in § 46b-84(d). Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 401-02, 72 A.3d 1 (2013).
During the pendency of this action, the parties entered into a written Stipulation (Exhibit #27) dated October 30, 2013, under which, among other things, the husband agreed to pay unallocated alimony and support to the wife on a pendente lite basis in the amount of $30,000.00 per month. A year earlier, by Stipulation (Exhibit #26) dated October 22, 2012, the husband agreed to pay the wife $9,000.00 per month for unallocated alimony and support. This issue was obviously on the minds of both parties as they both specifically reserved the question for trial. Another reason for making an initial child support determination is the fact that by definition, a portion of every unallocated alimony order is child support. Matles v. Matles, 8 Conn.App. 76, 79, 511 A.2d 363 (1986). Accordingly, in order to address the husband's claim for a credit, assuming that he is correct, it is necessary to make an initial determination of child support in order to calculate any potential offset.
Separate Property vs. Marital Property
The parties are also at odds over the status of the marital home at 71 Old Church Road in Greenwich, which was acquired in joint names by the parties during the marriage. The case of Fields v. Fields, 15 N.Y.3d 158, 931 N.E.2d 1039, 905 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2010), is instructive on several points, particularly in setting forth the template for a trial court to follow in arriving at an equitable division of the marital property. First and foremost, the court therein reiterated the fundamental premise that marriage is an " economic partnership, " and that " spouses have an equitable claim to things of value arising out of that relationship and classifies them as subject to distribution by focusing on the marital status of the parties at the time of acquisition." Fields v. Fields, supra 162. Secondly, citing Domestic Relations Law § 236B.1.c, it instructs the trial court to first make a determination of what is marital property, which it defines as " all property acquired by either spouses during marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held." Fields v. Fields, supra 161-62. Expressed another way, one could simply state that all property, as defined above, is marital property, unless it is " separate property, " which the Legislature went on to define in Domestic Relations Law § 236B.1.d.4, in relevant, part as: " property described as separate property by written agreement of the parties . . ." (Emphasis added.) Fields v. Fields, supra, 162. Finally, the court went on to hold that the question of what is " marital property should be construed broadly in order to give effect to the 'economic partnership' concept of the marriage, " and conversely, what is to be considered " separate property, " as an exception to that concept, " should be construed narrowly." Fields v. Fields, supra, 162-63.
The husband contends that the real property falls squarely within the definition of " Marital Property" as set forth in Article 3(a) of the Premarital Agreement, which provides in relevant part: " . . . except for Separate Property (defined below) Marital Property shall be deemed to be all property acquired by the parties, or by either of them during the marriage and until an Event of Termination . . ." More fully, New York domestic relations law provides that: " The term 'marital property' shall mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part [ dealing with pre and post-nuptial agreements ]. Marital property shall not include separate property as hereinafter defined ." Domestic Relations Law § 236B(1)(c) . (Emphasis added.)
For her part, the wife contends that her undivided one-half interest in the family home at 71 Old Church Road, Greenwich is separate property by virtue of the fact that it was a gift from her husband. She relies upon the phrase taken from the statutory definition of " marital property, " which states " except as otherwise provided in [the] agreement." She cites Article 10 of the Prenuptial Agreement which states clearly and unequivocally that: " Neither party intends . . . to limit or restrict his or her right to receive a voluntary transfer, conveyance, devise or bequest from the other." The term " gift" clearly falls within the plain meaning of the term " voluntary transfer." Furthermore, Article 3(b)(iii) of the Prenuptial Agreement defines separate property to include " inter-spousal gifts." That being the case, her argument goes, her undivided one-half interest in the property should not be included in the $2,500,000.00 cap. She cites several cases to support her argument, that in the case of the acquisition of real property in joint names during the marriage, the law presumes a gift by the husband to the wife. Hosford v. Hosford, 273 A.D. 659, 661, 80 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1948); Larsen v. Larsen, 54 A.D.2d 1073, 388 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1976); and Shapiro v. Shapiro, 208 A.D. 325, 326-27, 203 N.Y.S. 373 (1924) (" estate by the entirety").
The uncontroverted evidence supports a finding that the real property was acquired during the marriage prior to any " Event of Termination, " and that the monies used for the purchase were derived from the husband's earnings. Furthermore, the title to the property was taken in joint names with right of survivorship. In that context, the weight of the law favors a finding of an " economic partnership" which recognizes both the financial and non-financial contributions of each spouse, as articulated by the New York Court of Appeals as set forth in Fields v. Fields, 15 N.Y.3d 158, 161-62, 931 N.E.2d 1039, 905 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2010), and as such, the property should be treated as marital property. This reasoning is followed by more recent court decisions. Swett v. Swett, 89 A.D.3d 1560, 1561-62, 934 N.Y.S.2d 280. Moreover, " the party seeking to overcome such a presumption has the burden of proving that the property in dispute was separate property." Galachiuk v. Galachiuk, 262 A.D.2d 1026, 1027, 691 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1999). The wife has failed to meet that burden. Accordingly, under all the facts and circumstances, her undivided one-half interest in the real estate at 71 Old Church Road, Greenwich is marital property subject to division in accordance with the agreement of the parties.
