Opinion
CIVIL 23-00461 JMS-WRP
08-05-2024
JEFFREY S. LINDNER and MOLOAA FRUIT STAND, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. JASMINE FARAH, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT JASMINE FARAH
Wes Rebel Porter, United States Magistrate Judge.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT JASMINE FARAH
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant Jasmine Farah, filed on May 22, 2024 (Motion), ECF No. 17. The Court found the Motion suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule 7.1(c) of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. See Minute Order, dated 5/24/2024, ECF No. 18. The Court FINDS AND RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs' Motion be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as detailed below.
Within fourteen days after a party is served with the Findings and Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a party may file written objections in the United States District Court. A party must file any objections within the fourteen-day period to preserve appellate review of the Findings and Recommendation.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jeffrey Lindner, a Hawaii resident, is the sole member of Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand, LLC (Moloaa Fruit Stand), a Hawaii limited liability company. See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1, 2. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is a resident of California and a former employee of Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand. See id. ¶ 3.
Plaintiffs allege that in August 2023 and September 2023 Defendant posted several false and disparaging statements on the social media platform TikTok referencing Plaintiffs and directed to individuals in Hawaii. See id. ¶¶ 716, 19-20. As alleged in the Complaint, the five disparaging posts make false statements that Plaintiff Lindner, identified by Defendant as her “old boss at the smoothy bar at Moloaa Kauai,” was an abuser and was involved in human trafficking, sex trafficking, and child sex trafficking. See id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 14, 16, 1920. Plaintiffs also allege that in one of the posts, Defendant showed a photo of Plaintiff Lindner, identified him as the owner of Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand, and falsely claimed that Plaintiff Lindner was part of a child sex trafficking ring. See id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant continued to make these statements even after Plaintiffs' counsel sent her a cease-and-desist letter. See id. ¶¶ 18-20. As a result of these false and disparaging statements, Plaintiff Lindner has been injured both personally and professionally and Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand has been damaged in the form of lost revenue and property damage. See id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 15, 17, 21-22.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant on November 14, 2023, asserting a claim for defamation (libel and libel per se). See Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendant was personally served with the Summons and Complaint on January 3, 2024. See Proof of Service, ECF No. 9, at 2; see also Pls.' Suppl. Decl. in Support of Request for Default, ECF No. 13. The Clerk entered default against Defendant pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on February 20, 2024. See Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No. 15. The present Motion followed seeking default judgment against Defendant.
DISCUSSION
Default judgment may be entered if the defendant has defaulted by failing to appear and the plaintiff's claim is for a “sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(1), (2). The granting or denial of a motion for default judgment is within the discretion of the court. See Haw. Carpenters' Trust Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1986). Default judgments are ordinarily disfavored, and cases should be decided on their merits if reasonably possible. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986).
A. Jurisdiction
Before considering the merits of default judgment, the Court has an affirmative obligation to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To avoid entering a default judgment that can later be successfully attacked as void, a court should determine whether it has the power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.”).
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the Court has diversity subject matter jurisdiction. See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 4. Plaintiffs are residents of Hawaii. See Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. Although the Complaint alleges that Defendant is a resident of California, Defendant was personally served in Florida. See Pls.' Suppl. Decl. in Support of Request for Default, ECF No. 13, at 3. Although the record regarding Defendant's current place of residence is not entirely clear, there is no indication in the record that Defendant currently resides in Hawaii, which would prevent the Court from exercising diversity subject matter jurisdiction. For purposes of default, the Court accepts Plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations as true. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that on default “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). Because Plaintiffs are residents of Hawaii and Defendant is a resident of California and the alleged amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2); see also Maine Cmty. Health Options v. Albertsons Companies, Inc., 993 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 2021) (“In a diversity case originally filed in federal court, the sum claimed in the complaint controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”).
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction is proper if it is consistent with Hawaii's long arm statute, and it comports with due process of law. See Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2008). Because Hawaii's long arm statute reaches to the full extent permitted by the United States Constitution, the Court need only determine whether due process permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Television Events & Mktg., Inc. v. Amcon Distrib. Co., 416 F.Supp.2d 948, 958 (D. Haw. 2006) (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2004)); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634-35.
