Opinion
C/A 1:21-4019-JD-SVH
07-19-2022
Rosa Alba Licon as Personal Representative of the Estate of Clemente Licon, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
A mother seeks money damages from the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”), alleging that her son was assaulted while in SCDC custody, resulting in his death on May 24, 2019. SCDC moves to dismiss this action, arguing that it is barred in part by the applicable statute of limitations and should otherwise be dismissed because SCDC is not subject to suit and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Rosa Alba Licon (“Plaintiff”), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Clemente Licon (“Decedent”), originally filed this matter in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina, on November 8, 2021. [ECF No. 1-1]. SCDC removed this case on December 13, 2021. This matter comes before the court on SCDC's motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 12].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f) (D.S.C.), this case has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended the court grant SCDC's motion to dismiss.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: (1) survival action pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-90, (2) wrongful death pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-10, and (3) violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges as follows:
On or about May 22, 2019, the Plaintiff's decedent was an inmate in the care and custody and confined to the Broad River Correctional Institution when he was assaulted and beaten brutally about the head and body in his cell until he was non-responsive. He was at some point dragged in a manner not appropriate to that of a human by guards and/or prison personnel through the prison after he was cruelly beaten and not protected by the Defendant's employees. Medical assistance was not immediately called. He was later taken by the Defendant to Prisma Health Baptist where he remained on life support non-responsive until May 24, 2019, when he was pronounced brain dead from blunt force trauma to the head.[ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 5]. Plaintiff clarifies in briefing that Decedent's death was caused by his cellmate while guards were in another dorm during the relevant period. [See ECF No. 15 at 2].
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244. Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support the legal conclusion.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
B. Analysis
1. Statute of Limitations
SCDC argues that Plaintiff's first two causes of action (for survival and wrongful death) are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, as Decedent died on May 24, 2019, and the instant suit was not brought until November 8, 2021.
Plaintiff's first two causes of action fall under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), which provides for a two-year statute of limitations. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(b) (stating the “remedy provided by [the SCTCA] is the exclusive civil remedy available for any tort committed by a governmental entity, its employees, or its agents except as provided in § 15-78-70(b).”). Plaintiff agrees [see ECF No. 15 at 5], but argues the two-year statute of limitations is tolled by a provision found in the South Carolina Probate Code.
The South Carolina Probate Code provides under article 3, “probate of wills and administration,” under part 8, “creditor's claims,” the following, entitled “statute of limitations”:
(a) Unless an estate is insolvent, the personal representative, with the consent of all successors whose interests would be affected, may waive any defense of limitations available to the estate. If the defense is not waived, no claim which was barred by any statute of limitations at the time of the decedent's death shall be allowed or paid.
(b) The running of any statute of limitations measured from some other event than death or the giving of notice to creditors is suspended during the eight months following the decedent's death but resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the sections which follow ....S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-802. The reporter's comment to this statute provides as follows: “This section provides for waiver of and the suspension of the running of any statute of limitations, measured from some event other than death and notice to creditors, during the eight months following the decedent's death, resuming thereafter.” See id.
This statute concerns claims made by creditors and is not applicable to the instant situation. A statute “must be read as a whole” and not in isolation, and sections which are part of the same general scheme must be construed together. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Inj. Fund, 611 S.E.2d 297, 302 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). Plaintiff has not cited, nor is the court aware of, case law applying this statute outside of a creditor-claim context. See Murray v. Est. of Murray, 871 S.E.2d 173, 179 (S.C. Ct. App. 2022) (applying S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-802 without discussion in the context of a creditor claim); see also Moore v. Smith, 7 S.E. 485, 487 (S.C. 1888) (finding a similar statute gave a creditor of an estate nine months in addition to the statutory period); Gaston v. Gaston, 61 S.E. 393, 396 (S.C. 1908) (finding a similar statute giving a creditor of an estate an additional 12 months in addition to the statutory period).
Because Plaintiff's survival action and wrongful death claims were not filed until November 8, 2021, they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See, e.g., Bayle v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 542 S.E.2d 736, 742 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding wrongful death and survival causes of action barred by the two-year statute of limitations that begins to run “on the date of loss regardless of whether the plaintiff knows the cause of the loss”). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant SCDC's motion to dismiss these claims.
2. Claims Brought Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.”
Here, SCDC does not qualify as “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Rivera v. Stirling, C/A No. 8:19-00718-JMC-JDA, 2019 WL 3070083, at *4 (D.S.C. June 11, 2019) (“SCDC is ‘a department, group of buildings, or a facility, and it is not considered a person subject to suit under .... § 1983.'”) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 8:19-00718-JMC, 2019 WL 3067488 (D.S.C. July 12, 2019).
Additionally, under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Unless a state has consented to suit or Congress has waived a state's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a state and its agencies may not be sued in federal or state court. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
Here, SCDC is an agency and an alter ego of the state of South Carolina. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-1-30. As a result, the Eleventh Amendment bars the action against SCDC. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66.
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing first that she can assert claims against SCDC pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to the Supreme Court's decision in Monell. [See ECF No. 15 at 6 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978))]. Plaintiff does not dispute that SCDC is a state agency, but appears to argue that Monell has expanded the definition of “person” to include state agencies like SCDC.
In Monell, the Supreme Court expressly overturned any limitation on municipal liability as held by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), stating that Congress intended for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to apply to “municipalities and other local government units.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. However, Plaintiff fails to argue, and the court cannot discern, what in Monell would indicate that SCDC should be characterized as a municipality or local government unit such that it would be characterized as a “person” for § 1983 purposes, or that Defendant would not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at 690 n. 54 (“Our holding today is, of course, limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.”). As a state agency, and not a local or municipal entity, SCDC is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983. See, e.g., Mays v. McMaster, C/A No. 4:20-2176-JFA-TER, 2020 WL 7647456, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2020) (“Since SCDC is an arm of the state, and not a political subdivision or municipality, theories of municipal liability discussed in Monell . . . have no application here”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 4:20-02176-JFA-TER, 2020 WL 7332905 (D.S.C. Dec. 14, 2020)).
Plaintiff additionally argues the SCTCA requires her to sue only SCDC and not SCDC employees. [See ECF No. 15 at 7]. However, the SCTCA does not govern the identity of parties subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff additionally argues that SCDC has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity via the SCTCA. Through enactment of the SCTCA, South Carolina has generally consented to suit for tort claims filed against it in state court. However, the SCTCA, by its terms, is not to be “construed as a waiver of the state's or political subdivision's immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States ....” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
Given the recommendation above, it is unnecessary to address the parties' further arguments as to whether Plaintiff has stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or whether qualified immunity should be applied in the instant case.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends granting SCDC's motion to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. [ECF No. 12].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).