Opinion
1:21-cv-01734-DAD-BAM
08-23-2022
CHONG SOOK LIM, Plaintiff, v. LISA A. MILLER, Ph.D., et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION (DOC. 8.)
BARBARA A. MCAULIFFE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff Chong Sook Lim (“Plaintiff'), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lisa A. Miller, Ph.D. and Does 1-53 on December 7, 2021. (Doc. 1.) On June 17, 2022, the Court screened Plaintiff's complaint and granted her leave to amend within thirty days. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed on August 16, 2022, is currently before the Court for screening. (Doc. 8.)
II. Screening Requirement and Standard
The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiffs allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
III. Summary of Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant Lisa A. Miller, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Miller specializes in child psychology and does not have the proper expertise to diagnose parents and report to the court.
In December 2019, Defendant Miller reported to the Tulare County Family Court that Plaintiff, the mother of minor child Yerin Lim, was “very dangerous as she exhibited symptoms of Munchausen By Proxy Syndrome (MBPS, Factitious Disorder on DSM-V)” (Doc. 8, First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), at p. 3.) Defendant Miller allegedly did not participate in any screening methods to evaluate or diagnose Plaintiff and there were no outstanding reports to support the diagnosis. Defendant Miller recommended that Plaintiff should only be permitted supervised visits with her minor child, of whom she had sole physical custody. Plaintiff contends that this caused damage to her household as a single mother and to her career as a preschool instructor. Plaintiff lost full custody and was permitted supervised visits with her minor child. Plaintiff also has been unable to find a job since 2019 due to Defendant Miller's allegedly false accusations. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff met with Defendant Miller three times, with Defendant Miller suggesting conjoint therapy on July 12, 2019. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Miller never requested the minor child's medical records for review when suspecting Plaintiff of MBPS. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant failed to meet with Plaintiff individually to assess if Plaintiff needed referral to an adult-specialized counselor, family or group counseling facilities, or to a psychiatrist.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Miller “openly shamed and foul-mothed the Plaintiff in front of her children, going as far as to emailing the Plaintiff's oldest daughter past midnight and threatening to take the Plaintiff, their mother, away from them if they did not “receive [her] help.” (FAC at p. 5.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Miller openly talked about the Plaintiff and shared false information with anyone who asked. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Miller does not understand the diagnostic criteria for MBPS or Factitious Disorder. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Miller was not aware of the change in 2013 from the term MBPS to Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another (FDIA) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder - V (“DSM-V”) and “did not describe the correct diagnostic criterion in her evaluation report to the court in December 2019.” (Id.)
Defendant Miller's actions reportedly have caused Plaintiff and her family to experience mental distress and trauma. Plaintiff and her oldest daughter regularly attend counseling sessions. Plaintiff alleges that they were ripped apart from their family members with Defendant Miller's allegedly irresponsible and unethical behaviors. Plaintiff visited a team of psychiatrists for three months after Defendant Miller's alleged misdiagnosis. Plaintiff has attended biweekly counseling sessions since 2019. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Miller never properly evaluated her, and Plaintiff was not diagnosed with either MBPS or FDIA by other mental health providers or psychiatrists. (Id. at pp. 5-6.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Miller reported to the family court from 2020 to 2022 that Plaintiff was not receiving counseling and was mentally unstable. Defendant Miller never made any contact with Plaintiff and only met regularly with the minor child. Defendant Miller has not had contact with the rest of Plaintiff's family since 2019. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Miller shared false information and false evaluations to the court “in retaliation to the Plaintiff's concerns about the Defendant's misdiagnosis and breach of confidentiality.” (FAC at p. 6.) Plaintiff claims that she has a right to complain about potential malpractice or potential wrongdoing by medical providers.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Miller refused to interview and properly evaluate Plaintiff upon request but continued to speculate about Plaintiff's mental condition and spread rumors about Plaintiff's personal life and comments made by the minor child about her parents. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Miller continued to spread false information about Plaintiff to the minor child, past patients, and personally texted Plaintiff's medical providers to bribe them into falsifying information about Plaintiff with her. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Miller neglected to review Plaintiff's medical records, breached confidentiality, and committed perjury in Tulare County Family Court. (Id. at p. 8.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Miller shared false information or sensitive details about Plaintiff's family with unrelated third parties who asked about the case and committed perjury to publicize her own biases and narratives about the Plaintiff. Defendant Miller allegedly threatened Plaintiff's oldest daughter that if Defendant Miller was not involved in the family's life, then Plaintiff would violently murder her own children, and that Plaintiff was not fit to be a healthy mother. Defendant Miller reportedly did not refer to state, federal, or universal code of ethics, laws, and regulations, and diagnostic criteria to evaluate Plaintiff, whose age and functioning was outside of her expertise. Plaintiff asserts that she lost her family and opportunities to advance her career because of Defendant Miller's actions.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant is not a licensed or certified court child custody evaluator. Defendant Miller was assigned by the family court judge to provide services to the minor child and to participate in the family's therapy sessions. Defendant Miller's duties were not to evaluate or make recommendations on the Plaintiff's child custody case. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Miller has used misdiagnosis, false information and heavy speculation about Plaintiff to manipulate court decisions. Defendant Miller also is alleged to have retaliated against Plaintiff when confronted with wrongdoing. (Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, along with injunctive relief, related to alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's actions violated Plaintiff's rights to privacy and familial association and her right to be free from judicial deception.