For due process to be satisfied, a defendant must have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the assertion of jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945)). Here, the Court must determine whether it has specific jurisdiction over Defendant. Specific jurisdiction exists if (a) the defendant has purposefully directed its action or consummated some transaction within the forum or otherwise purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum; (b) the claim arises out of or results from the defendant's forum related activities; and (c) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1021.
a. Purposeful Direction
First, to show purposeful direction, “the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendant intentionally posted five videos on social media specifically accusing Plaintiff Lindner, a Hawaii resident and Hawaii business owner, of engaging in abusive and criminal conduct in Hawaii. See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 7-20. Given that the accusations involved conduct by Plaintiff Lindner in Hawaii, and that Plaintiff Lindner resides in Hawaii and operates Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand in Hawaii, Defendant knew that any resultant harm would likely also take place in Hawaii. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant's contacts with Hawaii are sufficient to show purposeful direction. See Scofield v. Guillard, No. 3:22-CV-00521-REP, 2023 WL 7496739, at *7-8 (D. Idaho Nov. 13, 2023) (finding personal jurisdiction over a Texas resident who posted allegedly defamatory TikTok videos regarding an Idaho resident's actions in Idaho).
b. Claims Arise Out of Forum-Related Activities
Second, for specific personal jurisdiction, the claim asserted in the litigation must arise out of the defendant's forum-related activities. See Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs must show that they would not have been injured “but for” Defendant's conduct directed toward the forum. Id. Here, as noted above, Defendant's contacts with Hawaii are posting defamatory videos regarding Plaintiffs in Hawaii. If not for Defendant's conduct, Plaintiffs would not have been injured. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the second requirement for specific personal jurisdiction is met.
c. Reasonableness of Exercise of Jurisdiction
Finally, to satisfy due process, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be reasonable. See Menken, 503 F.3d at 1057 (citations omitted). To determine reasonableness, the Court must balance seven factors: “(i) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state's affairs; (ii) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (iii) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state; (iv) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (v) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (vi) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (vii) the existence of an alternative forum.” Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
Here, the Court finds that these factors weigh in favor of finding that the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant comports with the notions of fair play and substantial justice. First, the degree of Defendant's interjection weighs in favor of finding jurisdiction. Defendant's acts were aimed at Plaintiffs in Hawaii. She posted defamatory statements about Plaintiff Lindner and Plaintiff Lindner's business, Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand, in Hawaii knowing that this would likely injure Plaintiffs in Hawaii. Second, the burden on Defendant, a resident of California, to litigate in Hawaii is significant; however, the inconvenience is not so great as to deprive her of due process, particularly given Defendant's purposeful direction of her actions to Hawaii. See Caruth v. Int'l Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A defendant's burden in litigating in the forum is a factor in the assessment of reasonableness, but unless the inconvenience is so great as to constitute a deprivation of due process, it will not overcome clear justifications for the exercise of jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Third, there is no indication that the court's exercise of jurisdiction in Hawaii would conflict with the sovereignty of California. Fourth, Hawaii has a “strong interest in providing an effective means of redress for its residents who are tortiously injured.” Resnick v. Rowe, 283 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1141 (D. Haw. 2003) (quoting Miracle v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., 87 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1070 (D. Haw. 2000)). Because Plaintiffs are Hawaii residents, this factor weighs in favor of finding jurisdiction. Fifth, considering of the most efficient judicial resolution, witnesses and evidence are located in both Hawaii and California. This factor is neutral. Sixth, although it would be more costly and inconvenient for Plaintiffs to litigate in another forum, this factor is given little weight. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998). Seventh, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the unavailability of an alternative forum. See id. However, because Defendant has not come forward to request an alternative forum, this factor is neutral. Balancing these seven factors, the Court concludes that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant is reasonable.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the requirements for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction are satisfied. Because the Court has found that subject matter and personal jurisdiction are appropriate, the Court turns to default.
B. Default Judgment Factors
Following a determination that jurisdiction is proper, the Court must consider whether default judgment is appropriate. The court should consider the following factors in deciding whether to grant a motion for default judgment:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff;
(2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim;
(3) the sufficiency of the complaint;
(4) the sum of money at stake in the action;
(5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts;
(6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and
(7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.Id. at 1471-72 (the Eitel factors).
On default “the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18. The allegations as to liability are deemed true, but the plaintiff must establish the relief to which it is entitled. See Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). Also, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)).
1. The Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs
The first factor considers whether Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if default judgment is not entered. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, absent entry of default judgment, Plaintiffs would be without another recourse for recovery. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor favors default judgment.
2. Merits of Plaintiffs' Substantive Claims
For purposes of liability, the factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true on default. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18; Fair Hous. of Marin, 285 F.3d at 906. Here, the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint, taken as true, establish that Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment against Defendant.
Plaintiffs seek default judgment against Defendant for their claim of defamation. See Mot., ECF No. 17. To state a claim for defamation under Hawaii law, Plaintiffs must allege: “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.” Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp. in Hawaii, Ltd., 58 P.3d 1196, 1218 (Haw. 2002).
