Opinion
6:23-cv-01061-GTS-TWD
10-16-2023
WILLIE LINDER, JR., Plaintiff, v. ONEIDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE ET AL., Defendants.
WILLIE LINDER, JR. Plaintiff, pro se
WILLIE LINDER, JR. Plaintiff, pro se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a complaint submitted by pro se plaintiff Willie Linder, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) alleging the Oneida County District Attorney's Office, Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Scott D. McNamara, ADA Grant Garramone, and ADA Todd Carville violated his civil rights. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Plaintiff, who at the time of filing, was in the custody of New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) at the Oneida County Correctional Facility, has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP application”). (Dkt. Nos. 2, 4.)
The Clerk sent the text order reopening Plaintiff's case (Dkt. No. 6) to Plaintiff's provided address at the Oneida County Correctional Facility via U.S. mail. On September 19, 2023, the text order was returned to the Clerk's Office as undeliverable. (Dkt. No. 7.) According to the DOCCS Incarcerated Lookup, Plaintiff was transferred to the Elmira Correctional Facility in Elmira, NY on September 8, 2023. See https://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/. The Court directs the Clerk to send this decision to Plaintiff (DIN # 23B3980) with a change of address form at Elmira Correctional Facility 1879 Davis St, Elmira, NY 14901 as a one-time courtesy. Plaintiff must complete and file the change of address form in order to continue receiving mail relating to this case.
Plaintiff filed his complaint and motion to proceed IFP on August 25, 2023. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) However, Plaintiff did not file the required inmate authorization form with his IFP application. By Order entered August 28, 2023, this case was administratively closed with an opportunity to comply with the filing fee requirement. (Dkt. No. 3.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed his inmate authorization form required in this District, and the Clerk reopened the matter and restored it to the Court's active docket. (Dkt. Nos. 5, 6.)
II. IFP APPLICATION
“28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No. 09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010). “Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Upon review, Plaintiff's IFP application demonstrates economic need. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 4.) He also re-filed the inmate authorization form required in this District. (Dkt. No. 5.) Because Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and has filed the inmate authorization form required in this District, he is granted permission to proceed IFP. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 4.)
III. BACKGROUND
On August 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 complaint form with an attachment detailing his claims. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff claims ADAs McNamara, Garramone, and Carville violated his Fourth Amendment rights “by malicious prosecution by alleging [his] unlawful pretrial detention and prosecution.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff further alleges the three prosecutors “have caused [him] continued confinement for a[n] assault crime [he] did not commit, and continued threats of charging [him] with other potential crimes to force [him] to plead to the assault charge.” Id. According to Plaintiff, “[n]o probable cause supported [his] original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution.” Id. Moreover, the prosecutors “acted with malice and racism” and Plaintiff “sustained and suffered damages as a result of his malicious prosecution” including “a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure.” Id. Plaintiff argues “[t]his entire criminal proceeding would [have] been resolved in [his] favor if [his] motions and due process wasn't terminated” and “[a] predicate constitutional violation [occurred] as a result of the proceedings.” Id.
Plaintiff then concludes he has “met all five elements” for his malicious prosecution claim and list them as follows:
1) All three defendants Scott D. McNamara, Grant Garramone, and Todd Carville cause me continued confinement and prosecution.
2) The original action was terminated in favor of my criminal defense.
3) No probable cause supported my original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution.
4) All three defendants acted with malice.
5) I sustained damage because of the defendants unlawful action.Id. at 10.
Plaintiff lists malicious prosecution as his one and only claim and requests punitive damages in the amount of $1,000,000 and “for all criminal charges to be dismissed.” Id. at 11.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The Court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action if the Court determines it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) “To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. Cty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993).
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
B. Oneida County District Attorney's Office
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks money damages against the Oneida County District Attorney's Office, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Best v. Brown, No. 19-CV-3724, 2019 WL 3067118, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim against the Office of the Queens County District Attorney as barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also D'Alessandro v. City of New York, 713 Fed.Appx. 1, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]f a district attorney or an assistant district attorney acts as a prosecutor, she is an agent of the state, and therefore immune from suit in her official capacity.”); Rich v. New York, No. 21-CV-3835, 2022 WL 992885, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“[A]ny claims Plaintiff may raise against the DA Defendants in their ‘official capacity' would be precluded by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”); Gentry v. New York, No. 21-CV-0319 (GTS/ML), 2021 WL 3037709, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant assistant district attorneys in their official capacities-which were effectively claims against the State of New York-as barred by the Eleventh Amendment) adopted by, 2021 WL 3032691 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2021).
C. ADAs McNamara, Garramone, and Carville
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue ADAs McNamara, Garramone, and Carville, these individuals are protected by prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors are immune from civil suit for damages in their individual capacities for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”). In addition, prosecutors are immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009).
In short, absolute prosecutorial immunity covers “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). This includes “the decision to bring charges against a defendant, presenting evidence to a grand jury, and the evaluation of evidence prior to trial.” Moye v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 316, 2012 WL 2569085, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Immunity even extends to the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses, the knowing use of perjured testimony, the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information, the making of false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings, and conspiring to present false evidence at a criminal trial. See Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991); Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994).
Moreover, “‘[w]hen prosecuting a criminal matter, a district attorney in New York State, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, represents the State not the county.'” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1014 (1989)); see also Rich, 2022 WL 992885, at *5 n.4 (“[A]ny claims Plaintiff may raise against the [District Attorney] Defendants in their ‘official capacity' would be precluded by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”); Gentry, 2021 WL 3037709, at *6 (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant assistant district attorneys in their official capacities-which were effectively claims against the State of New York-as barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
Plaintiff's threadbare allegations in the complaint do not clarify the context of his malicious prosecution claim. For instance, while it seems Plaintiff was arrested for assault, there are no details surrounding his arrest, the actual charge, or any probable cause relating to the charge. (Dkt. No. 1 at 9-10.) Moreover, Plaintiff claims “[t]his entire criminal proceeding would [have] been resolved in my favor if my motions and due process wasn't terminated” yet claims on the next page that “[t]he original action was terminated in favor of my criminal defense.” Id. at 9, 10. Nevertheless, Plaintiff appears to complain ADAs McNamara, Garramone, and Carville violated his Fourth Amendment right against malicious prosecution while performing their official duties as prosecutors. Simon, 727 F.3d at 171. Because Plaintiff's allegations against ADAs McNamara, Garramone, and Carville relate to non- investigative actions they have taken in their official capacities as prosecutors, they are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Simon, 727 F.3d at 171; see, e.g., Matthews v. Cty. of Cayuga, No. 5:17-CV-1004 (MAD/TWD), 2018 WL 2926272, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018) (dismissing claims against prosecutor on initial review because of prosecutorial immunity). Thus, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against ADAs McNamara, Garramone, and Carville fails as a matter of law.
Because the Defendants are protected by prosecutorial immunity, the Court does not find it necessary to discuss the merits of Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim.
Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against ADAs McNamara, Garramone, and Carville be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A.
WHEREFORE, for these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 4) is GRANTED, and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 1915A(b)(1); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.