However, in distributing the marital property equitably, it is not enough that the court simply consider contributions by the husband from his separate property. In fact, the court should consider the " economic and noneconomic contributions" of the parties to the marriage, as well as their parenting contributions. Fields v. Fields, supra, 168. Specifically, the court should consider the contribution of the wife as a homemaker, as well as any contribution as a wage earner. Richards v. Richards, 207 A.D.2d 628, 630, 615 N.Y.S.2d 784 (3d.Dept. 1994). In general, once the court makes a determination as to what is marital property, and what is the separate property of the respective parties, " marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties." Domestic Relations Law § 236B.5.c . In so doing, the court is to be guided by fourteen enumerated statutory factors. Domestic Relations Law § 236B.1.d . After a distributive share is awarded, it is incumbent upon the court to enumerate those factors that the court considered in arriving at the decision. Domestic Relations Law § 236B.5.g . However, by agreement, the parties have limited the wife's distributive share to a maximum of 1/3rd of the marital estate or $2,500,000.00, whichever is the lesser. Moreover, to date the husband has made certain advances toward equitable distribution, for which he is entitled to credit. In any event, the evidence is clear that the value of the marital estate is well in excess of $7,500,000.00.
Likewise, during the course of the marriage, other assets were acquired in joint names, including checking and savings accounts at Citibank, and an interest in No-Ah Trading, LLC. As to the latter, the husband testified that at some point, he bought out the wife's interest, so that interest is now in his name alone. For the foregoing reasons, each of the parties owns an undivided one-half interest in any joint Citibank accounts, which the court finds to be marital assets. As to the joint UBS Private Equity Fund, the court finds that each party has a one-half share which is separate property.
Breach of Contract and Attorneys Fees
Each party claims the other has breached the terms of the prenuptial agreement. The husband seeks damages, while the wife asserts the claim that in the event of a material breach, the agreement is unenforceable.
For his part, the husband claims that per Article 4(b)(i) of the Premarital Agreement, the wife has breached the agreement in that she contests the validity of the agreement and has sought relief that is " inconsistent" with its terms. As a result, he claims that he is entitled to reimbursement for attorneys fees by way of damages incurred in defending the wife's contest of portions of said agreement. While the parties agreed to be " bound by all of the terms of this Prenuptial Agreement, " this does neither foreclose a party in any way from making a good faith challenge to its enforcement, nor does it prevent a good faith argument as to the meaning of any portion thereof. It is well-settled law in both New York and in Connecticut, that a signatory has the right to challenge enforceability on the grounds of unconscionability, and any contract is subject to interpretation. His claim must, therefore, fail. General Statutes § 46b-36g .
Likewise, where the wife has asked the court to set aside the Premarital Agreement on the grounds that the husband has failed to fulfill a substantial obligation thereunder, she, too must fail. Specifically, she claims that the husband has failed to make a lump sum payment to her upon the occurrence of an " event of termination." In this case, the event being, the filing of an action to dissolve the marriage. The facts and circumstances militate against this course, in particular, as the language of the agreement leaves then actual timing of the payment somewhat up in the air, as it uses the phrase, " as soon as is practicable."
FINDINGS
The Court, having heard the testimony of both parties, and having considered the evidence presented at hearing, as well as, inter alia, the factors enumerated in General Statutes § § 46b-56, 46b-56a, 46b-56c, 46b-81, 46b-82, 46b-84, and 46b-215a, including the Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines Regulations, hereby makes the following findings.
1. That it has jurisdiction.
2. That the allegations of the complaint are proven and true.
3. That the marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably, and that ample evidence exists that while both parties have contributed in some fashion to said breakdown, the husband must bear the largest share of the blame.
4. That three children have been born to the wife since the date of the marriage, issue thereof, to wit: Dylan Litt, age 15; and Carly Litt, age 13; and Chloe Litt, age 10. No other children have been born to the wife during the marriage, and she is currently not expecting.
5. That during the marriage, neither party has received any aid or assistance from the State of Connecticut or any town or political subdivision thereof.
6. That the parties entered into a certain Custody and Parenting Plan (#270.00) dated March 15, 2015; that the parties executed an Addendum to said Plan dated October 22, 2015; that the court found the Plan as amended to be in the best interest of the minor children and approved same; and that said Plan is attached hereto and incorporated herein as " Schedule A."