First, Plaintiffs assert that the following statements made by Defendant about Plaintiffs are false: that Plaintiff Lindner is part of human trafficking and sex trafficking ring in Hawaii, that Plaintiff Lindner was trying to lure girls who worked at Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand, that Plaintiff Lindner was abusing a “slave” in the sex trafficking ring, that Plaintiff Lindner was threatening the life and safety of Defendant's friend, that Plaintiff Lindner was part of a child sex trafficking ring, that Plaintiff Lindner sold women from his home, that Plaintiff Lindner was a manipulator and sexual abuser. See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 9-21. Second, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant knowingly published these false statements on a social media platform. See id. ¶ 24. Third, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant made these statements intentionally. See id. ¶ 27. Fourth, Plaintiffs assert, in the alternative, that Defendant's statements are defamation per se, and that Plaintiffs have suffered special damages. See id. ¶¶ 26, 29.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled defamation per se. Under Hawaii law, defamatory statements that “impute to a person the commission of a crime” and statements that “have a tendency to injure [Plaintiff] in his office, profession, calling or trade” or “which hold [Plaintiff] up to scorn and ridicule and to feelings of contempt or execration” are considered defamation per se. Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F.Supp. 906, 915 (D. Haw. 1993) (citing Butler v. United States, 365 F.Supp. 1035, 1044 (D. Haw. 1973)). The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged defamation per se because the statements made by Defendant impute Plaintiff Lindner with the commission of crimes including sexual assault, human trafficking, and child sex trafficking. See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 10-21. Additionally, Defendant's statements concern Plaintiff Lindner's ability to conduct his business at Moloaa Fruit Stand, including that Plaintiff Lindner tried to lure employees into a sex trafficking ring. See Id. ¶ 10. These statements impugn Plaintiff Lindner's business reputation as well as injure Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand's business reputation.
Even if the Court did not find that Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to establish that they are entitled to judgment against Defendant for defamation per se, the Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently pled special damages in the form of lost profits and property damage. See id. ¶ 29.
This factor weighs in favor of default judgment because the allegations in the Complaint, taken as true, are sufficient to establish Plaintiffs' claim for defamation.
3. Sufficiency of the Complaint
The allegations in the Complaint are sufficiently pled and supported by the documents filed with the Complaint and the Motion. The Court finds that the sufficiency of the Complaint weighs in favor of default judgment.
4. Sum of Money at Stake
The Court “must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177 (citing Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472).
Plaintiffs seek damages against Defendant in the amount of $70,029.92 in special damages, $50,000 in general damages, and $200,000 in punitive damages. See Mot., ECF No. 17 at 13-20. Although, as discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden regarding the specific amount of damages sought in their Motion, Plaintiffs' damages request is tailored to Defendant's specific wrongful conduct. The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor default judgment.
The Court notes that on one page of Plaintiffs' Motion they state that they are seeking $146,312 in special damages. See Mot., ECF No. 17, at 13. However, the discussion of the specific requested damages and the Declaration of Plaintiff Lindner in support of the requested damages reference the amount of $70,029.92 in special damages. See id. at 5, 15, and 20.
5. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts
The well-pled factual allegations of the Complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true. TeleVideo Sys., Inc., 826 F.2d at 917-18. Defendant has been given a fair opportunity to defend this action and has not done so. Because no dispute has been raised regarding Plaintiffs' material factual allegations, this factor favors default judgment.
6. Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect
The Court finds that Defendant's default was not the result of excusable neglect. Defendant's default was not the result of any excusable neglect, but rather due to her conscious and willful decision not to defend this action. Defendant failed to defend this action and default was entered against her. See Entry of Default, ECF No. 15. This factor too favors default judgment.
7. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits
Defendant's default renders a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible. Under Rule 55, “termination of a case before hearing the merits is allowed whenever a defendant fails to defend an action.” PepsiCo., Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“the mere existence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) indicates that the seventh Eitel factor is not alone dispositive”). Here, Defendant has failed to defend this action and has consequently rendered adjudication on the merits before this Court impracticable. This factor does not preclude the Court from entering default judgment against Defendant.
8. Totality of Eitel Factors
The Court finds that the totality of the Eitel factors weighs in favor of entering default judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and against Defendant.
