Opinion
Case No. 3:16-CV-492-NJR-GCS
08-13-2019
TITUS LINTON, Plaintiff, v. ANGELA CRAIN, Defendant.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION SISON, Magistrate Judge :
As limited by the Court's threshold order (Doc. 12), Plaintiff Titus Linton brings this pro se action against Defendant Angela Crain and alleges a single Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against her. Linton claims that Crain falsified statements about his medical care and failed to provide sufficient care commensurate to his medical needs. Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Crain (Doc. 45). The matter has been referred to the undersigned by Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and Local Rule 72.1(a)(2). For the reasons delineated below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court grant Defendant Crain's motion for summary judgment.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
Linton, who at all times relevant to this action was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), has a number of diagnosed medical conditions, including scleroderma, Raynaud's syndrome, eosinophilic esophagitis, rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn's disease, hypertension and proptosis. At his deposition, Linton testified that he has difficulty walking due to the scleroderma. (Doc. 46-1 p. 2-3). When he transferred to Menard from Pontiac Correctional Center in 2014, Linton was taking a number of prescription medications, and he used crutches at Pontiac. (Doc. 46-3, p. 1). According to his deposition, Linton was using a cane prior to his transfer, not crutches. (Doc. 46-1, p. 4).
Linton had a number of medical appointments throughout April 2014, and on April 15, 2014, was seen by a doctor, who issued him permits for a low bunk, low gallery, shower on gallery, slow walk, double cuff, feed-in cell, front cuff, and no yard. (Doc. 46-2). Linton was also given a special no-bean diet and was referred to see the medical director. (Doc. 46-3, p. 11-13). Linton saw Dr. Trost on May 16 and June 5, 2014.
On April 17, 2014, Linton filed a grievance complaining that Menard would not let him have an assistive device to help him walk. The medical records indicate that Defendant Crain, the nursing supervisor and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) coordinator at Menard, reviewed his medical records on June 13, 2014, in order to respond to the grievance. Crain wrote in the records, "[o]ffender to be scheduled with MD for assessment of medical need for crutch/cane or other assistive device for ADA." (Doc. 46-3, p. 25). Crain also sent Linton a memorandum stating, "I have received your grievance and reviewed the medical record and offer the following. I find that you have previously used a single crutch at the previous institution. I have scheduled you to see the physician for assessment of gait and questionable continued need for a crutch." (Doc. 46-4).
A counselor formally responded to the grievance on June 30, 2014, conveying the same information included in Crain's memo to Linton. (Doc. 46-5). On August 29, 2014, Linda Carter, a grievance officer, recommended denial of the grievance as moot because medical treatment is to be determined by medical professionals. She noted the permits issued to Linton, and wrote, "I am going to go over and see this guy today and talk with staff just to see exactly what it is that he is unable to do. I spoke with Dr. Trost and he does not feel like this inmate would fall under the ADA Standards because although his gait is slow and steady he is still able to ambulate. Dr. Trost did comment that as his disease process progresses he would probably benefit from a cane or crutch but does not feel that he is currently at that point." (Doc. 46-5). Kimberly Butler, in her role as Chief Administrative Officer, concurred in the decision to deny the grievance on September 8, 2014.
Linton testified at this deposition that he spoke to Crain while he was living in the hospital following a fight in November 2014. (Doc. 46-1, p. 8). He did not expound on the topics they spoke about. Linton also testified that he wrote Crain several times and continues to write to her because, at the time of his deposition, his wheelchair was broken. (Doc. 46-1, p. 8). As to the information in Carter's denial of his grievance, Linton maintains that he asked Dr. Trost if he said what was written on the grievance response form and that Dr. Trost denied it. He acknowledged that Crain never directly provided him with medical treatment. Linton also testified writing to Crain about a number of ADA issues at Menard unrelated to his deliberate indifference claim against Crain in this case. (Doc. 46-1, p. 12-15).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014)(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012). A genuine issue of material fact remains "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), "we set forth the facts by examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his] favor." Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2014).