7. That throughout the marriage, until their separation, both parties have each made significant contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of the family assets, including the real estate.
8. That while the court must consider the statutory factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82, it " may also consider any other factors which may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution." Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 743-44, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).
9. That the court is not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory criteria; and that, in addition to the other criteria, in entering its financial orders, the court has given significant weight inter alia to the ages of the parties, the length of the marriage, the subsequent birth of three children, the health of the parties, the estate and station of each party, and the ability of the respective parties to acquire capital assets and income in the future. Bleuer v. Bleuer, 59 Conn.App. 167, 172-73, 755 A.2d 946 (2000); McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 172, 440 A.2d 274 (1982).
10. That " the power to act equitably is the keystone to the court's ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances that arise out of the dissolution of a marriage. [citation omitted] These equitable powers give the court the authority to consider all the circumstances that may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute." Porter v. Porter, 61 Conn.App. 791, 797, 769 A.2d 725 (2001).
11. That in entering an order for child support, a court must consider both General Statutes § 46b-215b and the Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines Regulations (" Guidelines "), as well as the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-84, Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 90-92, 995 A.2d 1 (2010); and that alimony and child support orders must be based upon the net income of the parties. Morris v. Morris, 262 Conn. 299, 306, 811 A.2d 1283 (2003); Ludgin v. McGowan, 64 Conn.App. 355, 358, 780 A.2d 198 (2001).
12. That the net income of the husband is $3,274,056.00 per year ($62,963.00 per week); and that the net income of the wife is $0.00 per week.
13. That based upon the combined net weekly income of the parties, the presumptive minimum child support is $824.00 per week; that based upon the combined net weekly income of the parties, the presumptive maximum child support would be $12,921.00 per week ($62,963.00 x 20.61%); that based upon the needs of the children, as demonstrated by past and projected expenditures, taking into account the respective contributions of each to these needs, including private schooling, and the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-84(d), it is equitable and appropriate to apply a factor of 7.48% to the combined net income in excess of $4,000.00 per week for a total of $4,391.00 additional child support per week ($58,963.00 x 7.48%); that therefore the basic child support obligation of the parties is $5,215.00 per week ($824.00 + $4,391.00); and that the husband's obligation is $5,215.00 per week ($22,598.00 per month). Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 400-03, 72 A.3d 1 (2013).
14. That the parties have entered into a parenting arrangement that amounts to shared physical custody; that such arrangement both substantially reduces expenses for the children, for the parent with the lower net weekly income, and increases expenses for the children, for the parent with the higher net weekly income; that, however, insufficient funds would remain for the parent receiving support to meet the needs of the children after a deviation; and that it is equitable and appropriate not to deviate from the child support guidelines.
15. That pursuant to the Prenuptial Agreement of the parties, the husband is entitled to a credit toward a lifetime cap for " spousal maintenance" (alimony) paid to the wife to date; that from November 2013 through and including January 2016, a period of 27 months, the husband has paid a total of $810,000.00 of non-taxable, unallocated alimony and child support pendente lite ($30,000.00 x 27); that for that same period, the amount attributable to child support is $610,146.00 ($22,598.00 x 27); that the husband is entitled to a credit in the amount of $199,854.00 toward the lifetime cap on spousal maintenance for said period; that from October 2012 through and including October 2013, a period of 13 months, the husband has paid a total of $117,000.00 of non-taxable, unallocated alimony and child support pendente lite; that for that same period, the amount attributable to child support is $87,750.00 ($9,000.00 x .75 = $6,750.00 x 13); that the husband is entitled to a credit in the amount of $29,250.00 toward the lifetime cap on spousal maintenance for said period; and that the husband is entitled to a total credit of $229,104.00 toward the lifetime alimony cap.
16. That it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to each of the children for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact, in that in their proposed orders, the husband has requested that the court to retain jurisdiction to enter educational support orders in the future, and the wife has requested that the husband be responsible for such expenses, both pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c; and that the husband has set aside significant funds under his control for the benefit of the minor children.
17. That where time-limited alimony is awarded, there must be " sufficient evidence to support" the court's finding that it is appropriate. Wolfburg v. Wolfburg, 27 Conn.App. 396, 399, 606 A.2d 48 (1992); Marmo v. Marmo, 131 Conn.App. 43, 26 A.3d 652 (2011); and that taking into consideration the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82, including the age, health, education, property award hereunder, and prior work experience of the wife, in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, a time-limited award of alimony is appropriate. Ippolito v. Ippolito, 28 Conn.App. 745, 612 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 905, 615 A.2d 1047 (1992); Milbauer v. Milbauer, 54 Conn.App. 304, 312-15, 733 A.2d 907 (1999).