IV. Discussion
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.
Plaintiff's complaint is not a short and plain statement of her claims. It lacks basic factual information regarding what happened and when it happened. Plaintiff's repetitive and conclusory assertions are not sufficient. In evaluating whether a complaint states a claim for relief, the Court is not required to “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re GileadScis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The complaint must do more than allege “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has been unable to cure the Rule 8 deficiencies.
B. Lack of Jurisdiction
Plaintiff presents her claims as a civil rights action against Defendant Miller. However, to the extent Plaintiff's purpose in bringing this action is to seek modification of child custody orders or modification of the terms and conditions of visitation with her minor child, she may not do so. Federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims regarding child custody issues because they are exclusively matters of state law. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702-704 (1992) (holding that the domestic relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.”); see also Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.1983) (stating that “federal courts have uniformly held that they should not adjudicate cases involving domestic relations, including ‘the custody of minors and a fortiori, right of visitation.' For that matter, the whole subject of domestic relations and particularly child custody problems is generally considered a state law matter”). “Even when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters.” Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir.1986). In this circuit, federal courts refuse jurisdiction if the primary issue concerns child custody issues or the status of parent and child or husband and wife. See Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1987).
In Coats, the plaintiff invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged that her ex-husband and others involved in state court proceedings had wrongfully deprived her of custody of her children. 819 F.2d at 237. Defendants in the action included the plaintiff's former husband and his current wife, their attorney, the court-appointed attorney for the children, a court-appointed psychologist, two court commissioners, two superior court judges, the county, the police department, a school district, and an organization called United Fathers. Because the action at its core implicated domestic relations matters, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction.
Although the instant action does not seek direct adjudication of Plaintiff's parental rights or custody arrangements, the amended complaint, while raising constitutional issues, implicates, at its core, child custody and visitation issues.
C. Rooker-Feldman
Further, to the extent Plaintiff is challenging the orders of the state court regarding custody or visitation premised on Defendant Miller's reports or testimony, she may not do so. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the final determinations of state court dependency proceedings. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir.1986) (“The United States District Court ... has no authority to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.”). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005); see also Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims relating to child custody and supervised visitation, which presumably arise from state court orders, would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Walton v. Hopper, No. 2:22-cv-00453 JAM AC PS, 2022 WL 837268, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2022), (“Child custody and parental rights are quintessentially state law matters that are generally outside the purview of the federal court.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-0453 JAM AC PS, 2022 WL 1506096 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2022).
D. Immunity
“It has long been established that judges are absolutely immune from liability for acts ‘done in the exercise of their judicial functions.” Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The absolute immunity granted to judges has been extended to other public officials “who perform activities that are ‘functionally comparable' to those of judges.” Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)); Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984) (“All those who perform judge-like functions are immune from civil damages liability.”). “With respect to individuals who participate in the judicial process, federal courts have held that quasi-judicial immunity may extend to persons providing child protective services, social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists, therapists, and others.” Deluz v. The L. Off. of Frederick S. Cohen, No. CIV S-10-0809, 2011 WL 677914, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2011); see also Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.1984) (finding psychologist and two psychiatrists who examined child and whose findings were used by the courts to determine what environment best served the interests of the child entitled to immunity); Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 847-61 (1990) (ruling that absolute quasi-judicial immunity extended to independent psychologist who, pursuant to court order, performed evaluation and produced nonbinding report regarding a child custody and visitation dispute). Defendant Miller, as a court-assigned psychologist for the minor child, is similarly entitled to immunity, particularly related to her actions in providing reports and testimony to the court. Cf. Karkanen v. California, No. 17-CV-06967-YGR, 2018 WL 3820916, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2018 (concluding defendant immune for making custody recommendations as part of her duties as a family court mediator and custody recommending counselor).
E. Section 1983
Even if not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, Defendant Miller is not a proper defendant to the extent Plaintiff premises her claims on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). Generally, private parties do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). Indeed, the law presumes that conduct by private actors is not state action. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011). The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is whether the alleged infringement of federal rights is fairly attributable to the state. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); see also Huffman v. Cty. of L.A., 147 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a defendant must have acted “under color of law” to be held liable under § 1983). Simply put, § 1983 “excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts to establish that Defendant Miller was acting under color of state law, particularly with regard to alleged actions and conduct by Defendant Miller unrelated to therapy sessions, reports to the court or court testimony. Indeed, Plaintiff attempts to make clear that Defendant Miller was not a licensed or certified court child custody evaluator and was assigned only to provide services to the minor child and to participate in the family's therapy sessions.
F. State Law Claims
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert state law claims, the Court declines to screen them in the absence of a cognizable claim for relief under federal law, and will recommend that the district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the “district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). The Supreme Court has stated that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
V. Conclusion and Recommendation
Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, subject matter jurisdiction is inappropriate, seeks relief from a defendant immune from such relief and fails to state a cognizable claim under section 1983. Despite being provided with the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure these deficiencies and further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate's factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
IT IS SO ORDERED.