C. Remedies
Although Defendant's default establishes liability, it does not establish all relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled. See Fair Hous. of Marin, 285 F.3d at 906. Plaintiffs must provide evidence to support their requested relief and that relief “must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c). “In determining damages, the court can rely on the declarations submitted by the plaintiff.” Philip Morris, 219 F.R.D. at 498. As noted above, Plaintiffs request that the Court award special damages, general damages, punitive damages, plus an award of prejudgment and post judgment interest. See Mot., ECF No. 17, at 13-20. Each category of requested relief is addressed below.
1. Special Damages
First, regarding special damages, Plaintiffs assert that they have suffered lost profits and property damage. See id. at 13. Based on the profit and loss statement for Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand, its monthly average net profits in the eight months following the publication of Defendant's defamatory statements decreased by $3,671.58, as compared to the thirteen months before. See Decl. of Pl. Lindner, ECF No. 17-1, ¶¶ 7-10 and Ex. B. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask the Court to award special damages in the amount of $66,529.92, which is total amount of lost profits from September 2023 through April 2024 ($44,353.34) plus anticipated future lost profits from May 2024 through August 2024 ($22,176.64). See Decl. of Pl. Lindner, ECF No. 17-1, ¶ 11; Mot., ECF No. 17, at 14-15. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have carried their burden in proving these special damages.
Calculated by adding the actual net loss that Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand generated in the eight months after Defendant's defamatory statements (loss of $36,863.02) plus projected lost profits based on the average monthly net profits from the year before Defendant posted her defamatory statements (loss of $936.29 in profits per month x 8 months = -$7,490.32), for a total of $44,353.34 in past lost profits.
Calculated by adding the average monthly net loss that Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand generated in the eight months after Defendant's defamatory statements (actual net loss of $36,863.02 x 8 months = $4,607.87), multiplied by four to account for losses through August 2024 ($4,607.87 x 4 = -$18,431.48), plus projected lost profits based on the average monthly net profits from the year before Defendant posted her defamatory statements (loss of $936.29 per month in profits x 4 months = -$3,745.16), for a total of $22,176.64 in anticipated future lost profits.
Additionally, Plaintiffs seek $3,500 “to repair or replace” vandalized property. See Mot., ECF No. 17, at 15. In support of this request, Plaintiff Lindner states Plaintiff Moloaa Fruit Stand's property was vandalized in September 2023 and that his “best estimate to repair the vandalism or have it replaced in $3,500.” See Pl. Lindner's Decl., ECF No. 17-1, ¶ 15 (stating property was “vandalized with terms like ‘predator,' ‘pedo,' and ‘abuser'”). Although Plaintiff Lindner's Declaration states that the property was “e.g. a large dumpster,” Plaintiffs do not state whether it was only the dumpster that was vandalized or whether other property was also vandalized. See id. Further, Plaintiffs do not state what would be required to repair the property versus replace the property and provide only Plaintiff Lindner's “best estimate” of $3,500 for either alternative. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in proving these requested special damages.
2. General Damages
Second, Plaintiffs request an award of general damages of $50,000 based on Plaintiff's Lindner's mental anguish and reputational harm caused by Defendant's defamatory posts that accused him of criminal acts including human trafficking involving adults and children. See Mot., ECF No. 17, at 15-16.
Plaintiff Lindner's declaration details that he received harassing text massages and calls about what Defendant posted on social media, that his reputation was harmed because he was forced to respond to hurtful questions from business colleagues, friends, and family, and that he was distraught, angry, and emotionally overwhelmed. See Pl. Lindner's Decl., ECF No. 17-1, ¶¶ 3, 4, 6.
In support of the requested amount of general damages, Plaintiffs cite to a 1995 case from Louisiana state court where the court reduced the amount of general damages awarded by a jury from $80,000 to $50,000 in a case involving defamatory statements that the plaintiff was a rapist. See Mot., ECF No. 17, at 16. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish a 2018 case from this court where the court awarded $10,000 in general damages on default involving defamatory statements arguing that the statements in that case were merely that the plaintiff was a thief “among other statements.” See id. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish that case. Notably, the “other statements” alluded to in Plaintiffs' Motion were that the plaintiff in that case was a sexual deviant, had criminal convictions for sex crimes, was a sexual predator, and had drugged his employees before sexually assaulting them. See Isaac v. Daniels, No. CV 1600507 DKW-RLP, 2018 WL 1903606, at *5 (D. Haw. Mar. 30, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 1902543 (D. Haw. Apr. 20, 2018). Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, given the similarity of the defamatory statements at issue, the Court finds this case persuasive as to the appropriate award of general damages. See also Olive v. Robinson, No. 2:18-CV-00862-BAT, 2019 WL 4748390, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2019) (awarding $10,000 in general damages on default involving statements that the plaintiff was a pervert, a sexual predator, and a manipulator). However, the Court finds that the nature of the defamatory statements at issue in this case are more egregious because they involve criminal acts against children. Given the nature of Defendant's statements, the fact that Defendant made five postings over a short period of time, the evidence presented by Plaintiffs, and the awards by other courts in similar cases, the Court finds that an award of $20,000 in general damages is appropriate.