18. That the fair market value of the jointly-owned real property at 71 Old Church Road, Greenwich, Connecticut, is $5,100.00.00; that on November 15, 2001, the husband purchased same with his funds; that title was taken in joint names with right of survivorship (Exhibit #31); that the property is marital property; that there is a mortgage thereon having a present balance of approximately $960,000.00; and that the remaining equity in the real property is $4,140,000.00.
19. That the value of the husband's interest in Land & Buildings Capital Growth Fund, LP and related entities, including Litt CCD Holdings, LLC and No-Ah Trading, LLC, is $15,753,300.00; and that these entities are marital property.
20. That the Peter Beard photograph entitled " Cubs, " was a gift to the wife and is her separate property (TR. October 23, 2015 @ pp. 147-48); that other than unsupported estimated values of the remaining home furnishings and artwork in the possession of the respective parties, as set forth in their respective financial affidavits, no credible evidence was introduced as to the value or origin of same; that each party is currently in possession of certain of said items, and except as otherwise set forth herein, the court makes no orders concerning same. Rathblott v. Rathblott, 79 Conn.App. 812, 832 A.2d 90 (2003).
21. That the court finds that the wife's Morgan Stanley Roth IRA (XXX5-444) and her Morgan Stanley Investment Account (XXX4-444) are her separate property; and that the husband's Morgan Stanley Roth IRA (XXX7391) and Citi Pension are his separate property.
22. That the evidence supports a finding that the " marital property" is well in excess of $16,000,000; that the lesser of a cap of $2,500,000.00 and 1/3rd of the marital assets is the former; that pursuant to a Stipulation (Exhibit #27) by and between the parties dated October 30, 2013, the husband has paid to the wife the sum of $250,000.00 as and for an advance upon the final distribution of marital property; that the husband has advanced to the wife the additional sum of $50,000.00 pursuant to the Prenuptial Agreement (Exhibit #28); that the $100,000.00 payment to the wife at her request (Exhibit #44) was a gift and should be treated as her separate property; and that the husband is entitled to a credit in the amount of $300,000.00 against the $2,500,000.00 cap on the distribution of marital property.
23. That the husband has ample liquid assets to pay for his own legal fees and costs incurred herein; that the ability to pay the fees is not an " absolute litmus test" especially where the court finds that the use of that party's assets would " undermine" the purpose of the court's financial orders. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 190 Conn. 26, 29-30, 459 A.2d 498 (1983); that the court has reviewed the financial affidavit submitted by the attorney for the wife, and finds that under all the circumstances, to leave the wife with the obligation to pay the entirety of the balance of her expert fees incurred herein, would undermine the effect of the court's financial orders; and that the husband should contribute to same.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
1. The marriage of the parties is hereby dissolved, and they are each hereby declared to be single and unmarried.
2. The parties shall share joint custody of the minor children, and they shall exercise their parental responsibilities in accordance with a certain Custody and Parenting Plan (#270.00) dated March 15, 2105, and as amended by an Addendum dated October 22, 2015, attached hereto and incorporated herein as " Schedule A."
3. Commencing February 1, 2016, and monthly thereafter, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $12,500.00 as and for periodic alimony, until the death of either party, the remarriage of the wife, the entry into a civil union by her, January 31, 2024, or reaching the lifetime cap of $1,020,896.00 ($1,250,000.00 less $229,104.00), whichever shall sooner occur. It is the intention of the court that, except for the foregoing, that the term of periodic alimony shall be non-modifiable by either party. It is the further intention of this court that, except for the foregoing, the amount of alimony shall be non-modifiable by the husband where the sole basis for the modification is the annual gross earnings of wife of $50,000.00 or less .
4. Commencing February 1, 2016, and monthly thereafter, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $22,598.00 as and for child support, until such time as the oldest child shall reach the age of eighteen years, at which time child support for the remaining children shall be adjusted in accordance with the then existing Child Support Guidelines or as a Court may otherwise direct, and in like manner at such time as the next oldest child shall reach the age of eighteen years. The foregoing notwithstanding, if any child shall turn eighteen years old and is still in high school, then, in that event, the child support shall continue until the first day of next month following graduation from high school or their nineteenth birthday, whichever shall sooner occur, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-84(b) .
In addition thereto, the husband shall pay for the private school tuitions and related expenses, and, pursuant to Articles 1.2 and 2.13 of the Custody and Parenting Plan (" Schedule A"), all agreed upon extra-curricular activities for each child, including but not limited, to athletics, tutoring, summer camp, music and/or dance lessons. Thereafter, the parties shall share the cost of said expenses equally.