B. Eight Amendment Deliberate Indifference
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, and the deliberate indifference to the "serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution." Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner is entitled to "reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm"—not to demand specific care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
In order to prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a prisoner who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge of constitutionally-deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part test. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011). The first consideration is whether the prisoner has an "objectively serious medical condition." Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. Accord Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). "A medical condition is objectively serious if a physician has diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson." Hammond v. Rector, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1084 (S.D. Ill. 2015)(citing Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)). It is not necessary for such a medical condition to "be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated." Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (violating the Eighth Amendment requires "deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm")(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Prevailing on the subjective prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate health. See Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. The plaintiff need not show the individual "literally ignored" his complaint, but that the individual was aware of the condition and either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). "Something more than negligence or even malpractice is required" to prove deliberate indifference. Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409. See also Hammond, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 1086 (noting that "isolated occurrences of deficient medical treatment are generally insufficient to establish . . . deliberate indifference"). Deliberate indifference involves "intentional or reckless conduct, not mere negligence." Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010)(citing Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Deliberate Indifference
Crain does not challenge that Linton has an objectively serious medical need. Instead, she challenges whether she was sufficiently involved in Linton's medical care to be liable for deliberate indifference and whether there is sufficient evidence that she knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Linton's health. Linton maintains that Crain caused a delay in his care because her actions slowed the time it took for him to see a physician, to receive medications and to receive an assistive device or wheelchair.
There is some evidence that Crain was aware of Linton's serious medical needs and the allegedly deficient medical care that Linton received through June 13, 2014. On that date, Crain reviewed Linton's medical records in order to assistant the counselor in responding to the April 2014 grievance. Crain sent Linton a memo regarding his past use of an assistive walking device and indicated that she scheduled Linton to see a doctor to assess his gait. The medical records reflect that Linton was scheduled to see a doctor on June 20, 2014, but the visit was rescheduled to June 27, 2014, by someone other than Crain. The June 27th appointment was rescheduled, as well, but there is no evidence that Crain was involved in that decision. Dr. Trost examined Linton on July 11, 2014 for what he charted as multiple medical, diet and disability issues, noting that he discussed Linton's disability issues with Assistant Warden Lashbrook.
Taken together, and despite some evidence that Crain was aware of Linton's medical needs, there is still insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Crain acted with deliberate indifference. The record reflects that Crain reviewed Linton's medical records on June 13, 2014, recognized a medical need and acted to address that need by scheduling an appointment for him to see a physician regarding his complaints. That was the extent of her personal involvement in his allegedly deficient medical treatment.
Only persons who cause or participate in an alleged constitutional deprivation are responsible under § 1983. See Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656-657. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). A defendant's liability depends on his or her "knowledge or actions, not on the knowledge or actions of persons they supervise." Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009). Crain cannot be held liable for alleged delays or problems with Linton's medical care and medications simply because she was a nurse supervisor. She can only be held liable as to a claim for inadequate medical care for the care in which she was personally involved. In this case, she was not a medical care provider for any appointments with Linton.
Linton focuses heavily on the August 2014 grievance response in his claims against Crain. He attributes the contents of the response to Crain and argues that she falsified information because she never came to see him. The problem with this line of argument is that Carter drafted the August 2014 grievance response. There is no evidence of Crain's involvement beyond mere conjecture. Crain's role in responding to the grievance was to review the medical records and to draft a memorandum to Linton. As he does not allege that the contents of her memorandum were inaccurate, there is no evidence that Crain falsified information as alleged in this action.
Outside of reviewing his medical records to draft the memorandum and non-treatment related conversations while Linton was housed in the medical unit, there is insufficient evidence of any involvement of Crain in Linton's medical care to substantiate a deliberate indifference claim. Linton testified that he sent her kites, but it's not clear that they related to his claims in this case that Crain falsified a grievance response and failed to treat his medical needs. Based on the foregoing, no reasonable juror could conclude that Crain acted with deliberate indifference by falsifying a grievance response and denying medical care as alleged in this action.
It is worth noting that this case brings a deliberate indifference claim against Crain and not a claim under the ADA for failure to accommodate, as ADA claims cannot be brought against individual defendants. See Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). To the extent that Linton complains that Crain failed to accommodate adequately a disability after the timeframe covered by the amended complaint, that claim is not properly before the Court.
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields "government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The doctrine "balances two important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Id. It protects an official from suit "when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted." Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
The qualified immunity test has two prongs: (1) whether the facts shown, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. See also Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 197; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Given the above conclusion that Crain's conduct did not violate a constitutional right, the undersigned recommends that the Court find that she is entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT Defendant Angela Crain's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 36), enter judgment in favor of Crain and against Plaintiff Titus Linton. In light of the recommendation to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Crain, it is further RECOMMENDED that the pending motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. 52) be DENIED as MOOT and that the Court close this case.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.1(b), the parties may object to any or all of the proposed dispositive findings in this Recommendation. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed on or before Friday, August 30, 2019.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 13, 2019.
/s/_________
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge