Opinion
23-2471
08-14-2024
JEANETTE S.R. LIPINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. YESENIA CHAVEZ, et al., Defendants-Appellees
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Submitted August 14, 2024 [*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 19-cv-06154 Martha M. pacold, Judge.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
ORDER
Jeanette S.R. Lipinski appeals the district court's decision to grant the motion of defendants (two police officers from the Village of Burnham, Illinois, and the Village) in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the settlement of this case and dismiss it. The district court properly found that the parties agreed to settle and enforced that agreement by dismissing this case; thus we affirm.
The district court recruited Attorney Antonio Jeffrey to represent Lipinski. In December 2021, Jeffrey recommended to Lipinski over a text message that he demand $15,000 to settle the case. Lipinski replied "Ok! Still in rehabilitation. Thank you," but later asked him to demand more. The next month, Jeffrey and an opposing lawyer began to discuss settlement via email. On January 20, 2022, defense counsel offered $4,500 for a "full and complete settlement." Jeffrey replied with a demand of $13,500; defense counsel countered with $9,500; and Jeffrey returned with a $11,500 demand. On February 25, defense counsel replied, "We have a deal." The next day, Jeffrey confirmed to counsel that Lipinski had previously approved the deal, but he added that she was now giving "a little push back." The next week, after Jeffrey sent Lipinski paperwork reflecting the settlement, she told him over text message, "NO DEAL."
The Village and the officers sought to enforce the settlement. Shortly before they moved to enforce, Lipinski fired Jeffrey, the district court allowed him to withdraw, and it recruited new counsel for Lipinski. She then responded to the motion to enforce with a sworn statement that she never authorized Jeffrey to demand $11,500 and that the text exchange of December 2021 was the last time she discussed settlement with Jeffrey before he sent her the paperwork. The defendants replied with an affidavit from Jeffrey and attached his phone records. He asserted that during calls on January 11 and January 24, 2022, Lipinski authorized him to settle the case for any amount over $10,000. He also stated that during a phone call the day after defense counsel accepted the $11,500 demand, Lipinski "expressed hesitation regarding settlement" because she wanted the officers to lose their jobs and be arrested as part of a settlement. Lipinski's second attorney later moved to withdraw, the court granted the motion, and it declined to recruit another lawyer, so Lipinski proceeded pro se.
To resolve the competing narratives about the settlement, the court held an evidentiary hearing after which it granted the motion to enforce and dismissed the suit. Jeffrey testified consistently with his affidavit that Lipinski authorized him to settle the case for over $10,000. Lipinski at first denied giving him that authority, but then admitted that she did: "Just to get him off my-the subject, I agreed to the 10,000 just to shut him up." In granting the motion, the court applied Illinois law, reasoning that state law governs the enforcement of settlement agreements in federal court. Next, the court found that, as Illinois law requires, Jeffrey had express authority to settle the case for over $10,000. It found credible Jeffrey's testimony, corroborated with his phone records and Lipinski's concession, that Lipinski authorized the settlement and voiced no regret until after the case settled. Ruling that under Illinois law the settlement was enforceable, the court dismissed with prejudice the claims against the Village and the officers. This left only claims (under state law) against another defendant, a neighbor, who never appeared and thus defaulted. The court vacated the default, relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, and dismissed them without prejudice.
On appeal, Lipinski's opening brief does not engage with the district court's reasoning. Although Lipinski is pro se, she must comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure by including in her opening brief an argument explaining why the court's decision was incorrect. Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022). Lipinski's reply brief includes such an argument, but arguments raised for the first time in a reply are waived. See White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021). Still, we prefer to decide cases on their merits when we can, Atkins, 52 F.4th at 361, and overlooking her waiver, we are able to do so here.
We begin with the governing legal principles. First, we review for clear error a district court's findings about historical facts, Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 126 (2009), and de novo its conclusion that a settlement agreement existed and is enforceable, Beverly v. Abbott Lab'ys, 817 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2016). Also, as the district court explained, state law governs the enforcement of a settlement deal reached in federal court, id. at 333, and the relevant state law is from Illinois because negotiations all occurred there, see Sims-Madison v. Inland Paperboard and Packaging, Inc., 379 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2004). In Illinois, an attorney must have the client's express authority to settle a lawsuit. Magallanes v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 535 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Webster v. Hartman, 749 N.E.2d 958, 963 n.1 (Ill. 2001)). And a settlement is enforceable if supported by an offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds on its material terms. Dillard v. Starcon Intern., Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying Illinois law).
The district court did not clearly err by finding that Jeffrey had Lipinski's express authority to settle the case for any amount over $10,000. The record contains ample evidence of the finding: Jeffrey testified-and Lipinski confirmed-that Lipinski gave him that authority and that she voiced regret only after the deal for $11,500 was made.
Likewise, the district court properly enforced the settlement, and Lipinski's arguments for vacating the enforcement are unavailing. First, she argues that she rejected the settlement when Jeffrey sent her the paperwork and when she fired him. But those events happened after February 25, 2022, and by then the defense had already accepted Lipinski's authorized offer to settle the suit for $11,500 by replying on February 25 "We have a deal." This exchange reflects a meeting of the minds regarding an offer and acceptance of the essential terms of the suit's settlement, and thus it is an enforceable agreement under Illinois law. Second, Lipinski contends that she and Jeffrey never exchanged emails about settlement. But the absence of an email exchange is irrelevant because, as Jeffrey testified and the district court permissibly found, Lipinski authorized the settlement over the phone. Third, Lipinski insists that Jeffrey lied. But we must defer to the district court's credibility determinations, see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985), where, as here, Lipinski gives no compelling reason to overturn the court's amply supported determination.
Finally, the district court properly handled the state-law claims against the neighbor who defaulted by failing to appear. District courts may relinquish supplemental jurisdiction when they dismiss all the claims over which they have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). And we presume that they will do so when they dismiss all federal claims before trial. RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2012). Because the district court never entered a judgment against the neighbor, and it dismissed all federal claims before trial, the district court properly followed that practice here.
We have considered Lipinski's remaining arguments; none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED
[*]We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).