5. After the application of any scholarship funds or monies available through a § 529 plan set aside for the benefit of a particular child, the husband shall contribute to the necessary educational expenses of each of the four minor children in pursuit of a bachelor's degree or four full academic years of study toward same, whichever shall sooner occur, to include room, board, dues, tuition, fees, registration and application costs, as well as required text books and laboratory materials, and, in the absence of an agreement of the parties to exceed same, said expenses for each child shall not be more than the amount charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student. All payments shall be made directly to the institution. The foregoing notwithstanding, the obligation of the husband hereunder shall, in all events, cease when each child reaches the age of twenty-three years. The court hereby reserves jurisdiction to modify and/or enforce said educational support order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c .
6. As to the jointly-owned real estate at 71 Old Church Road, Greenwich, Connecticut, within thirty (30) days from the date hereof, the wife shall convey her interest therein to the husband by means of a fully-executed Quit Claim Deed along with completed Conveyance Tax Forms. Thereafter, the husband shall have exclusive possession of the real estate, subject to the existing indebtedness, and he shall be responsible for the payment of all mortgages, liens, taxes, and insurance, and shall indemnify and hold the wife harmless from any further liability thereunder. Likewise, within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum of Decision, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($2,200,000.00) DOLLARS. The husband shall use his best efforts to refinance the existing mortgage/home equity line and/or otherwise eliminate any obligations of the wife thereunder within one (1) year from the date of this Memorandum of Decision.
7. Personal property shall be divided as follows:
A. Except as otherwise set forth herein, the court makes no orders regarding the household furnishings and artwork currently in the possession of the respective parties.
B. Each party shall be entitled to keep the automobile which they are currently driving, subject to any existing liens, loans, or leases, free and clear of any claims by the other, and each party shall cooperate with the other regarding the execution of any documentation necessary to transfer and/or register same. Specifically, the wife is entitled to the 2003 Lexus LX470 and the 2006 GMC Yukon XL, and the husband shall be entitled to the Tesla.
C. Except as otherwise set forth herein, as separate property, each party shall be entitled to keep their respective savings, checking, money market, and investment accounts, as well as their pension and retirement accounts, free and clear of any claims by the other. The joint UBS Private Equity Fund shall be divided equally as of the date of this Memorandum of Decision.
D. The husband shall be entitled to retain the following items free and clear of any claims by the wife:
1) His clothing and personal effects, including his jewelry, watches, and rings.
2) The boat.
3) His interest in Litt CCD Holdings, LLC, and Land & Buildings Capital Growth Fund, LP, along with all related entities.
4) His interest in NoAh Trading, LLC.
5) Any remaining distributions from the GRAT.
6) His interest in CCP I and CEFOF.
E. The wife shall be entitled to retain the following items free and clear of any claims by the husband:
1) Her clothing and personal effects, including her jewelry, watches, and rings.
2) Her security deposit for 18 Osee Place, Cos Cob, CT.
3) Peter Beard photograph entitled " Cubs."
8. The husband shall promptly notify his employer as to the change of marital status and shall cooperate with the wife in obtaining continuation health insurance coverage as provided by state and federal law. The wife shall be responsible for the payment of any premiums due for such coverage.
9. The husband shall maintain and pay for health insurance for any minor child of the parties so long as he shall be obligated to pay child support for that child, including post-majority support pursuant to an educational support order or a written post-majority agreement. Unreimbursed medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, pharmaceutical, psychiatric, and psychological expenses for the minor child shall be divided by the parties, 80% by the husband and 20% by the wife. The provisions of General Statutes § 46b-84(e) shall apply.
10. Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-84(f), as and for security for his alimony and support obligations hereunder, the husband shall maintain the existing life insurance in the amount of $5,000,000.00, and shall name the wife and children equal beneficiaries thereof for so long as he has an obligation to pay alimony and child support under the terms of this decree. In the event that his alimony obligation hereunder ceases, for whatever reason, he shall name each child as the beneficiary in the amount $1,250,000.00 thereof for so long as he has an obligation to pay child support to that child under the terms of this decree. For purposes of the enforcement of this provision, a child support order shall include an educational support order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c or a written agreement of the parties for post-majority educational support.
11. Except as otherwise set forth herein, the parties shall each be responsible for the debts as shown on their respective financial affidavits, including the balance of any attorneys fees due and owing, and they shall indemnify and hold each other harmless from any further liability thereon. In particular, the husband shall be responsible for the outstanding balance owed to Meyers, Harrison & Pia as of October 2, 2015, and he shall pay same in full within thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum of Decision.
12. The wife shall be entitled to claim the personal exemption for each of the minor children commencing with the tax year 2016 and thereafter.
13. Except as otherwise set forth herein, each party shall be responsible for the outstanding balance of his or her own attorneys fees and costs incurred in connection with this action.