3. Punitive Damages
Third, regarding Plaintiff's request for punitive damages, under Hawaii law, punitive damages are “assessed in addition to compensatory damages for the purpose of punishing the defendant for aggravated or outrageous misconduct and to deter the defendant and others from similar conduct in the future.” Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 570 (Haw. 1989). To warrant punitive damages, Plaintiffs “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has acted wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations, or where there has been some wilful misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.” Ass'n of Apt. Owners v. Venture 15, Inc., 167 P.3d 225, 290 (Haw. 2007) (quoting Masaki, 780 P.2d at 570). “[T]o justify an award of punitive damages, a positive element of conscious wrongdoing is always required[.] Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.” Valvanis v. Milgroom, No. CIV.06-00144JMS-KSC, 2009 WL 1561575, at *16 (D. Haw. June 1, 2009). The defendant's mental state is a primary focus of the inquiry in determining whether punitive damages are appropriate. See Masaki, 780 P.2d at 570.
Here, Plaintiffs have not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant has acted “wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations.” See id. To determine whether the award of punitive damages is appropriate, the Court primarily focuses on the defendant's mental state. Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are warranted because Defendant continued to post defamatory statements even after receiving a cease-and-desist letter from Plaintiffs' counsel. See Mot., ECF No. 17, at 18. The Court is not persuaded that this is sufficient “clear and convincing evidence” to “raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.” Masaki, 780 P.2d at 570. Although Defendant made one social media post after receiving the cease-and-desist letter from Plaintiffs' counsel, it appears that Defendant did not mention Plaintiff Lindner by name, referring to him as “Mr. You-Know-Who from Kaua‘i that I've been talking about” and it appears that Defendant did not repeat her prior defamatory statements, but rather merely stated that Plaintiffs were “guilty.” See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 20 (alleging that Defendant made statements referencing “Mr. You-Know-Who from Kaua‘i that I've been talking about” and “Fruit Stand Tr@fficking Kauai,” followed by a statement that Defendant received a letter “proving that they are guilty,” and that “there's too much evidence to prove that it's true and they're guilty”). Further, there is no evidence that Defendant made any additional social media posts containing false statements after September 19, 2023, and no evidence that the posts at issue remain publicly available. Further, Plaintiffs have not provided any authority that similar punitive damages have been awarded on default judgment in similar cases. See Mot., ECF No. 17, at 18-19. The only case cited by Plaintiffs is from Maryland. See id. (citing Harvey-Jones v. Coronel, 239 Md.App. 145, 158-60 (2018) (affirming a $200,000 punitive damages verdict following a hearing on damages after entry of default, because the defendant's failure to object to the plaintiff's requests for admissions permitted the court to infer that the defendant's net worth was over $1 million, and because there was evidence that during litigation, the defendant transferred a property worth $200,000). Further, Plaintiffs have not provided any information regarding Defendant's financial condition. See Isaac, 2018 WL 1903606, at *8 (citing Alutiiq Int'l Sols., LLC v. OIC Marianas Ins. Corp., 149 F.Supp.3d 1208, 1215 (D. Nev. 2016) (“When punitive damages are sought by default judgment, the court must have independent evidence to support the award because punitive-damages-worthy conduct alleged in a complaint is not regarded as admitted by default.”). Based on the circumstances of this case and the evidence presented by Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that punitive damages are appropriate in this action.
4. Interest
Finally, Plaintiffs request an award of prejudgment and post judgment interest. See Mot., ECF No. 17, at 19. Based on the facts of this case and the relevant statutory authority, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment beginning on August 20, 2023, through the date of entry of judgment and are entitled to post judgment interest from the date of entry of judgment. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 636-16; 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
In total, the Court recommends that the district court award $66,529.92 in special damages and $20,000 in general damages, plus prejudgment and post judgment interest.
CONCLUSION
The Court FINDS and RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
(1) The district court GRANT Plaintiffs' request for default judgment against Defendant Jasmine Farah; (2) The district court AWARD Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $66,529.92 in special damages, $20,000 in general damages, plus prejudgment and post judgment interest against Defendant Jasmine Farah; (3) The district court DENY Plaintiffs' request for punitive damages.
IT IS SO FOUND AND RECOMMENDED.