14. The Court hereby orders a Contingent Wage Withholding Order pursuant to General Statutes § 52-362(b) in order to secure the payment of the alimony/child support order.
15. There having been a contested hearing at which the financial orders were in dispute, the financial affidavits of the parties are hereby unsealed per P.B. § 25-59A (h) .
" SCHEDULE A"
CUSTODY AND PARENTING PLAN
WHEREAS, the Defendant, Jonathan Litt, (hereinafter referred to as the " Father") and the Plaintiff, Renee Litt, (hereinafter referred to as the " Mother") were married on Dec. 13, 1997;
WHEREAS, there are three minor children of the marriage to wit: Dylan Litt, Carly Litt and Chloe Litt;
WHEREAS, the Parties desire to enter into this Parenting Plan in order to accommodate the present best interests of the minor children;
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows:
ARTICLE ONE--CUSTODY
1.1 The parties shall share joint custody of their minor children.
1.2 " Joint legal custody" shall mean that the parties shall confer and agree upon all important matters pertaining to the children with a view towards arriving at a harmonious policy designed to promote the best interest of each child. Examples of important matters pertaining to the children include, but not limited to, issues affecting their mental and medical health, education, growth and development, after school and extracurricular activities, extent of travel away from home, choice of camp, psychotherapy, employment, and purchase of a motor vehicle. In the event that the parties have any dispute regarding major decisions, they shall first make reasonable efforts to resolve such disputes themselves. In the event that the parties are unable to agree, the court shall decide.
1.3 Day-to-day decisions of a routine nature, the parties shall try to agree and adopt a harmonious policy to be applied in both households including but not limited to, bedtime, homework, routine hygiene and day-to-day activities appropriate for the minor children's age and maturity. The Mother and the Father shall cooperate to establish a mutually agreeable policy regarding such day-to-day decisions, including providing each other with a list of outstanding items such as homework completion/project; pharmacy needs; clothing or equipment needs, and the like, so the parent receiving the children is up to date on their needs and progress. Both parents shall use best efforts to insure the children's homework due the next day is completed and all medication is taken when they are exercising their respective parenting time overnight.
ARTICLE TWO--PARENTING SCHEDULE
2.1 During the school year the children shall be with the Mother and Father as follows:
A. Week 1: With the Father from school dismissal on Monday through drop off at school on Wednesday, and with the Mother from school dismissal on Wednesday through drop off at school on Friday. The Father shall be with the children on Friday from dismissal from school through Tuesday drop off at school.
B. Week 2: With the Father until school drop off on Tuesday then with the Mother on Tuesday from school dismissal to Monday drop off at school.
C. For purposes of the drop offs and pickups, in the event school is not in session, they shall occur at noon.
D. On January 1 and July 1 of each year, the parties shall switch the weekend schedule so that the Husband will have the Wife's weekends for the next six months, and the Wife will have the Husband's weekends for the next six months.
2.2 During the children's summer school vacation the children shall be with the Father at the same times as during the school year, i.e. as per paragraph 2.1, except that each parent shall have the children for two one-week periods from Friday at 5 p.m. through the following Friday at 5 p.m. The weeks may be consecutive, however, they cannot be the same week as outlined in section 2.1A " Week 1" or 2.1B " Week 2." The Father shall notify the Mother, in writing, on or before April 1st of each year of which two one-week periods he will have the children. The Mother will notify the father, in writing, on or before May 1st of each year of which two one-week periods she will have the children. If the father fails to give written notice on or before April 1st, he may select his two one-week periods only after the Mother has selected hers and the periods selected by the Father shall not interfere with those selected by the Mother.
2.3 Holy days, holidays, and other vacations:
A. The parties shall alternate and divide the Jewish holy days as mutually agreed upon.
B. Other holidays:
I. Thanksgiving--The Mother in even numbered years and the Father in odd numbered years shall have the children from the close of school on the last school day before Thanksgiving until drop off at school on Monday morning. The Mother in odd numbered years and the Father in even numbered years shall have the children the week of Thanksgiving from Monday after school until Wednesday morning when the children are taken to school.
II. Christmas--Each year the Christmas break will be divided evenly between the Father and Mother by the number of days. In even-numbered years the Father shall spend first half of the Christmas break with the children beginning from the close of school on the last day before break begins until 6:30 p.m. on the evening of the Father's last vacation day with the children and the Mother shall spend the second half of the Christmas break with the children beginning at 6:30 p.m. on the Father's last day and ending on the day that school resumes. In odd-numbered years, the Mother shall spend first half of the Christmas break with the children beginning from the close of school on the last day before break begins until 6:30 p.m. on the evening of the Mother's last vacation day with the children and the Father shall spend the second half of the Christmas break with the children beginning at 6:30 p.m. on the Mother's last day and ending on the day that school resumes. For purposes of this paragraph " odd-numbered" or " even-numbered" shall be determined by the year in which Christmas occurs. If vacation is an odd number of nights, the extra night should go to the Mother in even years and the Father in odd years. Overnights include the night school lets out and up to the night before school resumes.
III. Spring Break--In the event there are two consecutive weeks of spring vacation, in odd-numbered years, the Mother shall have the children during the first week of the spring break from the close of school Friday, until the second following Saturday at 6:30 p.m. The Father shall have the children during the second week of spring break from the second Saturday at 6:30 p.m. until drop-off at school on Monday. In even-numbered years, the Father shall have the children during the first week of spring break from the close of school Friday until the second following Saturday at 6:30 p.m. The Mother shall have the children during the second week of spring break from the second Saturday at 6:30 p.m. until the drop off at school Monday.
In the event that the children's vacation schedule changes to a separate Winter and a Spring break, typically in February and April, the Mother will have the children during the Winter break in odd numbered years and Spring break in even numbered years, and the Father will have the children during Winter break in even numbered years and Spring break during odd numbered years from the time school lets out at the start of vacation until they are returned to school after vacation.
If one child has a different schedule then the other's Mother will have the child for the first half of that child's vacation and the Father will have the child for the second half of vacation. The number of vacation overnights will start on the day the child's vacation begins until the day they are returned to school. If the number of overnights is an odd number, the Mother will have the child for the extra night in odd-numbered years and the Father will have the child for the extra night in even numbered years.
If as a result of the foregoing one parent would have the children for three weekends in a row, the other parent who would not have holiday or vacation weekend, would get the first of the three weekends, or whoever's weekend is not associated with a vacation.
IV. Any three or four-day weekend holidays (including Martin Luther King, President's Day, Easter, Memorial Day, July 4th Weekend, Labor Day, and Columbus Day) shall fall to the parent who is with the children for that weekend, except that each parent shall have no less than three holiday weekends each year irrespective of on which parent's weekend the holiday may fall, which weekends shall be determined annual when the parties set the parenting schedule.
2.4 Birthdays, Other One Day Events
I. Children's birthdays--The parties shall jointly celebrate the children's birthdays with them.
II. Parent's birthday- Each parent shall spend 3 hours with the children on their respective birthdays from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m.
III. Mother's Day and Father's Day--Each parent shall spend their respective day with the children, from Sunday at 9:00 a.m. until drop off at school on the Monday following the day, when the regular parenting plan shall recommence.
IV. Halloween--The parties shall jointly take the children trick-or-treating.
2.5 In the event a holiday or vacation results in one parent having three consecutive weekends with the children, the parent who does not have the holiday or vacation weekend shall be with the children either on the first of the three consecutive weekends, or, if the first weekend is part of the holiday or vacation, the weekend which is not associated with the holiday or vacation.
2.6 Except for the balance of 2014 and 2015, on or before October 1, of each year, the parties shall establish the visitation schedule on a calendar for the following calendar year. For 2014 and 2015, a copy of the calendar is appended as Schedule A.
2.7 The Mother and Father shall jointly ask any school and camp either child attends to send notices with regard to meetings, activities, progress reports and other important information and each shall be listed as emergency contacts on all such forms. The parties shall jointly attend the designated camp visiting.
2.8 Both the Mother and Father shall have equal right to attend all public events and school-related activities when and where either child is participating, subject to the other provisions of this parenting plan. Both the Mother and Father shall have equal rights to attend all school conferences involving either child.
2.9 The Mother and Father shall each be entitled to complete and full information from any physician, dentist, mental health professional, consultant, social worker or specialist attending to either child's needs for any reason whatsoever, and shall be entitled to have copies of any records or reports from same.
2.10 Each of the parties agrees to keep the other informed of the minor children's general whereabouts while with the Husband or Wife, including the telephone number or cell phone number, and agrees that if either has knowledge of any illness or accident or other circumstances seriously affecting the health or welfare of either child, the Husband or Wife, as the case may be, will promptly notify the other.
2.11 To the fullest extent possible, the parties shall exert every reasonable effort to promote free access and unhampered contact between the children and each of the parties and to foster a feeling of affection between the children and the parties hereto. Each party shall exert his and her best efforts to refrain from doing anything to estrange the children from the other party, or to disparage the opinion of either child as to his or her mother or father, or to act in such a way as to hamper the free and natural development of love and respect between parent and child. Any and all major decisions affecting the general health, welfare education, guidance, or other aspect of the upbringing of the children shall be made with the participation and involvement of both parents.
2.12 The parties shall confer with each other on all important matters pertaining to the children's health, welfare, education and upbringing with a view toward arriving at a harmonious policy designed to promote the best interest of each child. The parties shall communicate in a responsive non-derogatory and non-threatening way regarding all non-emergency matters pertaining to the minor children.
2.13 The parties shall discuss and agree on recurrent activity enrollments for the children, medical appointments, and how forms are filled out for these activities and school prior to submitting any forms, signing a child up for a recurrent activity, or making a non-emergency medical appointment. If a parent does not respond within three (3) days of a request for an activity, then the parent who made the original request may act in accordance with the request and the other parent's non-answer shall be deemed an agreement to the request. If there is a disagreement over the activity, the provisions of paragraph 1.2 shall apply.
2.14 In the event a minor child is on a sailboat for one of the Father's offshore races, the Father shall ensure that such child has taken and passed the Safety at the Sea Class, that the child will wear a life vest, and that the child will be tethered on the deck after sunset or in the event of a storm. No child shall operate the Father's powerboat unless the Father is on the boat. All children shall wear life vests while on any boat, other than for long distance races, pursuant to U.S. Coast Guard guidelines.
ARTICLE THREE--MISCELLANEOUS
3.1 The Father shall return the children to the Mother's home at the end of his parenting times except when he returns them to school or to camp. The Mother shall return the children to the Father's home at the end of her parenting times except when she returns them to school or to camp.
3.2 Holiday and vacation time shall supersede the school year and summer school regular schedules.
3.3 Prior to either parent travelling outside of Connecticut or New York City for more than one overnight with the children that parent shall provide written notice to the other parent which notice shall include:
A. A detailed itinerary, including the name and address of each place where the children will spend each night;
B. Land-line telephone number(s), if applicable;
C. Airline name(s), flight numbers, and times of departure, if applicable;
D. Train name, number, and times of departure, if applicable; and
E. Cruise line, ship name, and times of departure, if applicable.
3.4 The Father and Mother shall maintain reasonable access and contact between the children and the other parent and each shall endeavor to foster a feeling of love and respect between the children and the other parent. Neither parent shall directly or indirectly attempt to estrange the children from the other parent or do anything that might impair the children's regard for the other parent or the other parent's family and spouse. Neither parent shall use the children as an intermediary for communication.
3.5 If either parent has any knowledge of any serious illness or accident or other circumstance affecting the health or welfare of the children, he or she shall promptly notify the other party and shall notify the other party about any subsequent changes in the children's condition.
3.6 If either parent will be away from the children overnight during any of the times they are to be with him or her, he or she shall notify the other, orally and by e-mail, as soon as he or she learns that will be the case. At the other parent's option, he or she may elect to have the children with him or her. Once that parent elects to exercise the right of first refusal, they shall be responsible to care for the children during that time, even if they are later unable to do so directly and the other parent is unable to care for the children during that time. If the other parent does not so elect, the parent with whom the children are scheduled to be shall remain responsible for child care.
3.7 Where emergent circumstances or unanticipated events or conflicts arise, the Mother and Father may agree temporarily to alter a provision of this Agreement by email. In no case shall any temporary alteration of or failure to complaint of or enforce a provision of the Agreement constitute a precedent for or concession to a modification of this agreement.
3.8 If a parent is traveling without the children, he or she shall notify the other parent about such out-of-town travel and provide a phone number where he or she may be reached in the event of an emergency.
3.9 Within three months of this stipulation becoming a court order, the parties shall meet with Dr. Spotts to discuss any issues regarding the children or parenting plan. Thereafter, the parties shall meet with Dr. Spotts on an annual basis for the same purposes. Any recommendations or suggestions by Dr. Spotts will not be binding on either party and will not be admissible in any court proceedings.
3.10 Neither party shall be entitled to makeup time.
3.11 Relocation: Shall be determined after a final resolution on the finances.
THE PLAINTIFF
THE DEFENDANT
RENEE LITT
JONATHAN LITT
GUARDIAN AD LITEM
LOUISE T. TRUAX
CUSTODY AND PARENTING PLAN ADDENDUM
1. The Parties entered into a Custody and Parenting Plan dated March 15, 2015.
2. Paragraph 2.2 concerns the summer vacation. The parties hereby amend paragraph 2.2 to add the following provision:
In the event either party desires to schedule his or her summer vacation to be the two consecutive weeks following the end of summer camp for the three minor children, the other parent shall have the three days immediately following the conclusion of summer camp with the children prior to the commencement of the consecutive two-week block of summer parenting time.
3. In all other respects the March 15, 2015 Custody and Parenting Plan shall remain unchanged.
THE PLAINTIFF
THE DEFENDANT
RENEE LITT
JONATHAN LITT
GUARDIAN AD LITEM
LOUISE T. TRUAX